5.4 Development of potential Romanian Local Action Groups
5.4.1 Establishing Public-Private Partnerships
Establishing a PPP is a major requirement for LAGs to become eligible for funding under LEADER. Nonetheless, the survey of Romanian LAGs revealed that in early 2008 the majority (76%) still had no legal status. Regional development activities in the territory of LAG-MA, started in 2000 when a microregion-association was founded by the communes; it was financially and technically supported by the County Council. In 2006, the microregion-association began preparations for participating in LEADER. It featured a closed network of ten mayors and a regional manager. The density (definition in Table 5.2) of the communication network, i.e., the overall proportion of ties, was 100% in 2006 (Table 5.3),
Table 5.3: Development of densities for selected relations of the social networks of the case-study LAGs
LAG-MA LAG-BU
Established in 2000 Established in 2002
In 2006 11 Actors 7 Actors
Network density (%)
Centralisation (%)
Network density (%)
Centralisation (%)
Communication binary 100.00 0.00 80.95 13.33
Communication valued 93.50 1.67 34.87 37.50
Formal relations 84.30 0.00 50.00 16.67
Informal relations 39.67 44.44 40.48 30.33
Multiplex relations 37.19 44.67 14.29 13.33
In 2007 15 Actors 24 Actors
Communication binary 80.95 12.09 47.00 44.66
Communication valued 71.14 15.66 34.75 35.08
Formal relations 67.11 15.38 18.30 43.48
Informal relations 25.78 49.45 25.72 50.20
Multiplex relations 22.67 46.70 5.07 13.83
LEADERa 2.86 18.13 28.96 90.12
Relation established through LEADER activities
5.7 --- 11.20 ---
No contactb 18.57 --- 52.36 ---
LAG-internal transfer of information
5.56 75.61
(OutDegree)
2.98 41.98
(OutDegree)
Early 2008 24 Actors 28 Actors
Communication binary at leastc 74.00 --- at leastc 45.00 ---
Up till 2008 27 Actors
(LAG members + external actors)
35 Actors
(LAG members + external actors)
Alerted to join the LAG --- 37.44 --- 12.69
Note: a The relation “LEADER” was registered if two actors solely had contact through LEADER activities.
b Actors have “no contact” if they communicate personally (beyond saluting) less than once per year.
c For this calculation, relations between recently joined actors were not considered, only their relations to established LAG members. Therefore, the real network density might be higher than the density shown here.
which implies that all actors were connected to each other and well embedded in a fixed actor constellation from 2000 to 2006. The density of valued network relations, which accounts for the actors’ contact frequency, is also high at 94%. 37% of the relations were multiplex
Social Networks and Rural Development – LEADER in Romania 89 (meaning formal and informal contacts); multiplexity can be seen as an indication of strong ties (Granovetter 1973). However, additional private and public partners had to be included to formally establish a LAG. One key constraint was that the general public was not aware of the potential LAG. Only selected public employees and individual business people were "invited"
to join. It soon became clear that public partners were preferred by the communes over local civil society organisations, which is no uncommon phenomenon (HCC 2005). Commune authorities are generally better able to calculate the activities of public entities, which are also better equipped with administrative capacities and institutional relations. However, the LEADER guidelines permit the involvement of public partners only up to 50%. The microregion-association therefore opened its network strategically. The network of the relation “alerted to the LAG”, which indicates which actor has won new LAG members, is highly centralised around the microregion-association, its key actors, and the LAG-external County Council (Table 5.4). Abruptly, the total number of LAG members increased considerably by 2008 when the application deadline neared (Table 5.3). Moreover, the low density (5.7%) of the network of “relations established through LEADER activities” indicates that most LAG members had known the "invited" actors before. However, the ‘invited’ actors take an outsider position in the LAG-MA. They are not well connected and have a low degree of links in the communication and LEADER-related information networks.
Table 5.4: Actors’ position in selected social networks of the two case-study LAGs
LAG-MA LAG-BU
In 2007 15 Actors 24 Actors
Actor Degree (%) Actor Degree (%)
Communication (binary data) Highest
ranked actors
Regional manager 100.00 LEADER-Animator 100.00
Consultant 100.00 Private actor BU-5 100.00
President 100.00 Private actor BU-1 95.65
Mayor MA-11 100.00
Mayor MA-12 100.00
Communication (valued data) Highest
ranked actors
Regional manager 96.43 LEADER-Animator 75.00
Mayor MA-11 96.43 Actor BU-5 70.65
President 94.64 Mayor BU-6 55.44
LAG-internal transfer of information Highest
ranked actors
Regional manager 78.26 LEADER-Animator 55.56
President 34.78 Private actor BU-1 22.22
Mayor MA-15 13.04 Private actor BU-9 11.11
Private actor BU-2 11.11
Isolators 2 Actors 0.00 0 Actors 0.00
Transfer of information about the LAG to internal and external actors Highest
ranked actors
Regional manager 65.52 LEADER-Animator 43.59
President 31.03 Private actor BU-1 23.08
Mayors MA-6, MA-8, MA-15, Representative of a NGO/
employee of a commune
3.00
Private actor BU-22, member of two associations
7.69 Relation established through LEADER activities
Highest ranked actors
Regional manager 28.57 LEADER-Animator 91.30
Consultant 28.57 Private actor BU-5 30.44
Mayor MA-2 21.43 Private actor/ pastor BU-7 26.09
Mayor MA-5 21.43
Alerted to join the LAG a Highest
ranked actors
Microregion-association 40.00 Private actor BU-1 15.63
Regional manager 20.00 LEADER-Animator 15.63
County Council 20.00 Private actor BU-5 15.63
President 20.00 Private actor BU-9 12.50
Isolators 19 Actors 0.00 20 Actors 0.00
Note: a In this network a high degree of an actor indicates that the actor has alerted many other actors to join the LAG.
Furthermore, the density of the communication network decreased substantially after the network expanded. While all possible ties were active (density = 100%) from 2000 to 2006, the proportion of the maximum possible number of ties decreased to 81% in 2007 and to at least 74% in 2008 (see Table 5.3, Note c). The invited actors had created an imbalance in the LAG-MA and, probably, due to the reduced density, caused a lower level of trust and social control within the network (see the findings of Russo and Rossi 2009). Owing to such network constellation, with a core of high density with multiplex relations, less integrated individual private actors found it unappealing to conclude a contract with the microregion-association. Moreover, some actors’ expectations were wrong. Invited businessmen believed LEADER to be similar to the pre-accession programmes. Instead of receiving co-financing for single (independent) projects, they found themselves confronted with complex integrated regional development strategies which potentially thwarted their individual investment strategies. Once they had gained a clearer understanding of LEADER, their interest in the programme decreased.
LAG-BU was initiated in 2002 by seven private actors, some of whom were well embedded in the region. The initiative grew slowly into a loose, outgoing network of 28 actors with a mixture of informal and formal relations. Interestingly, the proportion of the maximum possible number of ties (density) within the communication network decreased over the years.
It was 81% between 2002 and 2006, 47% in 2007, and at least 45% in 2008 (Table 5.3).
When the initiative had to register as a potential LAG in 2006, the density of the networks of formal and informal relations was 50% and 40%, respectively. Only 14% of the relations were multiplex. The valued network density remained at around 35% over time. The contact frequency among the founders from different villages remained moderate, and a lack of contact of new members is compensated for by the dense communication relations among new and old members within villages.
Overall, compared to LAG-MA, the relations within LAG-BU show a less binding and less tight notion. The much more diverse actors in the LAG-BU – including better-off business people, teachers, and farmers – collaborated owing to their common interest in developing their region. This is an essential prerequisite for establishing social capital (Farrell and Thirion 2005). LAG-BU also accepted economically weaker members. This can partly be explained by the remote and mountainous location in which mutual aid is inherent in the local culture, for both the poor and the elites.99 Furthermore, norms are held dear in a rural milieu, and social control, which tends to be strong in a non-anonymous context, exerts pressure to respect them.100
Although LAG-BU was socially well embedded in the region, the necessary collaboration with mayors was not a matter of course. To persuade mayors to become involved, private actors with a strong supra-regional reputation served as connectors. Due to their high in-degree (definition in Table 5.2) in the communication network, they were able to exert influence within the region. For instance, the private actor BU-1 is well known by many
99 The correlation between mutual reciprocity as a (survival) strategy and limited local opportunities is illustrated by Meert (2000). Among other things, he shows that deprived rural households rely more on their social networks because of, for instance, a less dense network of public services or limited access to markets, while deprived urban households can rely on the welfare state. For an outline of similar coping strategies of villagers, see also Matějů and Vitásková (2006). Also, the participation in such exchange networks is certainly likely to decrease with higher socio-economic status in disadvantaged areas (see Matějů and Vitásková 2006).
100 A geographical definition of rurality or a rural milieu is not sufficient, or following Pahl (1966, p. 322), a
“fruitless exercise”. Although there is no commonly agreed definition of rurality or rural areas, it is widely accepted that rurality and certain features of the social structure are interlinked. [See, for instance, Harrington and O’Donoghue (1998)] Henkel [1999], and Pahl [1966]) While Pahl denies any spatial dependency of rurality, it is suggested in this chapter that rurality should be seen as a characteristic which can be temporarily linked to a place through social structures. In line with Harrington and O’Donoghue (1998) and Henkel (1999), certain social phenomena such as the relevance of traditions and church are taken as important indicators.
Social Networks and Rural Development – LEADER in Romania 91 individual and organisational actors beyond the region (Figure 5.1; Table 5.5). He facilitated the integration of four mayors into LAG-BU by 2006. With an in-degree of 68%, he is more central than the mayors of LAG-BU. It is noteworthy that this convincing power results from weak ties as indicated by the less central position of actor BU-1 in the valued communication network – most of his relations are characterised by a low contact frequency.
Figure 5.1: The in-degree-centrality in the communication network between the actors of both potential local action groups and selected organisations
In the case-study region, social capital in the form of the large personal networks of individual key actors was used in the interest of the community for controlling the power of the mayors.
Similarly, power imbalances resulting from an unequal distribution of financial resources among actors might be compensated for by social capital (see also Derkzen et al. 2008;
Shucksmith 2000). However, it is also likely that groups with weak social and cultural capital are excluded from the LAG (cp. Shucksmith 2000).
In summary, numerous obstacles stand in the way of meeting the requirement to establish formal PPPs, and they differ depending on the structure and development of the LAG network. On the one hand, LAG-MA can build on a contracted network of strong ties among members of equal status. On the other hand, the consolidated network of mayors hindered the integration of new, especially private, actors.LAG-BU draws on a less dense network with a high ratio of informal relations, which is a challenge, and requires an even higher level of trust because - as Bartol and Zhang (2007, p. 8) point out - “weak ties generally offer greater
opportunities for aspiring leaders to expand their capacities than do strong ties”. Nevertheless, transforming an informally coined, less dense network into a formal PPP is difficult owing to the widespread aversion to formal affairs in Romania (cp. Section 3.5.2.1). Compared to the open, participatory approach of LAG-BU, it is effortless for LAG-MA to establish the trust which is needed for signing a contract (see Matějů and Vitásková 2006; Murray 2008) because actors are already linked through strong ties and "selected newcomers" are known.
However, the more open, non-binding, and informal network structure of LAG-BU facilitates the inclusion of diverse members.
5.4.2 Critical mass on regional outreach – who is served by LAG activities and to what