The period following the death of Sultan Shaykh Uvays was one of dis-ruption of the central authority he had attempted to establish in Tabriz.
Between 776/ 1374 and 788/ 1386 the rule of the Jalayirid sultans was chal-lenged by the power of the amirs, who rallied support around alternative Jalayirid princes. The most powerful amir in this period was Amīr ‘Ādil Āqā, who enjoyed support from the Oyrat tribesmen, and whose author-ity in Sultaniyya was confirmed by Tīmūr. Power in the sultanate became divided between Tabriz, Baghdad and Sultaniyya, each home to a Jalayirid contender for the throne. In addition, this period saw the rise in influence of the Qarāquyūnlū Turkmans on the northwestern frontier, and the begin-ning of their at times friendly, at times hostile relations with the Jalayirids.
The political situation was turned upside down after 788/ 1386, with the first campaigns of Tīmūr in Iran, which fundamentally altered the balance of power and challenged the Ilkhanid legacy as promoted by the Jalayirids. Tīmūr’s arrival was not immediately devastating for the Jalayirid dynasty, however, and in fact Tīmūr’s conquests served to restore the authority of the sultan by eliminating his rivals. The long reign of Sulṭān Aḥmad (r. 784/ 1382–813/ 1410) was characterised by a series of flights from Tīmūr’s armies and subsequent attempts to regain control of Tabriz and Baghdad. Although Sulṭān Aḥmad was severely weakened by the Timurid campaigns, between 788/ 1386 and 813/ 1410 Jalayirid sovereignty remained important for political actors who sought to oppose or resist the Timurids. The Mamluk sultanate, the Ottoman beylik and the Qarāquyūnlū confederation all looked to the Jalayirid sultan as the embodiment of an alternative to Tīmūr in the late fourteenth century. For the Qarāquyūnlū leader Qarā Yūsuf in particular, Sulṭān Aḥmad became a link to the Ilkhanid legacy, which served as ideological capital with which to make claims to legitimate authority in Azarbayjan and Iraq in the early fifteenth century. Although the Jalayirid dynasty continued until the demise of Sulṭān Aḥmad’s grandson, Sulṭān Ḥusayn, in 835/
1432, the Qarāquyūnlū seizure of Tabriz following Sulṭān Aḥmad’s death
in 813/ 1410 signalled the end of the symbolic significance of Jalayirid sovereignty in the former Ilkhanid lands.
Breakdown of Central Authority (776/ 1374–788/ 1386)
The period from the death of Shaykh Uvays in 776/ 1374 until Sulṭān Aḥmad was driven from Tabriz by Tīmūr’s forces in 788/ 1386 was one of political decentralisation, the growth of power of the amirs, and a weak-ening of the sultan’s authority. Sulṭān Ḥusayn (r. 776/ 1374–784/ 1382) depended on his chief amir, ‘Ādil Āqā, who held effective power in Tabriz and Sultaniyya. At the same time, Sulṭān Ḥusayn’s brothers became ral-lying points for other amirs who opposed Amīr ‘Ādil. In a sense, this was an indication that the notion of Jalayirid dynastic authority continued to be strong among the ruling elite after Shaykh Uvays’s death. Any amir who wanted to establish himself sought the ideological cover of a Jalayirid prince to lend him legitimacy. At the same time, however, the Jalayirid state seemed on the verge of disintegration from within, particularly after Sulṭān Ḥusayn was killed by his brother, Sulṭān Aḥmad, in 1382, even while his other brothers Bāyazīd and Shaykh ‘Alī maintained separate courts at Sultaniyya and Baghdad respectively. Amid the internal strug-gles for power among the Jalayirids was the steady growth in power of the Qarāquyūnlū Turkmans, led by Bayrām Khwāja, and subsequently by Qarā Yūsuf. The expansion of the territory and prestige enjoyed by the Qarāquyūnlū was linked to events in the Jalayirid sultanate in these years, as Amīr ‘Ādil, and later Sulṭān Aḥmad, called on the Turkmans for military support in order to tip the balance of power to themselves in the struggles with the other amirs and princes.
Amīr ‘Ādil Āqā (sometimes called ‘Sāriq’; ‘yellow, blond’) began his rise to power at the end of the reign of Shaykh Uvays. In approximately 772/ 1370–71, Shaykh Uvays assigned him to the province of Rayy,1 and it was here and in Sultaniyya that he would establish the base of his support. Although his assignment to Rayy is the first mention of Amīr ‘Ādil in the sources, it seems that he quickly rose to prominence thereafter among the amirs of the Jalayirid realm. When Shaykh Uvays died in 776/ 1374, several amirs supported Sulṭān Ḥusayn in opposition to Amīr ‘Ādil and another of Shaykh Uvays’s sons, Shaykh ‘Alī.2 At the time of the sultan’s death, both Amīr ‘Ādil and Shaykh ‘Alī were away from Tabriz, unable to assert themselves in the question of succession, and were obliged to offer their allegiance to Sulṭān Ḥusayn.3 Although several important amirs were hostile to Amīr ‘Ādil, he maintained his position of prominence. Amīr ‘Ādil acted as Sulṭān Ḥusayn’s protector
when the Muzaffarid Shāh Shujā‘ occupied Tabriz in 777/ 1375, escorting the new sultan to Baghdad. This act allowed Amīr ‘Ādil to keep Sulṭān Ḥusayn at a distance from those amirs who were hostile to himself. After the Muzaffarid threat had passed, however, and Amīr ‘Ādil returned to his post in Sultaniyya, a group of conspirators attempted to move against him.
The timing of the conspiracy may have been prompted by Sulṭān Ḥusayn’s bestowal of the city of Rayy to Amīr Valī, who, as discussed in Chapter 6, had served there as military governor under Shaykh Uvays.4 Rayy had been under the authority of Amīr ‘Ādil, and the reassignment of the city to Amīr Valī may have been perceived as a sign that Sulṭān Ḥusayn was willing to limit the scope of Amīr ‘Ādil’s authority. In 779/ 1378, a group of amirs gathered around Sulṭān Ḥusayn at his camp in Ujan. When Amīr ‘Ādil arrived and presented himself at the royal pavilion, the amirs voiced their dissatisfaction with him, and announced that they no longer accepted his leadership.5 Amīr ‘Ādil was forced to return to Sultaniyya, and the amirs momentarily had their major rival out of the way. The role of Sulṭān Ḥusayn in these events is unclear. Ḥāfiẓ Abrū seems to indicate that he initially accepted the amirs’ attempt to marginalise Amīr ‘Ādil;
however, he was soon forced to call on Amīr ‘Ādil’s aid after his treasury and possessions were plundered by the amirs.6
It thus became apparent that Amīr ‘Ādil was the real power that held the sultanate together, and that the Jalayirid sultan’s position in the royal capital at Tabriz could only be maintained by his backing and protection.
This was due in part to the fact that Amīr ‘Ādil commanded the loyalty of the Oyrats, one of the few autonomous Mongol tribal groups in the former Ilkhanid realm. Leading his own forces from Sultaniyya, and calling on the Oyrat army to the west, Amīr ‘Ādil was able to overwhelm the rebellious amirs from two fronts. In his message to the Oyrats, he promised abundant property grants (suyūrghāls)7 to all who joined with Sulṭān Ḥusayn.8 After the rebels were defeated, Sulṭān Ḥusayn sent his own letter to Amīr ‘Ādil, assuring him that he had been opposed to the rebels, and that they should be punished.9 Amīr ‘Ādil executed four of the leaders of the uprising, while those who had remained loyal to the sultan were generously rewarded.10 After this incident, there was no question that Amīr ‘Ādil was the supreme authority behind the Jalayirid throne.11
Amīr ‘Ādil’s power increased even more following his successful defence against a second Muzaffarid invasion, led by Shāh Shujā‘ in 783/
1381.12 Based on Ḥāfiẓ Abrū’s account, Shāh Shujā‘ this time seemed certain that he would be successful thanks to an alliance with Amīr
‘Ādil. The Jalayirid commander had made overtures of friendship to the
Muzaffarids, sending gifts from Baghdad to Shiraz. Shāh Shujā‘ sent an envoy to Amīr ‘Ādil at Sultaniyya with the message:
I have set out to subdue Tabriz. Now, if ‘Ādil Āqā is in agreement with me, and if his outward show of friendship is sincere, he must join with me and become obedient. If he has feigned the appearance of friendship, there must be war.13 However, the historian of the Muzaffarids, Maḥmūd Kutubī, does not suggest that there was any perceived alliance between Amīr ‘Ādil and the Muzaffarids, and writes only that Shāh Shujā‘ sought to punish Amīr
‘Ādil for exerting his own total authority over the region of Sultaniyya.14 The battle that ensued outside Sultaniyya resulted in a Muzaffarid with-drawal, and Shāh Shujā‘ returned to Shiraz.15 For Amīr ‘Ādil, his success-ful defence of the country against the Muzaffarids seems to have helped him even further in the consolidation of his own power. Ḥāfiẓ Abrū writes that Amīr ‘Ādil had achieved such a victory, and dealt with a matter of such difficulty, that his power (tasalluṭ) in the country increased.16 Sulṭān Ḥusayn, on the other hand, had not faced the Muzaffarid attack. He had delayed in coming from Tabriz, and although he did take part in the main battle, he left Sultaniyya during the siege to meet his brother Sulṭān Aḥmad.17 This situation reflected the relationship between the sultan and Amīr ‘Ādil throughout Sulṭān Ḥusayn’s reign: authority in the Jalayirid realm was exerted by Amīr ‘Ādil through his control of the military, while Sulṭān Ḥusayn remained largely a symbolic figure.
Amīr ‘Ādil’s military power was mirrored in the urban milieu by the influence of certain notable families, particularly the Kujujī shaykhs in Tabriz. Christoph Werner, Daniel Zakrzewski and Hans- Thomas Tillschneider have traced the close ties between the Kujujī family and the Jalayirid sultans, beginning with Shaykh Uvays, and have described Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī as both an urban notable and a representative of the Jalayirid dynasty.18 In the conflict within the Jalayirid family after Shaykh Uvays’s death, Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī sought to secure his prominence in Tabriz and provide some measure of stability for his family in the midst of the uncertain political situation by founding a mosque- madrasa- khānqāh complex in the city.19 The endowment document, dated 782/ 1380, was witnessed by three of Shaykh Uvays’s sons, including Sulṭān Ḥusayn, who referred to Kujujī in the document as ‘my father’ (padaram) and the
‘sultan of shaykhs of both worlds’ (sulṭān al- mashāyikh fī ‘alamayn).20 According to Werner et al., Kujujī was a largely independent ruler in Tabriz, and portrayed himself in the tradition of a princely founder of the complex.21 Between the power of Amīr ‘Ādil among the army, and Khwāja Shaykh Kujujī in Tabriz, the Jalayirid dynasty seemed to be
more of an irrelevant or even destabilising element in the political life of Azarbayjan after Shaykh Uvays.
Little changed in this balance of power after Sulṭān Ḥusayn was mur-dered by his brother, Sulṭān Aḥmad, in Tabriz in 1382. Shaykh Uvays had made Sulṭān Aḥmad responsible for the region around Ardabil, a region closely tied to the Ṣafaviyya Sufi order under the leadership of Shaykh Ṣadr al- Dīn (d. 794/ 1392).22 After a disagreement with his brother Sulṭān Ḥusayn, Sulṭān Aḥmad left Tabriz for Ardabil, and then went on to Arran and Mughan, where he prepared a military force. He then returned to attack Tabriz, a task made easier by the fact that Amīr ‘Ādil and all the Jalayirid forces were away from Azarbayjan, engaged in operations against Amīr Valī in Rayy.23 Sulṭān Aḥmad entered Tabriz and the palace unopposed, and took the place of his brother on the royal throne. Sulṭān Ḥusayn managed to escape from the palace into the city, where he attempted to hide among the populace. However, he was quickly seized and executed.
Initially, Sulṭān Aḥmad seems not to have had the support of many of the amirs, who remained loyal to Amīr ‘Ādil. Instead, Sulṭān Aḥmad’s fol-lowers were among the lower strata of society. According to Astarābādī, who served Sulṭān Aḥmad in Baghdad before joining the court of the ruler of Sivas, Qāḍī Burhān al- Dīn, Sulṭān Aḥmad systematically eliminated the ‘great amirs and renowned chiefs (ṣanādīd- i nāmdār), who were the step- sons of favor (rabīb- i ni‘mat) and the product of the dynasty (ṣanī‘- i tarbiyat- i ān khāndān)’, and gathered to himself ‘a faction (ṭā’ifa) from among the followers of the army (dhanāb- i mutajanda) and the rabble of the people (awbāsh al- nās) who were marked by weakness of origin and ignorance of lineage’, and who lacked intellect and bravery.24 Of course, Astarābādī was clearly hostile to his former patron Sulṭān Aḥmad, and would not have been interested in glorifying his rise to power. However, it does seem likely that Sulṭān Aḥmad would have had to rely on non- elite supporters from among the population of Tabriz, considering that Amīr ‘Ādil commanded the loyalty of many of the Jalayirid amirs, and at the same time controlled Sulṭān Ḥusayn. Sulṭān Aḥmad could not have expected much enthusiastic support after killing his brother the sultan, and disrupting the political dynamic that put power back into the hands of the amirs in the period after Shaykh Uvays.
Sulṭān Aḥmad fled Tabriz when Amīr ‘Ādil marched against him fol-lowing his assassination of Sulṭān Ḥusayn.25 It was at this point that he attempted to appeal to his royal heritage in order to win some of the amirs to his side. He sent a message to Muḥammad Davātī, who was leading Amīr ‘Ādil’s forces near the Aras river, and another to ‘Abbās Āqā and Misāfir Īradājī, the amirs whom Amīr ‘Ādil had deputised to occupy
Tabriz.26 According to the Timurid historian Mīrkhvānd, Sulṭān Aḥmad asked, ‘you are the nökers of my father, why do you serve ‘Ādil?’27 His appeal to their loyalty to Shaykh Uvays, and thus the Jalayirid dynastic authority which had now devolved upon Sulṭān Aḥmad himself, con-vinced these amirs to turn against Amīr ‘Ādil. They made their opposition known to Amīr ‘Ādil, who was forced to leave Azarbayjan and return to Sultaniyya.28 Sulṭān Aḥmad was able to return to Tabriz, but not before his own followers killed ‘Abbās and Misāfir, out of fear that they would acquire privileged positions under Sulṭān Aḥmad.29
Amīr ‘Ādil’s supremacy among the amirs continued not only after Sulṭān Aḥmad came to power, but also even after Tīmūr’s armies came to Iran. Details of Tīmūr’s campaigns will be discussed below. At this point it is useful to note that initially Amīr ‘Ādil was the beneficiary of Tīmūr’s arrival. In 787/ 1385, Tīmūr captured Sultaniyya, and summoned Amīr ‘Ādil, who had fled to Shiraz.30 When Amīr ‘Ādil complied, Tīmūr rewarded his obedience with suyūrghāl grants and confirmed his authority in Sultaniyya and Tabriz.31 Tīmūr sought to incorporate Amīr ‘Ādil into his own expanding military elite and marginalise the Jalayirid sultan in the process. Thus, the initial contact between Tīmūr and the Jalayirid realm continued the process of decentralisation and weakening of Jalayirid authority that had begun after Shaykh Uvays’s death.
Despite the weakness of the sultanate in the period 776/ 1374–788/ 1386, the notion that legitimate authority resided in the Jalayirid dynasty per-sisted. Amīr ‘Ādil did not attempt to seize the throne for himself, but executed his power in the name of Sulṭān Ḥusayn. The durability of the idea of Jalayirid sovereignty combined with a decentralisation of power meant that Jalayirid princes became rallying points of political conflict after the reign of Shaykh Uvays. In fact, this pattern reflected that of the Ilkhanid period, which was characterised by a balance between the cen-tralising aspirations of the royal court and administrative authorities on the one hand, and the tendency for military power to be distributed among the amirs in the provinces on the other. Thus, the sons of Shaykh Uvays, as the Chinggisids had previously, all represented potential foci for the political aspirations of the military elite.
Sulṭān Ḥusayn was an attractive rallying point for the amirs when faced with the threat of invasion by the Muzaffarid Shāh Shujā‘ on two occa-sions. From all of our Timurid accounts, Sulṭān Ḥusayn was little more than a puppet of Amīr ‘Ādil. According to Naṭanzī, he was desperately in love with his own image, and would cover his head, stare at his beauti-ful face in the mirror, and weep.32 Yet, Sulṭān Ḥusayn’s personality was preferable to the Muzaffarid invaders, and the amirs were ready to accept
the nominal authority of the Jalayirid sultan, who could be more easily controlled and manipulated. Once the Muzaffarid threat had passed, other princes also offered opportunities for those opposed to the authority of Amīr ‘Ādil. Sulṭān Ḥusayn’s brothers Shaykh ‘Alī, Sulṭān Aḥmad and Bāyazīd were all potential candidates for the Jalayirid throne.
Shaykh Uvays had assigned his son Shaykh ‘Alī to govern Baghdad before he died in 776/ 1374.33 He was not chosen to succeed as sultan, despite the fact that he was older than Sulṭān Ḥusayn. Following the revolt of Khwāja Mirjān in the 760s/ 1360s, it is likely that Shaykh Uvays intended to prevent such uprisings in the future by leaving both Iraq and Azarbayjan in the hands of his two sons. Iraq had regained its political importance under the Jalayirids, after having become a secondary Ilkhanid province. Iraq had been the base of Shaykh Ḥasan’s authority in the 740s/
1340s and 750s/ 1350s when Azarbayjan was under Chubanid control.
Under Shaykh Uvays and his successors, Baghdad remained the ‘second city’ in the Jalayirid realm, after Tabriz. By appointing Shaykh ‘Alī to the government of Iraq, he ensured that this province would remain under the authority of the Jalayirid royal house.
Shaykh ‘Alī seems to have governed Baghdad quietly during the first years of the reign of his brother Sulṭān Ḥusayn. However, he became the focus of an uprising in the year 780/ 1379,34 directed against the son of the vizier Shams al- Dīn Zakarīyā, Vajīh al- Dīn Ismā‘īl.35 The conspirators were from among the entourage of Shaykh ‘Alī and Vajīh al- Dīn Ismā‘īl and had the backing of the prince, who had come into conflict with Ismā‘īl.36 They ambushed and killed Vajīh al- Dīn Ismā‘īl, sending the city of Baghdad into an uproar.37
The murder of the son of the vizier in Baghdad in the name of a Jalayirid prince posed a challenge to the established order of Sulṭān Ḥusayn, Shams al- Dīn Zakarīyā and Amīr ‘Ādil. When the sultan got word of the disorder in Baghdad, he appealed to his brother to remember that Iraq had been their family’s original stronghold, from where they drew much of their power and support, and that he held his authority by virtue of royal mandate (vaṣīyat- i pādishāhī) and was not dependent on the amirs.38 Essentially, Sulṭān Ḥusayn was urging his brother Shaykh
‘Alī to bring the situation in Baghdad under control before the violence spread.
However, the sultan’s message was not enough to bring order to the region. Until the end of Sulṭān Ḥusayn’s reign, the province of Arab Iraq
However, the sultan’s message was not enough to bring order to the region. Until the end of Sulṭān Ḥusayn’s reign, the province of Arab Iraq