This chapter analyses the components of and prerequisites for understanding. It negotiates between the idealistic strive for clarity & truth and the ambiguity &
uncertainty. The former desire is rooted in the motivation for making sense of being in the world. The latter one derives from actual events and phenomena which pose a disturbance if not a threat to absolute truth claims and closed systems of understanding.
Different kinds and levels of understanding will be examined for various purposes: for their interrelation, the means that bring them forward, obstacles that interfere with them, and finally means and practices to overcome these obstacles.
The chapter responds to the observation that the concept of one-size-fits-all has proven itself to be a failure: there is no actual linearity in development. There is no universally applicable Absolute. The attempt to globally impose one-size-fits-all approach resulted in an uneasy dependence of the non-Western part of the world upon the Western. Through a discussion of the elements of understanding, the chapter shows the gap in pre-structuration: a counter-hegemonic movement can creatively challenge this dependence.
Creativity
Sculptor Carl Andre is an unconventional artist. He is known to be a strong proponent of appreciating meaninglessness. Defying conceptual perception constitutes an important part of Andre’s work (Brockes, 2013; Guggenheim, n.d.; Rose, n.d.). Andre can inspire a variety of artists who are engaging in different types of artistic work. One kind of professional that Andre is unlikely to prompt is the social analyst. Unlike sculptors, analysts do not have the liberty of embracing meaninglessness. They are required, if not obliged, to maintain a certain sense of clarity in their argumentation. They want to be understood by the others; therefore, they regard clarity as a prerequisite to
their analyses. Embracing meaninglessness would be a contradictory act. Clarity proves to be a universal aspiration for those who want to analyze.
Clarity is indeed a primary aspect of a well-grounded analysis. Nevertheless, clarity cannot be regarded as an end in itself. Clarity is nothing but a means to achieving a desired end: building a sound argument. Therefore, analysts remain committed to the principle of clarity and attempt to deliver their respective messages ‘uninterrupted’
(Selinger & Crease, 2006, p. 189). However hard they try, analysts will fail to understand and make others understand unless they regard their analytical frameworks as tentative.
In other words, due to the nature of their occupation, while analysts must try to fight against ambiguity, at the same time, they must learn to let the desire of disambiguation go. Analysts must remain open to exploration. They must accept the provisional character of their analyses. Intellectual modesty cannot be regarded as a matter of preference. It is a matter of accepting what is inevitable. Analysts can only make various conjectures about the outcome of their analyses. They cannot make absolute truth claims.
Analysts tend to draw on empirical data for making strong truth claims.
Nevertheless, reality is always prone to conceptual difficulties and the phenomena are resistant to clarity regardless of the level of enthusiasm of the analysts (Kateb, 2011, p.
xii). This is troubling for analysts who put the highest value on disambiguation. They can no longer escape asking core questions about the contradictory nature of their engagement. Such fundamental questioning will create even more confusion. They are urged to make pragmatic decisions. Pressing issues concerning the processes of analysis are bypassed. The tendency to rely on circular argumentation is enhanced. As a consequence, analysts may not always fully know what they are talking about. But they take refuge in adopting a habit of pretending at all times that they have a clear idea about the topic at hand (Chakrabarti, 1997, p. 208; Desmond, 2008, p. 126; Sutton, 2007, p.
104). Pretentiousness becomes a fundamental characteristic of an inquiry. Despite inherent limitations to making such strong truth claims, analysts assert the possibility of acquiring full transparency. Consequently, they commit epistemic violence (Spivak, 1988). The result is closing the doors for elevating the discussion, and compromising
possibilities for developing emancipatory understanding. In this context, celebration of opacity is put forward as something less pretentious.
The attitude of welcoming opacity points at another irony. Analysts are considered to be open-minded and modest if they do not make strong truth claims, whereas others who try to understand and explain—claim to know something about the truth—are regarded as proud and pretentious. Such logic amounts to claiming that making no truth claims is better than making incomplete truth claims. The plain fact is that both attitudes are proud and pretentious.
There is no doubt that analysts are better equipped when they question attitudes towards knowledge which are commonly taken for granted, but the approach is useful when it is not transformed into pure cynicism and denied all possibilities of acquiring some truth. A doubtful attitude, on the other hand, can promote the idea that all truth claims must be supported by unambiguous evidence that is acquired by suspending judgment in investigations. This is why, when eccentric artists such as Andre seem to celebrate opacity, they also show signs of aspiration for clarity. Andre’s self-dramatization reveals his artistic frustration. The important matter to register here is that due to his dispositions, Andre tends to embrace an overall feeling of frustration. This is an entirely different attitude in comparison to avoiding frustration and making unsubstantial claims for transparency (Brockes, 2013).
With that in mind, analysts may adopt unpremeditated analyzing traits for dealing with the aforementioned issues related to transparency and opaqueness. They may believe that an unpremeditated approach to analysis is the most effective advance in the quest for meaning. Following an unpremeditated approach, they become familiar with the anxiety and the frustration of eccentric artists (Cohn, 2001, p. 112). Therefore, one can argue that the tendency to despise meaning and conceptual clarity is something that is related to the analyst’s level of toleration of ambiguity and uncertainty (Tingle, 2004). One must also take note of the fact that the level of permissiveness of a precarious state of being is related not only to the individual qualities of the analysts (e.g., natural dispositions), but also to their situatedness (e.g., social dispositions) (Bourdieu, 2002).
How natural and social dispositions interact is a difficult question with many variables which need to be explored with a multidisciplinary approach. There are biological factors (e.g., heritability, age, brain structure), group factors (e.g., gender and birth-order), cultural factors (e.g., there is empirical evidence for suggesting that levels of tolerance of uncertainty differ from one culture to another) and social factors (e.g., education and socialization). When these factors interact with each other, individuals are pre-structured in various ways in terms of their attitudes towards ambiguity and uncertainty. While some individuals are pre-structured to be at ease with unstructured and unpredictable situations, and prefer approaches that promote creative thinking, some others will be conditioned to be generically more careful about the general order of things, and make big changes only after elaborate processes of deliberation. Therefore, analysts who are rendered more tolerant of welcoming unpredictable situations will find it easier to embrace uncertainty. They will refrain from being conditioned to focus on detailed processes and structure.
The primary factor for analysts to embrace uncertainty and opaqueness is their conviction that they are looking for a novel approach for understanding the world they are situated in. Under those circumstances, they are obliged to tolerate if not embrace uncertainty. It is a matter of principle. When analysts are aiming to create something they do not yet know, ambiguity becomes inevitable (Žižek, 2012a). And analysts who value predictability and certainty persist in thinking and acting in their own ways because they are urged to do so by their natural and social dispositions (Levine, 1985). All of these issues are related to the question of understanding.
Against this backdrop, the question of understanding will be examined in two sections: bewilderedness and IKEAization. The former takes looks at the bewilderedness of the analyst by focusing on four themes: undivided understanding, the critical mode of self-reflection, pre-structuredness, and disenchantment. The latter looks at what it labels as IKEAization by breaking it down into two issues: ready-to-assemble and one-size-fits-all. The final subsection will give the example of modernization theory to explain how an IKEA model theorization works.
Bewilderedness
In order to argue clearly and thoroughly, one can start with basic premises and build up to more complicated ideas (Shand, 1993, pp. 121-122). Humans are thinking beings, and thinking beings are capable of bewilderedness (Tschemplik, 2008). Human beings are bewildered about being in the world, and this is the primary motivation for analysts to analyze (Jowett, 1997, p. 126). At this basic level, every human being is an unprofessional analyst (Fischer, 2000, pp. 79-110). Bewilderedness is a given, but it may or may not motivate a desire to understand. Therefore, understanding can exist only as a potentiality (Lear, 1988, pp. 60-63). In other words, understanding is not necessarily actualized. It may remain unexplored and the bewilderedness of the analysts may persist.
Therefore, understanding can never be taken for granted (Rehbein, 1997).
Understanding is actualized when a bewildered person develops an intention to understand (Britzman, 2009, pp. 94-95). The intentionality will transform a bewildered person into an ordinary analyst who is interested in the physical and the social world. As a social being, one may develop a closer interest in the human condition, which is how a bewildered analyst gets into the social inquiry. Ordinary analysts start the inquiry with a set of basic but fundamental questions: what bewilders me the most? How do I desire to understand? Nobody can be bewildered by random phenomena. People are interested in subjects that are related to their particularities of being in the world (Strauss, 1989, p.
210). Bewilderedness and the desire to understand are pre-structured by the existential conditions they are situated in. Due to the existential situatedness of bewilderedness, understanding at the most primary level is personal and undivided. Self-understanding, understanding others and understanding the world are inseparable (Rehbein, 1997).
The way and the manner in which ordinary analysts desire to understand are determined by their position towards the undividedness of understanding, which is not self-evident and cannot be taken for granted. A lack of attention to the undividedness of understanding will break the dialectical relation between self-understanding, understanding others, and understanding the world (Olkowski & Morley, 1999). When
ordinary analysts acknowledge the undividedness of understanding, they realize that not only can there be no understanding of the human way of being in the world in the singular, but also there can be no isolated understanding of the world in the universal, and of people in general (Arendt, 1994, p. 433). When ordinary analysts understand the world in the particular then they become critical analysts. Critical analysts grasp the pre-structuredness of being in the world by appreciating particularities and comprehending the undividedness of understanding with critical self-reflection (Flewelling, 2005, pp.
101-102). A self-reflective process does not always have to be critical, and it does not always lead to a critical realization. Self-reflection might have a noncritical character that is appreciative of commonsensical everyday being in the world (Tan, 2009, p. 400).
While the critical mode of self-reflection infuses analysts with critical thinking, an everyday mode of self-reflection informs ordinary understanding. Immersed in the everyday mode of self-reflection, ordinary analysts are either not aware of the pre-structuredness of being in the world, or make conscious decisions to ignore it.
Understanding in this mode is undivided in the wrong way (Žižek, 2012a, pp. 1-5). The ordinary analyst projects an idiosyncratic self-understanding onto the world (Deranty, 2009; Elliot, 1991). Thusly, self-understanding absorbs understanding. Since understanding is assimilated by self-understanding, it becomes an activity that happens as a matter of course. One understands just-like-that. It is self-evident. Therefore, understanding cannot be a concern (Dahlberg, 2007).
Critical analysts, on the other hand, doubt everything. Their outlook is irreversibly changed. Nothing can be taken for granted. But this is not a radical doubt. Excessive doubt becomes irrelevant (Wittgenstein, 1969, pp. 4, 56, 93, 341, 343). “The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty” (Wittgenstein, 1969, pp. 114-115). The critical analyst becomes aware that self-understanding precedes and motivates the desire to understand the human condition. Nevertheless, the dialectical relation between self-understanding, understanding others, and understanding the world cannot be broken.
Self-understanding is not equal to understanding. If anything, understanding is the aggregate of numberless little streams of self-understanding and understanding others that
are formed to overlap and interlace with one another. Becoming suspicious of self-understanding is the primary condition for critical thinking.
Everyone’s favorite subject is themselves. Things that are supposed to be unique are of primary interest (Wilson, 2007). While considering that, one can make a bold claim and suggest that there is only one plot in all kinds of understanding: who am I?
(Buford, 2011). A critical analyst takes this popular yet unanswered question, strips it off from the excessive self-absorption, and promotes it to underline a contradictory point: I could have been someone else. The reality is that one co-exists with others (Heidegger, 1986, p. 114). The individualistic question gains a common character with the realization that one did not choose to be oneself. One is rendered oneself. The critical analyst’s disenchantment can be confusing. Pre-structuredness of being in the world can easily be confused with pre-determination of being.
Pre-structuredness is not equal to pre-determination. A person’s bewilderedness is shaped by the existential conditions but it is not determined. Things are related, not necessitated. Understanding the pre-structuredness of being leads to a primary realization about being in the world, and it is the most basic step for starting to make sense of the world. When one reaches the realization that one could have been someone else, one can no longer take the activity of understanding for granted (Rehbein, 1997). Although according to the self-evident nature of being, understanding happens just-like-that, from a critical point of view it-is-what-it-is thinking cannot be regarded the equal of understanding. It marks the point where thinking stops and idle talk begins (Heidegger, 1962/1927; 1996/1927). When understanding is monotonized, understanding disappears as a concern. The concern of understanding may easily be vacuumed by the carelessness of everyday being in the world. It can be trivialized. Nevertheless, one is not destined to remain in the idleness of everyday being in the world. One can transcend these limitations by avoiding thinking in terms of it-is-what-it-is. One can persist in thinking in terms of could-have-been-otherwise. This is the antidote of taken-for-grantedness (Srubar, 1999, pp. 40-42; Zucker, 1986, p. 58).
Under normal circumstances, taken-for-grantedness dominates in a society (Schutz
& Luckmann, 1989). Society tends to maintain a stable condition. And the steady state is not supposed to be questioned by the members of that society. Status quo is legitimized as a protective stability. Until further notice, the state of things is unquestionable (Rogers, 1991, pp. 61-62). Reactions do occur against the taken-for-grantedness. But they often occur at such rates that they cannot be observed. And when they are observed, disturbances are immediately incorporated, regulated and rendered invisible. A critical analyst who aims to go beyond it-is-what-it-is thinking will always be perceived as a dangerous anomaly. The majoritarian it-is-what-it-is thinking is solidly embedded in taken-for-grantedness. It will counter every challenge to the protective stability with an assault of take-it-or-leave-it logic. The critical understander either identifies with commonsensical ways of being in the world (e.g., legitimacy) or thinks otherwise. Many thinkers have worked on this theme (e.g., Bourdieu, 1972/1977; Foucault, 1975/1977;
Gramsci, 2010). What lies at the center of their perspective are social actors conforming to self-evidentalized domination. This can be examined with a business metaphor:
IKEAization.
IKEAization
IKEA is a Swedish giant that designs and sells ready-to-assemble furniture. The company has become a widespread phenomenon (Moon, 2004). Popular writers are now talking about a wave of IKEAization (Blackshaw, 2013) hitting the shores of an already McDonaldized world (Ritzer, 2004). There is indeed a certain level of exaggeration with both of the conceptualizations. Nevertheless, they have become popular for good reasons.
One can visit flats in Berlin, Istanbul, and London and experience a strong déjà vu feeling. The familiarity with the furniture is evident. The same types of furniture have spread all over the globe. Soon enough, even in the remotest parts of the world, one will come across a piece of IKEA furniture or accessory. Depending on one’s taste, this could be regarded as progress (e.g., designing a personal space has become affordable), or a
repressive all-encompassing process of homogenization of everyday life (e.g., the personal space is no more personal—it is just like any other space) (Lyotard, 1984, pp.
71-84). A piece of furniture might not necessarily prove to be an interesting topic of investigation. One could argue: ‘if one does not like it, one may refrain from buying IKEA furniture’. But the discussion here is hardly about a piece of furniture. It is not about liking IKEA or not. The emphasis here must be put on the déjà vu feeling generated with the process of IKEAization. There is an apparent antagonism between consensus and dissensus. It is about choosing integration or plurality (Habermas, 1981, pp. 3-14; Lyotard, 1984, pp. 71-84).
A stranger is no longer a stranger. One has become quite familiar with people who one used to regard as strangers. People travel and meet strangers in foreign countries.
They realize how astonishingly easy it has become to establish instant acquaintances.
One wonders about the source of this familiarity. People try to make sense of this strong sense of existential-affinity. One knows what it means to be that person on the basis of a direct participation in the other person’s way of being in the world. The foreign has already become familiar. This is knowledge based on existential-affinity. And one tries to translate the knowledge based on existential-affinity into properly theoretical and conceptual knowledge by highlighting the transformative power of modernity. There has been an endless debate going on for at least three decades now as to whether or not globalization processes have had homogenizing effects on the economic, cultural and political spheres (Cohen, 1996; Giddens, 1984; Pieterse, 2004, pp. 65-94).
Coming from the same type of global social milieus, people are pre-structured similarly in their respective societies. Their ways of being in the world are perhaps not homogenized so much as synchronized. A process of habilitation in the same minimalist kind of being in the world has generated global IKEA partners with a strong sense of existential-affinity. From a positive point of view, this is a great development in human history. Since the foreign has become familiar, a thorough understanding of each other can now be developed. A consensus and an integration of different ways of being in the world are now possible. From a negative point of view, though, a consensus has become
possible only because particular world-views are gentrified and plurality is lost. One can now take the comfort of the now-familiar exotic. At the same time, one can still enjoy the
possible only because particular world-views are gentrified and plurality is lost. One can now take the comfort of the now-familiar exotic. At the same time, one can still enjoy the