The current refugee crisis is characterized by an unprecedented influx of people pre-dominantly from North Africa and the Middle East. The majority of illegally residing migrants in the EU entered the Single Market via international airports, holding valid travel documents and visa, and then simply overstayed the visa validity duration (Frontex, 2016 f). The following table and figure provide an overview of the major routes that have been used to enter the Single Market. The number of illegal crossings in the first half of 2016 and the registered nationalities per route are stated in the ta-ble, the geographical map describes the seven main routes of migratory flows based on Frontex statistics to facilitate an understanding of the current crisis and to provide a visual and quantitative overview of migratory movements.
6.3.1.3
6.3.2
6.3 Frontex – European Border Management
Listed Illegal Crossings by Route (January – July 2016)
No. Route (2016) Illegal Crossings Registered Nationalities
1 Eastern Borders 1,920 Vietnamese, Afghan, Ukrainian
2 Western Balkan 121,908 Not specified
3 Eastern Mediterranean 164,796 Syrian, Afghan, Iraqi
4 Apulia and Calabria
96,465 Nigerian, Eritrean, Gambian 5 Central Mediterranean
6 Western Mediterranean 3,402 Guinean, Ivorian, Cameroonian
7 Western African 330 Guinean, Ivorian, Cameroonian
Source: Frontex, Migratory Routes Map, 2016 f
Migratory Routes Map 2016
Source: Frontex, Migratory Routes Map, 2016 f, adopted by Dankert, 2016
The Eastern Borders Route covers 6,000 km of land borders between Belarus, Moldo-va, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Eastern member states. Although the num-ber of illegal crossings accounts for just 0.1% of the total, the states still struggle to secure their borders. The Arctic Route has developed in 2015 via Russia and Finland, and the borders still remain difficult to control (Frontex, 2016 g).
A 16-fold rise was registered in 2014 on the Western Balkan Route with a record number of 764,038 illegal border crossings. In order to reach Western Europe, the Tab. 6.2
Fig. 6.2
Union was entered in Greece, then continued in Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary. The unprecedented number of migrants led Hungary to build a fence, aiming to stop the continuous influx of people (Frontex, 2016 h). On the Eastern Mediterranean Route, 885,386 illegal border crossings were registered in 2015, which is 17 times the num-ber of 2014, a record year itself. In 2008, this route was used for 40% of all migrants arriving in the EU (Frontex, 2016 i). The popular Central Mediterranean Route re-mains under intense pressure with a well-established smuggler network in Libya, a collecting point for African migrants. Due to bilateral agreements between Italy and Libya, the flow of migrants was very low in 2009. The Arab Spring of 2011 renewed the rush and led to a record year 2014 with 170,760 illegal crossings (Frontex, 2016 j).
Although the Apulia and Calabria Route is not a major point of EU entry, the difficulty are travelers claiming to have lived in Greece for months or years before de-ciding to move within the Union. The decline in crossing numbers on this route is solely due to the migrant flow relocation via the overland Western Balkan Route (Frontex, 2016 k). The Western Mediterranean Route is characterized by fluctuating migrant numbers, also the likelihood of residence in Europe is increased through a departure from Libya, reached over land routes. 7,164 illegal migrants passed Europe’s external border in Spain in 2015 (Frontex, 2016 l).
Bilateral Agreements between Spain, Senegal and Mauritania improved the situa-tion on the West African Route through strengthened border controls. Characteristic of this route is the bad organization of smuggler networks that will eventually lead individuals to arrange the passage themselves (Frontex, 2016 m).
The possibilities of the EU to reduce and restrict migration are limited. Some re-searchers even state that it is impossible to limit migration or to effectively control migration. However, creating less favorable conditions for migrants, eliminating smuggler networks, or diplomatic endeavors to end the civil war in Syria, to actually reform the asylum system and to cooperate with nations of origin in order to remove causes of migration and allow readmission (Stern, 2015) might reduce the migration wave and separate those in need from forum shoppers and economic migrants. But the Union is devoted to the Geneva Convention: keeping migrants outside the
‘fortress Europe,’ as critics refer to the Union’s approach to limit the migratory influx, is no option for the EU. Adequate protection is legally guaranteed. There are several legal frameworks on Migration and Mobility like the GAMM Framework or the Khartoum Process (see Annex L: Selected Legal Frameworks on Migration and Mo-bility). Despite the desire to pursue common goals, the lack of binding effects of agreements between the Union and third-countries effectively cause an inability to change the status quo. The signatories’ implementation is mainly driven by individual national goals, which might contradict with the ones pursued by the EU. The volun-tary approach facilitates engagement and results in an increased likelihood of cooper-ation, yet improved change and active support are lacking.
Like the Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process is a promising initiative designed to create a dialogue on migration, but transparent communication is incessant. Both parties, the EU and African states, pursue different goals, which makes it hard to achieve a common goal, especially if the declaration does not create legal rights under
6.3 Frontex – European Border Management
international law. In order to retain its credibility, the EU must ensure to engage with third-nations, provided that human rights are maintained according to international standards. Aiming to abandon illegal migration, the initiative has to focus on estab-lishing concrete projects to allow legal migration. However, critics in scientific re-search argue that legal migration was not addressed strongly enough (Stern, 2015).