Notwithstanding a series of important analytical issues - which might indeed be a source of serious interpretative conflict, a n d of which we have provided some illustrations - we do see a n ideal sequence of modes of interpretation and levels of description in which both the evolutionist a n d regulationist programmes could ambitiously fit. As sketched in Table 2, they run from a sort of 'nano-economics', wherein t h e abandonment of any magic of a perfect a n d invariant rationality forces a dialogue with cognitive and social psychology, organization theory, sociology, all the way t o grand historical conjectures on the long term destinies of contemporary forms of socio-economic organisation. Even a quick look a t t h e table highlights the enormous gaps between what we now a n d what such a n ideal evolutionary-institutionalist research programme would demand. These gaps a r e high a t all levels but in our view four issues a r e particularly urgent on the agenda.
A first one concerns co-evolutionary processes. T h e essence of t h e co-evolutionary point is t h a t what happens in each partly autonomous domain of the system (e.g. technology or insti- tutioilal structures) shapes a n d constrains what is going t o happen in t h e other ones. Hence, the overall dynamics is determined by the ways each domain evolves but also by t h e ways t h e various domains are coupled with each other.14 We have listed "co-evolution" under a separate level of description in order t o demarcate t h a t broad area covering e.g. the interactions between t h e forms of economic organisation, social a n d political institutions a n d technical change. How- ever, co-evolutionary issues appear a t all levels of description. For example, the emergence a n d development of each industry ought t o be seen a s a co-evolutionary process between technologies corporate organisations and supporting institutions (Nelson (1994)). Analogously, t h e origins of organisational routines (cf. above) is intimately a co-evolutionary process, shaped by diverse a n d probably conflicting selection criteria (i.e. problem-solving vs. governance requirements).
A second (and related) item which is high on t h e research agenda regards t h e transition across rliflerent socio-economic regimes of growth: for example, a t which level can such transitions be
1 4
A co-evolutiouary view runs against, for example, "technological determinism" (i.e. technology proceeds exclusively according t o its inner logics, and institutions ought simply t o adjust, with varying lags) but also t o
"social determinism" (e.g. technology is purely a "social construction"). On the contrary, the co-evolutionary view does accept t h a t technological change and social change have their own inner logics (possibly conflicting with each other) and does attempt t o explain e.g. the emerging trajectories of technical change as the outcome of such a coupling.
Table 2. Levels of Analysis.
Objects of analysis Examples of
(some still t o be explored) "analytical styles"
Level 0 From "macroeconomics" t o (i) Nature and origins of routines a n d , generally, From H.Simon t o Holland et al. (1986) microanalytic part
microeconomics 1,ehavioural norms of Nelson and Winter (1982); Cohen and Bacdayan
(ii) Learning processes (1994); Egidi (1994); organisational economics on (iii) Mechanisms of expectation formation "competences" , etc.; Coriat (1994a); Dosi et al. (1994);
(iv) Nature and evolution of micro organizations (e.g. Marengo (1992); Warglien (1995); Marengo and Tordjman (1995); possible economic applications of Fontana and business firms)
Buss (1994); and a lot to be done ...
(v) 'Embedding' mechanisms of individual behaviours . . into the institutional context
(i) Generic properties of growth fuelled by technical Explicit microfounded models with aggregate emergent
change statistical properties:
(ii) Industrial evolution e.g. Nelson and Winter (1982); Silverberg and Verspagen (iii) Self-organizing properties of labour markets (1994); Lesourne (199 1) Dosi et al. (1995)
(iv) T h e dynamics of consumption patterns
(i) Functional relations among aggregate variables More 'stylized' b u t (hopefully) institutionally richer macro (ii) Socio-economic regimes: consistency conditions models (not necessarily microfounded):
among processes of economic adjustment a n d from KeynesianIKaldorian models t o Boyer (1988a/b) ...
institutions Gordon (1994); Silverberg (1987)
(i) Co-evolutionary patterns between teclinologies, . . . A lot of appreciative theorizing from historians. . .
corporate organizations and broader institutions relatively little modeling (but cf. the suggestion in Nelson (ii) C o u ~ l e d institutional dvnamics.. . (1994) on industrial dynamics). . .
\ I 1
(iii) (Political discretionality, and institutional inertias a vast regulation-inspired empirical literature (cf. Boyer and Saillard (1995))
Level 4 "Grand history" General interpretative conjectures on long-term historical . . . from Karl Marx to . . . Schumpeter.. . t o Freeman and patterns . . . Perez (1988) . . . t o Aglietta (1982) and Boyer and Mistral
(1978) (just t o name the perspectives discussed in this work) . . . !!
detected? (which probably will be conditional on the type of transition one is talking about).
What are the effects of "higher level" changes (e.g. in the institutional set-ups or in the policy environment) upon micro-economic behaviour? And, conversely, under what circumstances non-average micro-behaviours become 'autocatalytic' and eventually induce higher-lee1 phase transitions? What kind of co-evolutionary processes do particular classes of transitions entail?;
etc.
A third priority item, in our view, concerns what could be called, in a shorthand, the relation- ships between emergence and embeddedness, or, putting it another way, the role of "bottom-up"
processes shaping/generating higher-level entities (or a t least aggregate statistical patterns) vs.
"top-down" processes by which higher level entities (e.g. institutions, established mechanisms of interaction, etc.) shapelgenerate 'lower level' behaviours. One of the claims underlying this whole paper is t h a t the links work both ways and that one ought t o account for "macrofounda- tion of the micro" as well as "microfoundations of the macro"
. .
. B u t how does one get beyond suggestive metaphors and elaborates more rigorous - albeit highly simplified - models which nonetheless capture the intuition? (Note t h a t what we mean is something more than a feed- back between a system-level state variable - say, a price or a market share-,
and the argument of an individual decision algorithm - say, pricing or investment rules -: somewhat deeper, we think it is not beyond reach t o develop models whereby micro decision algorithms themselves are shaped by macro states and, conversely, possibly non-linear interactions among the former cha.nge collective interaction rules/constraints/perceived payoffslperceived opportunities . . . ).But in turn, all this involves difficult issues concerning, again, coordination; relative time-scales of change; relative invariances of 'structures' and conditions of their stability
.
. . .Fourth, we suggest t h a t the nature of learning processes, too, ought t o deserve a prior- ity attention. As Lundvall emphasizes (in this volume) the objects of learning ("know what",
"know why", "know how", "know who"
.
. .) are likely t o discriminate among classes of learning processes. And, certainly, the competence gap between the intrinsic complexity of any one cog- nitionldecision problem a t hand and the pre-existing abilities of (individual or collective) agents fundamentally shapes learning processes (for a discussion, cf. Dosi and Egidi (1991)). But, in turn, it is only a weird twist of contemporary economic thought t h a t gives credibility t o the idea t h a t increnlentalist procedures, either based on sophisticated hypothesis testing (such as in Bayesian models) or stimulus-response reinforcements are the general paradigm of learning (note t h a t this applies t o 'evolutionary games', but also t o most evolutionary models in general)that one has developed so far.15
As a way forward, we suggest, possibly building upon preliminary (and still very rudimen- tary) attempts by e.g. Marengo (1992), Egidi (1994), Cohen and Bacdayan (1994), Marengo and Tordjman (1995) and also Dosi et al. (1994), a priority task is t o account for the formation and collective establishment of cognitive categories, problem-solving procedures ( . . .routines ??
. . . ) and expectations about the identities and behaviours of other social axtors
. .
. l 6Yes, all this is an enormous task. Very fascinating and extremely difficult. The way we see it pursued, it involves tight and troublesome interchanges between empirical investigations, "ap- preciative theorizing" and formal modeling efforts. It is likely t o involve also major adjustments in the building blocks of institutionalist/evolutionary theories themselves.
Probably, we witness now a rare window of opportunity for fulfilling the promise of making economics an "evolutionary/institutionalist discipline". The blame for failing t o do so will fall mainly on ourselves, well before the sectarian attitudes of chair committees or international jour~lal editors . .
.
151ncidentally, "Bayesian" and "Pavlovian" learning have most characteristics in common since both claim (i) what Sarage would have called a "small world" hypothesis (the notional set of events and response strategies is given from the s t a r t ) ; and (ii) there is a striking transparence of the links between actions and consequences.
Hence, ultimately, the difference between the two just rests on what the theorist assumes the agent t o consciously know, without much influence on the ultimate outcomes. So, for example, it is easy for biologists overwhelmed by ecoiiomists' fascination t o build models of rats who behave in equilibrium "as . . .if" understanding strategies in- volving first-order conditions and Lagrange multipliers, or conversely, respectable economists claiming 'Pavlovian' convergence t o sophisticated Rational Expectation equilibria.
''By way of a comparison, recall that even in the most sophisticated state-of-the-art accounts, in economics, of behaviours and interactions (even under conditions of imperfect information) agents are assumed t o obviously have the correct 'transparent' understanding of the causal links of the environment, t o obviously know how t o solve the technical problems a t hand . . .
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