EU AND PARTY COMPETITION IN SERBIA

At the 2008 elections, the main competing political parties – the DS headed by Boris Tadić and the SRS, at that time led by Tomislav Nikolić – managed to split public opinion on the issue of Serbia’s membership to the EU. The DS (part of the coalition “For the European Serbia – Boris Tadić”) campaigned for further EU integration, while the SRS mostly avoided the topic, or touched upon it in negative contexts, implying that the European Union sought to take Kosovo away from Serbia.

During the 2008 campaign, Javier Solana, in his capacity of EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, stated that the people of Serbia should use the elections as an opportunity to show they were in favour of European integration, as – according to him – there was no better way than through EU membership to secure the country’s future. Prompted by journalists to say whether a potential victory of the Serbian Radical Party would lead Serbia into political

221 See videos at http://bit.ly/1bLd1UU, http://bit.ly/M37KP4, last accessed on: 26 January 2014.

222 See the articles and texts published on Pescanik.net portal, that inspired one of the liveliest debates in the 2012 elections, available at: http://bit.ly/1o8mQ4z, and the blog especially dedicated to the blank vote, available at:

http://bit.ly/1da39F8, last accessed on: 26 January 2014.

223 See more on the results of the survey at http://bit.ly/1bhACi9, last accessed on: 26 November 2013.

isolation, Solana asserted that such a scenario would be highly unfortunate: “I love Serbia very much, although it is prone to looking backward instead of forward […] [w]e have to do everything in order to create the sense among the people in Serbia that we want them as close to us as possible. I want to go to sleep in the evening of 10 May with a peaceful conscience that we did all we could, and not to wake up on 12 May and realise that we could have done more... One of the things we could do, in spite of the difficulties we have, is to sign the SAA with Serbia.”²²⁴

Solana’s words were interpreted in the country as lending support to the coalition “For a European Serbia” and to Boris Tadić. In response to Solana’s declaration, the SRS issued a press release stating that such statement meant that Solana would “help and underpin with all means necessary those political forces in Serbia that support the dismemberment of the Serbian state... Those who are taking away Kosovo from Serbia today attempt to secure the election victory for those in Serbia who would recognise the independence of Kosovo and work on the further destruction of Serbia.”²²⁵ In addition to the heated campaign atmosphere, there was also a widely-shared feeling during the 2008 elections that the participation of parties from the opposition camp in the new government would not please much the EU, and might not bode well for the country’s European ambitions. The opposition parties did little to assuage people’s concerns on this issue, or to promote themselves as reliable partners through contacts with top EU officials.

In fact, the topic of Serbia’s European integration was generally not properly analysed or debated by the main political parties, either in terms of the progress made or outstanding challenges. Instead,

‘Europe’ was presented to voters as a rather symbolical and ideological aspiration, which citizens could either embrace or reject. For example, Tadić claimed that only his victory and the overall success of the coalition “For a European Serbia” could secure the country’s prospects but steered clear of listing concrete implications.

Serbia received candidate status in March 2012, during the mandate of the DS-led government, after the country successfully delivered in 2011 on the condition of full cooperation with the ICTY and signalled that it was ready to play a constructive role also in the EU-sponsored dialogue aimed at the normalisation relations with Kosovo. However, the DS failed to capitalise on this success in the campaign for the 2012 elections, and the SNS emerged victorious in the polls. Two main reasons can explain this outcome.

First, unlike in the 2008 campaign, the main opposition party – the SNS – abandoned the anti-EU discourse and entered the electoral race by expressing commitment to Serbia’s EU membership goal.

For instance, Nikolić and Vučić set up numerous meetings with EU officials ahead of the elections, seeking to demonstrate their European credentials.²²⁶ Second, with the question of whether or not Serbia should join the EU settled among all main political competitors, the focus of the campaign moved away from symbolic issues towards more ‘bread-and-butter’ concerns, like unemployment and the overall economic downturn, ²²⁷ or the pace of political and economic reforms.

224 The address of Javier Solana to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, on 8 April 2008, available at:

http://bit.ly/1ey2TP6, last accessed on: 26 November 2013.

225 SRS press release of 8 April 2008, available at: http://bit.ly/1ey2TP6, last accessed on: 26 November 2013.

226 See some of the titles: “Tomislav Nikolić is not unwanted in Brussels”, Telegraf, 5 March 2012, available at:

http://bit.ly/Irw8Yd, “Timislav Nikolić: I did not hear the request to recognise Kosovo in Brussels, Washington and London”, NSPM portal, 16 April 2012, available at http://bit.ly/IhjfjC, or “Kacin: EU will accept the results of Serbian elections”, RTV, 29 April 2012, available at: http://bit.ly/18FC62l, last accessed on: 26 November 2013.

227 Serbia was severely hit by the global economic crisis, experiencing a double-dip recession, the growth of unemployment and public debt, and high inflation rates. In 2009, the GDP contracted 3.5%, followed by GDP growth of 1% and 1.8% in 2010 and 2011 respectively, and the recession returned in 2012 with the GDP contraction of 0.5%. The unemployment

Looking back at Serbia’s journey towards the European Union, and the efforts of the various Serbian governments in advancing on the path of integration, several trends become obvious. First, the main obstacles in the process of Serbia’s accession to the EU were the condition of full cooperation with the ICTY and the Kosovo issue. Second, of all six Serbian governments in the post-Milošević era, only the one dominated by Boris Tadić (2008-2012) and the subsequent Nikolić government demonstrated genuine commitment to the European integration agenda. Both of Koštunica’s governments (2004-2007 and 2007-2008) essentially gave up on the goal of Serbia’s EU membership due to the political conditionality for accession. In addition, although the credit/merit for the country’s strategic political re-orientation towards ‘Europe’ belongs to the governments led by the first democratic Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Đinđić, and his successor, Zoran Živković, their achievements in the Serbian rapprochement with the EU remained rather symbolic.

On the other hand, not even Boris Tadić’s administration, rhetorically devoted to European integration, actually managed to deliver on its promises. He won both the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2008 on the pro-EU ticket. However, despite having a clear mandate to finalise the cooperation with the ICTY and to embark upon the resolution of the Kosovo issue, he proved unable to come through. As a result, he failed to convince the EU member states, most notably Germany and the Netherlands, that Serbia deserved to advance on its EU path.

The strategy of Tadić’s administration on the Kosovo issue was to launch a major diplomatic action in order to prevent the international recognition of Kosovo’s independence. In addition, Serbia managed to secure the majority support in the UN General Assembly for the resolution adopted in October 2008, which requested an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the question: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”²²⁸ In July 2011, the ICJ gave its opinion, with 10 against 4 votes, stating that “the declaration of independence of the 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law”, as the “general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence”²²⁹. It was only after this unbinding opinion was issued that the Serbian government accepted to get on board with the EU-sponsored process aimed at the normalisation of relations with Kosovo.

Throughout 2008-2012, the hard-line conservative and nationalist opposition in the parliament (that is, the DSS and the SRS) repeatedly accused the government of betraying Serbia’s national interests.

At the other end of the political spectrum, the liberal opposition – the LDP – pointed out that the government pledged in the elections to advance Serbia’s EU membership bid but in reality only hampered the process by wrestling with the issue of Kosovo, which had already been lost.²³⁰

Stuck between a rock and a hard place – to accelerate the EU integration process and thus to deliver on its election promises, while at the same time normalising relations with Kosovo against the letter and spirit of the 2006 Constitution²³¹ – the DS fell short of expectations. Trying to deliver on both fronts, the administration of Tadić could not live up to its 2008 campaign slogan which read “Both

rate grew from 17.9% in 2009 to 25.9% in 2012. The public debt to GDP ratio grew from 38.2% in 2009 to over 60% in 2012. The inflation rate was high: 8.1% (2009), 6.2% (2010), 11.2% (2011), and 6.2% (2012).

228 Full text of the Resolution 63/3 of the UN General Assembly, adopted on 8 October 2008, available at:

http://bit.ly/1jI16HP, last accessed on: 26 November 2013.

229 Full text of the ICJ’s advisory opinion, “Accordance with International Law of the unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of Kosovo”, 22 July 2010, available at: http://bit.ly/d2NOqA, last accessed on: 26 November 2013.

230 Statement of Čedomir Jovanović, the LDP leader, “The politics ‘Both Europe and Kosovo’ is defeated”, available at:

http://bit.ly/1bBya0w, last accessed on: 15 January 2014.

231 According to the Serbian Constitution adopted in 2006, Kosovo is defined as an integral part of Serbia. This provision effectively puts any government under pressure not to make any concessions with regards to Kosovo.

Europe and Kosovo”. Combined with the challenges caused by the severe economic crisis, the government lost its voters, who no longer saw these national issues as priorities for the country.

With the EU’s decision not to engage with or show any preference in the 2012 elections, or in the aftermath of the vote, and with all major parties apart from the DSS colliding on their avowed support for Serbia’s EU membership, the strategic path of the country was for the first time in the history of Serbian elections an issue of controversy. Thus in 2012, the EU became the only game in town.