Different Subgroups by Partisan Condition and with a Fuller Partisan Choice Set
In Table 2 in the text, we combine data from both the PT and PSDB treat-ments and look at copartisanship as a choice variable (which means the selection of PT in the PT treatments and the selection of PSDB in the PSDB treatments). In addition, we combine all other parties (including the
Political Corruption and Partisan Engagement 79
PT in the PSDB treatments and the PSDB in the PT treatments) into the category of “other partisanship.”
Here we get closer to the raw data, displaying the partisanship distribu-tions for the PT vignettes and the PSDB vignettes and showing the specific numbers for the PT, PSDB, PMDB, and PV in each case. Because the chi-squared test becomes less reliable when cells have an expected value of less than 5, we group together the many other minor parties that respondents could have selected into an “other” category.
In both the PT and PSDB vignettes, we see the behavior among the highly educated respondents that is summarized in Table 2: nonpartisanship decreases (by 14.5 percentage points in the PSDB vignettes and by 8 per-centage points in the PT vignettes), and other partisanship increases (par-ticularly for the PV, which gains by 10 percentage points in the PSDB vi-gnettes and 8.5 percentage points in the PT vivi-gnettes). With the data sepa-rated between the PT and PSDB vignettes, the chi-squared statistics de-crease in size and are not significant at conventional levels for the highly educated. Nonetheless, these results are consistent with those presented in the text and offer further support for the claim that information about cor-ruption actually increases partisan engagement among the most educated.
For the remainder of the sample, the patterns in the data are somewhat more complex than the overall results in Table 2 suggest. In the PT condi-tions, information about corruption leads to basically no change in the dis-tribution of partisanship, which is consistent with the overall results reported in the text. In contrast, in the PSDB condition among the less educated respondents, the proportion of respondents declaring themselves to be PSDB partisans drops by 2.5 percentage points (or 30 percent), while the proportion of respondents declaring PT partisanship drops by 7.5 percent-age points (or 20 percent). The PMDB is the winner for less educated re-spondents in the PSDB conditions; the proportion of rere-spondents declaring PMDB partisanship doubles for this group. The differences in these distri-butions are statistically significant.
We did not have a priori hypotheses about how responses among the less educated might vary across the PSDB and PT conditions. We find the loss of PT support under the corrupt-PSDB condition particularly interest-ing and worthy of further exploration in future research. It is worth notinterest-ing that PSDB identification is much lower than PT identification in the popula-tion as a whole and within this group, which might make it more difficult for less educated respondents to quickly interpret this vignette and might in-crease the volatility of responses.
80 Matthew S. Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro Panel A: PT Vignettes; All Respondents.
N = 976; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.
2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 3.94 (p < 0.56).
PT PSDB PMDB PV Other None Panel B: PT Vignettes; Respondents with Completed Secondary Education or Less.
N = 824; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.
2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 1.72 (p < 0.89).
PT PSDB PMDB PV Other None Panel C: PT Vignettes; Respondents with Some Tertiary Education or More.
N = 152; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.
2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 5.25 (p < 0.39).
PSDB Vignettes Panel A: PSDB Vignettes; All Respondents.
N = 981; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.
2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 16.32 (p < 0.01).
PT PSDB PMDB PV Other None Panel B: PSDB Vignettes; Respondents with Completed Secondary Education or Less.
N = 849; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.
2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 14.78 (p < 0.02).
Political Corruption and Partisan Engagement 81
PT PSDB PMDB PV Other None
Not Corrupt
0.29 (20)
0.13 (9)
0.04 (3)
0.03 (2)
0.03 (2)
0.48 (33) Corrupt 0.29
(18)
0.13 (8)
0.05 (3)
0.13 (8)
0.08 (5)
0.33 (21) Panel C: PSDB Vignettes; Respondents with Some Tertiary Education or More.
N = 132; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.
2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 7.46 (p < 0.19).
Corrupção Política e Engajamento Partidário: Evidências do Brasil Abstrato: Em democracias consolidadas, as afiliações partidárias da maior parte dos cidadãos são estáveis e não são afetadas por eventos políticos de curto prazo. No entanto, pesquisas recentes em democracias jovens sugerem que a adesão partidária pode ser mais volúvel nesses contextos. No presente estudo, desenvolvemos hipóteses sobre como a corrupção política pode afetar a afiliação do eleitor aos partidos dos agentes políticos corruptos ou ao sistema partidário por inteiro. Com base em dados colhidos em pesquisa original feita no Brasil, demonstra-mos que perguntas com cenários de corrupção política mudam os pa-drões de afiliação partidária dos entrevistados com maior nível de escola-ridade. Especificamente, coletamos evidências de que corrupção associa-da a um partido reduz o apartiassocia-darismo e aumenta significativamente a identificação com outros partidos políticos. Por outro lado, concluímos que informações sobre corrupção não têm um efeito mensurável consis-tente na adesão partidária dos entrevistados com menos educação. Ao final, discutimos sobre as implicações de um partidarismo mais maleável na accountability democrática.
Palavras-chaves: Brasil, adesão partidária, corrupção
Journal of Politics in Latin America
James David Bowen (2015),
Rethinking Democratic Governance: State Building, Autonomy, and
Accountability in Correa’s Ecuador, in: Journal of Politics in Latin America, 7, 1, 83–110.
URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-8225 ISSN: 1868-4890 (online), ISSN: 1866-802X (print)
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Journal of Politics in Latin America 1/2015: 83–110