5. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
5.4. Discarding Stereotypes
In studying encounters between the protagonists and antagonists of Sufism, it is important to eschew stereotyping that echoes colonial discourse. This may be found in much of the existing literature about Sufism and Salafism, portraying African Sufis as inherently “peaceful”,
“moderate” and “syncretistic”, while their Arab Salafī opponents and coreligionists are depicted as predisposed to “harshness” and “rigidity”.70 Some of the postcolonial literature, also distinguishes African Islam, or “Islam Noir”, from Arabic Islam along almost the same lines, as both early and later colonial-era literature, that is, by conflating religion with race.71
Some of the misconceptions about Sufism have fortunately been corrected by more recent studies taking a more nuanced approach, as Seesemann suggests.72 Nevertheless, one trope of the colonial discourse that has proved to be everlasting is that of the purportedly inherent peacefulness of Sufism, and the allegedly rigid and xenophobic character of Salafism.73 Salafīs, particularly those
70 Alexander Thurston, “Polyvalent, Transnational Religious Authority: The Tijaniyya Sufi Order and Al-Azhar University”, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 2018 (advance article,
https://doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfx090), pp. 3-4.
71 Rüdiger Seesemann, “Sufism in West Africa”, Religion Compass 4/10, 2010, pp. 606-614, (see pp. 606-607);
Rüdiger Seesemann and Benjamin Soares, “Being as Good Muslims as Frenchmen: On Marabouts, Colonial Modernity, and the Islamic Sphere in French West Africa”, in Journal of Religion in Africa, 39 (1), (pp. 91-120).
72 Seesemann divides scholarship on Sufism and Islam in Africa to three categories: 1) works by colonial
administrators, most often without academic training, produced in the first half of the twentieth century; 2) works by Christian missionaries that were produced after the independence of the colonies in Africa, roughly around the 1960s; and 3) more recent works by anthropologists, historians and specialists in Islamic studies which are said to have corrected some of the misconceptions. See: Rüdiger Seesemann, Sufism in West Africa, p. 606-607.
73 French colonialism saw Islam in Africa (or as they labelled it, Islam Noir) “as fundamentally more tractable and less of a threat to their rule than Islam as practiced in North Africa or the Middle East, which they thought was
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who have studied or taught at the religious centres of the Middle East such as Dār al-Ḥadīth, or the Islamic University of Medina, after its establishment at the turn of the 1960s (CE) are often said to be extremely exclusivist, prone to labelling Sufis as disbelievers (kuffār), polytheists (mushrikīn) or tomb-worshippers (quburiyyūn) at the very least. They (Salafīs) are said to substantiate these accusations by the application of terms such as “reprehensible innovation”
(bidʿa), “disbelief” (kufr) and “polytheism” (shirk), while Sufis are supposed to be much more inclusivist in their approach and practice, in comparison to Salafīs. The data in this study, however, demonstrates that the picture is not that simple, as some studies would like the reader to believe.
All three of these Salafī polemics—al-Ifrīqī’s, al-Hilālī’s, and Dakhīl Allāh’s— are subjected here to thorough scrutiny, revealing that the primary objective was not just to discredit Tijānī Sufis and destroy their belief. Rather, in each case, the objective was to win them over and introduce them to what the Salafī authors of these polemics believed to be the true creed and correct practice of the religion of Islam. Chronologically the first of the three, al-Ifrīqī’s repeatedly calls his interlocutors brothers (ikhwān) and tries to appeal to their hearts. The second in chronological order, al-Hilālī’s polemic demonstrates a high reverence and respect towards the founding figure of the Tijāniyya. Moreover, her asserts that Aḥmad al-Tijānī had already shown his followers the true way to deal with certain problematic Sufi tenets, by insisting that if they were found to contradict the parameters of the religion, they would no longer bear any sanctity and should ultimately be discarded. Thus, he addresses the followers of the Tijānī master, imploring them to follow his example. Chronologically the last of the three, Dakhīl Allāh restricts himself to the scrutiny of Tijānī doctrine without hurting the feelings of his opponents. While it is true that on occasion, all three of these Salafī authors label certain practices of the Tijānīs as bidʿa and even shirk, none of the three depict their opponents themselves as disbelievers or polytheists.
It should also be remarked at this stage that not all opponents of the Tijāniyya have approached the Tijānīs in the same way as the three Salafīs mentioned above: some antagonists of Tijānī Sufism have applied extremely harsh and exclusivist styles of critique. A typical example is that of the Mauritanian Ibn Māyābā who did not hesitate to attack Tijānīs as “soldiers of Christian French colonialism”, nor to attack Aḥmad al-Tijānī in a rather direct way, portraying him as a liar
inherently ‘xenophobic’ and anticolonial”. See: Rüdiger Seesemann and Benjamin Soares, “Being as Good Muslims as Frenchmen”, p. 95.
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who had deceived gullible people in order to attain worldly gains. Some of Ibn Māyābā’s Jordanian disciples even depicted the Tijānī master as satanic saint (al-walī al-shaytānī).74 Here, however, the reader should also be reminded that neither Ibn Māyābā nor his Jordanian disciples were Salafī or Wahhābī. Ibn Māyābā was himself a Sufi, belonging to the Qādiriyya, a rival order to the Tijāniyya at the time.75 This does not mean, however, that no Salafī ever composed any such harsh critique of the Tijāniyya, nor had recourse to abusive language and name calling. Hāshim Ḥusayn Rajab, a Salafī from the Sudanese city of Atbara, for example, produced a refutation of Tijānī doctrine at least as harsh as Ibn Māyābā’s, and had many debates with Tijānīs, the first of which, held in the house of ʿUmar Masʿūd, was transmuted into public confrontations during preaching sessions in the mosques of the city.76
Unlike what the stereotypes would lead one to believe, Tijānīs for their part, are occasionally appear to have lost their tempers and raised accusations of disbelief against their opponents, should they not recant and withdraw their criticism. Most frequently of all, they may be seen to have attempted to transpose the level of debate from that of a mere discussion to something quite different, wherein instead of providing counterarguments and refutations of their adversaries, they have attacked them personally, calling them names and targeting their scholarly credentials. Both ʿUmar Masʿūd and Aḥmad b. al-Hādī maye be seen to have repeatedly had recourse to this strategy.
Responding to al-Ifrīqī, for example, ʿUmar Masʿūd portrayed him as the ultimate liar (kadhdhāb), who had filled his treatise with excessive cursing and swearing directed towards the Tijānīs,77 whereas, in fact, it is hard to find a single swear word in al-Ifrīqī’s discourse that is directed at the followers of the Tijāniyya brotherhood. ʿUmar Masʿūd’s master, the Egyptian Muḥammad al-Ḥāfiẓ did not hesitate to call al-Ifrīqī a pseudo-scholar (shuwaykh) who lacked the required scholarly credentials to engage in debate. Aḥmad b. al-Hādī’s replies to his opponents, including al-Hilālī, are filled with such epithets that one would hardly believe it possible to find such
74 Ibrāhīm al-Qaṭṭān, one of Ibn Māyābā’s Jordanian disciples, for example, titled his anti-Tijānī polemical treatise as Makhāzī al-walī al-shayṭānī al-mulaqqab bi-l-Tijānī al-jānī (Disgraceful [Beliefs] of the Satanic Walī,
Nicknamed as the Criminal al-Tijānī).
75 Jamil Abun-Nasr, The Tijāniyya: a Sufi Order in the Modern World, p. 174.
76 ʿUmar Masʿūd, Iṭfāʾ al-qandīl wa-bayān mā fīhi min l-kidhb wa-l-ghish wa-l-taḥrīf wa-l-tabdīl, n.p. [Khartoum], n.d, p. 2
77 ʿUmar Muḥammad Masʿūd al-Tijānī, al-Radd ʿalā al-Ifrīqī difāʿan ʿan l-ṭarīqa al-Tijānīyya, n.p. [Khartoum] n.d, p. 1.
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natured name-calling in any Sufi’s discourse.78 On one occasion, he describes one of his opponents, thus: “The world of his heart being filled with obsession with disbelief and polytheism to the extent that when he opens his mouth he speaks of it”,79 adding elsewhere “This stupid ignoramus took the path of Khawārij and followed in their footsteps”.80 Thus, the data shows that
“rigidity” and “harshness” are, not, as some have presumed, the preserve of Salafīs and Salafism;
Sufis and Sufism are also shown here to have had recourse to them.