Concluding remarks

The underlying theme of the flow-related intellectual tradition – or political imaginary – is anything but contemporary. “Everything flows and nothing stays” is one of the well-known quotes associated with the ancient pre-Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus. Similarly, classical American pragmatists of the 19th and early 20th century, such as William James and John Dewey, emphasized the ideas of “stream of experience” and “stream of life”. These quotes are taken to emphasize the fixedness of flux and motion as the key constant characteristics of human reality. Yet streams, both in the natural and political world, are not always random – they do not flow just anywhere given the natural or socio-political riverbeds where they run. In fact, they tend to follow certain slowly transforming paths, and in doing so, exhibit both change and stability.

This FIIA report has aimed to develop new conceptual tools for the strategic analysis of the contemporary world order. It has aimed to broaden and readjust the common political imaginary of how to understand political space. The report has analyzed the shift in global geopolitics from territorial geopolitics towards the geopolitics of flows, and highlighted the importance of the global commons domains (sea, air, space, cyber) in this context. Its special focal point has been the analysis of the maritime domain. This domain, in particular, plays a key role in terms of global flows (e.g. trade, military projection, resources), even if the assured access to, and free use of, the major maritime flow corridors may be increasingly contested.

The report has argued that understanding (geo)political changes in the framework of global and regional interconnectedness and interdependency is likely to grow in importance for national security

in Finland and elsewhere. For example, the emphasis on global flows – and their (in)security – will have implications for the security of supply in energy, resource, information and logistic sectors around the world.

This highlights the need for an informed and up-to-date strategic situational awareness vis-à-vis the emerging world of global flows and its trends, transformations and consequences – many of which also call for critical thinking. This also applies to Finland. This report should be approached as an initial step in developing new conceptual tools and a theoretical framework for this analysis.

The report has applied the postulated political ontology of global flows as a theoretical framework for the analysis of the Finnish maritime environment, in broad terms. In this respect, special emphasis was put on the new and opening frontier: the Arctic.

The report has concluded that while Arctic geopolitical interests are rising and the region’s conflict potential is low, it is likely that it will take at least two decades for the geopolitical stakes to rise to a level that would make the region central to global geopolitics and global flows. Other key regions and topics are likely to remain more important than the Arctic in global politics, at least in the near future.

Similarly, due to serious challenges in key sectors, such as maritime transport and hydrocarbon extraction, the Arctic economic boom will probably keep itself waiting, at least for a decade or two. The Baltic Sea region will continue to be the most important maritime region for Finland in the foreseeable future.

The report has also highlighted that (perceptions of) global interconnectedness and interdependency are increasingly affecting the Finnish preparedness planning – both defence policy-wise as well as in relation to the overall security of supply. The report has argued that Finland’s national defence has essential international enablers without which credible national defence capability is seen to be impossible to maintain, and that self-sufficient national preparedness and especially security-of-supply actions by national authorities are considered to be increasingly difficult in the age of global flows.

Looking to the future, it is important to note that the Finnish maritime domain is not about ships and water alone. It is about increasingly complex human activities with different implications for Finnish security and prosperity in general, and security of supply in particular. In several ways, these activities are transnational and rely on global flows. The actors themselves are often multinational corporations. The activities are, by definition, cross-border trade related. Furthermore, the Finnish maritime domain as a context

conducts information and resources that are not tied to the container ships. The activities are inter-domain, in other words highly integrated into the existence of space-dependent navigation and a cyber-based inventory – as well as other critical systems.75

It is vital to note that being integrated into the global flows poses not only opportunities, but also threats. As an example, while having no Arctic Ocean coastline, Finland, situated between the opening Arctic Ocean and the strongly trafficked and economically significant Baltic Sea, has the potential to increase its importance as a facilitator of global logistics and data flows, for example, if the announced plans for new railway connections in the Arctic Ocean-Baltic Sea nexus and new datacentres and data-cable connections were to materialize.

However, at the moment, the northern railway corridor to the Arctic Ocean lacks economic rationale. Lapland’s mining industry does not produce in large enough volumes to compensate for the costs of major railway investment, and there is no indication that Finland could be a major logistic transition route between the Arctic Ocean and mainland Europe (see LoGHU3 2011, 28; KLTp 2013; jbTp 2013). Also, the security-of-supply element in the railway consideration seems dubious, since the heart of the Finnish logistics system is situated in the Helsinki metropolitan area (KH 2010), and the northern railway corridor could not substitute for the Baltic Sea route in big enough volumes and remain undisrupted in a major crisis scenario. Thus, there is no indication that the Finnish geopolitical positioning would change considerably in the near future due to these factors.

If, on the other hand, the planned data-cable connection linking Europe and Asia through the Northern Sea Route materialized, Finland could increase its geopolitical relevance. This would be the case only if the planned data-cable connection from Finland to Germany

75 When analyzing the future maritime trajectories, it is worth remembering that the maritime domain does not exist in isolation from the technological and economic transformations. Any stovepipe view of the maritime domain may run the risk of being misleading about the overall direction of change. Other global commons capabilities and assets influence the strategic meaning of maritime flows. Furthermore, the scope of movements has also broadened. In addition to people and goods, the maritime fibre-optic networks are transferring digital information. Cyber is present also in the way ships and their cargo can be exchanged while at sea. The navigation is based on digital and space technologies. The logistic and surveillance systems have changed the way in which the maritime areas are regulated. It should also be pointed out that different maritime areas are differentially impacted by the ongoing technological, economic, and climate-related changes. The Baltic Sea is often used as an example of a maritime area where different advanced technologies and systems are used.

materialized, and Finland could attract more datacentre and cloud computing services. In this case, Finland could play some role in the global data flows as a relevant connector. However, one should note that while the new connections could increase the diversification and resilience of the Finnish data connections, the increased role as a major connector would also increase Finland’s relevance as a strategic target.

Following on from this, in conclusion, the report highlights two contending scenarios as a starting point for future research:

1. Security as defence 2. Security as resilience

Although the second scenario appears to represent a rational strategy of diversification, it can pose a security risk from the perspective of the first scenario. When Finland turns itself into a connector (in the inter-domain sense of the word), it exposes itself as a strategic target – in the same way that the Suez Canal can constitute a problem.

The scenarios are partially contradictory. That which in the first makes Finland important as a cross-roads, in the second turns Finland into a difficult to manage cross-current. However, there is a detectable trend away from the first scenario towards the second. This is caused by the flows. The business models of production (goods, materials), finance (capital), knowledge (information and innovation), and security (military and societal) are increasingly interdependent and dynamic. So it increasingly makes sense for Finland to adopt the second resilience scenario in order to make it attractive for the flows.

But, this leads to increasing geopolitical and geo-economic insecurity in terms of the first security scenario.

So, what is the most advantageous Finnish solution to the global challenges? How does this strategy relate to the maritime contexts?

Is this adaptive schema applicable in the case of other small states or even bigger states? Agility is seen as a virtue for small states, which are relatively more dependent on global inter-linkages due to their more specialized economies. At the same time, there are demands for resilience and societal stability as the differentially exposed small states face the cumulative and potentially disruptive effects of global circulations. This, needless to say, poses pressing challenges for any self-confessed democratic polis, Finland included. That said, as some regions and sub-regions become linked to the global flows, the political geography will change significantly. These “privileged” places will become re-contextualized as parts of the emerging global hub-and-spoke structure, rather than of their traditional national or regional context. More research is needed in order to better understand the

contemporary geopolitics of flows and their potential implications for the global order as well as Finnish security, prosperity and security of supply. In many respects, theoretical, empirical and critical work remains to be done.