A simple model has been developed in this paper to examine two important questions related to the nature of protest (or independence) movements in regions under occupation (or disputed regions). First, how is the nature of a protest movement a¤ected by the opportunity costs of the leaders who lead these movements? Second, how is the nature of the movement a¤ected by the intrinsic level of hawkishness of the occupiers? These questions are motivated by facts observed in historical liberation struggles (e.g. the Indian Independence Movement) and present day con‡icts (e.g. the Israeli-Palestinian con‡ict). The answers to these questions, as identi…ed by this paper, are relevant to truly understanding the nature of such con‡icts,
and will assist in their successful management. I have discussed the results of the paper in detail in section 4 above, as well as their policy implications.
Further, a major contribution of this paper lies in identifying and characterizing the priors which lead to the outcomes of protest movements in occupied regions. These priors involve the characteristics of the population residing in the occupied region, the nature of punishment that is being meted out to the leaders of the protest movement, and enforcement costs. Di¤erences in these priors lead to the nature of various protest movements being di¤erent in some crucial aspects, though they might be similar in other aspects.
No doubt, a comprehensive characterization of these priors is essential in developing tailor-made con‡ict management strategies in the context of a particular protest or liberation movement.55
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Appendices
Appendix 1:
Proof of proposition 1 Proof: From the FOC of the occupier :dc
d jc=c = @F=@ @F=@c
jc=c =
h(fa + pa )@@ @c2a +(@ @ [ @a@f + @a@p]@a@c)i
@2 =@c2
jc=c
Now, the denominator is always negative for the payo¤ function of the occupier being concave atc . So, if@F=@ jc=c >0, then d dc
jc=c >0:
But@F=@ jc=c >0, only ifh
>0 for aandcbeing strategic complements.
Hence for @ @c@2a The …rst part of proposition 1 follows from the above conditions.
Now, as dcd >0and dad >0, we have dfd >0, given fa>0andfc>0(per assumption):
Hence under the conditions of the proposition the protest movement has greater mass support for a higher-cost leadership
Appendix 2:
Proof of proposition 3Proof: Applying the implicit function theorem to the FOC of the occupier:
dc
The denominator is always negative for the payo¤ function of the occupier being concave atc . So, if@F=@ jc=c >0, then ddc
>0 for aandcbeing strategic complements.
Hence for @ @c@2a The …rst part of proposition 3 follows from the above conditions.
To prove the second part of the proposition, observe that as dcd >0 and dad >0, we have dfd >0; given fa >0 andfc >0 (per assumption):