CNDP, PARECO and the Amani Program

The ceasefire signed in 2008 led to two major events in the dynamic of armed groups. The first event was the surrender of CNDP and PARECO troops to the government military structures and the second the arrest of Laurent Nkunda (principal leader of CNDP) by Rwandan authorities on 20^th January 2009. On 21^st March 2009, under the auspices of former Nigerian President Obasanjo with the diplomatic support of the international community, three ‘Acts of Engagement’ were signed at Ihusi Hotel in Goma town as the follow up to the 2008 ceasefire agreement. The first was signed between the Congolese Government and armed groups of North Kivu, the second between the government and armed groups of South Kivu and the third between the government

141 and CNDP. In reality, the Goma agreements between CNDP and PARECO and other Mai-Mai groups from North and South Kivu was rather an agreement of surrender because all the troops had already been integrated into the national army in 2008. In this situation, leaders of these armed groups could hardly negotiate their demands because they were in a weak position. One of the PARECO leaders who signed the Goma agreement put it in this way:

we were caught in a difficult trap because we were forced to sign under some promises by the government of political positions and the recognition of military ranks for our officers. This arrangement actually was made possible through a political deal between Congolese and Rwandan authorities, without even the involvement of the international community. (Interview Goma, III.01.15)

However, to make this ‘unofficial’ political arrangement, the Congolese authorities suggested to the mediators to jointly draft the three ‘Acts of Engagement’, and asked the armed groups’

representatives to sign them. According to the above informant, this ‘forced’ integration of former rebels in the national army was a great benefit to some of them who got promoted to high ranks whereas very little was done for the political cadres. A good number of political leaders who were unhappy about this integration could have led to the resurgence of a new rebellion. It was to prevent this eventuality that the Goma agreements provided that the Congolese government would create a specially funded program to implement the agreements and to prevent any escalation. This program was called the Amani program, established by a Presidential Ordinance No. 08/008 of 2^nd February 2008 for a period of 6 months.

The Amani program was designed as an executive body in charge of the implementation and monitoring of the Nairobi Agreement I of November 2007 between CNDP and the Congolese government and of the Goma Acte d’engagement signed on 23^rd January 2009. The Nairobi Agreement I was about a cease-fire between CNDP troops and the government army (FARDC) whereas the Acte d’engagement was about the commitment of different armed groups to surrender and to be integrated into the FARDC.

The aim of the Amani program was to provide conditions for the security, pacification and stabilization of North and South Kivu provinces. It had two main executive bodies. At the national level, there was the monitoring committee composed of the Minister of the Interior, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Social

142 Affairs. The second was the Coordination Unit. It was chaired by a coordinator and four deputies, each with a technical commission. The Peace and Security Commission, the Pacification and Reconciliation Commission, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Commission and the Finance and Projects Commission. Besides these commissions, there was a body of international players involved in the Amani program which formed a Task Force created in January 2008 and whose role was to facilitate the implementation of several projects and the above agreement between former armed groups and the government. Members of this Task Force were the United States, Belgium, UK, France, Canada, South Africa, the European Union, the UN, the African Union and the Southern African Development Committee (SADC).

The implementation of the Amani program became difficult because of this configuration of actors and unclear agenda, also because of the bureaucracy caused by a difficult chain of communication between the members of the commissions. For example, one of the priority tasks of the peace and security commission was to organize the absorption of the armed groups' troops into the national army. However, the execution of this task divided those affected into two different tendencies.

According to Mararo (2009: 128), the first was of the Mai-Mai armed groups and a faction of PARECO who complained that the presidential ordinance (which established the Amani program) had appointed the CNDP delegates to the strategic posts in the Amani program, to the detriment of the other groups. This tendency also thought that the disarmament of their troops should be achieved through negotiation and not by force.

The second tendency was that of the CNDP's representatives. On the one hand, the CNDP demanded that the FDLR should return to Rwanda and the Congolese refugees in Rwanda should be assisted to return to DR Congo and, on the other hand, the CNDP demanded higher positions in the government and the army while the Congolese Government did not want to give in to these demands. In such a complicated coordination, many complaints from members of different commissions started to emerge when everything seemed to be stuck. Some delegates from these commissions started to denounce the Government’s lack of political will to push the Amani program forward. At this point, it is important to remember that the Amani program was based on the Acts of Engagement agreement of January 2009. One of the major concerns expressed by parties involved in the program was the need to eliminate foreign armed groups present in North and South Kivu provinces, notably the FDLR. The first attempt was joint military operations against the FDLR called Umoja wetu (in Swahili meaning Our unity) from 20^th January to 25^th

143 February 2009, involving the Congolese army and Rwandan army in collaboration with the UN mission in the DR Congo.

These operations ended while the Nairobi Agreements I of November 2007 between the Government and CNDP was still pending. Not only were CNDP leaders not convinced about the results of Umoja wetu operations, the Nairobi agreement of 2007 was only a ceasefire agreement without any significant political engagement reflecting the demands of both sides. It was on 23^rd March 2009 (two months after the Acts of Engagement were signed) and the end of the above military operations that the government and CNDP (without other armed groups) signed the Goma agreement. The main points in this agreement were (a) the transformation of CNDP into a political party (art 1), the release of political prisoners, members of CNDP (art 2), an amnesty for CNDP leaders (art 3), the resolution of local conflicts that pit ethnic communities against each other (art 4) and the return of Congolese refugees still living in neighboring countries (art 6). Disappointment increased in the CNDP camp, which accused the government of not implementing the 23^rd March agreement. As result, René Abandi (representative of CNDP in the Amani program), a most important member of one of the key commissions (peace and security), decided to resign, followed by some PARECO representatives who also suspended their participation. The culmination came in April in 2012 when some ex-CNDP military officers decided to create another rebellion called the Movement of 23^rd March (M23) demanding the full application of the Goma agreement of 23^rd March 2009 by the Congolese government.

Unlike when CNDP was created, many important Hutu leaders in Masisi did not join M23, for two main reasons. The first one relates to how M23 started. Several Hutu leaders from Masisi I spoke to mentioned that the motivation for the new rebellion and its goals were not clear to them.

Additionally, they were convinced that compared to previous rebellions, M23 did not have mass support from the population and that its political vision was vague. The second reason was the national legislative elections of 2011, which had given some Hutu leaders in Masisi an opportunity to gain political power peacefully without fighting. Only a very small number of Hutu leaders who did not win in elections joined M23. M23 was defeated by the Congolese army supported by UN troops in 2013; troops and political cadres are still in refuge in Rwanda and Uganda. The end of the RCD as a rebel movement and its political integration in the transitional government in 2003 had led to the reconfiguration of actors and alliances at the local level, precisely in Masisi. The rise of CNDP and PARECO in Masisi allowed, to some extent, to bring the dynamics of actors

144 locally into a broader regional picture of actors that has been emphasized in the literature mentioning the Rwandan and Ugandan military support to AFDL, RCD, CNDP and M23. Up to this level of analysis, it is nevertheless difficult to identify in the discourse and claims of these armed groups the issues related specifically to land and identity. What is clear throughout this analysis is the search for political positions and military ranks. The next section examines the place of land, power and identity through the claim of Nyatura and APCLS armed groups as well as current influential individuals and their networks.

6.2.2 Nyatura: The quest for land and power in Masisi