All Balkan governments are aware of the importance of the political criteria for acces-sion and are all committed to the goal of joining the EU. In principle, this is good news as the credibility of a country’s membership bid and willingness to undertake reform can only be maintained if commitment to the objective of integration is expressed in a national unified position and lasts over several legislative terms. The case of Croatia, and its National Committee for Monitoring the Accession Negotiations, demonstrates the benefits of rising above political squabbling and turning EU accession into a
‘na-In practice, however, what all too often gets in the way of real commitment to the demo-cratic agenda is the persistence of national sentiment, which tends to clash with sensi-tive and politically-charged conditions, like that of full cooperation with the ICTY (cf.
Croatia’s and Serbia’s difficulties in delivering key fugitive indicted war criminals), or that of reconciliation in the region (with positive initiatives in this field between the Croatian President Ivo Josipović and his former Serbian counterpart, President Boris Tadic, not really followed up). However, nationalism is increasingly articulated in a Eu-ropean and less exclusive context, as illustrated, for instance, by the fact that the current nationalistic Serbian President Nikolić has shown some willingness to talk and strike agreements with the Kosovo leadership.
A high degree of political polarisation, as witnessed between the two main political par-ties in Albania, as well as ethnic tensions, particularly salient in the case of FYROM, are further factors that impair the ability of Balkan politicians to meet the political con-ditionality for accession, and thus to consolidate and complete their countries’ demo-cratic transition. Finally, unresolved status and border issues, most notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Serbia-Kosovo, represent a further major challenge in carrying out the necessary reforms for democratisation and EU integration.
The EU-government dynamics have a direct impact on public opinion regarding en-largement in the Balkans. Over the years, the popularity of the EU has been declining.
This is to be expected as integration moves from a general aspiration to the level of spe-cific experience; the same happened in Central Europe. While this may reflect increased awareness and understanding that entry into the EU also entails costs and obligations, the lack of popular backing could also restrain the preferences of decision-makers for integration, making it difficult for the pro-European elites in the region to press for-ward and implement the democratic reforms for accession.
PROSPECTS
At the heart of the solution is support for the full democratic transformation of the Balkans by building congruence between political elites and the people. The linear read-ing of democratisation – which presumed a cumulative and irreversible progression of democracy from transition to consolidation – was already called into question by recent events which threatened the EU’s democratic principles and values both in the young and old member states [Rupnik, 2007]. The best pre-emptive strategy in this regard is to strengthen the substantive aspects of democracy in the Balkans, including civil society, parliaments and the media.
Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat
Balkan politicians and societies need to be fully aware of the crucial importance of achieving effective democracy. Those in power need to take ownership of the reform agenda and act responsibly, implementing policies that coincide with and respond to the needs of their electorates. Likewise, CSOs in the region need to hold their leaders ac-countable for specific policy outcomes and to demand that they respect formally-spec-ified democratic rights and standards. Also, civil society actors in the Balkans need to work towards consolidating their organisations and boosting cooperation on or across projects, thereby avoiding the duplication of efforts and ensuring financial sustainabil-ity at a time of growing competition for diminishing resources.
The effective democratisation of the region is also in the EU’s strategic interest and power of action. For instance, the Union can help to build social capital in the region by providing education, mobility and training to improve CSOs’ professionalism; reform-ing the structure and distribution of fundreform-ing in the (pre-)accession phases of integra-tion; and pushing for the adoption of legal frameworks that detail the standards for government-CSOs consultation and which allow civil society to operate freely in the (early stages of the) formulation and implementation of decisions. These issues should be incorporated into the acquis and treated like any other formal requirement. More-over, the EU could do more to address the ‘executive bias’ of its accession process by demanding and supporting the involvement and input of crucial democratic actors, such as national parliaments, local authorities, the media, and CSOs from the Balkans in their country’s membership effort. The participation of the civil society sector in Montenegro’s accession negotiations could serve as a positive example to build on and emulate across the region.
Make no mistake: the effective democratisation of the Balkans is the best investment that these countries and the EU can make for the future.