In contrast to the French, who sought to maximize publicity so that their re-sponse to the disaster would be both “important and known,”80 American offi-cials endeavored to keep a low profile, hoping to minimize public associations of the United States with the toxic oil. Soon, however, US Ambassador Charles Yost began to press the State Department to commit to a more robust American response. Yost’s position on this matter may have been due to his regular contact with Moroccan officials, who pleaded for additional aid. It may also have been due to Yost’s view of Morocco’s strategic role in the Cold War.
At the strategic level, the American government was divided as to whether the priority in Morocco ought to be to preserve the bases, in order to fight the Soviets in World War III, or to mitigate anti-Americanism, in order to fight communist propaganda. The Truman administration had recognized that, in Europe, “the primary threat was not that the Soviet Union would seize territory through direct military intervention but that it would capitalize on economic and social unrest, expanding its power through subversion and manipulation.”81 For North Africa in the Eisenhower years, however, this remained a point of contention. The construction of new bases in Spain and plans for long-range nuclear bomber routes from the US diminished the need for the North African bases,82 but the resulting policy change was gradual and fraught. Base tenure of-ficially remained the top priority for US policy in Morocco into the early 1960s, although friction developed over this question both in Washington, between State and Defense, and in Rabat, between the Navy and the Embassy. Yost was an early advocate of the view that preserving the bases was less important than preserving a positive image of America among Moroccans.83 Yost’s prioritization of public opinion rather than base tenure seems to have affected his approach to the oil poisoning. Yost saw base tenure as expendable in the larger, “total” Cold War. From this perspective, a vigorous American contribution to relief efforts might draw attention to the origin of the toxic oil at Nouasser, but if it promoted favorable views toward Americans in general, then that might do more to thwart Soviet ambitions in North Africa than the Strategic Air Command’s bombers ever would.
Yost requested that the State Department approve the release of “Cold War”
(Mutual Security Act) contingency funds, or, failing that, a smaller $50,000 emergency fund, to assist with relief efforts. The Moroccan government, having learned of the jake poisoning epidemic in the 1930s, hoped that American exper-tise could offer something beyond the grim prognosis provided by the European
doctors. 84 Indeed, experts at the Bellevue Medical Center suggested that suc-cessful treatment was possible and recommended that the United States send an “expedition team” comprised of six specialists representing various branches of medicine and therapy.85 Yost argued that the United States would not make itself conspicuous by providing such aid: the International Red Cross had issued a global call for assistance, which had been publicized in the Moroccan press.
He noted that the Austrian government had already pledged to provide a one hundred-bed hospital,86 and Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Britain, and Switzer-land were sending physiotherapists.87 When, on December 3, 1959, Moroccan health minister Ben Abbes announced the details of the Leroy plan for the re-habilitation of the victims, the enormity of the Moroccan need for assistance became more evident.88
In this light, the American response started to seem stingy. The Institute of Physical medicine and the American Red Cross were willing to send a medical survey team for two weeks, and the United States agreed to pay for transporta-tion, but the World Health Organization had proceeded beyond mere evalua-tion and needed a “semi-permanent treatment team,” which the American orga-nizations were unable or unwilling to provide.89 US Air Force C-124s airlifted the twelve-ton Austrian field hospital to Morocco, and American Red Cross did provide a donation of $5,000,but in the critical area of medical personnel, the Americans came up short.90 The State Department took care, in its con-tacts with the international Red Cross, to stress American reluctance to provide further aid and “to avoid any impression that the United States is prepared to contribute.”91 The Moroccan government complied with the American desire to keep a low profile, and no public or official request for aid was made to the Em-bassy or the State Department. However, the international League of Red Cross Societies appealed to the American Red Cross for two complete field hospitals, which American Red Cross president Alfred Gruenther urged the State Depart-ment to provide, pointing out that thus far, the Europeans and Canadians had been providing all the personnel. The international Red Cross suggested that President Eisenhower’s upcoming visit to Morocco on December 22 might be the perfect occasion to announce such an American donation.92
Ambassador Yost repeatedly made the case for a more generous American response, pointing to the more generous responses of European countries and to the threat that the Soviet Union might seek to gain an advantage from the cri-sis.93 Yost also argued that, while the Moroccan government had been silent on the issue of American culpability, the Moroccan press had not, and he nervously anticipated the return of Al-Istiqlal to the news shops: Mohamed Lyazidi, editor
of Al-Istiqlal, had indicated that his paper would demand an investigation into American responsibility when it resumed publication.94
Yost’s appeal for additional aid was complicated, however, by Eisenhower’s scheduled visit. Eisenhower was coming to Morocco as part of an “eleven-nation goodwill tour” intended to counter the publicity impact of Khrushchev’s visit to the US in September. The point of the tour was to counter Soviet propaganda and generate a positive image of the United States, and in Morocco, the US Information Agency had plans to make the most of Eisenhower’s visit using film, radio, pamphlets, photographs, and window displays.95 The oil poisoning issue threatened to subvert the narrative that Eisenhower wanted to create: if Eisenhower announced the donation of American field hospitals for Meknes, then the oil poisoning would dominate the headlines. The expected coincidence of the resumption of A-Istiqlal and the president’s tour was also unfortunate, for it assured that the focus would be on American culpability and not just Amer-ican generosity. For these reasons, Yost recommended a “short postponement”
of major American aid.96
Yost continued to be troubled, however, by the urgency of the human crisis and the inadequacy of the American response. Winter was setting in in Meknes, and on December 17, representatives of the health ministry contacted the Amer-ican embassy and described the suffering of the paralysis patients being housed and treated in tents. Yost urged the State Department to arrange to meet the Moroccan request for ten thousand each of long underwear, sweaters, wool blan-kets, pajamas, and wool socks, ideally through the Red Cross.97 The American Red Cross soon arranged a shipment of sweatshirts and union suits from stores in Switzerland, but only a fraction of the number requested.98
What the international Red Cross rehabilitation program most desperately needed was personnel. However, the Americans were participating in the re-habilitation program only minimally. The American Red Cross did arrange to send two nurses to Morocco but the fact that the Americans were sending no doctors or physiotherapists was noticeable, since the Red Cross societies of other Western countries had provided altogether a dozen doctors and thirty physiotherapists, as well as ten nurses. In the early months of the rehabilitation program, the American staffing contribution was on par with that of Austria, Australia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, and Norway, but was outstripped by the efforts of Canada, France, West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Iraq.99 The American Red Cross cash donation of
$6000 was more impressive, making up over half the total cash donations at the time, but it was less conspicuous, by design.100
The return of Al-Istiqlal to publication on December 19 increased the politi-cal pressure on the Americans, as expected, explicitly linking the oil poisoning to the American bases and to a general American disregard for Moroccan rights and sovereignty. Al-Istiqlal’s December 19 article on the oil poisoning exempli-fied the nationalist view that the American bases were colonial “enclaves” (im-plicitly comparable to the Spanish enclaves at Septa, Melilla, and Ifni) although the article placed equal blame on the Moroccan state, as befitted Istiqlal’s role as the political opposition.101