As described in the conceptual chapter above, the research interest of this thesis focuses on addressee-oriented strategies of political rule. Neither the identification of strategies, their categorization into the framework nor the evaluation of the success or failure of the specific measures can be tackled through quantitative measurement. Instead, a qualita-tive approach is necessary. For choosing an appropriate method, it is important to first establish what this thesis is about. This concerns the research question and the phenom-enon to be studied about which more general statements are sought (George & Bennett 2005: 77).
The class of phenomena of which the research object is an example is the management of a crisis of legitimacy. More specifically, the subclass of this phenomenon is tempo-rally defined as the distinct period of legitimacy crises during the Arab uprisings. For assessing the empirical success or failure of strategies of political rule, detailed case studies using the method of process tracing are well suited. Process tracing as it has been described by George and Bennett (2005), David Collier (2011) and others is a qualitative method that is especially apt for the social sciences as it serves to detect causal mechanisms, which is in line with the goal of this study. George and Bennett offer the following definition: “The process-tracing method attempts to identify the in-tervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an inde-pendent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the deinde-pendent variable” (2005: 206).
It is worth noting that a thorough application of this method is by no means less de-manding than the rigorous procedures in quantitative social sciences because ideally,
60 Schlumberger (2010: 235) hints at this aspect. See Martin (1997: 38ff.) for the interplay of hegemony and legitimation in Gramsci’s thought.
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“all the intervening steps in a case must be as predicted by a hypothesis” (ibid., italics in original). One task of this study is therefore to derive as many hypotheses as possible from existing theories and deduce the implications that follow from them in order to test them against empirical evidence.
The overall aim of the analysis is a contribution to theory-building in the field of regime survival strategies. After establishing the empirical basis in the following chapters, it is necessary to move up the ladder of abstraction for explaining stability (Sartori 1991). In the words of George and Bennett, “[W]hen explanations for the outcome of individual cases vary, the results can be cumulated and contribute to the development of a rich, differentiated theory about that phenomenon” (2005: 216). Of course, there is always the danger of establishing competing theories that together overdetermine the empirical evidence (ibid.: 218). There are no straightforward solutions to this general problem of qualitative social science which is also connected to the small-N problem: there are too many variables and too few cases. The focused comparison of two cases takes up this criticism through the MDSO design (see below). Process-tracing is especially suitable for this thesis also because it “encourages the investigator to be sensitive to the possibil-ity of equifinalpossibil-ity” (ibid.: 215). This is in line with the logic underlying the most dissim-ilar systems design with simdissim-ilar outcome which is employed here.
Regarding the delicate question of causality in social science, “process-tracing is one means of attempting to get closer to the mechanisms or microfoundations behind ob-served phenomena” (George & Bennett 2005: 147). Regarding the levels of analysis, as has already been mentioned in the theoretical part, this study follows the principle of methodological individualism, which entails the so-called “micro-to-macro problem” of inferring from individuals’ actions to a systemic level (Coleman 1994: 6). In order to trace causal mechanisms, the micro level is indispensable for analyzing the impact of strategies and reactions towards them.
The procedure for building the causal process is to establish “a good narrative or […] a timeline that lists the sequence of events. One can then explore the causal ideas embed-ded in the narratives, consider the kind of evidence that may confirm or disconfirm the-se ideas, and identify the tests appropriate for evaluating this evidence” (Collier 2011:
828f.). More precisely, “[e]vidence that a given stimulus caused a given response can be sought in the sequence and structure of events and/or in the testimony of actors explain-ing why they acted as they did” (Van Evera 1997: 65). Process tracexplain-ing draws the
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searcher’s attention to crucial events that mattered for the development as turning points, “which in turn permits good analysis of change and sequence” (Collier 2011:
824). This objective is also intended for studying the sequencing of legitimation and repression that is one of the focuses in the empirical chapters. Furthermore, these turn-ing points will be analyzed through another method which originates from social an-thropology, ethnographic description. Thick description as described by Clifford Geertz (1973) shall serve to understand the specific context in which protests took place in de-tailing the circumstances and course of events. In Geertz’ own words, “we gain empiri-cal access to [symbol systems] by inspecting events” (1973: 17). This procedure should be actor-oriented in “setting down the meaning particular social actions have for the actors whose actions they are” (Geertz 1973: 27).
Of course, process tracing is not the ultimate method for solving all problems of social sciences. One disadvantage is that it does not allow for statements about necessary or sufficient conditions and/or the relative weight of independent variables for an outcome (ibid.: 203).61 And as a caveat, process tracing is a demanding method in the context of this thesis because “human agents […] may be doing their best to conceal causal pro-cesses” (George & Bennett 2005: 207) – which is especially true in authoritarian re-gimes where decision-making processes are even more secretive than elsewhere, bring-ing us back to where we started.
3.3.CASE SELECTION
For the purpose of comparison, I follow the logic of Przeworski and Teune’s most dis-similar systems design (1970) in choosing two cases with a dis-similar intensity as regards the crises of legitimacy and similar subsequent outcomes of regime survival under dis-similar structural conditions in terms of sources of legitimacy. A most disdis-similar sys-tems design usually serves to identify the one common independent variable that ac-counts for a similar outcome, given a multitude of differences. In this study, the primary goal is not to establish one independent variable that is responsible for the outcome.
Rather, the aim is to look more closely into the causal mechanisms leading to a similar outcome and thus to contribute to theory-building. Following these research objectives, two cases will be selected as “building block” studies in the sense suggested by George
61 Causal mechanisms can be either sufficient or necessary, or both, in bringing about an outcome (George and Bennett 2005: 136; 145).
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and Bennett. These types of studies serve to “identify alternative causal paths to similar outcomes when equifinality is present” (George & Bennett 2005: 76). It makes sense to study more than a single case because a higher number of cases enables a researcher “to chart the repertoire of causal paths that lead to a given outcome and the conditions un-der which they occur – that is, to develop a typological theory” (ibid.: 207). Typological theorizing means “the development of contingent generalizations about combinations or configurations of variables” in the sense of identifying pathways that lead to certain outcomes (ibid.: 233). Again, a MDSO design fits very well as the focus lies on “the variety of causal patterns that can lead to the outcome of interest and determine the con-ditions under which these patterns occur” (ibid.: 244; italics are mine).
As regards this thesis, comparing a resource-rich republic with a resource-poor monar-chy introduces the greatest possible variety in the foundations of legitimacy. Variance is thus present in the structures of legitimacy, the precondition for elites choosing strate-gies. The consequences as regards the scope of protests, demands, and the intensity of the crisis are similar. This comparative background of the analysis enhances the possi-bility for tracing the mechanisms of single strategies and to uncover in how far they are context-dependent. The design is supposed to show under what conditions similar strat-egies are successful or not and thus whether and how the potential variance materializes in actual policies.
As to case selection, existing cases of resource-poor monarchies include Jordan and Morocco; resource-rich republics are Algeria, Iraq, and Libya. The outcome of relative stability is definitely not present in Libya, where a civil war in combination with a mili-tary intervention resulted in a change of regime. Among the republics, Iraq represents a rather atypical case in the Arab uprisings, as the aftermath of the US invasion and the ensuing civil war together with power struggles between the different sects overshad-owed the short-lived protests in terms of a regime crisis. This leaves us with Algeria as the only remaining case of a resource-rich republic that was affected by the Arab upris-ings but preserved its regime stability. Among the poor monarchies, the Moroccan re-form efforts have been hailed in an overly enthusiastic way, undermining the protest movement even by outside actors. The challenge the Moroccan king faces appears to be relatively manageable. Unlike Morocco, Jordan has seen a higher level of recurrent pro-tests and therefore seems to have experienced a greater crisis of legitimacy. It qualifies also by its dire economic situation, especially due to its precarious geographical
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tion next to Syria and its dependence on energy from external sources. These factors make it a more “shaky” case in need of good crisis management strategies. The setup of both cases in terms of classical types of legitimacy is thus:
Algeria: ideological and material legitimacy Jordan: traditional and religious legitimacy
Scholarly works that explicitly compare these two countries are scarce. By and large, they touch upon more narrow and specific topics rather than macropolitical factors.62 Mostly, in previous qualitative works the two states were chosen as case studies among other Arab countries, but the comparison hardly focused on the two.63
A thorough comparison of Jordan and Algeria during the Arab uprisings has not been undertaken up to this point. This is somewhat surprising since both states share similari-ties as regards their respective crises of legitimacy. Both Jordan and Algeria experi-enced a similar level of protests and a similar setup of protest movements, which could not build momentum in either state. Instead, the regimes have remained relatively sta-ble. Both have also been described as already living their second “Arab spring” in 2011, after the democratic opening in Algeria in the elections of 1991-1992 following the 1988 riots and the political liberalization in Jordan following the 1987 bread riots. This parallel development also serves as a backdrop for a final within-case comparative checking that is supposed to shed light on the distinctiveness of strategies in the Arab uprisings – or in the negative case to show they are typical reactions to any regime cri-sis.
In the analysis that follows, special attention will be paid to the sequencing of different strategies of political rule. It is important to study both legitimation and repression in the context of the protests that posed the most tangible challenge to the respective re-gimes. Therefore, a detailed “thick description” of the key events in the sense of Geertz (1973) will be offered in both case studies, focusing on the most important demonstra-tions that were crucial for setting the course of the protest movements. In Jordan, this was the youth movement’s demonstration on March 24 and 25. In Algeria, the protest on February 11 was the key event that was decisive for later developments.
62 Recent examples include Gail Buttorf’s (2011) study on electoral boycott; Hogan & Cavatorta’s (2013) work on macroeconomic policy changes after critical junctures; again Cavatorta & Elananza (2008) on the relationship between religious and secular actors in civil society; and Tessler & Robbins (2007) on support for terrorist acts against the U.S. among ordinary citizens.
63 Cf. e.g. Schlumberger (2004) and Tessler (2002).
68 3.4.SOURCES
To find out which strategies of legitimation are being used, I draw on openly available sources such as newspaper articles64, other media coverage, online news websites,65 official statements, reports by local and international organizations, and secondary liter-ature in order to analyze public discourses and to categorize policies according to the framework.66 Moreover, I conducted field trips to Jordan in spring 2011 and to Algeria in fall 2013. Further sources are qualitative semi-structured interviews that I conducted with analysts from various academic disciplines and consultancy, journalists and activ-ists in different societal organizations, ranging from current and former members of reform movements to functionaries of political parties and autonomous trade unions.67 In Jordan, I conducted the interviews mostly in English, but sometimes partly in Arabic.
In Algeria, the working language was French. During the interviews, I took extensive notes instead of recording the statements in the hope to encourage more open answers.68 As authoritarian rule is still in place in both countries, I have decided to keep my inter-view partners anonymous and identify only their position.69 In contrast, the names of speakers in public events and discussions are given in the footnotes.
Turning to the side of addressees, I resort to a combination of qualitative and quantita-tive data. Firstly, as to the attitude and behavior of citizens, existing surveys focusing on different topics are used, such as those conducted by i.a. the Center for Strategic Stud-ies, Arab Barometer, and the International Republican Institute (IRI). This means that there is some data on the attitudes towards e.g. different political institutions available
64 For Jordan, especially the Jordan Times as the semi-official English daily newspaper is pertinent. For Algeria, the newspapers I used the most are El Watan, Liberté, and Le Quotidien d’Oran. Le Soir d’Algérie is also respected, although its appearance is less elitist. “[N]ewspapers help us to recapture the perspective of officials at the time.” Deborah Welch Larson 2001: “Sources and Methods in Cold War History: The Need for a Theory-Based Archival Approach.” In: Elman, Colin & Miriam Fendius Elman (eds.): Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relation.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 327-350, cit. in George & Bennett (2005: 108, Fn 32).
65 The most important online news platforms in Jordan are Ammonnews.net and Ammannet.org, while various Algerian platforms gather news from other sources, most prominently DjaZairess (http://www.djazairess.com).
66 I have tried to include relevant scholarly articles that were published until spring 2014.
67 The lists of questions that guided the more general interviews especially at the beginning of my re-search in each country can be found in the appendix. In both countries, over a dozen interviews were conducted, in addition to more informal personal communication and participant observation in public events. As the field research took place during different phases of the uprisings – in Jordan at the height of protests, in Algeria more than two years afterwards – the contents of the interviews also differed. The questions posed to representatives of certain groups were more specific and usually only included some of these issues. Instead the groups’ possibilities for action were a further pertinent topic in those interviews.
68 On the manifold dilemmas of doing field research in the Middle East, cf. Clark (2006).
69 The lists of interview partners is not included in this document, but can be provided upon request.
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for Jordan. In Algeria, however, there is no independent or even semi-independent re-search institute that conducts opinion polls (Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2009). Regarding the behavioral aspect, I include election results and turnout, as far as this can be evaluated as significant. Due to the empirical intricacies of authoritarian elections, these data are interpreted through qualitative assessment.
Also, as there are various addressees of legitimation strategies, it would not be advisable to conduct interviews with a random sample. Questioning a representative sample of each case for all strategies is a logistic impossibility and could not be attained due to lack of time and resources. Instead, I conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of different parts of the spectrum of society (see above) for purposes of illustration. As Geertz claims, “it is not necessary to know everything in order to understand some-thing” (1973: 20).
According to the concept laid out above, a more qualitatively informed approach is em-ployed, complementing aggregate data with interview-based information. Taking the different addressees apart from the population as a whole into account, strategically important groups are identified and their behavior analyzed, again using both the inter-views and secondary sources. One of the challenges of this procedure was to identify and delimit relevant groups in a way that other researchers might approve of.
The questions also tackled the disadvantages of neighboring countries. This strategy served two purposes: On the one hand, an additional piece of the puzzle of legitimacy could be analyzed. On the other hand, the delicacy of direct political questions and an-swers – at least concerning the regime of the respective country – was avoided. The validity and range of the results of this strategy is of course limited. In order to increase the validity of results, as many different sources as possible will be taken into account for every issue area so that contradictions, especially those caused by biased answers in interviews, can be better detected.
Regarding the timing of my field research, the stay in Jordan fell exactly into the most exciting time when the public space was still opening up and a feeling of hope and new opportunities was around – more so in March than in April 2011. In Algeria, it was al-ready much more difficult to find interview partners. Many former activists had disen-gaged and assumed new roles. Moreover, a feeling of suspicion kept even scholars from talking openly about politics or talking to a foreign researcher in the first place. In
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other sense it was possible to gain substantial insights because many interview partners held multiple positions in different relevant organizations and had a close network.
In a couple of instances, participant observation of public debates on different topics pertaining to political reform was feasible in Jordan. I attended various roundtable dis-cussions organized by youth activists, a local radio network, and others, all in Arabic language. Additionally, I taught seminar sessions on legitimacy in two different M.A.
level courses at the University of Jordan’s Faculty of International Studies (in the ab-sence of a political science department), during which I not only tried to find out what the students knew about the topic from a conceptual perspective, but also what they thought about it in the context of their own political situation. In a way, this setup im-plicitly resembled a focus group discussion. In Algeria, an informal talk with youth likewise turned into a focus group interview. Furthermore, I attended a press conference in which societal organizations presented a petition.
Whenever possible, different sources are triangulated to make sure that possibly biased sources are balanced out and that evidence gains validity.
3.5.STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS
In the following two empirical chapters, the two case studies will be preceded by an introductory part that outlines the countries’ basic features before the period of
In the following two empirical chapters, the two case studies will be preceded by an introductory part that outlines the countries’ basic features before the period of