Since 1989
Foreign policy change
Compared to mainstream interpretations, a red thread in the previous sec-tions has been the limited degree of change that a closer look, taking into account historical perspectives and domestic political controversies, seems to reveal. From the foregoing analysis we may recapitulate these main points.
Order policy, as defined in section 3, has been an integral but rather neglected part of the Danish foreign policy tradition. When a new inter-national system came into being after the end of the Cold War, space was created to bring this part to the fore, whereas the hitherto dominant, more passive and cautious part of the tradition became more or less superfluous.
The new focus on an activist policy, which the system change had cleared the way for, was heavily supported by an overall upgrading of the role assigned to international organizations, of common norms and values among states and of the non-military aspects of security (‘broad security’). The concrete direction of Danish activism reflected these external changes and fitted well with the requirements of a US-dominated international system. Finally, it was argued that political parties adjusted long-held positions to the changed environment, although the 2000s saw an intensification of such positions and, to some degree, a deviation from them. However, until developments suggest a different interpretation, these deviations should be regarded
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marily as a consequence of an extraordinary domestic political situation, and thus – compared to the most frequent assessments – with a more limited impact on Danish foreign policy viewed in a longer term perspective.57It is the inclusion of a historical dimension and – concerning the period after 2001 – domestic conditions not directly related to the conduct of for-eign policy that make possible the above conclusion, emphasizing continuity rather than change. But carrying out the analysis on these premises also calls for objections. The following supplementary remarks will therefore attach further nuances to the conclusion.
With regard to the historical dimension, the specific content that the for-eign policy tradition has been attributed may be questioned. However, more open to objection is probably the underlying assumption that a tradition can survive even the most dramatic external upheavals and therefore influ-ence behavior under circumstances which require totally different responses.
This assumption is based on the belief in the very existence of traditions and their long-lasting character. Nevertheless, it is part of the overall picture that traditions are also subject to alterations and modifications. And it seems quite plausible that this is exactly what has been at issue since the end of the Cold War. Taking in the other premise about the importance of the domestic political situation, one could claim that the tradition is changing, or at least being modified, in two different respects.
First, it seems hard to maintain that the conspicuous militarization of policy which has undoubtedly taken place without reservations – notwith-standing the special circumstances of the 2000s –can be included within the established tradition. It has been argued that this militarization, at least in its initial phase, should be seen as an offshoot of the internationalist part of the tradition, which after 1989 became adapted to an entirely altered external environment. This seems true in so far as militarization – as already indicated in the introduction – reflects a change of means and not of goals.
But considering the significant space that anti-militarism has occupied in the Danish tradition since 1864, the renewed emphasis on military instruments in the conduct of foreign policy represents more than an ordinary change of means.58 Therefore, and because of the nature of these instruments, it could be regarded as a step that might eventually lead to a revision of the tradition.
Once the use of military instruments has become habitual, it might easily encourage decision-makers to set new goals, since the state will then tend to view its role on the international scene in a new and more influential way.59
The second comment pertains to the extraordinary domestic political cir-cumstances after 2001. Although all circir-cumstances are unique, be they
in-ternal or exin-ternal, it was argued that those that arose after the parliamentary
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elections of 2001 were so unusual, especially concerning foreign policy, that not all of the decisions taken in the period can be considered representative of a long-term change of policy. But even assuming that this argument is valid, the situation in the 2000s calls for a general observation, which points to a need to revise the content of the Danish tradition. At least in one respect the circumstances of decision-making in this period are not unique, namely the increased blurring of foreign and domestic policies in many countries – a tendency that is especially evident in EU member states. The difficulty of separating the two kinds of policies may have only limited negative conse-quences, if any, in the realm of ‘low politics’, but with regard to ‘high poli-tics’ states might be faced with more serious problems. This holds true not least for small states like Denmark, with limited, although recently enhanced manoeuvrability and great dependence on the external environment. For a small state a foreign policy based on a domestic agenda of little relevance for its international position may have irreparable, negative consequences.60 It may very well be on this general level, and not so much in respect to the concrete decisions taken, that the 2000s signify an evolution in the Danish tradition.
Together the two comments above raise a rather worrisome question as to the modifications which the Danish foreign policy tradition apparently is undergoing at present. Whereas the tradition in the dualistic interpretation given in section 3 altogether represented a politically and logically coherent set of doctrines, the changes that seem discernable today represent almost the opposite.
If militarization continues on the road laid out at the beginning of this century, i.e. no longer rooted in the established internationalist part of the tradition, it loses its legitimization as an effective small state strategy. Al-though developments may have relieved Denmark from part of its former small state status,61 she still belongs to the category of weak powers in the global hierarchy. And as such Denmark has no interest in upgrading the importance of military instruments in relations between states, and not at all when used without the explicit backing of an international organization.
States of the status occupied by Denmark have a built-in interest in stressing soft rather than hard instruments of foreign policy.
Likewise, the present intermingling of domestic and foreign policy un-dermines the coherence that has characterized the tradition until now. In the past the creation of an expanded welfare state was regarded as a corollary to a security policy based on a very limited military defense capability. A strong
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cohesion in the population compensated for the lack of physical measures to prevent foreign encroachments on Denmark’s sovereignty.62 In this way do-mestic and foreign policy was directly and convincingly connected, at least for those who favored this kind of soft security policy. But today the connec-tion between the two types of policy is either non-existent or the two do not support each other.Regarding change, we are thus left with the conclusion that it no longer seems appropriate solely to apply the Venus label when categorizing Den-mark’s foreign policy, but since changes altogether are rather limited, the Mars label is not a fitting one either. A movement in the direction of Mars has begun, but without convincing durability. However, by positioning itself between Venus and Mars, Denmark risks falling into a trap in which the advantages of a hitherto successful small-state strategy embedded in her du-alistic foreign policy tradition disappears.
Reverting to Charles Hermann’s typology presented in section 2, the analysis has shown that the changes that Danish foreign policy has under-gone since the Cold War by far match the upper category of change in in-ternational orientation, a conclusion that deviates from what appears to be the predominant view. Denmark has maintained a strong attachment to other European powers through her membership of an enlarged EU,63 and although relations with the US have been markedly strengthened, this west-ward orientation basically represents a continuation of a long-held foreign policy aspiration, while its greater fulfillment is to be seen primarily in the light of changes in the international system that have left the US as the sole superpower and to a lesser degree in the light of internal changes. A similar conclusion seems valid with regard to Denmark’s global orientation. Finally, activism, which will be dealt with below, has been an integral part of past policies and as such does not represent a totally new orientation, as is often claimed. What is new is the greatly enlarged opportunities for practicing activism and in doing so a strong inclination to make use of military means.
This adds up to the conclusion that, in Hermann’s terminology, changes should be categorized as program change rather than as problem or goal change, that is, as not even attaining the number two level of change. Con-sidering the possible modifications of the foreign policy tradition discussed above, however, goal changes may also be on their way, which further under-lines the difficulties in applying the typology proposed by Hermann.
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Further investigation is necessary to substantiate the above conclusion con-cerning the degree of change, but if valid the degree of activism also has to be reconsidered. A final discussion of this issue has to include a comparison of the period before and after the end of the Cold War, a comparison which, on the basis presented in this article, risks becoming somewhat superficial. But by applying the criteria set up in section 2, a few preliminary conclusions may be attempted.
Section 3 has reviewed a number of Danish policy steps before 1989 – and even before World War II – which qualify as an expression of activism as defined in this article. It is remarkable how continuously Denmark has followed a small-state strategy, which on one hand has at times led to ex-treme restraint in participation in traditional international power politics, but on the other hand has resulted in initiatives in the realm of order policy with sometimes rather far-reaching consequences. Danish order policy up to 1989 seems rooted in a long-term strategy, and apparently isolated steps, like unwillingness to yield to NATO pressure regarding the Greek coup of 1967, should be interpreted as manifestations of such a strategy. Moreover, on some specific issues like the CSCE it is possible to discern a policy line that has been assiduously maintained for several years and over several gov-ernmental terms, notwithstanding neglect by and opposition from alliance partners. When finally we add the emphasis Denmark has continually laid on working within international organizations, all the criteria for character-izing the internationalist part of the Danish foreign policy tradition as activ-ism seem fulfilled.
On the same basis it would not be difficult – but also non-controversial – to characterize post-Cold War Danish foreign policy as activist. One con-spicuous sign of this activism has been the Danish push to draw the newly independent Baltic states closer to the West by helping to prepare their entry into NATO and the EU. With Uffe Ellemann-Jensen as foreign minister, and continued by his successors, Denmark was not only a frontrunner on this issue, but– very much at variance with her immediate past – did not hesitate to stand up to her great-power neighbor to the east, Russia. If any-thing, Danish Baltic policy in the 1990s signaled a willingness to bear costs, and this time costs incurred by her until then primary adversary on the in-ternational scene.64
In comparison, the often stressed militarization of Danish foreign policy after 1989 may not be characterized quite as unequivocally as activism in the sense defined in section 2. During the 1990s militarization should first of all
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be seen as a corollary of the intensification of traditional Danish order policy which the international system change had opened up. As such it provided decision-makers with new and effective means to pursue an activist policy, but, as emphasized earlier, it was not in itself an expression of activism. When militarization then took a new form after the turn of the century, another yardstick became necessary to evaluate the degree of activism involved. Still, militarization was a way of equipping decision-makers with more effective instruments, though in the case of the Iraq War these instruments could no longer be seen as an unambiguous part of the traditional order policy. Rather they became part of a new US-oriented hard security policy, as an integral component of which militarization acquired an importance it had not had before. Evaluating the degree of activism thus hinges on the delicate political question of how one should interpret the motives and implications of this new, but maybe short-lived direction in Danish foreign policy.Finally it should be stressed that, like the degree of change, the degree of activism has to be evaluated against the background of the unprecedented external changes that took place around 1990. During the Cold War and earlier, the action space for Danish foreign policy was very circumscribed, partly because the costs involved in launching independent initiatives could be very heavy. When initiatives of this kind were nevertheless taken in this period, as demonstrated in section 3, they may not have been as spectacular as in the later period, but can still be regarded as activism at an equivalent level.
It is tempting to conclude that activism in the present period differs pri-marily from activism in the previous period because of the external circum-stances that have given this part of the foreign policy tradition a more promi-nent position; and because new foreign policy instruments, mainly military power, have been upgraded without fully considering the possibly negative implications of this process for the continuation of a long-term successful small-state strategy.
Three Phases in the Evolution of Danish Foreign Policy:
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Cold War and earlier 1990s 2000s
Activism Order policy (internationalism) as part of a dualistic small-state tradition, stronger leaning to the US, traditional small-state strategy challenged
Militarism Anti-militaristic tradition, modified but not abandoned after giving up neutrality in 1949, UN peacekeeping
Consensus continued Activism and militarism partly on a narrow
US-oriented militarization, non-durable goal change
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1 Former external lecturer, University of Copenhagen, and former project researcher at DIIS. The author is grateful to Morten Kelstrup, Thorsten Borring-Olesen, Poul Villaume, Mikkel Runge Olesen and an anonymous reviewer for many useful comments on earlier versions of this article.
2 For a detailed account of recent Danish foreign policy history, see Petersen, 2004. For an English version, see an early attempt to analyze the general change of policy in Due-Nielsen and Faurby (eds.), 1995.
3 Originally applied by Heurlin, 1994.
4 See Rynning, 2003. Here the change primarily refers to the shift after 2001; see section 5 below.
5 See Jakobsen, 2012. The metaphor was originally used by Robert Kagan to illustrate dif-ferences in the approach to international politics by Europe and the US (Kagan, 2004).
6 Branner, 2010.
7 Wivel, 2005. The movement from Venus to Mars is also discussed in this article.
8 Borring Olesen, 2008 and Brun Pedersen, 2012.
9 Dealt with in Petersen, 2004; see also Branner, 2011. The word ‘cornerstones’ refer to distinctions between global (UN), Atlantic (NATO), European (EU) and Nordic pillars originally made in a book by former foreign minister Per Hækkerup, 1966.
10 For reasons of space, Danish EU policy has been left out of the analysis; cf. note 62 below.
11 In official rhetoric, however, the word has been downplayed. Former Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller (2001-09) explicitly dissociated himself from seeing it as an apt characteriza-tion of Danish foreign policy during his tenure in office, whereas Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen was more willing to use it (see Fogh Rasmussen, 2006).
12 In Denmark, attempts to establish a definition have been made by Kelstrup, 1990 and Holm, 1998 and 2002. For an earlier Swedish discussion of the concept, see Elgström, 1983.
13 E.g. former foreign minister Mogens Lykketoft (Social Democrat) stated in a newspaper article: ‘When the Prime Minister [...] chooses to join Washington’s dictates [in the deci-sion to invade Iraq] rather than the possibility of a dialogue through a joint response from Brussels, the term ‘activism’ becomes a false trade mark. In such cases, it amounts to foreign policy adaptation in a classical sense: Denmark seeking shelter from the dominant power and evading any initiative that challenges the established world order.’ Lykketoft, Mogens (2003), ‘Fogh dyrker falsk aktivisme’ in Berlingske Tidende, 21 May 2003.
14 E.g.Villaume, Poul, ‘Aktivisme eller tilpasning til USA’ in Information, 9 June 2006; also Branner, 2003.
15 Activism is very explicitly identified with the use of military power by Vedby Rasmussen, 2005: ‘Activism means that Denmark had begun to think of armed intervention as a natu-ral part of its foreign policy and to organize its defense accordingly.’ Vedby Rasmussen:
82. This definition forms part of an attempt to interpret Danish activism as the result of a change in strategic culture whereby the author tends to blur important differences in activism between the 1990s and the 2000s; see section 5 below.
16 Being activist and not just active entails, according to standard dictionaries, the pursuit of specific and well-defined goals by an actor. In foreign policy it seems less relevant to make a distinction along these lines, but the degree of goal attainment and awareness of goals is inherent in the criteria mentioned below.
17 It should be added that taken together the criteria are by no means sufficient to determine
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whether a policy should be categorized as activist or not. A lot of questions remain to be answered. What kinds of initiatives are relevant? How should costs be measured? What does ‘long-term strategy’ mean more precisely? Within the limits of this article a satisfac-tory answer to such questions cannot be given; cf. the conclusions in section 5.
18 Hermann, 1990. His complete analytical scheme also includes a distinction between vari-ous sources of foreign policy change and the decision-making system as an intermediate variable. See Gustavsson (1999) for a discussion and critique of the scheme presented by Hermann and five others and for his own proposal for an alternative model.
19 No attempt has been made to include the period after the change of government in 2011 in the analysis.
20 Cf. Branner, 2000a: 375-78.
21 For an in-depth analysis of reservations in Danish NATO policy up until 1961, see
21 For an in-depth analysis of reservations in Danish NATO policy up until 1961, see