In 1999 and again in 2000, Islamic terrorists associated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan invaded Kyrgyzstan’s southern borders and were repelled only after fierce fighting. These
experiences may have prompted Kyrgyzstan’s approval almost immediately after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States of a U.S. request to use Kyrgyz airspace for counter-terrorist operations in Afghanistan. The U.S. military repaired and upgraded the air field at the Manas international airport near Bishkek, and it became operational in December 2001.
According to the U.S. Air Force, the Manas airbase serves as the “premier air mobility hub supporting military operations in Afghanistan.” Missions include support for personnel and cargo transiting in and out of the theater, aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, and medical evacuation.
The Manas Transit Center reported in 2013 that there are about 1,500 U.S. troops and U.S.
contractors at the center, as well as KC-135 and C-17 aircraft, and that it transports nearly 300,000 troops and other personnel into and out of Afghanistan per year.47
On February 3, 2009, President Bakiyev announced during a visit to Moscow that he intended to close the Manas airbase. Many observers speculated that the decision was spurred by Russia, which offered Bakiyev a $300 million loan for economic development and a $150 million grant for budget stabilization in the wake of the world economic downturn. Russia also stated that it would write off most of a $180 million debt. The United States was notified on February 19, 2009, that under the terms of the status of forces agreement it had 180 days to vacate the airbase.
The Defense Department announced on June 24, 2009, that an agreement of “mutual benefit” had been concluded with the Kyrgyz government.48 According to then-Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev, the government decided to conclude the annually renewable
“intergovernmental agreement with the United States on cooperation and the formation of a transit center at Manas airport,” because of growing alarm about “the worrying situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” A yearly rent payment for use of land and facilities at the Manas airport was increased from $17.4 million to $60 million per year, and the United States reportedly pledged more than $36 million for infrastructure improvements and $30 million for air traffic control system upgrades for the airport. Sarbayev also stated that the United States had pledged
$20 million for a U.S.-Kyrgyz Joint Development Fund for economic projects, $21 million for counter-narcotics efforts, and $10 million for counter-terrorism efforts.49 All except the increased rent had already been appropriated or requested. The agreement also reportedly included stricter host-country conditions on U.S. military personnel. One Kyrgyz legislator claimed that the agreement was not a volte-face for Kyrgyzstan because Russia and other Central Asian states had signed agreements with NATO to permit the transit of supplies to Afghanistan.50
47 Transit Center at Manas, “Inside Manas,” at http://www.manas.afcent.af.mil/library/index.asp; Senior Airman Lynsie Nichols, “We Move You,” January 4, 2012, at http://www.manas.afcent.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123285008.
48 U.S. Department of Defense. DoD News Briefing, June 24, 2009. See also U.S. Department of State. Daily Press Briefing, June 25, 2009.
49 Tolkun Namatbayeva, “Kyrgyzstan Allows U.S. to Keep Using Base,” Agence France Presse, June 23, 2009.
50 See also CRS Report R40564, Kyrgyzstan and the Status of the U.S. Manas Airbase: Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol.
The Status of the Manas Transit Center after the April 2010 Coup
Initially after the April 2010 ouster of then-President Bakiyev, some officials in the interim government stated or implied that the conditions of the lease would be examined. Interim acting Prime Minister Roza Otunbayeva quickly announced, however, that the lease on the transit center was not in jeopardy.
In January 2011, Kyrgyz security forces killed or apprehended nearly two dozen alleged members of Jaishul Mahdi (Army of the Righteous Ruler), a primarily ethnic Kyrgyz terrorist group.
Besides reportedly bombing a synagogue in September 2010 and a sports hall in November 2010, the group allegedly had planned to bomb the Manas Transit Center, according to the
then-chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s National Security Committee, Keneshbek Duishebaev. In late February 2012, an obscure “Muslim Resistance Committee” issued a call for violence against the Transit Center to force its closure and against Kyrgyz political and clerical leaders.
During his presidential election campaign, then-candidate Atambayev stated that when the agreement for U.S. operations at the Manas Transit Center ends in 2014, he would press for ending military operations at the transit center and using the facilities for commercial transit and trade, including with Afghanistan. In late December 2011, newly elected President Atambayev responded to Iran’s threats to close the Straits of Hormuz by claiming that the U.S. Manas Transit Center—a major U.S. military facility supporting operations in Afghanistan—might be a target of Iranian missiles. Such an attack, he warned, could endanger the city of Bishkek adjacent to the Manas Transit Center, and stated that “Why do I need this kind of a base here? Does anyone need it?”51 In March 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta visited Bishkek to meet with military and other officials (although reportedly not Atambayev) before proceeding to Afghanistan. Kyrgyz media reported that these officials stressed that the airbase would be closed in 2014. During his meeting with visiting Russian President Putin in late September 2012, Atambayev reiterated that he planned to close the airbase in 2014 and to incorporate the facilities into the operations of the international airport co-located in Manas.
As part of efforts to be more open about the operations of the transit center to allay some Kyrgyz popular and elite misconceptions, the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek has reported that in FY2012, the United States provided $142.1 million in direct, indirect, and charitable expenses in connection with the Manas Transit Center; $150.6 million in FY2011, $131.5 million in FY2010; and $108 million in FY2009.
Of this FY2012 amount:
• $60 million was a lease payment;
• $25.89 million was landing and other fees and leases;
• $60,505 was a contribution to Kyrgyz Aeronavigation;
• $52.23 million was for building renovations and road repairs, for furniture and other equipment, for supplies and services, and other airport improvements;
• $ 1.89 million was for “programmatic humanitarian assistance”; and
• $2.0 million was for other local spending
51 CEDR, December 29, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950083.
In addition to this spending, $230 million was paid in FY2009 and about $370 million in FY2010 for jet fuel (see also below).52
In September 2012, Kyrgyzstan Airlines announced that it had joined with other air cargo operators to transport military cargoes through the U.S. Manas Transit Center to and from Afghanistan, providing the airline with the opportunity to gain revenues as a participating carrier along the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) of land, sea, and air routes into and out of Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan is not a major land route for shipments into and out of Afghanistan, but is an alternative route for land shipments. In May 2012, on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Chicago, the United States and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement on the ground transit of cargoes out of Afghanistan. The agreement was approved by the Kyrgyz legislature and signed into law in July 2013.
On June 27, 2013, President Atambeyev signed a bill into law directing that the Manas Transit Center be closed in July 2014 upon the expiration of the U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Transit Center Agreement, signed in 2009. U.S. Ambassador Pamela Spratlen held a meeting with the Kyrgyz foreign minister to discuss the ramifications of the legislation the day it was signed into law. In early July 2013, Ambassador Eric John, the State Department’s Senior Advisor for Security Negotiations and Agreements, led a U.S. delegation to hold talks in Bishkek “on key, mutually-beneficial security issues such as counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, border security, and building peacekeeping capability. Kyrgyzstan’s ... hosting of the Transit Center at Manas ... is one facet of this overall cooperation.”53 This statement implies that discussions included Kyrgyzstan’s future support for U.S. military activities in Afghanistan and the status of the Manas Transit Center. Kyrgyzstan’s deputy foreign minister reportedly indicated that the Kyrgyz side stressed that the United States must remove military personnel and equipment from the Transit Center before its closure on July 11, 2014.54
On August 14, 2013, Col. John Millard, Commander of the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing at the Manas Transit Center, stated that if the Manas Transit Center is closed in July 2014, “operations [carried out by the airbase] will have to move someplace else,” since U.S. forces are still scheduled be deployed in Afghanistan at that time.55 Perhaps in contrast to this statement, there are some reports that Turkey may be offered a role at the Manas International Airport
(coterminous with the present Transit Center) that could facilitate some continued U.S. use.
According to the EIU, the closure of the Manas Transit Center will signal Kyrgyzstan’s shift to heavy reliance on Russia’s economic, political and security support.56
52 U.S. Embassy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Transit Center at Manas: Recent U.S. Contributions to the Kyrgyz Government and Economy, at http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/tc_recent_contributions.html; Transit Center Jet Fuel Contracts 2009-2011, at http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/fuel_contracts.html.
53 U.S. Embassy, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, U.S. Embassy Statement on Bilateral Security Negotiations, July 12, 2013.
54 Joshua Kucera, “Reports: U.S. Has Agreed To Leave Kyrgyzstan Air Base,” Eurasianet, July 16, 2013.
55 Joshua Kucera, “After Getting Kicked Out Of Manas, Where Will U.S. Go?” Eurasianet, August 17, 2013, at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67402. The webpage contains a video clip of Col. Millard’s interview.
56 Country Report: Kyrgyz Republic, EIU, August 2013.
The December 2010 Congressional Report on Fuel Contracts
In December 2010, the majority staff of the Subcommittee for National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House Oversight Committee released a report on contracts awarded by the Defense Department’s Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to the privately owned Red Star and its sister Mina firms for the supply of jet fuel for the Manas Transit Center.57 The report stressed that many citizens of Kyrgyzstan, and even current Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva, supposed that former Kyrgyz Presidents Askar Akayev and Bakiyev and their families had benefitted from the contracts in a corrupt fashion. Perceptions of corruption regarding the fuel contracts, according to the report, were significant factors in the overthrow of the presidents and in growing tensions between the United States and Kyrgyzstan. The subcommittee reported evidence from the FBI that the Akayev family was corruptly involved in fuel supplies to the Manas Transit Center, but the subcommittee found no direct evidence of illicit involvement by the Bakiyev family. President Otunbayeva had called for transparency in the fuel contracts in a speech at the U.N. General Assembly in September 2010 and during an associated meeting with President Barack Obama.
According to the report’s findings, DLA did not know who owned Red Star or Mina until late 2010, did not claim to care whether contract funds were being misappropriated by Akayev’s family, did not know that Russia’s state-owned Gazprom gas firm had an ownership interest in a subsidiary of the firms, and did not claim to know that the firms were using false certifications to obtain fuel from Russia. On the latter issue, Red Star and Mina had repeatedly informed DLA of the false certifications scheme, according to emails and other documents. In a 2006 Red Star proposal for a fuel contract, for instance, the firm spelled out that it was participating in a scheme to circumvent supposed Russian restrictions on fuel exports for military uses, and warned DLA that opening up the contracting process to other bidders might expose this scheme and lead to a fuel cut-off by Russia. The 2006 contract was subsequently awarded to Red Star without competition. A 2009 contract to Mina also was awarded without competition on “national security” grounds. The subcommittee argued that the use of such a scheme to obtain fuel and DLA’s apparent lack of reaction to the scheme opened the United States to excessive strategic vulnerability, since a sudden fuel cutoff by Russia could jeopardize U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.
Red Star and Mina reported that the Russian government knew that Gazprom was the source of jet fuel for the Manas Transit Center. The firms claimed, however, that they still had to falsely certify that the aviation fuel was being used for civilian purposes so that Russian authorities could claim that their ban on aviation fuel exports for military uses was not being circumvented. After then-President Putin apparently decided in early 2009 that the U.S. airbase at Manas should be closed and offered assistance to Kyrgyzstan as a seeming quid pro quo, Gazprom initiated a slowdown in fuel shipments, according to the report. Although Kyrgyzstan’s then-President Bakiyev had pledged to Putin that he would close the airbase, in mid-2009 Bakiyev instead re-designated it as the “Manas Transit Center” and permitted it to continue operations. Russia then
“discovered” that Gazprom’s fuel shipments were being used by the airbase, imposed a high export tariff on all fuel exports to Kyrgyzstan on April 1, 2010, and later cut off all fuel shipments to Kyrgyzstan through Mina and Red Star.
57 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Mystery at Manas: Strategic Blind Spots in the Department of Defense’s Fuel Contracts in Kyrgyzstan, Report of the Majority Staff, December 2010.
The report also criticized the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek for ignoring the ramifications of the fuel contracts on U.S.-Kyrgyz relations. Even after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton became engaged with the issue during her December 2010 visit to Kyrgyzstan, the embassy reportedly asserted that issues involving the fuel contract were beyond its concern, according to the report.
Among the recommendations on improving the transparency and due diligence of fuel contracts for the Manas Transit Center, the subcommittee called for an interagency analysis of the U.S.
military’s “extraordinary reliance on Mina and Red Star for jet fuel” and on the risks associated with increased Russian influence over the fuel supply chain supporting U.S. operations in Afghanistan.
Recent Changes in Jet Fuel Suppliers
In November 2010, DLA awarded Mina a contract to continue supplying up to 240 million gallons of fuel to the Manas Transit Center in 2011. Russia was listed in contract information as the main source of supply, but other countries reportedly also provide some fuel. An amendment to the contract, later highlighted by Secretary Clinton during her December 2010 visit to
Kyrgyzstan, provided for the possible addition of a second supplier firm for between 20% and 50% of the fuel.58 A U.S.-Kyrgyz inter-governmental agreement was signed in February 2011 amending the 2009 lease agreement to permit the non-competitive acquisition of jet fuel by the United States from a Kyrgyz-designated firm. Shortly after the agreement was signed, Russia and Kyrgyzstan agreed to form a joint venture, Gazpromneft-Aero-Kyrgyzstan (GAK), to supply fuel to the Manas air base. Russia has 51% of the shares in GAK and Kyrgyzstan has 49%. Also in February 2011, some Kyrgyz legislators advocated for imposing taxes on jet fuel used by the Manas Transit Center, but U.S. and Kyrgyz authorities reminded the legislators that the June 2009 lease agreement calls for no taxes or fees to be imposed on fuel deliveries.
In May 2011, the DLA issued a pre-solicitation notice for competition for the extension of the November 2010 jet fuel contract, which would provide for Mina, GAK, and other firms to compete to supply 208 million gallons of jet fuel to the Manas Transit Center in 2012.
The DLA placed its first order for fuel with GAK on September 26, 2011, to initially supply 20%
of the Transit Center’s aviation fuel needs (estimated at up to 12 million gallons per month), potentially reaching 50% or more by the end of the year. According to one report, the fuel is directly supplied from Gazprom’s oil refineries and transported by the Russian Transoil company to the transit center.59
On October 26, 2011, the DLA announced that it had awarded a one-year contract for 2012 for the provision of fuel to the Manas Transit Center to World Fuel Services Europe (WFSE), a subsidiary of a U.S.-based firm. Under the contract, WFSE will cooperate with GAK to fulfill the aviation fuel needs of the Transit Center. WFSE is to provide a minimum of 10% of the fuel requirements of the Transit Center and a maximum of 100%, but GAK may eventually be called upon to provide up to 90% of the monthly aviation fuel supplies based on its capabilities and performance. The U.S. Embassy in Bishkek stated that the new contract aimed “to ensure a
58 U.S. Department of Defense, Press Release, November 4, 2010.
59 Deidre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Manas Fuel Contract Goes to Kyrgyz-Russian Venture,” Eurasianet, September 27, 2011; CEDR, September 28, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950073.
stable, secure, and uninterrupted supply of fuel” to the Transit Center.60 The new contract does not mention any role for Mina Corporation in providing fuel (however, Red Star was given a contract in early 2012 to continue to supply jet fuel to the Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan).
The U.S. Embassy in Bishkek reported in October 2012 that DLA had provided $208.1 million to GAK for jet fuel in FY2012. According to some reports, DLA also may have purchased jet fuel from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, in order to diversify the sources of supply and not rely exclusively on Russia as a source.61
60 U.S. Department of State, Embassy of the United States in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Manas Fuel Contract Award, October 27, 2011; Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: The End of an Era at Manas Air Base,” Eurasianet, October 27, 2011.
61 Joshua Kucera, “Turkmenistan Big Beneficiary Of Pentagon Money, While Uzbekistan Lags,” Eurasianet, December 3, 2012.
Table 1. U.S. Budgeted Assistance to Kyrgyzstan by Objective and Year, FY1992-FY2001 (millions of current dollars)
Objective FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 Economic Growth 0.91 7.5 50.16 14.45 11.94 11.88 11.53 17.36 12.63 11.2 Governing Justly &
Democratically 0.55 3.54 7.75 5.92 4.21 5.11 8.38 9.42 9.21 12.8 Investing in People 0.47 2.34 3.98 2.76 4.1 4.03 3.42 3.75 4.32 3.68
Peace & Security 0.0 0.7 0.05 0.09 1.28 1.5 3.27 3.79 7.25 6.55
Humanitarian 11.1 94.14 28.42 21.21 42.1 1.33 23.69 26.8 16.32 4.82 Cross-Cutting &
MCC & Program
Support 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.02
Total 13.03 108.22 90.36 44.43 63.63 23.85 50.29 61.12 49.73 43.07 Source: Derived from U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia.
Notes: Includes all agencies and accounts. Some rounding has occurred.
Table 2. U.S. Budgeted Assistance to Kyrgyzstan by Objective and Year, FY2002-FY2010 (and Totals, FY1992-FY2010) (millions of current dollars)
Objective FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 Total
(FY1993-FY2010) Economic Growth 19.76 14.33 14.79 13.75 12.28 12.07 10.3 39.13 26.53 312.49 Governing Justly &
Democratically 14.92 13.43 14.02 14.31 9.89 15.12 15.38 12.17 14.82 190.97 Investing in People 5.56 7.06 7.18 5.82 5.66 7.48 6.45 7.02 7.48 92.54 Peace & Security 38.62 11.28 12.33 17.44 13.27 18.78 37.57 42.23 48.62 264.62 Humanitarian 4.76 5.29 5.97 3.42 0.87 0.75 0.61 7.92 16.05 315.57 Cross-Cutting &
MCC & Program Support
10.84 2.45 0.97 0.5 1.48 17.06 0.92 3.26 4.03 45.52
Total 94.47 53.85 55.25 55.23 43.44 71.25 71.23 111.74 117.52 1,221.71 Source: Derived from U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia.
Notes: Includes all agencies and accounts. Some rounding has occurred.
Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests
Figure 1. Map of Kyrgyzstan