In July 2012, a failed round of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran in Istanbul centered on a proposal that demanded that Iran stop enriching to 20 percent, ship its entire stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium abroad, and shut down the Fordow facility in return for a series of confidence building measures. The proposal, described at the time by the P5+1 as
“balanced,” was rejected by the Iranians. Seven months passed before the parties returned to the table in Almaty, Kazakhstan on February 26, 2013.
Among the developments that set the stage for the meeting were the Iranian announcement in January that it intended to install advanced centrifuges at its Natanz facility, the new round of US sanctions that went into effect on February 6, and President Obama’s remarks during his February 12, 2013 State of the Union address that the Iranians “must recognize that now is the time for a diplomatic solution, because a coalition stands united in demanding that they meet their obligations.”10
Determined to sustain the process, in early 2013, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton presented a “revised offer” on behalf of the P5+1, with the “purpose being to make sure that we’ve had a good and detailed conversation, with the ambition that we see progress by the end of the meeting.”11 This new and revised offer was actually a watered-down version of the rejected 2012 proposal. According to the new proposal, Iran would halt all 20 percent enrichment activities; transfer only part of its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA custody; suspend operations at the Fordow facility (rather than demanding a shutdown of the facility); provide the IAEA with information to address the outstanding allegations of possible military activities; and commit to the Additional Protocol and the subsidiary arrangement to Iran’s safeguard agreement, known as Code 3.1.
In return, the P5+1 were willing to provide Iran fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR); support IAEA technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR; review the IAEA technical cooperation projects and recommend to the IAEA Board that some be restarted; and put together a detailed package to provide medical isotopes for cancer patients in Iran. The Unites States said it was prepared to permit
safety-related inspections and repair in Iran for Iranian commercial aircraft and provide spare parts, and the P5+1 would cooperate in acquiring a light water research reactor to produce medical isotopes; provide sanctions relief on sales of precious metal and petrochemicals; and not impose new proliferation-related sanctions on Iran.12
Even though the proposal took into account the failure of the previous round, it was still not enough to accommodate Iran, especially the Iranians’
longstanding demand for recognition of its right to enrich uranium and the imperative of lifting all sanctions. At the end of the meeting, all that Ashton could announce was that “the main result” of the meeting was an agreement to have an experts meeting in Istanbul in March. That would give Iran time to examine the content of the proposal. Ashton did not elaborate on the specifics of the proposal other than to say that they included a “confidence building proposal.” She added, “This is an opportunity for Iran to take some initial steps that would improve the confidence of the international community in the wholly peaceful nature of their nuclear programme.”13 At the experts meeting in March the P5+1 provided further details on the revised confidence building proposal they had put forward in February in Almaty.
Against the backdrop of these two meetings, the parties convened once again at the political level in Almaty (April 5-6, 2013). Following this meeting, it became clear, in the words of Ashton, that “the positions of the E3+3 and Iran remain far apart on the substance.”14 US Under Secretary of State Sherman described the Iranian counterproposal as
“very disappointing,” noting that, “According to the counterproposal, Iran would place little or no constraints on the current nuclear activities, while demanding major sanctions to be removed immediately.”15 This round of engagement ended with a meeting between Catherine Ashton and Saeed Jalili, which in terms of the overall process was essentially meaningless.
In sum, the three rounds of talks in the spring of 2013 were a disappointment for several reasons. The talks drove home that while over the course of 2012 the US had put in place elements of a new and more determined approach toward Iran, when it came to the negotiation itself, the result was a “more of the same” approach from Tehran. Moreover, sweetening one’s offer without having received anything from the other
side, which is what occurred in Almaty, is a problematic negotiating tactic.
In any case, the second round of talks in Almaty in early April ended in deadlock, with no date set for another meeting. The diplomatic process was put on hold until after the Iranian elections in June.
Following Rouhani’s election, it was clear that a new round of negotiations would be initiated, but it took until mid-October for the first meeting between Iran and the P5+1 to take place in Geneva. The two days of talks (October 15-16, 2013) were hailed as the most detailed and substantive to date.16 Western negotiators were struck by the fact that Iran seemed willing to “cut to the chase,” i.e., to deal with its nuclear program in a direct and focused manner, even speaking English in order to eliminate the cumbersome translation process and speed up the pace of talks. But these diplomatic statements about the seriousness of the talks should not be understood as indication of actual change in Iran’s nuclear approach. Indeed, regarding the ultimately failed Almaty talks, American officials had also noted that they experienced then “the most substantive conversation they ever had” with the Iranians, and that international arms control envoys were able to go through their proposal slide by slide without the Iranians focusing on their counter-proposal.17
When focusing not on such atmospherics but rather on the concrete proposals that the Iranians were actually willing to consider, and whether they provided indication that Iran was reversing course as far as its military ambitions, it was not clear what if anything had substantively changed in the negotiations since Rouhani became president. The Iranians were still engaging in tactical bargaining, while continuing to advance their program.
By early November, ahead of the second round of talks in Geneva on November 7-9, 2013, it became clear that what the US, and the P5+1, was actually set on is a two-staged process whereby an initial deal with Iran would be negotiated that would involve some sanctions relief in return for initial Iranian concessions on the nuclear front, in order to gain some breathing space for negotiating a comprehensive deal, or as one US official put it: “to put some time on the clock.” The risk in this strategy is that the so-called confidence building measure will not build confidence, but rather will serve as the platform for continued bickering over what was agreed and who is upholding, or not upholding, what. This was the experience
ten years ago with the partial deals that involved Iranian suspension of uranium conversion activities (the 2003-2005 years).18 At the end of the third round of talks in late November, the negotiations did yield agreement on an interim deal. Though immediately hailed as an “historic agreement,”
some problematic loopholes became apparent very soon thereafter. As 2013 drew to a close, the Iranians already began to challenge elements of this understanding that is intended to freeze Iran’s nuclear advances while the parties negotiate a final agreement over the next six months.
Days after the deal was announced, Iran’s foreign minister clarified that Iran would continue some construction work at Arak. In early December Iran announced that it was testing its advanced centrifuges.
Another notable aspect of the current talks are hints that in parallel to the nuclear-specific talks, bilateral US-Iranian talks on a broader spectrum of regional issues may also have been initiated. The prospect that these two states are engaged in talks that will relate to their respective spheres of influence in the region, or whereby the US may acquiesce to increased Iranian regional influence in return for nuclear concessions, has begun to raise serious concerns in other regional states. The impact on Saudi Arabia has been especially striking, and signs of an emerging crisis with the US – focused mainly on Saudi anger at the handling of Syria, but including fears regarding bilateral talks with Iran – began to surface.