Ainsi, apr`es avoir choisi un rang de deux, nous pouvons proc´eder `a estimer un mod`ele VAR coint´egr´es, et de l’identifier. Nous imposons les deux restrictions men-tionn´ees ci-dessus pour identifier le syst`eme, `a savoir que les anticipations d’inflation n’entre pas dans la r`egle de politique budg´etaire, et que la dette n’entre pas dans la r`egle de politique mon´etaire. Une fois que ces restrictions sont impos´ees et le syst`eme soit identifi´e, les erreurs standard peuvent ˆetre calcul´es et la signification d’autres variables est ´evalu´ees. `A ce stade, le taux d’int´erˆet dans la r`egle de politique budg´etaire, et le solde primaire dans la r`egle de politique mon´etaire sont insignifiants et sont donc omis, en excluant une forme directe d’interaction des politiques.
Les premi`eres conclusions indiquent que toute autre strat´egie possible d’identi-fication entraˆınerait les mˆemes vecteurs de coint´egration d´efinitifs donc celles-ci est inutile d’examiner tous : Restreindre pbt`a z´ero au lieu de dtdans la r`egle mon´etaire et, rt au lieu de πat dans la r`egle budg´etaire.
Ainsi, les diff´erents variables sont non-stationnaire et elles ont une int´egration d’ordre 1 pour le d´eficit budg´etaire et le taux d’int´erˆet nominal, ce qui explique l’ab-sence de coint´egration ; ensuite une int´egration d’ordre 2 pour le reste des variables, ce qui explique, en fait, l’existence de trois ´equations de coint´egration.
Enfin, d’apr`es les r´esultats trouv´ees on peut conclure que la politique mon´etaire et budg´etaire ne sont pas compl´ementaire et s’orientent dans un sens oppos´e, ainsi, l’avantage d’employer des m´ethodes de coint´egration est que chaque domaine de la politique devra avoir son propre chemin d’´etat stationnaire, qui devrait ˆetre ungo-vernable dans les donn´ees, et les r´eponses des instruments politiques et les variables cibles peuvent ˆetre ´etablie ´egalement en utilisant l’approche VAR coint´egr´es.
4 Conclusion
Nous essayons d’´elaborer une strat´egie mon´etaire et budg´etaire faisant la th´eorie et la m´ethodologie VAR coint´egr´es ´econom´etrique. Kirsanova `a al ont fourni la th´eorie sur la conception de meilleures politiques mon´etaires et budg´etaires, mais
l’estimation des arrangements de politique mon´etaire a souffert de nombreuses cri-tiques. Les pr´evisions trouv´ees dans la litt´erature trouve un soutien partiel, et les donn´ees de l’enquˆete est ´egalement utilis´e pour aider `a faire la lumi`ere sur les formes possibles de la formation des anticipations. La preuve ne sugg`ere pas d’interactions des politiques solides, et appuie l’id´ee que la politique mon´etaire est plus stabili-sateur dans son influence sur l’activit´e ´economique que ce qui est de la politique budg´etaire.
Au sein de ce travail, nous avons men´e une ´etude th´eorique et empirique d’inter-action entre la politique mon´etaire et la politique budg´etaire. Nos r´esultats montrent qu’il n’existe pas d’interaction forte entre la politique mon´etaire et la politique budg´etaire.
L’analyse de la coint´egration permet d’identifier la relation entre plusieurs va-riables. Ainsi, l’analyse de la coint´egration permet d’identifier clairement la relation v´eritable entre deux ou plusieurs variables en recherchant l’existence d’un vecteur de coint´egration et en ´eliminant son effet, le cas ´ech´eant.
La preuve ne sugg`ere pas de politique d’interactions fortes, et prend en charge l’id´ee que la politique mon´etaire est plus stabilisateur dans son influence sur l’acti-vit´e ´economique que la politique budg´etaire dans le cas de la Gr`ece.
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