Choosing the Research Design

In order to find profound answers to the questions formulated above we need to employ an appropriate research design. The major requirement is that it delivers a comprehensive description and comparison of the reform outcomes in the countries of the enlarged EU. Going further than a separate comparison of liberalization or privatization policies (Schneider and Tenbücken 2004) or a cross-national analysis of regulatory

authorities (Tenbücken and Schneider 2004), such a research design would have to integrate the three dimensions of regulatory reform into one coherent framework.

However, since reform developments seem to differ significantly between countries and sectors, such an analytical concept needs to be flexible in its classification of the various national reform trajectories.

Based on these requirements, the concept of regulatory regimes seems to be most suited for the comparison of the reform outcomes in the EU-15 and the CEEC-10 (cf.

Eisner 2000; Francis 1993; Harris and Milkis 1996; Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin 2001).

The reason is that it allows for the flexible combination of quantitative as well as qualitative reform aspects and thus an integration of the three dimensions that are central for the analysis. As Thatcher (2002a: 869) argues, the concept of regulatory regimes is

“[…] the framework that has greatest potential for understanding the diversity of regulatory reform across both countries and sectors […]”. By employing the regime concept the analytical framework is not limited to material state retreat, but can be extended to two other reform dimensions: liberalization and reregulation.

The use of the regime concept allows for cross-sectoral variation. We may find various regulatory regimes in a country at the same time, depending on the specific sector under analysis. A research design based on the concept of regulatory regimes thus possesses sufficient flexibility and accuracy for mapping complex reform developments as in the case of infrastructure reform. It can be employed to investigate national reform patterns as well as specific sector developments. The latter are important characteristics of an analytical framework because sectoral regulatory regimes, although generally sharing certain features of the national regulatory system, often differ significantly from each other (Vogel 1996: 22).

Regarded from a methodological perspective, the study also is innovative as it combines quantitative and qualitative elements of empirical analysis. It tries to overcome the somewhat artificial separation of statistical evaluation and case study design that often leads to disputes between political scientists. On the one side, the study profits from a quantitative analysis which structures the large data universe constituted by 25 countries

and two sectors (chapter 6). Thus, the researcher can more easily sort out those cases that deserve closer analysis and cross-country comparison. On the other side, a case study design allows a more precise and country-specific analysis of the reform process and its outcomes. This in turn is necessary to investigate the factors that are responsible for potential regime diversity (chapter 7). As Marin and Mayntz (1991: 21-22) claim, the advantage of a combined qualitative and quantitative approach is that “[…] it offers the chance of greater precision, and of discovering both details and comprehensive patterns that would otherwise have remained invisible”.

An analysis that sets out to capture all aspects of regulatory reform and draw general conclusions has to choose a sufficiently large empirical basis. Thus far, case studies have furthered our understanding of the causal mechanisms behind national reform processes, their drivers and mediating forces. They have provided valuable information on exogenous pressures, processes of policy diffusion and the role of domestic institutions impacting on those pressures and processes. As such, single case studies and comparative case studies are without doubt of great analytical value (cf. Eckstein 1975; Lijphart 1971). They are especially well-suited for an in-depth analysis and comparison of domestic political and economic characteristics. In doing so, they can scrutinize and, thus, refute or strengthen existing theories on the basis of a thorough examination of their propositions. However, case studies also posses certain methodological limitations. For instance, it becomes problematic to draw broad generalizations from a small number of observations. Case analyses are often highly selective and might thus employ an empirical basis that is not representative for the composition of the basic population.

Deficits of inferring from a small number of cases can be overcome by changing certain features of the research design. The basic idea is to increase the number of observations. This can be accomplished using “new units and new measures” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 217ff.). As regards the units of analysis, the number of observations can be increased through variation across space and time. The empirical analysis in this study incorporates improvements on both. First, the number of countries analyzed is significantly higher than in other studies of regulatory reform. The statistical evaluation will not be restricted to a few selected member states but integrates all 23 old

and new EU member and two applicant countries into the analysis. Second, data is collected from two classic infrastructure sectors, telecommunications and electricity. And third, analysis is not limited to the comparison of the status quo at a certain point in time.

Instead, historical data will be used for the analysis of privatization. This enables us to map developments over time, i.e. the patterns of state retreat. Privatization data cover two sectors in 15 countries over a period from 1980 to 2003 (EU-15) and in ten countries over a period from 1990 to 2003 (CEEC-10).²⁷ Based on these three methodological improvements, the number of observations can be significantly increased and the results should possess greater generalizability.

Secondly, the number of observations can be increased using new measures. As outlined above, I will base my comparison of the reform situation on the three dimensions privatization, liberalization, and reregulation. Changes along these dimensions correspond to policy outcomes at three distinct levels of analysis that are at the same time the characterizing features of a regulatory regime as it is perceived in this study: ownership structure, market liberalization and regulatory institutions.²⁸ To each reform dimension we can find corresponding indicators for the collection of empirical data. Although these three variables have been used individually in many studies on regulatory reform, an empirical assessment of regulatory diversity based on the combination of all three of them is truly innovative.

27Problematically, a consistent time series data set on privatization for a total of 25 countries is difficult to collect. In addition, if we want to fully capture the regulatory turnaround we need to consider recent data of the last five years. These data are in some cases difficult to obtain since many sources provide information only until the mid or end 1990s. Therefore, more detailed research on the country and the specific sector, i.e.

through press releases or annual reports, becomes necessary in order to construct a reliable data set.

28Please note that the term ‘regulatory institution’ is employed in a much wider sense than the term ‘NRA’.

While the former represents any kind of regulatory organization, such as a NCA, NRA, ministry or central bank, the term ‘NRA’ stands exclusively for a sector-specific regulatory body with specifically-defined characteristics.