4-5
• Managing transitions and transfers of responsibility and authority to nonmilitary organizations.
• Implementing measures coordinated by higher civilian and military organizations.
• Managing support requests from civilian organizations and coordinating military responses to these requests.
• Coordinating military requests for support from civilian agencies.
• Managing operations of joint or inter-organizational civilian-military teams.
• Convening civilian-military groups to plan or assess military operations in support of non-military requirements such as security for humanitarian relief convoys or DP camps.
4-5.4. Figure 4.3 depicts an example CIMICC organization. The actual staff may come from the military force or it could have a hybrid civilian-military composition. Due to a potential lack of personnel depth in their organizations, many of the civilian members may be present only on a part-time basis. Non-military members could operate within the appropriate functional specialty cell that relates to their organizations.
4-5.5. The CIMICC facility itself should include a meeting area, work space, power, and communications (both secure and non-secure). The location could be on a military base, although potentially with its own entrance point to facilitate access by civilians.
The CIMICC could also be located elsewhere, such as a municipal building. Units should avoid situations in which redundant civil-military coordination offices are created in mul-tiple locations, as these result in overlaps, gaps, and excessive bureaucracy. It also creates a coverage challenge for civilian organizations (especially host state agencies) that have limited personnel.
► Figure 4.3: Example Civil-Military Cooperation Center (CIMICC)◄
4-5.5. The CIMICC may include sections to manage communications and logistics.
The representative structure in Figure 4.3 includes an Operations and Information Sec-tion with a cell to manage informaSec-tion, funcSec-tional specialty cells, and joint civil liaison teams to conduct field work. In many situations it may be appropriate to include PoC as a functional specialty cell.
4-5.6. Task Challenges. A likely challenge for an effective CIMICC is balancing the requirements for access and security. Civilian and military personnel should not be un-reasonably inconvenienced if they desire to conduct business at the CIMICC; on the other hand, the CIMICC can be a lucrative and relatively soft target for spoilers. Com-manders must be personally interested in and use the CIMICC in order to increase its significance. An effective CIMICC must be resourced with facilities, staff, supplies, and automation equipment. Some organizations will not have the personnel resources or desire to support the CIMICC in addition to their other responsibilities. This does not necessarily mean that these organizations are irrelevant. Organizational representatives who maintain a frequent presence at the CIMICC should be valuable contributors and not simply be loiterers.
Probable Military Role: Support other actors
PSO Context: Likely task
MOAC Context: Possible task
4-6.1. Task Description. Humanitarian assistance is aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies.48 While humanitarian assistance is ideally provided by civilian organizations without military involvement, the military force and other security actors may be mandated or tasked to support conditions conducive to humanitarian action. The military’s primary task is to ensure a secure environment in which humanitarian workers can operate. In extreme situations and as a last resort,49 humanitarian actors may deter-mine that they require more direct assistance from military forces to deliver assistance safely to people in need.
4-6.2. Task Relevance to PoC. Physical threats to civilians are often accompanied by acute needs for essential goods and services. Civilians may flee a threat, thus losing their access to livelihoods, services, and support networks. Perpetrators may destroy sources of food, water, and shelter or otherwise purposely restrict access to essential services. The situation may be a complex emergency, characterized by both conflict and natural disasters such as droughts or flooding. As discussed in Task 3.16—Support Relief for Displaced Persons, lack of access to clean water, medical services, and other essentials can harm more civilians than physical violence. Moreover, lack of access to basic goods and services may undermine an individual or communities’ ability to protect or rebound from physical violence. Additionally, competition over scarce essential goods and services can be a root cause of or contribute to conflict and violence against civil-ians. It is therefore vital to foster an environment conducive to humanitarian assistance in order to protect civilians. This requirement could accompany other military operations, and may at times be the military’s most important task in order to prevent widespread human suffering.
4-6.3. How the Task is Accomplished. The vast majority of humanitarian organiza-tions have made institutional commitments to adhere to the principles of humanity, neu-trality, impartiality, and independence,50 which are outlined in Figure 4.4. Humanitarian actors and political/military actors may have different understandings of these principles
48 Global Humanitarian Assistance, “Defining Humanitarian Aid” (Bristol UK: Global Humanitarian Assistance), available at (http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/defining-humanitarian-aid).
49 “Last resort” implies a temporary situation in which military or civil defense assets augment civilian capabilities to meet a critical humanitarian need. See United Nations, “Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Support of Humanitarian Emergency Operations: What is Last Resort?” (Geneva: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, April 2012), available at http://ochan-et.unocha.org/p/Documents/Last%20Resort%20Pamphlet%20-%20FINAL%20April%202012.pdf. Also see Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines), Revision 1.1 (Geneva: Office for the Coordination of