Discussion

The most important values are those calculated for the impact of foreign-born. For income redistribution, the original metric coefficient resulting from the multilevel regression modeling is not significant, thus the standardized effect of -0.20 may be disregarded as potential random measurement error. For health care we see that the average marginal change in public opinion is roughly -0.7 (calculated by taking the low margin of 85.93 and subtracting it from the high margin of 85.25). Although this number appears small when the scale is potentially calculated out of 100, it is in fact quite large.

The regional standard deviation of public opinion (all else equal) is 1.56 as listed in the bottom rows under the label "Empty-model SD". Most of the standard deviation from the overall variance may be explained at the individual and country-levels. However, -0.7 is 44% of the regional standard deviation in public opinion toward health care. And this represents a very large effect at the regional level, the second largest in the model behind tertiary degrees, all else equal. A similar story is told for the effect of foreign-born on public opinion toward old-age welfare. The marginal average change is roughly -1 (82.75 subtracted from 81.70) and this is a change of about 41% of the variation at the regional level and is the largest standardized effect in the model for old-age welfare.

standardized effect in the model predicting old-age welfare and second largest in predicting health care. In both cases the addition of foreign-born by region improved the model fit compared with models that were otherwise identical. These results are consistent with previous research that demonstrates a negative relationship between the size of region’s immigrant population and support for universal spending programs in Sweden (Eger 2010b), although they are the first of their kind to look at all of Western Europe. Finally, individuals who are higher in SES measured by years of education are less supportive of redistribution and old-age welfare consistent with self-interest theory. I discuss these findings further in Chapter 7. Having tested for the determinants of individual-level public opinions in this chapter, I shift my focus to the relationship of public opinion to social policy next.

5 CHAPTER FIVE CAUSALITY OF PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL POLICY

This chapter picks up on the arguments presented in Chapter 2.4 on the importance of individualism, corporatism and the differences between English-speaking and European historical institutions. I present two competing arguments to explain the cross-national alignment of opinion and policy. One is a feedback loop between opinion and policy the other is an institutional co-determination of opinion and policy. Using data from the ISSP and various country-level sources I provide tentative answers to the questions: Is this cross-national patterning of public opinion and social policy the result of opinion-policy causality? Or is it the result of an institutional factor that brings them into alignment?

Or, are both true?

What is known from research in the social, economic and political sciences is that sometimes opinion appears to shape policy and sometimes policy to shape opinion. On the one hand, opinion feedback occurs when various democratic processes facilitate opinion to cause policy-makers to alter or introduce new policies; and on the other, policy feedback occurs when policies shape opinions through creation of public clienteles reliant on social policies and publics who normatively support these policies. When both exist, the relationship of opinion and policy exists in a feedback loop, where each exerts an influence on the other over time leading them towards equilibrium with each other.

Looking at the advanced democratic nation-states of the world reveals a pattern that looks like equilibrium. Where public opinion is low, social policy spending is also low and vice-versa. Figure 8 plots opinion and social policy using data from the ISSP and OECD. It shows a clear patterning of data with a positive linear relationship; greater public support equates with greater spending.

Note: Data from ISSP and OECD; Two-letter country codes found on p. vii.

OZ'06

OZ'86 OZ'90

OZ'96 CA'06 OZ'98

CA'96

IE'06 IE'91 IE'96

IE'98 JP'06

JP'96

JP'98 NZ'08

NZ'91

NZ'97 NZ'98

GB'06

GB'85

GB'90 GB'91 GB'96

GB'98

US'06

US'85 US'90

US'91 US'96 US'98

AT'93 AT'99 DK'08

FI'06 FR'06

FR'97 FR'98

DE'06

DE'85 DE'90

DE'91 DE'96

DE'98

IT'91 IT'96

IT'98

NL'06

NL'91

NL'98 NO'06 NO'90

NO'96 NO'98

PT'06

ES'06 ES'96

ES'98 SE'06

SE'96 SE'98

CH'07 CH'99

1015202530

-2 -1 0 1 2

Public Opinion: Support of Social Policy

The relationship in Figure 8 could be a product of a feedback loop between opinion and policy, or it could be the result of some external forces that simultaneously impact both opinion and policy in a similar manner leading them towards alignment.

Figure 9 plots public opinion and social policy in a different way by dividing these same countries into English-speaking and European groups. In the left panel, the average spending on social policy is plotted for each group of countries from 1960 to 2008; the thick solid line represents the average for European countries and the thick dot-dash line for the English-speaking. Standard deviation bands are presented for each as corresponding thin lines. In the right panel, public opinion by country and year is plotted in triangles for European countries and crosses for the English-speaking countries.

Figure 9. Social Policy Spending and Recent Public Opinion Data in Two Families of Institutions

Note: Figure adapted from (Breznau 2011), data from OECD, ILO and ISSP. Countries included are the 16 from Brooks and Manza (2007).

5 10 15 20 25 30 35

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Public Opinion toward Social Policy

5 10 15 20 25 30 35

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Social Policy, Spending as a % of GDP

European Family:

Average/SD English-speaking Family:

Average/SD

English-speaking (Х) European (Δ)

Figure 9 demonstrates how stable the social policy differences are between the two groups of countries over time. It also shows a pattern of opinion between the two in the right panel, albeit with more variation. As discussed in Chapter 2.3, each of these groups has institutional similarities such as individualistic social norms and corporatist political institutions. In this chapter I provide theoretical explanations for the cross-national patterning of public opinion and social policy.