AND REAGAN
According to Carter, the Soviets saw détente as “a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence” with “military power and military assistance as the best means of “expanding their influence abroad” as well as the use of “proxy forces to achieve their purposes.”9 Carter noted the excessive Soviet military increase, the violation of hu-man rights (and thus the Helsinki agreement), and the closed nature Soviet society to further differentiate the United States and the USSR. In contrast, Carter con-tinually made statements offering his view of détente, typically stating his desire that détente be “broad in scope” and “reciprocal.”10
Some of Carter’s understanding of détente can be gleaned from statements of what détente is, as when he said, “To me it means progress toward peace.”11 In-deed, when Carter used the term, he said he was “not speaking only of military security” but of:
the concern among our individual citizens, Soviet and American, that comes from the knowledge . . . that the leaders of our two countries have the capacity to destroy human society through misunderstandings or mistakes.12
By relaxing this tension through reducing the nuclear threat, Carter claimed the world would be safer, and the superpowers would free themselves “to concentrate on constructive action to give the world a better life.”13 For Carter, détente related not only to military security, but to the peace of mind and better life people would experience as the specter of nuclear war declined.
Some of Carter’s understanding of détente can be gleaned from quotations wherein he distinguished détente from something else, as when he said:
Detente and arms control are necessary conditions, but not enough to build world peace upon solid foun-dations. To assert otherwise would be to give military matters an autonomy that it does not have, to give it primacy over the political, and to disengage politics from social matters. . . .14
Détente was not arms control; the two were distin-guishable. Note also how détente was here presented as a condition of world peace.
In addition, Carter sought a definition of détente that was both expansive and flexible, “further defined
by experience, as . . . nations evolve new means by which they can live with each other in peace.”15 Cart-er’s sense of détente’s breadth can be found in state-ments like, “We seek a world of peace. But such a world must accommodate diversity—social, political, and ideological. Only then can there be a genuine co-operation among nations and among cultures,” and,
“Our long-term objective must be to convince the So-viet Union of the advantages of cooperation and of the costs of disruptive behavior.”16
Despite his insistence that détente be broadly con-ceived, sometimes Carter’s usage painted a restricted, even anemic, portrait of détente as when he referred merely to “a pattern of détente,” his only mention of détente in his 1979 State of the Union Address.17 An-other such example can be found in the Vienna Sum-mit Communiqué released on the signing of the SALT II treaty. The communiqué implied détente was in-adequately defined. Referring to détente as a process rather than a pattern, the communiqué mentioned the two sides “expressed their support for the process of international détente which in their view should become increasingly specific in nature.”18 Perhaps greater clarity can be found by exploring the rules or principles of détente as understood by Carter.
Carter’s clearest statements on détente are found in his 1978 United States Naval Academy (USNA) commencement address—a speech he “largely wrote himself”19 in which he sought to balance détente and resolve. In addition to calling for a broad definition of détente, he laid out the following principles for détente: reciprocity, restraint, meticulously honoring agreements; cooperation, arms limitation, freedom of movement and expression; protection of human rights, discarding the goal of attaining military
su-premacy, and forgoing the opportunities of military advantage.20 Although some of these things are goals rather than principles, this articulation was the clear-est statement of the foundations of détente as Carter envisioned them. Almost as clear was a later state-ment that “genuine détente . . . includes restraint in the use of military power and an end to the pursuit of unilateral advantage” and “must include the hon-oring of solemn international agreements concerning human rights and a mutual effort to promote a climate in which these rights can flourish.”21
The noted quotations could suggest Carter’s un-derstanding of détente never really coalesced in his own mind. Moreover, even in Carter’s time, observ-ers heard “contradictory voices” in Washington, DC, regarding the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Carter ex-plained the apparent contradictions between détente and resolve as follows: “We have one basic policy that is complicated in itself.”22
Just as Carter clarified détente’s apparent tension of relaxation and resolve, much of Reagan’s overall approach to détente can be expressed in terms of de-terrence, dialogue, and signaling. To President Rea-gan, détente was not playing out well; hence, he was determined to change course. Reagan treated military power as a prerequisite for U.S.-Soviet negotiations, first to attract Soviet attention, second to deter Soviet aggression, and third to permit the United States to bargain from a position of strength. Reagan empha-sized the importance of clear signaling through con-crete action, noting in an interview that “the Soviet Union . . . during what was supposed to be a detente, has gone forward with the greatest military buildup in the history of man. And maybe we need to get their attention.”23
On the one hand, then, Reagan read a clear signal from Soviet activity, faulted U.S. policy, and proposed a policy change to attract Soviet notice. At the mid-point of his presidency, Reagan reiterated the practi-cal importance of commanding Soviet attention in the following critique:
. . . Mr. Brezhnev said that detente was serving their purpose and that by 1985, they would be able to get whatever they wanted by other means.
So, I have no illusions about [the Soviets]. But I do be-lieve that the Soviets can be dealt with if you deal with them on the basis of what is practical for them and that you can point out is to their advantage as well as ours to do certain things. . . .
Evil empire, the things of that kind, I thought . . . it was time to get their attention, to let them know that I was viewing them realistically.24
On the other, however, Regan avoids a “just peace”
approach,25 for he believed strengthened U.S.
military power was a prerequisite to fruitful U.S.- Soviet engagement.
I believe that the United States . . . went all out in various efforts at détente . . . in which we unilaterally disarmed with the idea that maybe if we did this and showed our good faith, [The Soviets] would recipro-cate by reducing their own [arms]. Well, they didn’t.
They’ve engaged in the most massive military buildup the world has ever seen. And therefore, the reason I believe that there is more security today is the redress-ing that we’ve done of our own military strength, the strength of the alliance, and the unity that we have.26
Strength precedes, originates, and fosters security in Reagan’s view. Strength coupled with arms reduc-tions were keys to productive U.S.-Soviet relareduc-tions in Reagan’s vision, but he also recognized that American public support for both was necessary to undergird and sustain them.
PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF