The measurement of value beliefs in empirical research has not fully covered this theoretical richness of value beliefs. Few studies using the Eccles’ et al. model as theoretical framework have incorporated separate scales for all four components (for exceptions, see Conley, 2012; Trautwein et al., 2012). Instead, several alternative strategies have been adopted: Many studies combined the positive value aspects (i.e., intrinsic, attainment, and utility value) into one general value scale consisting of a small number of items (e.g., Eccles, Wigfield, et al., 1993; Jacobs, Lanza, Osgood, Eccles, &
Wigfield, 2002); other studies collapsed two of the value components (often importance as a combination of attainment and utility value; e.g., Durik, Vida, & Eccles, 2006; Watt et al., 2012) or used only one component as an indicator of task value (e.g., intrinsic value; Nagy, Trautwein, Baumert, Köller, & Garrett, 2006). Although the importance of cost for choices is emphasized in expectancy-value theory, this component has been included less frequently in the measurement of value beliefs. In their review on the perspectives for research based on expectancy-value theory, Wigfield and Cambria (2010a) suggested a further exploration of this component as one major line for future research.
Partly, previous studies were simply not able to separate the value components (e.g., Eccles, Adler, & Meece, 1984; Eccles, Wigfield, et al., 1993). Although various factors might contribute to the empirical separability of different value aspects (e.g.,
students’ age), the set of items that is used to assess value beliefs is certainly one important factor. The items that were used in different studies were not always consistent. Table 1.1.1 presents an exemplary set of measures for value beliefs that were used in different studies with sample items (for a review on measures of task value, see also Wigfield & Cambria, 2010b). Eccles and colleagues developed measures of intrinsic, attainment, and utility value with two to three items each (for the full set of items, see Wigfield et al., 1997). These items refer to the value of domains such as math, reading, sports, or music and have been used in most of their research in this or an adapted form. Conley (2012) combined this set of items with newly developed ones to explicitly cover all four value components, including two items referring to cost.
Trautwein et al. (2012) also included separate scales for all four value components in their study, using a total of twelve items on value beliefs. Both studies by Conley (2012) and Trautwein et al. (2012) were able to separate the four value components empirically. The most broadly applied questionnaire to assess motivational beliefs as well as self-regulated learning strategies in various setting is the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ), which was developed by Pintrich and colleagues (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & McKeachie, 1993). The questionnaire is designed to refer to a specific class and includes a scale on task value with the items referring to intrinsic, attainment, and utility value aspects. Similarly, Hulleman et al. (2008) used measures of intrinsic and utility value that referred to a specific course and separated the value of this course from interest and goals referring to psychology as a domain. Recently, several researchers (A. Battle & Wigfield, 2003;
Luttrell et al., 2010; Perez, Cromley, & Kaplan, 2014) developed elaborate measures of cost, particularly for university students. Perez et al. (2014) explicitly distinguished between three types of cost: effort cost, opportunity cost, and psychological cost.
Table 1.1.1
Measures of task value with sample items Authors and scale title Sample item Wigfield et al. (1997)
Interest value How much do you like doing math?
Attainment value For me, being good in math is (not at all important, very important).
Utility value In general, how useful is what you learn in math?
Conley (2012)
Interest value Math is exciting to me.
Attainment value Thinking mathematically is an important part of who I am.
Utility value Math concepts are valuable because they will help me in the future.
Cost value I have to give up a lot to do well in math.
Trautwein et al. (2012)
Intrinsic value I enjoy puzzling over mathematics problems.
Attainment value Mathematics is important to me personally.
Utility value I’ll need good mathematics skills for my later life (training, studies, work).
Cost value I’d have to sacrifice a lot of free time to be good at mathematics.
Pintrich & De Groot (1990)
Task value It is important for me to learn what is being taught in this class.
Hulleman et al. (2008)
Intrinsic value Lectures in this class are entertaining.
Utility value What I am learning in this class is relevant to my life.
Battle & Wigfield (2003)
Intrinsic-attainment value I’m excited about the idea of going to graduate school.
Utility value I don’t think a graduate degree will be very useful for what I want to do in the future.
Cost Getting a graduate degree sounds like it really requires more effort than I’m willing to put into it.
Perez et al. (2014)
Effort cost When I think about the hard work needed to get through my science major, I am not sure that getting a science degree is going to be worth it in the end.
Opportunity cost I’m concerned my science major may cost me some treasured friendships.
Psychological cost I’m concerned that I won’t be able to handle the stress that goes along with my science major.
Several aspects can be noted when comparing the measures of task value across studies and research groups. First, the various measures imply different levels of task-specificity. Whereas expectancy-value theory conceptualizes values as task-specific beliefs, most research uses value measures referring to broader subjects (e.g., math) as domains. Some studies also assessed the value of specific courses (e.g., Hulleman et al., 2008; Pintrich & De Groot, 1990) or particular education forms (e.g., graduate school;
A. Battle & Wigfield, 2003). Second, different measures of the same construct only partially overlap in the value aspects that are tapped by the wording of the items. The items could sometimes also be used as measures of related motivational constructs such as interest (e.g., “Mathematics is important to me personally.”; Trautwein et al., 2012), whereas other items seem to capture qualitatively different aspects (e.g., “For me, being good at math is [not at all important, very important]”; Wigfield et al., 1997). Such inconsistencies in the operationalization of constructs have been described as jingle-jangle-fallacies (Marsh, Craven, Hinkley, & Debus, 2003): Scales with the same name do not always reflect the same construct, and scales with different names do not always reflect different constructs. In their review on the measurement of task value, interest, and goal orientations, Wigfield and Cambria (2010b) note similar problems and call for more research on the empirical distinctiveness of motivational constructs.