The Obama Administration has recognized the significance of the homegrown jihadist threat in its June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism.200 The strategy focuses on Al Qaeda, its affiliates (groups aligned with it), and its adherents (individuals linked to or inspired by the
197 Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. persons or property, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, and a provision of material support to a terrorist organization. DOJ Press Release, February 22, 2010. For more on Zazi’s childhood, see Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor.”
198 In June 2011, the friend, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, was convicted of conspiracy in the Danish plot and for providing material support to LeT. However, he was acquitted of involvement in the Mumbai plot. DOJ Press Release, “Chicago Businessman Tahawwur Hussain Rana Guilty of Providing Material Support to Terror Group and Supporting Role in Denmark Terrorism Conspiracy,” June 9, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-releases/2011/chicago-businessman- tahawwur-hussain-rana-guilty-of-providing-material-support-to-terror-group-and-supporting-role-in-denmark-terrorism-conspiracy; United States v. David Coleman Headley, Plea Agreement, 09 CR 830-3. U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, 2010, http://www.hindu.com/nic/headleyplea.pdf; DOJ Press Release, March 18, 2010.
199 Ibid.
200 White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
counterterrorism_strategy.pdf. Hereinafter: National Strategy.
terrorist group).201 John Brennan, President Obama’s top counterterrorism advisor, publicly described the strategy as the first one, “that designates the homeland as a primary area of emphasis in our counterterrorism efforts.”202 The Strategy states:
We know al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates continue to try to identify operatives overseas and develop new methods of attack that can evade U.S. defensive measures. At the same time, plots directed and planned from overseas are not the only sort of terrorist threat we face.
Individuals inspired by but not directly connected to al-Qa‘ida have engaged in terrorism in the U.S. Homeland. Others are likely to try to follow their example, and so we must remain vigilant.203
The spate of recent arrests and other counterterrorism successes should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in disrupting homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism efforts exist within two broad contexts. Many of the legal behaviors associated with radicalization occur in the open marketplace of ideas where consumers weigh competing ideologies within the context of free speech. Conversely, the operational aspects of violent jihadist plots largely involve illegal activity. In this secretive realm involving criminality, law enforcement pursues terrorists in a real-world version of hide-and-seek.
The divergent nature of these two contexts may imply a distinct wall between the public realm and the secretive operational realm. In reality, the barrier is far from distinct. What happens operationally has significant impacts in the marketplace of ideas (Figure 1). The success of terrorist plots may spur radicalization, while effective policing may make terrorism a less popular option for radicals. High levels of radicalization may expand the potential pool of terrorist recruits.
201 Ibid, p. 3.
202 Mathieu Rabechault, “U.S. Refocuses on Home-Grown Terror Threat,” AFP, June 29, 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hLyJyB7khhqIxWOOlm1mCj7fYsRQ?docId=
CNG.3f90005700ea65e0b05509a135c7a3a8.471; Karen DeYoung, “Brennan: Counterterrorism Strategy Focused on al-Qaeda’s Threat to Homeland,” Washington Post, June 29, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/brennan-counterterrorism-strategy-focused-on-al-qaedas-threat-to-homeland/2011/06/29/
AGki1LrH_story.html.
203 National Strategy, p. 11.
Figure 1. Counterterrorism Context
Source: CRS
Intelligence Approaches
A group of intelligence and terrorism experts argues that “to infiltrate terrorist conspiracies, identify and head off future terrorist attacks, and build the knowledge base required to rapidly investigate when terrorist incidents do occur requires human intelligence.”204 The DOJ and FBI operate 103 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) in the United States—71 created since 2001.205 These interagency entities include more than 4,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and agents who “investigate acts of terrorism that affect the U.S., its interests, property and citizens, including those employed by the U.S. and military personnel overseas.”206 As this suggests, their operations are highly tactical and focus on investigations, developing human sources (informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots.
JTTFs offer an important conduit for the sharing of intelligence developed from FBI-led counterterrorism investigations with outside agencies. These task forces also connect state and local law enforcement with the U.S. Intelligence Community on terrorism-related matters. To help facilitate this, especially as the threat of homegrown jihadists has emerged, the number of top-secret security clearances issued to local police working on JTTFs increased from 125 to 878 between 2007 and 2009.207
204 America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate, June 2010.
205 See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs.
206 Brig Barker and Steve Fowler, “The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Officer,” The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, vol. 77, no. 11 (November 2008), pp. 12-15; FBI, “Protecting America Against Terrorist Attack: A Closer Look at Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” May 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/may09/jttfs_052809.html.
207 Kevin Johnson, “FBI Issues More Top Secret Clearance for Terrorism Cases,” USA Today, August 12, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-08-12-secret-clearances_N.htm; STRATFOR, A Decade of Evolution in U.S. Counterterrorism Operations, Special Report, December 2009, http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/150745/
analysis/20091216_us_decade_evolution_counterterrorism_operations?ip_auth_redirect=1; CRS Report RL33033, (continued...)
A significant dilemma for law enforcement and intelligence officials who straddle the public realm of ideas and the secretive realm of terrorist operations is how to sift the law-abiding, non-violent radical attracted to jihadist rhetoric from the would-be terrorist who merits targeting. The vast amount of terrorist-related material available on the Internet in a relatively anonymous setting attracts homegrown individuals open to radicalization. Many of these individuals may show great interest in radical content, engage in radical discourse, but not become terrorists.208 A growing pool of those who view jihadism as “cool” and engage in online “talk” may make it harder for police to identify actual terrorists.