2.6. Conclusion
This hints at the challenge facing any PES scheme in an area with cus-tomary tenure but individualized land-use rights in ensuring full individual enrollment in the PES scheme. Without this, the environmental outcome of schemes is at high risk. Large forest areas could be cleared by only a few non-participating famers. In such cases, individual PES would have to be embedded in a polycentric multi-layer forest governance framework. Po-tential options include for example group contracts or customary laws that complement individual PES contracts. In the latter case, customary insti-tutions could enforce and sanction land-use restrictions, if supported by a majority of the community. It remains for future research to investigate how and which alternative governance approaches best harness the individual preferences for PES contracts presented in this paper.
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Chapter 3
How Migrants Benefit Poor Communities: Evidence on Collective Action in Rural Zambia
Tobias Vorlaufer
a& Björn Vollan
aaSchool of Business & Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Germany
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of internal migration on the cooperation in host communities in rural Zambia, where in-migration is not confounded with increased ethnic or religious diversity. Potentially, in-migration could trigger discrimination, decrease overall levels of trust and hence negatively impact the propensity for collective action at the village level. We mea-sure cooperative behavior through both self-stated survey information on public good contributions and incentivized decisions in a lab-in-the-field ex-periment. Different group compositions with respect to migrants and locals were introduced in a linear public good experiment. Our findings provide a nuanced perspective on how in-migration can affect cooperation in host communities that have been exposed to migration for relatively long peri-ods. First, we find no evidence in the survey and experimental data that in-migration negatively affects cooperation across villages. Second, the par-ticular effect of in-migration depends on the characteristics of the migrants relative to the villagers in the host communities. In our research area, mi-grants are generally wealthier and have higher incomes. We find evidence that in villages where these inequalities are more pronounced, migrants con-tribute more to public goods if exposed as the minority in the experiment. In
these villages, migrants also contribute more to real public goods the more recently they have settled in the village and the higher their household in-come. The cooperation of better-off migrants is likely considered a signal of pro-sociality and the intention to integrate into the host community. Our findings indicate that the effects of migration on social dynamics in host communities are highly context specific and contingent on characteristics of the migrants in relation to the autochthonous population. More importantly, we provide evidence that communities that have been exposed to migration in the past can successfully accommodate migrants without negative conse-quences for the social fabric in these communities.
3.1 Introduction
The majority of migrants around the globe move within national borders:
as of 2005, more than 760 million people lived outside their region of birth (Bell and Charles-Edwards, 2013). Climatic changes are expected to further intensify internal migration, especially in the Global South. A large share of “climate migrants” are expected to move within countries, estimated at up to 143 million people by 2050, with 86 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa alone (Rigaud et al., 2018). While the poorest households may be unable to migrate and remain exposed to increasing environmental risks (Black et al., 2011b), better-off households with higher asset ownership build resilience through either temporal or permanent migration (Warner and Afifi, 2014). As a consequence, internal migration is considered a viable adaptation strategy for better-off households that are able to increase their resilience through migration (Black et al., 2011a). It remains an open question how in-migration of more affluent people affects the host communities, in particular with respect to collective action that is crucial for most rural communities in the Global South. Internal migration is, however, often overlooked in the media and in scientific analyses, as it often does not pose the same obvious problems inherent in the migration of people that speak a different language and practice different cultural norms or religions1. Our study on the effects of internal migration on collective action does not confound migration with these well-known factors of potential conflict and thus broadens the perspective on the effects of migration on host communities.
Many rural communities in developing countries jointly provide basic public goods such as schools or water supply given the weak government funding. Ethnic diversity, which is likely to increase as a result of internal
1When focusing on international migration from developing countries, the dominant view is often that migrants are most likely to occupy jobs in the low skilled labor market, which may lead to competition among workers in that sector and declining wages that give rise to social problems such as a loss in social cohesion due to increased heterogeneity of values and norms, even resulting in xenophobia, which erodes norms of cooperation in the host country (Collier, 2015; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).
3.1. Introduction migration in multi-ethnic countries, has been shown to negatively affect trust and cooperation (Putnam, 2007). In line with this argument, ethnic hetero-geneity decreases social capital, rendering the enforcement of social sanctions less effective and thereby reducing cooperation at the community level, as shown by Miguel and Gugerty (2005) for Kenya. To better understand the effects of migration on collective action, we believe it is imperative to also consider cases where incoming migrants are on average richer than the host population to explicitly capture the different capacities migrants may have and the resulting roles they assume in society. This situation is not un-common, as empirical work indicates that risk-taking (Jaeger et al., 2010), more patient (Goldbach and Schlüter, 2018) and better-educated (Malamud and Wozniak, 2012) individuals are more likely to migrate within countries.
Richer migrants may be especially willing to cooperate, as they might be more altruistic due to feelings of inequality aversion (Buckley and Croson, 2006). Migrants in general may be more likely to cooperate to signal their good intentions by building up reputation and social status in the host com-munity and contribute to “comcom-munity building” (Barr, 2003).
To our best knowledge, Sircar and van der Windt (2015) provide the only study on the effect of rural-to-rural migration on pro-social behavior in a de-veloping country context2. They report experimental findings from eastern Congo (DRC), where migration and displacement have been predominantly driven by years of civil conflict. In their study area, migration is mostly involuntary, and migrants are significantly poorer than locals. They find that initially, migrants exhibit levels of pro-sociality similar to locals among themselves. However, due to a lack of pro-social behavior of locals towards migrants, they eventually become less pro-social. As a result, migration does reduce overall pro-sociality at the group (village) level. Another strain of literature focuses on resettled communities3 and the effect on solidarity and trust. Gobien and Vollan (2016) find that after one and a half years of voluntary resettlement in Cambodia, people in heterogeneous, resettled com-munities exhibit lower levels of solidarity than a similar non-resettled control group. In her seminal paper, Barr (2003) shows that 20 years after volun-tary resettlement, Zimbabwean communities exhibit lower levels of trusting behavior than non-resettled communities. At the same time, trusting behav-ior is less responsive to expected trustworthiness in resettled communities, which can be interpreted as the intent of community-building. Furthermore,
2In a recent study, Wang et al. (2016), for example, found that out-migration negatively affects collective action for the maintenance of irrigation systems in rural China. We look at the complementary effect, namely, how in-migration affects cooperation in rural host communities.
3While resettlement is an outcome of a planned process (in most cases overlooked by government agencies and for a group of households), migration is commonly a volun-tary individual or household decision. We nevertheless believe that resettled households experience a situation similar to migrated households of newly settling in a different vil-lage/community.
resettled communities continue to invest in community building, as indi-cated by a larger number of civil society organizations. Such organizations are likely to fulfill functions similar to those of kinship and ethnic networks in non-resettled communities (Barr, 2004). In a follow-up study, Barr et al.
(2015) highlight that wealthier households played crucial roles in founding these organizations, particularly in relatively poorer villages, that were later joined by other villagers. The authors hypothesize that in poorer villages, relatively better-off inhabitants felt a greater obligation to provide support.
Our paper investigates the effect of in-migration on cooperative behav-ior in host communities that have experienced high rates of in-migration in the past. To do this, we combine survey data covering income levels and self-stated information on cooperative behavior with lab-in-the-field experi-ments in central Zambia, covering in total 18 villages in two chiefdoms. The sample contains both villages where migrants have on average income that is lower than or similar to that of locals and villages where the average migrant income is significantly higher. The lab-in-the-field public good experiments provide us with an incentivized measurement of the individual propensity to cooperate under similar circumstances across villages and individuals. The experiments also allowed us to exogenously vary the group compositions with respect to migrants and locals. Zambia provides an ideal country for investigation due to the high internal migration intensity (Bell et al., 2015).
Climate change is expected to further aggravate migration dynamics by low-ering agricultural yields in the southern part of the country (Kanyanga et al., 2013). Because of a long history of migration, our research site in central Zambia already contains ethnically diverse communities. Therefore, we can study the effects of the most recent wave of in-migration (over the last 10 years) without the often-accompanied effects of increasing ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural diversity. In addition, our research area is character-ized by customary land tenure systems, where traditional authorities oversee land distribution. Only under very exceptional conditions can a village head-man deny migrants land, minimizing the capabilities of host communities to pre-select migrants.
Our results indicate that there are no detrimental effects of internal mi-gration on the propensity for cooperation in communities. Migrants and locals exhibit similar levels of cooperation elicited through the experiment and in the self-stated survey information. Moreover, varying group com-positions in the experiment with respect to migrants and locals does not significantly affect the individual contributions of either migrants or locals.
Additionally, migrants who are relatively better-off than locals do not ex-hibit significantly different experimental behavior than worse-off migrants.
However, we find evidence for village effects. In particular, in villages with strong income inequalities between migrants and locals, migrants contribute more if matched with more locals in the experiment. Survey data on contri-butions to community projects indicates that better-off migrant households
3.2. Responses to Migration: Identity, Inequality and Cooperation