Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine the conceptualization of political corrup-tion on the basis of a critical reading of Kant’s concepcorrup-tions of honesty, publicity and truthfulness. The hope here is to contribute to the ongoing attempt to make the concept of political corruption more suitable for the study of democracies by critical engagement with Kant’s political theory and these specific conceptions.
A secondary aim is to shed some light on aspects of Kant’s political theory that seem to be neglected in the literature about political corruption and in the more
“realistic” texts that criticize Kant.
My original intentions were different. As a scholar whose main interest is political corruption, I wanted to examine if there was anything worthy to be learned about political corruption from Kant’s claim that there is a legal duty not to lie. My first intuition was probably similar to that of the scholar who is inter-ested in Kant but not an expert of him; I thought that we can hardly take seriously an argument that we do not have a right to lie, even to a would- be-murderer who is seeking his victim, but I also considered that there must be something profound in such an incongruous idea. Nevertheless, the deeper I dug the more I realized that a better approach might be to consider also his under-standing of honesty and publicity in Perpetual Peace (Kant 1991[1795]). More specifically, I found it interesting that in Perpetual Peace Kant expressed a real-istic approach to politics, while in his notorious essay “On the Supposed Right to Lie out of Philanthropy” (Kant 1996[1797]) he expressed a rigorist approach that does not seem to be realistic at all.
Moreover, it seems that, especially in Kant, like in Cicero before him, but in contrast to contemporary writers, realism and moralism are not mutually exclu-sive. That is, while Kant’s program in Perpetual Peace is considered to be suit-able even for a nation of devils and not only for “reasonsuit-able people,” he requires that politics bend the knee to morality, and his writings defend the moral politi-cian. If I am correct, then, Kant’s conceptions of publicity and truthfulness may have even more value for thinking about political corruption than one could think. Accordingly, it may be worthwhile to ask the following questions: what are the relations between the idea that agents have a duty not to lie and the duty
to make their principles public? What can they tell us about Kant’s political theory? What can they tell us about the subject of sincerity in politics? Shall we, in the end, adopt Kant’s conceptions when we think about political corruption in contemporary democracies?
The chapter suggests two major claims. The first claim is interpretive. I argue that both propositions about truthfulness and publicity are related to Kant’s deep suspicion about human motivations and about our ability to know what motiv-ates others and what motivmotiv-ates us, as well as to his belief that “the problem of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation of devils” (Kant 1991[1795]:
112). Put differently, Kant’s conceptualization of honesty, publicity and truthful-ness is influenced not only by his uncompromised commitment to the creation of a rightful condition, but also it is shaped by his suspicion towards human moti-vations, on the one hand, and his optimism about institutions and their capacity to direct human behavior with external incentives, on the other. My second claim is normative. Assuming that my first argument is correct, I argue that this is not a good approach for conceptualization of political corruption in contemporary democracies. As an alternative I suggest a neo- Kantian conception of political corruption, that shares his commitment to the ideal of equal worth of persons, but not his optimism about institutions.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the second section I shall present Kant’s conceptions of truthfulness and publicity and put these in historical and philo-sophical context. I suggest that Kant’s conceptions and conceptualization are part of a more general idea that there are principles with no exceptions in pol-itics. Kant requires not only truthfulness but also strict application of principles and duties. Such a position is more plausible if we consider it as part of a larger attempt to promote republics at the expense of monarchies, in an age of optimism about enlightenment, progress and institutional design. In the third section, I present recent conceptualizations of political corruption. While they are impor-tantly different, all have reservations about Kant and all share his most important political ideas. In the fourth section, I suggest an alternative for recent conceptu-alizations of political corruption. My conceptualization is not based on demo-cratic principles such as publicity, as Thompson suggested, or on the idea that corruption necessarily involves deception, as Warren suggested; rather, my con-ceptualization is based on the idea that political agents, whether politicians and public agents or not, should be motivated not only by their private interests but also by the desire to respect other people’s right to be their own masters. This is a Kantian moral idea, and the reason why Kant did not adopt it will be further clarified in the concluding section.
Kant on honesty, publicity and truthfulness
In the last decade of the eighteenth century, under the influence of the French Revolution, questions about principled and radical politics had immediate impact on the future of Europe. It was also then that philosophers were discussing the meaning of progress and humanity, and the role of reason and freedom in human affairs.
In Perpetual Peace Kant argued in favor of honesty and publicity: “Honesty is better than any policy” (Kant 1991[1795]: 116). Soon afterwards he emphas-izes the importance of publicity: “all actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public”
(Kant 1991[1795]: 126). That is, publicity is important as a device against the abuse of public power. For example, attempts to promote one’s private gain at the expense of other citizens, he argues, cannot be made public. The public would refuse to accept them. And if they can be made public, then this is an indication they are legitimate. This proposition is akin to the idea of “reasons that all can accept,” although it is more specific and it emphasizes the external, public element of action.
One year later, Benjamin Constant published a pamphlet, in which he argued that, if everyone adhered strictly to the principle of telling the truth, all society would become impossible. Constant wrote and published his pamphlet in con-ditions of growing distrust in France, as a result of the terror and violence, during what are known as the “post- revolutionary years.” For Constant, under such con-ditions, a moral person had to learn how to do things that under normal circum-stances would be regarded as immoral, such as lying (Holmes 1984: 108).
Politically speaking, Constant took a stand against the more democratic prin-ciples of the revolution and in favor of the political claims of the Directorate (Benton 1982: 139). Therefore he also argued that there was no duty to tell the truth to someone who has no right to hear it: “Where there are no rights, there are no duties. To tell the truth is a duty, but only to those who have a right to the truth. But no one has a right to a truth which injures others” (in Kant 1996[1797]: 611).
Constant also blamed “the German philosopher” (referring to Kant. according to the editor of Constant’s pamphlet [Paton 1953]) for arguing that we have no right to lie even to murderers. Indeed, Kant was in favor of the French revolu-tion, and as we saw he was taking a firm stand in favor of honesty and publicity.
But he had never argued such an extreme assertion before the publication of Constant’s pamphlet. Nevertheless, Kant was willing to advocate this radical position of not telling lies whatsoever. In the notorious essay, Kant maintains that the moral law against telling lies can admit of no exceptions whatsoever:
“[T]he duty of truthfulness [. . .] makes no distinction between persons towards whom one has this duty and persons towards whom one has not this duty. Truth-fulness is a duty unconditionally – a duty which holds in all circumstances”
(Kant 1996[1797]: 614).
The duty not to lie holds even when the outcome of telling the truth would be, almost with absolute certainty, the death of innocent people. This is such a depressing and cruel idea that some Kantians suggested that it shows that Kant would not have tried to defend such a position, had he not been advanced in age.
It was the confusion that came with age that led him to believe that Constant was blaming him for something that he had written, although he had not, and it was only pride (which also comes with age and perhaps professional habits), which made him defend something that he did not have to, and actually could not,
defend (Paton 1953: 202–3). But it is also possible that Kant’s “confusion”
reflects something else, namely, that he could have agreed with the idea that Constant ascribed to him (Benton 1982: 138). I shall suppose, then, that this is the major reason that Kant wrote the article. This is also the best way to interpret it, if we want to consider Kant’s conceptions of honesty, publicity and truthful-ness. More accurately, what is of interest for us is whether certain interpretations of these notions are of use for discussions of political corruption.
There are differences among honesty, publicity and “not lying whatsoever”.
Honesty is a subjective disposition, or an attitude, that reflects not only the true values of sentences as the agent conceives of them, but also his authentic will-ingness to share his understanding. Most importantly, honesty has an inter- subjective quality. To ask for honesty is also to be given the space and autonomy not to say anything. Sometimes not talking is a sort of honesty. Honesty is not necessary telling the truth.
Publicity is also distinct from the virtue of not telling lies. As Dennis F.
Thompson (1999) suggested, the publicity principle is consistent with secrecy, and even with lying. As long as the political agent hides his actions or lies for the public (as in cases of foreign affairs), the secrecy is temporary and his actions are under a certain kind of surveillance and procedures, the principle of publicity, or the core of the ideal of publicity, is observed.
Telling the truth or not lying, on the other hand, is something more technical.
One can avoid lying without being honest. Indeed, this is what sometimes the misleader does. Under certain conditions, the requirement of honesty is more demanding compared with the requirement of truth telling. More accurately, sometimes one simply cannot require honesty. A murderer, for example, can require hearing the truth. There is nothing unreasonable if he requires hearing the truth and no lies. He may also use brute force to extract the truth, or to enforce on the agent the requirement of avoiding lies. But he cannot use brute force to achieve honesty. It would be unreasonable to expect honesty when tor-turing someone, for example. The upshot of all this is that the requirements of publicity and honesty that appear in Perpetual Peace are different: they are weaker and more reasonable than the requirement not to tell lies no matter what.
This is clearer if we consider that the duty not to lie is not correlated to the alleg-edly right of the would- be-murderer for the truth, for, according to Kant, he has no such right.
But why is being truthful so important? What makes telling lies wrong, if no specific person is wronged? Kant’s answer is that telling lies wrongs humanity in general. It does so by (i) corrupting the language (which is source of right or the united will), (ii) transgressing the duties of truthfulness and of publicity that comprise the form of the united will, and (iii) violating an unconditional duty of truthfulness that is the juridical condition for the unification of wills, especially by contracts (Weinrib 2008, 156). It is not only the violation of dignity – we are not dealing here with ethics or virtue – but of the basis for any rightful condition.
The pre- condition of the rightful condition is what is at stake in the imperative of not lying.
Nevertheless, such a position is still not entirely reasonable. First, can it be argued that the would- be murderer makes the rightful condition impossible; that his murder makes honesty and truthfulness a chimera? Second, Kant presup-poses that we already live in a rightful condition, and what’s more interesting, that France or at least most of the countries in Europe in the 1790s live in a rightful condition; one can wonder how accurate such a description is even today for the countries in which we live. Third, we shall not accept the idea that lan-guage could be so easily corrupt, an idea presupposed by Kant’s argument; such a position towards the effect of lying on language, or towards speaking and words, seems to be more mystical than rational, like a relic of religious beliefs (Williams 2002). Language is not something so corruptible. Furthermore, the possibility of lying exists whether or not someone told a lie to a would- be murder, and this possibility is what makes the pre- condition of the rightful con-dition fragile.
To see this, we can compare telling a lie to a would- be murderer with another situation that Kant mentioned in Feyerabend Lectures: giving a counterfeit bill to someone who sells a blind horse (and the seller tries to hide this fact). Indeed, when one gives counterfeit money to a person to whom one is not indebted, one does no wrong to him. The problem is not between these two persons but rather with the fact that by passing counterfeit money, one endangers the possibility to live in a rightful condition. As Weinrib explained,
The counterfeiter does wrong by using money, the public means of exchange, in a manner that is inconsistent with its publicity. Similarly, the liar does wrong by using language, the means through which wills are united and rights proceed, in a manner that is inconsistent with its publicity.
(Weinrib 2008: 152) Nevertheless, the analogy between counterfeiting a bill and telling a lie is not appropriate. Lies do not have the material existence and the persistence of coun-terfeit bills. A lie to a murder is not necessarily circulated in the way in which bills usually are.
Therefore, I suggest three intertwined and complementary ideas that make, I believe, Kant’s approach more sensible, although not necessarily more accept-able. Both are related to the impact of the Scottish enlightenment on his political theory, but also to Kant’s religious beliefs. The first idea is that people as such are not trustworthy. They are inclined to advancing their own well- being. They are egoistic and self- centered. From Kant’s point of view, if you let them decide about making an exception, such as lying to a murderer, they will probably abuse this allowance and think on other occasions as well that they can make an excep-tion to the principle of not lying and justify in this way the violaexcep-tion of a prin-ciple. The problem of slippery slope is so acute in human affairs that nothing but strict compliance is enough.
The second idea is that humanity has reached a point where institutions can provide incentives for a rightful behavior (although not necessarily a moral
behavior). Kant sometimes called it the cunning of nature or providential order.1 That is, we do not need to presuppose that people are good to organize society in a rightful condition. We only need to assume that people are rational. The virtu-ous agent is not needed nor the public official who is inclined or motivated by the public good. It is enough that society would have the right institutions. Part of this institutional turn are the formal principles of honesty, publicity and truth-fulness. Relatedly, philanthropy is not important.
Lastly, Kant was very suspicious not only about human motivations but also about the ability to know what motivates us, not to mention what motivates others. Probably for these reasons he did not forbid misleading but forbade lying, even though the liar and the one who misleads are motivated by a similar or maybe identical motivation, and the effect of their behavior is basically the same (or worse in the case of the misleader, who actually and by definition succeeds in his attempt, while the liar does not necessarily succeed). This is another reason to think about right and wrong in politics as violations of formal prin-ciples, and not as things someone does out of selfish motivation.
Now let us think about political corruption via Kant’s conceptions and con-ceptualization. Assuming that the core of political corruption is the misuse of public power for private gain, our mission is to develop a Kantian conception of this notion. We can actually develop two conceptions of political corruption.
First, we can conceive political corruption as a wrong done to humanity in general or to a public right, but not to specific individuals. That is, political cor-ruption consists of behavior and practices that deviate from certain principles.
The wrong that characterizes political corruption is not to any specific person but rather to the principles themselves. Thus, this conception does not recognize or does not have an interest in the harm of specific persons.
Another conception would conceive political corruption as a form of decep-tion or secrecy. In addidecep-tion, this Kantian concepdecep-tion of political corrupdecep-tion dis-misses the subjective element of political corruption, and the material harm to specific individuals. In other words, what makes something corrupt is not the motivation to promote private interest but rather that the attempt to promote private interest is done in a manner that violates the imperative of honesty and publicity. Against this background, I want to turn now to contemporary writers who suggested revised conceptions of political corruption.
The upshot of all this is that Kantian conception of political corruption tends to be abstract and tends to be focused on official duties and institutions. It does not acknowledge the importance of motivations. Its starting point is not who endangers democracy, but what kind of behavior contradicts democratic prin-ciples. In addition, the conception does not have a place for class politics. The identity of the agent and the identity of the victim are not important. As we shall see in the next section, Kant’s conceptualization is very similar to recent concep-tual works on political corruption, although some of them intend to develop a different approach to the subject, and some of them reject Kant’s ideas. We can
The upshot of all this is that Kantian conception of political corruption tends to be abstract and tends to be focused on official duties and institutions. It does not acknowledge the importance of motivations. Its starting point is not who endangers democracy, but what kind of behavior contradicts democratic prin-ciples. In addition, the conception does not have a place for class politics. The identity of the agent and the identity of the victim are not important. As we shall see in the next section, Kant’s conceptualization is very similar to recent concep-tual works on political corruption, although some of them intend to develop a different approach to the subject, and some of them reject Kant’s ideas. We can