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1. From the Greek word “energeia,“ meaning ”activity, op-eration,” energy is an indirectly observed quantity. It is often un-derstood as the ability of a physical system to do work on other physical systems.

2. The views offered in this introduction reflect those of par-ticipants in this conference. The reader interested in putting these views in a broader perspective may turn to the reference hand-book, by Gal Luft and Anne Korin, eds., Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2009.

3. Some scholars prefer to use the term “collective” to stress the existence of problems that transcend national boundaries and cannot be solved without collective action. Among these is Gayle Smith, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director of the National Security Council.

4. Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics, Philadelphia, PA: Univer-sity of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, p. 93.

5. Some scholars think high prices undermine energy secu-rity. Others focus on “price stability.” They argue that we can adapt to “expensive” supply costs if we avoid price shocks and excessive volatility. (See, for example, the different views of Anne Korin and Eugene Gholz, Panel I, chap. 2.)

6. Shaffer, p. 93.

7. This reflects the consensus view of persons at the confer-ence but was especially prominent in the arguments of Eugene Gholz (chap. 2) and Alan Hegburg (chap. 1).

8. See especially Ibid.

9. There are scholars and analysts who are quite concerned about the dangers posed by terrorism to energy security, but Rob-ert Cekuta and Bernard Cole (chap. 5) as well as Gholz (chap. 2) were in agreement that fears here are exaggerated.

10. A point emphasized by Gholz (chap. 2).

11. Chinese foreign policy, as Cole observed (chap. 5), is keyed to improving energy security. Neither he nor other partici-pants were seriously concerned about resultant militancy, how-ever. Kevin Book (chap. 2) and others drew attention to the pres-sures on developing nations to use whatever technologies were available to them, including coal.

12. A major theme in the remarks of Korin (chap. 2 and throughout).

13. An electrical grid is an interconnected network for deliv-ering electricity from suppliers to consumers. It consists of three main components: 1) generating plants that produce electricity from combustible fuels (coal, natural gas, biomass) or noncom-bustible fuels (wind, solar, nuclear, and hydro power); 2) trans-mission lines that carry electricity from power plants to demand centers; and 3) transformers that reduce voltage so distribution lines can carry power for final delivery.

14. While skeptics remain, 98 percent of peer-reviewed scien-tific papers agree on this point.

15. Climate change is no longer considered merely an issue relating to quality of life and environment, but one that directly affects human and global security, Shaffer, p. 6. The various secu-rity implications were discussed in a 2007 joint Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS)/U.S. Army War College (USAWC) conference. Proceedings are available online on the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) website. See Carolyn Pumphrey, ed., Global Climate Change: National Security Implications, Carlisle, PA: Stra-tegic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2008. Weiss (chap. 4) found widespread support at the conference for his in-sistence that climate change was a serious problem.

16. See, for example, Gholz (chap. 2); Man-Sung Yim (chap. 3).

17. Cekuta (chap. 5).

18. The importance of infrastructure was stressed at the con-ference, notably by David Dayton (chap. 4).

19. Douglas Lovelace (chap. 6); James Bartis (chap. 4); and Book (chap. 2).

20. Many wars have been fought over oil: some would even claim that the recent wars in Iraq were primarily driven by our interest in this energy source. See, for example, Alex Roland (chap. 3).

21. Stephen Kelly (chap. 5) stressed the benefits that might be brought by closer relationships with Canada (and Mexico) includ-ing the development of pipelines.

22. See especially Book (chap. 2).

23. The advantages of natural gas are highlighted by Vikram Rao (chap. 6) as well as Kelly (chap. 5) and Hegburg (chap. 1).

24. Once vaporized, LNG is highly flammable, which makes it dangerous to transport and, some would say, a possible target for terrorism. Cindy Hurst, “Liquefied Natural Gas: The Next Prize,”

in Luft and Korin, pp. 271-281.

25. The problems caused by hydraulic fracturing were dis-cussed by Carey King in his analysis of the energy-security-water nexus (chap. 3).

26. See, for example, Book (chap. 2).

27. Geothermal (an energy source not addressed in this con-ference in any meaningful way but now supplying us with about 1 percent of our electricity) is also a renewable source which might be tapped in the future, especially in the West where there are geysers and volcanoes.

28. If one compares the amount of water that is used by differ-ent kinds of technologies in terms of how many gallons of water it would use to drive a vehicle a mile, we find that petroleum takes 0.1; natural gas, about the same; nonirrigated biofuels, 0.3-0.4; and irrigated biofuels like corn ethanol, a staggering 20-30 gallons. See Carey King (chap. 3).

29. These arguments recurred throughout the conference. See for example Michael Roberts (chap. 4), James Bartis (chap. 4), and discussion sessions (chaps. 1, 4, and 6).

30. Bartis (chap. 4).

31. In the United States, nuclear power already provides us with a substantial amount of our electricity: 21 percent in 2010.

32. Bartis (chap. 3).

33. See Steven Miller (chap. 3).

34. On March 10, 2011, just 6 days after this conference, a 9.0 earthquake (Richter scale) and a tsunami hit Japan. The nuclear plant at Fukushima Daichi suffered major damage, reawaken-ing public fears about nuclear energy. The conversation about nuclear energy would likely have been somewhat different had the conference taken place a week later.

35. These problems were discussed by Man-Sung Yim, Bartis, and Miller (chap. 3).

36. Man-Sung Yim’s research has led him to believe that countries eager to develop a nuclear industry will avoid mov-ing toward weapons development, as this will undermine their chances of success. Miller is generally more concerned over the possibilities of proliferation. See chap. 4.

37. John Bumgarner (chap. 5).

38. See the presentation by King (chap. 4).

39. A copy of the National Security Strategy (2010) is available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/

national_security_strategy.pdf. The goals are laudable but are inher-ently somewhat contradictory.

40. Rosemary Kelanic (chap. 2).

41. Gholz (chap. 2).

42. See, for example, the remarks by Cekuta and Kelly (chap. 6).

43. Korin (chap. 2).

44. Cekuta (chap. 6).

45. Book (chap. 2).

46. See, for example, Korin (chaps. 2 and 6).

47. Miller (chap. 3).

48. See, for example, Daniel Weiss (chap. 4) and discussion in chap. 6.

49. William Boettcher (chap. 6).

50. The wasteful culture of the United States (among others) has been widely noted. Jared Diamond, for example, claims that the average rates at which people consume resources like oil and metals, and produce wastes like plastics and greenhouse gases, are about 32 times higher in North America, Western Europe, Japan, and Australia than they are in the developing world. See www.

nytimes.com/2008/01/02/opinion/02diamond.html?pagewanted=all.

See also statistics on food waste provided by the U.S. Depart-ment of Agriculture, cited in Tristan Stuart, Waste: Uncovering the Global Food Scandal: New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2009.

What lies at the root of this behavior is debated, but in his influ-ential, though controversial paper, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, delivered at the American Historical Associa-tion in Chicago, Il, in 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner argues that the defining characteristics of the American people, among them an exploitative wastefulness, springs from their experiences as a frontier people.

51. See, for example, Michael Roberts’s explanation of “exter-nalities” (chap. 4) and the extended discussion of economic incen-tives in chap. 6.

52. Korin (chaps. 2 and 6).

CHAPTER 1

ENERGY AND SECURITY KEYNOTE