Conflict early warning is today undergoing significant and appropriate scrutiny. Crit-ics point to inaccurate predictions, failure to foresee important events and inadequate links of operational responses to early warning.8 Indeed, the open-source nature of many early warning systems means that whereas they can provide valuable strategic and operational insight, at a tactical level they cannot capture information about the plans (the ‘strategic surprise element’) of conflicting parties that determine when and where violence breaks out. Some argue that good analysis of conflict boils down to simple personal judgement and that the ‘bells and whistles’ (graphs, indicator lists, local infor-mation networks, etc.) of some early warning systems add little value. Proponents of conflict early warning say that it helps decision-makers and other stakeholders to antici-pate developments and understand the nature and dynamics of different situations.9 In its contemporary form, conflict early warning contributes to the evidence base of con-flict management and prevention decision-making. Beyond that, a good early warning system (along with its information sources and analytical tools) helps anticipate trends in violent conflict situations. Those systems that have strong links to response provide options for conflict management and prevention, forums for joint problem definition, joined-up response planning among different actors and local responses to escalating situations.
An early warning system involves regular and organised collection and analysis of infor-mation on violent conflict situations. It delivers a set of early warning products (based on qualitative and/or quantitative conflict analysis methods) that are linked to response instruments or mechanisms. Early warning systems exist now within governments, multilateral agencies and NGOs. They play different roles, ranging from giving alerts and catalysing response to bolstering the evidence base of decision-making and serving
8. Anna Matveeva, ‘Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas’, GPAC Issue Paper no. 1, September 2006.
9. Hélène Lavoix, ‘Etude sur l’Alerte Précoce’, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, 2007.
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Towards a global network of crisis rooms
as response mechanisms themselves. There is a consensus on what constitutes a ‘good’
early warning system and this good practice has been operationalised in initiatives such as FAST (now closed down), CEWARN, and the ECOWAS Early Warning System to men-tion just a few (see Box 2). There are also se-rious questions about the quality of analysis produced by many early warning systems: do they cover the real issues? Is the analytical depth sufficient for decision-making? The answer to these questions is probably ‘par-tially’. The need to bolster analytical rigour remains – along with enabling situational awareness among decision-makers. Situ-ational awareness is knowing what is going on (as the situation unfolds) so you can do something about it. Early warning reports support situational awareness among deci-sion-makers by providing situation assess-ments (background reports, current situa-tion analysis, scenarios and forecasting) and updating these on a regular basis.
In terms of quantitative and qualitative analytical methods, significant advances have been made. Quantitative methods have strong predictive capabilities, particularly in relation to political crisis and instability. State fragility indices provide easily graspa-ble watch-lists and help agencies working on these issues to prioritise focus countries.
Qualitative methods provide rich context analysis, as well as ways to plan programmatic responses and assess the impact of these responses on violent conflicts. More recent qualitative methods for state fragility analysis provide useful planning frameworks for programmatic responses. Numerous weaknesses persist, nonetheless. Analytical tools fundamentally over-simplify complex and fluid violent conflicts and situations of state fragility. They provide simple snap-shots that are quickly outdated and the quality of analysis often suffers from data deficits.
Box 2. good prACTiCE in opErATionAl ConFliCT EArly wArning SySTEmS Early warning is a process that (a) alerts decision-makers to the potential out-break, escalation, and resurgence of cri-sis; and (b) promotes an understanding among decision-makers of the nature and impacts of the crisis. Crisis or emer-gency preparedness is a state of readi-ness to respond to a disaster, crisis or any other type of emergency situation.
A ‘good’ early warning system is one that:
Is based ’close to the ground’ or has
•
strong field-based networks of moni-tors
Uses multiple sources of information
•
and both qualitative and quantita-tive analytical methods
Capitalises on appropriate
commu-•
nication and information technology Provides regular reports and updates
•
on conflict dynamics to key national and international stakeholders Has a strong link to responders or
re-•
sponse mechanisms.
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Crisis rooms: towards a global network?
Three questions emerge from the above:
On what topics (system design, information collection, analysis, links to
re-•
sponse) can sharing experiences enhance the performance of individual early warning systems/crisis rooms?
What are examples of good practice cooperation between early warning
sys-•
tems/crisis rooms? What has made such cooperation successful?
Will closer cooperation between crisis rooms/early warning systems help
bol-•
ster the global crisis management architecture?
Information sharing/communication
As the reach of communication technologies has increased, so has the quantity of data generated. As explained in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
(OCHA) ground-breaking report on ‘Humanitarianism in the Network Age’ (2013), it has become so large that the data exhaust (passively generated data from transactions or devices, such as GPS data from active mobile phones) has to be stored and analysed in large parallel systems. There is also a vast quantity of online sources (Twitter, YouTube, etc.) and mobile phone applications that can enable improved situational awareness.
Making such ‘big data’ useful to – and tapping better into online and mobile sources in – complex crisis management are the great challenges and opportunities of the network age.
In addition, broad, quick and timely international cooperation to support national or international needs assessments, project identification and planning in post-disaster and post-conflict situations is key to effective crisis response. There are several tions for such cooperation, particularly between crisis rooms. Some of these precondi-tions are about information sharing, communication and infrastructure. Speed and a constant state of readiness depend on specific IT resources (notably videoconferencing, sharing mechanisms and access to open sources), human skills, and trust in and be-tween crisis rooms.
Big data provides a critical source of data from often data-scarce crisis-affected areas.
However, the challenge is to understand how to use the new range of available data sources and transform this data into useful information. Beyond such operational use of big data, there is an emerging tactical dimension, where the act of sharing informa-tion becomes a response. The logic is simple and cues for early warning systems/crisis
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Towards a global network of crisis rooms
rooms can be taken from the humanitarian and peacebuilding fields. As explained in
‘Humanitarianism in the Network Age’ (2013, p. 3),
‘People from all walks of life are using modern communications technologies to help each other. Just as private companies are interacting more effectively with their customers, humanitarian agencies have an opportunity to get closer to the people they assist. The spread of mobile phones, the growth of the Internet and the rise of digital social media are enabling people to reach out to each other across previously impenetrable divides. For example, in February 2012, citizens from across crisis-wrecked Somalia communicated via SMS with high-ranking Government officials who had gathered at a summit in London to determine their future’.
What is within reach, therefore, is both of operational and tactical value; it is a model where for some crises, people determine their own priorities and communicate them to those who can assist. In terms of online and mobile sources for crisis data, Ushaidi and similar organisations are using these effectively. An exchange between trailblazing non-governmental initiatives and the crisis rooms of governments and international organisations on using such technology for crisis analysis can be beneficial.
Much of the thinking around crisis information sharing is centred on challenges as-sociated with different organisational information-sharing approaches. The mandates and legal bases of crisis rooms and early warning systems is a key determinant here, as is the policy decision of whether (and what kind of) information should be shared, how and under what terms. If a policy decision to share is made, then information sharing protocols become important. They define the reasons why information sharing is re-quired, how it supports the functions of the partnership, spell out the principles that govern the sharing, and set the foundation for partners to agree to share the required information.
Three key questions are:
What opportunities exist to make shared use of ‘big data’ and web/mobile
ap-•
plications across crisis rooms and in their information collection and analysis processes?
What are the opportunities, challenges and prerequisites for information
•
sharing between crisis rooms?
Is there a political appetite among decision-makers to make information
shar-•
ing between crisis rooms a more frequent practice?
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