What should China contribute to the post-2015 agenda?

With the expiration of MDGs approaching, China’s strategy for participating in the building of the post-2015 agenda should be based on the norm framework established by previous discussions, combine negative growth (poverty reduction) and positive growth (sustainable development), and contribute intellectually to the building of a new global partnership.

Firstly, as to the goal framework, China should ensure the integrity between the norms and goals of the post-2015 agenda, and avoid confusion between the goals and the means.

The fact that most voices advocate a period of 15 years indicates that the discussion about the post-2015 agenda should not be too broad nor too long-term based. Keeping this in mind, China should emphasise the link between

2 It is important to note that the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), a leading Chinese think-tank, has contributed a great deal to this effort. It has completed a project for the FOCAC, drafted a background paper for the EU (Grimm / Zhang 2013), held two international conferences in January and November 2013 respectively, and organised two special issues of its publications, one in Chinese (Global Review 3/2013)

Chun Zhang

German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)

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short-term goals and long-term norms. The post-2015 agenda should lay out a set of goals by consensus to guide international development cooperation and national development in a spirit of equality, mutual trust, inclusiveness, mutual learning and ‘win-win’ cooperation, without hidden objectives.

Given that the MDGs have made significant achievements but that much needs to be done to fully meet the goals set in 2000, China should insist on the continuation of the post-2015 agenda through comprehensively assessing the current state of international development cooperation, reviewing the progress and challenges in implementing the MDGs and, on this basis, exploring the possibilities of and developing a single set of goals for the post-2015 agenda. Meanwhile, given the fact that poverty eradication will be one of the key goals of the post-2015 agenda and that the other goals of MDGs are facing the risk of abandonment, China should argue for harmonising the remaining MDGs into the new goals system.

The post-2015 agenda will set a universal goal system for the whole world;

however, differing countries and regions have different contexts for future implementation. Thus, China should advocate a goal-zone approach, to set both floors and ceilings for each field, and set different stages of goals between the floor and ceiling for countries and regions at different levels of development. Such an approach is, to some extent, similar to that advocated by the HLP report to set a zero framework that all countries should abide by along with a goal zone combining “absolute goals and boundaries coupled with differentiated targets” (Nayar et al. 2013).

China needs to develop further its theoretical framework for the post-2015 agenda based on its experience of cooperation with other developing countries, especially Africa, in implementation of the MDGs. One point that must be noted is that such experience proves that development is the foundation of everything and that only development achievements can address the unfavourable conditions of development. China and the developing world should strengthen their public diplomacy for promoting such experience and advocate that the post-2015 agenda should see development goals rather than conditions of development as primary.

More profoundly, both China and the rest of the developing world should broaden their eyes to perceive the post-2015 agenda from the perspective of human development rather than international development assistance, for improving their capability to build international norms and rules. China and the rest of developing world should not only think about the agenda

from their own context, but also from the context of the developed world;

and think about the possibility of providing public goods for the developed world, especially intellectual public goods on development options, pushing the developed world to rethink the deficiencies of its own development path and theory.

Secondly, as to the time framework, China should advocate making the best use of the limited time and setting for a reasonable schedule of implementation.

It is important to note that one reason for the imperfectness of MDGs lies in the time limitation. If there were another five to ten years, the performance of the MDGs would definitely be better. Another important issue is that many international negotiations proceed on the basis that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” which becomes a recipe for gridlock (SDSN 2013, 25). Such gridlock is the biggest potential obstacle for reaching an agreement on the post-2015 agenda. If necessary, China should advocate an approach of ‘starting from agreed and leaving disagreed for other processes’

in order to save the negotiation framework and leave more time for further negotiation.

Combining the two points above, China should also advocate for a longer time framework for the implementation of the post-2015 agenda, if necessary.

The appropriate period could be 20–30 years with a speed and multi-track framework. Such a longer time framework could be structured as four phases, each of five years:

• Phase 1: Initiate the first phase of the post-2015 agenda for the developed world, and adapt and move from MDGs to the post-2015 agenda for the developing world;

• Phase 2: Move to the second phase of the post-2015 agenda for the developed world, and start the first phase for the developing world, and launch the building of a new global partnership;

• Phase 3: Finish the floor goals for the developed world, and move to the second phase for the developing world;

• Phase 4: Finish the ceiling goals for the developed world, and finish the floor goals for the developing world, and start the discussion and negotiation over the new goals (post-2035 or post-2040).

Chun Zhang

German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)

36

Thirdly, as to the implementation framework, China should join hands with the international community to ensure that the voices of the developing world are heard and its reasonable rights respected.

Armed with the experience of successful domestic implementation and international cooperation, China should contribute to a larger voice and the equal participation of the developing world through pro-active participation, both individually and collectively. However, as the United Nations has recognised, more fundamental reform in funding will not occur without a dramatic change in perspective. In particular, what is needed is a collective effort to overcome the recipient-provider discourse that reinforces the North-South dichotomy in UN circles. Furthermore, concrete steps should be taken to broaden and diversify donor bases and reduce reliance on a limited number of member state donors that primarily contribute earmarked funds (Wennubst / Mahn 2013, 3).

As to the building of a new global partnership, it is important to keep a balance between the rising South-South cooperation and the traditional South-North cooperation. While noting the rising capabilities of providing more public goods from the South, China should insist on the key role of South-North cooperation. Thus, the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ ought to be applied to the funding platform of the post-2015 agenda. Meanwhile, China should also remind the world of the risks of the developed world using ‘universal responsibility’ as an excuse for shirking the responsibility of public goods provision. This points to the importance of identifying the proper division of labour between the South-South cooperation and the South-South-North cooperation.

Fourthly, as to the monitoring framework, China should emphasise the combination of voluntary and universal principles to avoid the quiet attachment of political and social conditions. It is important to say that the illustrative goals and targets would not be legally binding, but must be monitored closely. Thus, while emphasising an independent and rigorous monitoring system, China should insist that monitoring must be seen by everyone as a way of motivating progress and enhancing cooperation, not as a tool for conditionality.

Fifth and finally, China should strengthen its capability towards the design of the post-2015 agenda. China should combine better its domestic development strategy with the post-2015 agenda, especially on how to combine negative with positive growth. China needs to improve its participation in the

post-2015 agenda building, through establishing an intellectual community consisting of governmental officials, academic researchers, think-tank analysts, civil society groups, and NGOs activists, etc. And a coalition should be built before the intergovernmental negotiations starting September 2014, for which some existing platforms are highly relevant, including the United Nations, G20, FOCAC, BRICS, G77+China, etc.

Chun Zhang

German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)

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Hongyuan Yu

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