31 To be able to compare, the percentage of the party votes was calculated by using the number of all respondents who voted (N=61), instead of all who answered (N=92).
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Governing Party Opposition Not voted n/a
What did you vote in the last election?
N=109
Figure 28: Voting Behavior of the Middle Income Groups
The Presence of Citizen-oriented Activism? 183
opposition, but not to be more or less involved in voting. Many respondents expressed concerns that their vote will not be counted since they intended to vote for the opposition; thus, we might even assume that a considerable share of those who did not vote, would support the opposition as well. The high vote for the opposition may be due to the urban environment in which the
research was conducted and where most of the middle income groups can be found, rather than a particular political preference of the group. This reminds us of the rural/urban divide which is pronounced in many African countries and has already played a role for us when comparing living conditions of the respondents with the average Ugandans. Kampala, like many other African cities, has traditionally been an opposition stronghold (Gore & Muwanga, 2014, p. 2202; Rakner & van de Walle, 2009, p. 117; Resnick, 2011, p. 142). In Kampala in 2016, Museveni received 30.9% of the votes, whereas the opposition was able to draw a support of 69.1%, which resembles more closely our results (Electoral Commission, 2016). Thus, the results from our respondents present an urban phenomenon, and can equally be applied to the urban underclass, hence is not guided by a collective interest derived from a common ideology or material position. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to have a closer look at the voting behavior and see whether any difference arises according to income, education, sex or age.
We chose to depict the results in their total numbers as well as in percentage, to allow a better comparison between the subgroups, while also revealing distortions that come about due to small sample size. Thus, the 100% abstention for those above 60 is put in context when compared to the table above, revealing that only one respondent was 60 or older. All other income groups have a similar range of respondents (between 9 and 15); only the LMC is much more represented, with 26 respondents. Hence, Figure 31 helps to put the LMC in perspective to the other groups. The conclusions drawn from alignment according to income are somewhat ambiguous. We see that opposition support is high among all groups except for the floating class, but highest among the UMC and UC. The floating class, equally termed as the “vulnerable”, might also be the most vulnerable to political change that may threaten their already unstable status. With some caution, we may say that those respondents best off are more likely to support the opposition than any other group. This would go against the assumption that those who managed to be in a good
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Poor FC LMC UMC UC
Voters' Alignment by Income N=73
Governing Opposition Not voted
Figure 29: Vote by Income Figure 30: Vote by Income, in Percent
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position will support the regime that allowed for their ascension. Instead, it might be that for these groups the services provided by the government are not sufficient anymore and other benefits gain importance, such as the guarantee of civil liberties, or the respect of human rights.
In terms of age, we notice a generational shift concerning political alignment. For those aged up to the age of 45, opposition was the preferred voter’s choice, followed by abstention. Only for those above 46 regime support is more pronounced. Even the person who is above 60 intended to vote for the NRM but could not do so because she was not in Kampala at the time of the election.
As indicated by some interviewees, the “youth” is more critical of the regime and more likely to vote for the opposition. The experience of the previous regimes and times of civil unrest play a big role in support for Museveni, a consideration absent among younger respondents who have only known Museveni as a president (see chapter 12.2.2 for more details). It remains to be seen whether in following years this trend will continue, as more and more young people reach voting age.
Regarding education, the sample gives an overrepresentation of people with tertiary education, which does not allow us to make any statements about the other educational groups. Here, the rates of abstention and opposition vote reflect approximative the general results, which is not surprising, given that they constitute the majority of the respondents. The vote in terms of gender is more revealing. Women are more likely than men not to vote at all or to refuse to answer that question. If they vote, they will less likely vote for the opposition; vote for the NRM regime remains about the same. This observation brings back to mind the argument from Ferree Marx & McClurg Mueller (2004) that women feel that access to politics is more restricted towards them and thus refrain from engaging in any political activity. This seems to be supported by the voting behavior of the female respondents. Similarly, they were less likely than men to report having an interest in politics (38.9% vs. 69.7% of male respondents), while at the same time they have more trust in
0
Figure 32: Vote Alignment by Age, in Percent
The Presence of Citizen-oriented Activism? 185
the current political leaders than men (32.4% of women trust their political leaders, contrary to 15.4% of men).
In her study on women and politics in Uganda, Tripp shows how Ugandan women movements, particularly in the time after the civil war were able to gain considerable rights, which may explain their favorable stance towards the regime (Tripp, 2000, p. 68ff).
On the contrary, neither religious affiliation nor regional origin gives some revealing insights into
0
186 Middle Income Groups in Uganda and Their Forms (and Absences) of Political and Social Mobilization
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voting behavior. This has also been confirmed elsewhere (Alava & Ssentongo, 2016). So, we find that voting behavior is influenced by some demographic characteristics, as already mentioned in other research on the topic, such as age or gender. We do not find a strong indication of regional voting, especially since the President and the principal contender both come from the Western region. Neither do we find that people with higher income are more inclined to vote, as suggested by Verba et al. (1987, p. 76). Thus, in this regard, the middle income groups do not behave overly
“democratic”, by making use of their constitutionally given right to vote. Linking a democratic attitude with voting remains problematic, however, given that the credibility of the elections is highly questioned by many respondents and the stakes are quite low, as people are relatively sure of the outcome.
Figure 37: Interest in Politics, by Gender 9.2.2 The Legitimacy of Elections
There have been several issues that challenged the legitimacy of the various elections held in Uganda. For one, every election had been accompanied by irregularities (Perrot et al., 2014, p. 13).
Thus, for example, only 44% of Ugandans believe that elections are adequate to remove unwanted leaders from office – in Kampala this rate is even eight percentage points lower (Afrobarometer, 2015, pp. 35–37). Ugandans like to remind themselves and others that the country has never seen a peaceful change of leadership, and there is a prevailing sentiment that the chances they will any time soon are rather bleak. For many, there is a dire need for change, but unless Museveni decides to leave power, this change will not come. Hence, in such a context, voting for change seems futile:
0