Now I recommend you to go home and sleep quietly in your beds.
—Neville Chamberlain, September 30, 1938
On September 30, 1938, Neville Chamberlain landed at Heston Airport in London. A crowd awaited his return from his third and final meeting with Adolf Hitler over the fate of the Czechoslovakia. After a month in which Britain believed it was the brink of world war, Chamberlain announced that Britain and Germany had reached a settlement, one that would give Germany the Sudetenland territory of Czechoslovakia. While Chamberlain had conceded to Hitler’s demands, the agreement was a victory. It was, as Chamberlain promised, “only the prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace.” Waving a piece of paper in front of the enthusi-astic crowd, Chamberlain announced that he held in his hands a promise bearing his and Hitler’s signatures, “symbolic of the desires of our two peoples never to go to war again.” Britain was on the cusp of “peace in our time.”
Peace, of course, was not to come, and the Munich agreement has come to epitomize the tragedy of the British interwar strategy of appeasement.
Few responses to rising powers have been more studied—and more criticized—than Britain’s decision to appease Nazi Germany.1 From 1933 onward Germany seemed determined to upend the status quo established in the Treaty of Versailles.2 Yet from 1933 to 1938, as Germany grew more belligerent, Britain eschewed confrontation and instead attempted to settle German “grievances through rational negotiation and compromise.”3 For some, British foreign policy was pathological, based, as Winston Churchill bluntly put it, on a “long series of miscalculations, and misjudgment of men and facts,”4 a policy tantamount to the “complete surrender of the Western Democracies to the Nazi threat of force.”5
Revisionist historiography has largely rejected the view that appeasement stemmed solely from incompetence. Indeed for some, appeasement was a necessary evil, the only possible response to insurmountable domestic and international constraints.6 Constrained by limited economic and military resources, Britain’s only choice was to buy time, to appease Hitler in the present and prepare to fight in the future. Other scholars are less certain that appeasement was the only or optimal strategy, but argue that it was still a reasonable response to the politics of harm and interest. In the interwar period, there was enough uncertainty about Germany’s intentions to under-cut collective mobilization and push the British toward accommodation.
Hitler’s legitimation strategies shaped Britain’s response to German revisionism in the 1930s. Until the Munich crisis, Hitler and other German politicians justified their aims with a multivocal strategy, appealing to Ger-man equality and self-determination to justify Gerpoliticians justified their aims with a multivocal strategy, appealing to Ger-man expansion. These legitimation strategies proved strongly resonant and had three significant effects on British politics: they signaled constraint, convincing British politi-cians that Germany could be bound to an existing institutional order; they silenced “antiappeasers” who demanded a more confrontational policy; and they resonated with Britain’s sense of self-identity as a liberal, democratic, and neutral state. After Munich, however, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that rearmament and expan-sion were justified as a matter of German might, not international rights.7 Hitler threatened to tear apart the foundations of the Versailles order and construct a new, revolutionary order in its place. The more illegitimate Hit-ler’s claims, the more he declared the Versailles system obsolete, the more Britain came to see Germany as an insatiable revisionist, impervious to negotiation , and responsive only to the language of force.
The study of interwar strategy may appear so well developed that additional explanations of appeasement are unnecessary. But this well-trod history still supplies significant puzzles that legitimation theory illuminates. As argued below, a focus on legitimation explains why it was that British politicians, at least until Munich, read Germany’s revisionist actions as largely benign. Scholars that emphasize the politics of harm and interests insist that Germany’s actions did not provide enough informa-tion to prompt mobilizainforma-tion, especially under challenging political and economic conditions. What these theories miss, however, is that Britain consistently responded to costless signals—to cheap talk—while ignoring the more “costly” signs of Germany’s ambition. The theory here suggests that it was Germany’s rhetorical framing of its actions—how it justified its revisionism —that made what could and should have been seen as aggres-sive and revolutionary behavior seem relatively benign. Moreover the legit-imation theory here sheds light, not only on why Britain chose to appease Germany before the Munich crisis, but also why Britain committed to con-fronting the German state after Munich, mobilizing its still scarce resources
to check the German threat. This chapter argues that this change in British policy stems from a shift in Germany’s rhetoric: as German actions appeared illegitimate, so too did they seem to be a threat to Britain’s very existence, which had to be confronted at all costs. This argument departs from much of the established historiography that sees the Prague coup of March 1939 as the turning point in British appeasement strategy.
Below, I make the case that British leaders’ changed their understanding of Germany’s intentions months before the Prague coup. As Roger Eatwell argues, “It is in the two months after Munich that we are to find the key to the ‘sudden’ change of opinion in March 1939.”8 It was in the fall of 1938 that the British began intensifying their rearmament, seeking allies, and mobilizing public support for war.9 Indeed, it was not the Prague coup that changed Britain’s perceptions of Germany as a threat; it was the shift in Britain’s understanding of Germany as a threat that shaped the meaning of Prague. Had Britain not settled on an interpretation of Nazi Germany as an insatiable revisionist, the Prague coup might have been yet another moment of ambiguous, limited expansion, not terribly different from events in the Rhineland, Austria, or the Sudetenland.10
Finally, the legitimation theory adds social and rhetorical context to tra-ditional approaches to British leaders and appeasement. Like the narrative presented in chapter 4, the story told in this chapter resembles an older historiography, which argues that British leaders failed to understand Hit-ler as the threat that he was.11 Although Britain took what Germany had to say seriously, the British politicians in the story that follows are not “guilty men,” trapped in cognitive blinders of their own making. Rather, both Ger-many’s ability to legitimate its actions, as well as Britain’s response, is only explicable in the context of rhetorical politics: it was Germany’s capacity to make multivocal appeals, combined with Britain’s institutional vulnerabil-ity, that explains why Germany’s appeals proved so resonant to the British audience. The account here, then, adopts a social framework, rather than a purely psychological one, to explain why Hitler’s legitimation strategies were taken seriously, and why they had such powerful effects on collective mobilization.
Appeasement: Tragic Choice or Grim Necessity?
For many scholars, Britain’s “choice” for appeasement was no choice at all;
it was necessity, a strategy of last resort. Britain politicians, these revisionist scholars argue, recognized Nazi Germany as a significant threat, one that would eventually have to be confronted with force. But from 1933 to 1938, there was very little the British could do to counter Hitler: in the interwar period, Britain was hamstrung by economic depression, military weakness, and domestic fragmentation, all which undercut the state’s ability to
mobilize against the looming German threat. Economically, Britain was still recovering from the international depression of the 1930s. Militarily, “the fighting strength of the British Empire was weaker in relation to its poten-tial enemies than at any time since 1779.”12 Although Britain had invested in its rearmament since 1935, its land capacity remained anemic: in late 1938 British civilian and military elites estimated they could send no more than two divisions to France, and by September 1939, the British could only deploy four poorly trained divisions to the Continent. By 1939 Britain had made significant improvements in its defensive air power, increasing its fighter strength and deploying the innovative defensive radar, the “Chain Home” system, to protect the nation from German attack. Yet it still had no significant bomber force, considered critical to fighting a war against Ger-many, and it remained terrified of a (much overestimated) German bomber threat. The British could do nothing to stop German rearmament, the remil-itarization of the Rhineland, and the expansion into Czechoslovakia. Far from accommodating the revisionist power, British politicians turned to appeasement as a means to “buy time”: it was a strategy, not of conciliation, not of attempting to sate insatiable demands, but of building up strength until Britain could match the rising power.13
To make matters worse, domestic fragmentation undercut Britain’s abil-ity to mobilize what little resources it had. Kevin Narizny points to the Con-servative government that wanted to protect private companies from the costs of confrontation as the source of appeasement.14 Likewise, Schweller argues that significant divisions in political coalitions, particularly among the Conservatives, Labour, and Liberals, undercut British efforts to form a coherent vision of its interests, and balance the rising German power.15 Appeasement was a strategy that would allow Britain to get its house in order, to build up its economy, its military, and mobilize its society for the fight that lay ahead.
There is no doubt that, before 1938, the British believed they were ill equipped economically, militarily, and politically, to confront Germany.
But to blame structural obstacles for appeasement underplays the extent to which appeasement was a purposive grand strategy, one aimed at secur-ing a lastsecur-ing peace with Germany. There is copious evidence that British politicians were committed to appeasement, not only as a measure of buy-ing time, but because these leaders believed that it could shape Germany’s behavior and avoid conflict.16 Certainly British politicians worried about Germany’s revisionist behavior and denounced Hitler’s aggression. But even in the face of Hitler’s revisionism, leaders such as Chamberlain ques-tioned whether the “picture was as black” as it appeared, expressing the belief that negotiation, and not confrontation, could bring Hitler to the table.
Concretely these efforts meant that Britain chose to accommodate Ger-many’s demands in most disputes from 1933 to autumn of 1938, even when this required concessions that were one-sided and allowed Germany
to increase its economic and military might. The British approach to Ger-man rearmament, for example, was not merely or even primarily to rearm itself in response, but to negotiate treaties that would guide and limit its armament.17 Britain pursued bilateral and multilateral disarmament and arms control treaties with the Nazi regime, such as the Anglo-German Naval Treaty (1935) that limited German naval acquisitions to 35 percent of Britain’s own forces and pushed Germany to negotiate an air pact as well.18 Britain also sought to incorporate Germany into multilateral secu-rity and disarmament pacts, in hopes of directing all of European arms procurement toward a goal of collective security. In this spirit, the British hoped to bring Germany into an “Eastern Locarno,” which would provide similar guarantees of security between Germany and the Eastern Euro-pean states that Locarno had established between Germany and its west-ern neighbors. Ultimately, Britain aimed to draw Germany back into the League of Nations.
Britain also tried to satisfy Germany’s territorial demands. Both the Brit-ish politicians and public were sympathetic to claims that Germany had been unjustly stripped of territorial holdings, both on the continent and abroad. To bring Germany back into a European settlement meant accept-ing, even facilitataccept-ing, a revision of territorial boundaries. While the British could not support a violent takeover of Austria, for example, it was willing to support unity pursued through “appropriate” procedures, particularly those institutionalized by the League of Nations.19 As early as 1936 officials were suggesting that Germany be allowed to annex Memel and Danzig20 and that the British should agree to a “peaceful evolution” of Czechoslova-kia’s boundaries.21 The British also considered returning colonies stripped from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles.22
Britain’s commitment to appeasement helps explain why it was British efforts to rebuild and rearm from 1933 to 1938 were half-hearted at best.
If “buying time” were the primary motivation for appeasement, then it is puzzling what little use the British made of the time they bought. Yes, the British pursued a policy of rearmament, but these efforts represented a frac- tion of what they were capable of: their efforts were guided by the assump-tion that Britain could conduct “business as usual”—that is to say, without concern of an imminent, significant threat on the horizon.23 Indeed, the Brit-ish purposefully restricted their own rearmament so as not to undermine an appeasement policy. From 1937 onward, Chamberlain and his cabinet deliberately avoided rearmament measures that they feared would make Germany insecure. Plans to conciliate Hitler meant reigning in land and naval armament, lest he feel encircled. Chamberlain and others argued vehemently that while rearmament might be accelerated, it should not be expanded in scope, “as any increase in the scope of our program” would lead to a “new arms race.”24 Even air rearmament, often considered the crux of the British deterrence strategy, was undercut by conciliatory efforts.
The British also avoided alliances, lest they signal to Germany that she was being encircled.25
And while Britain’s public might have been divided over general issues, it was largely unified on the issue of appeasement: those that opposed appeasement, such as Churchill, remained marginal to British politics until late 1938. Whatever disagreement there was among the means of British policy, there was a broad consensus on appeasement and conciliation as an end. For example, during the Rhineland crisis there were divisions between Labour and Conservatives over the utility of economic sanctions and sup-port for the Locarno treaty, but there was broad consensus, among both the public and politicians alike, that the Germans should be conciliated in the Rhineland, and that the end goal of whatever policy was to bring Germany back into the European fold.26 And the public greeted news of the Munich settlement with unified elation: Chamberlain returned to cheering crowds, and he received notes of congratulations and gratitude from heads of state across the globe.
As a strategy, then, appeasement meant far more than conceding to Ger-many’s revisionist demands in hopes of putting off a conflict. Britain’s ultimate goal was not buying time; it was to avoid conflict by ultimately
“bring[ing] Germany back into the comity of nations.”27 It was only by integrating Germany back into existing institutions—in particular by let-ting Germany take its place as a “good European,” embedded in revised institutions of collective security—that peace in Europe could be assured.28 Even after the Munich crisis, the British hoped that appeasement would lay the foundation for a peaceful European settlement. Having pulled back from the brink of war, British politicians and the public agreed that negotia-tions with Hitler had worked, that revision could be accomplished through talk and not violence, and that there indeed could be “peace in our time.”29
Yet from November 1938 to March 1939, British grand strategy would transform dramatically, shifting from appeasement to a policy of confronta-tion. In a cabinet meeting on November 7, officials agreed that rearmament must be not only accelerated but expanded in scope. They authorized the construction of new escort vessels and began planning for a heavy bomber force.30 By January 1939, the British had begun a voluntary national service campaign, and the cabinet had committed to an expanded bomber force capable of striking Germany, as well as to a substantial expeditionary force that could be sent to France in the case of war—a deployment far beyond the two divisions the British had considered sufficient in years before.31
In the months following Munich, the British also pursued alliances in full force. At the end of November 1938, Chamberlain and Halifax met with their French counterparts to discuss provisions for French security. While in November the British would still resist a firm commitment to France’s defense, by January 1939 they were engaged in upper-level staff talks with the French. By February 1939, Chamberlain proved ready to make a
pronouncement of an alliance with France, noting that while “it is impos-sible to examine in detail all of the hypothetical cases which may arise . . . I feel bound to make plain that the solidarity of interest, by which France and this country are united, is such at any threat to the vital interest of France from whatever quarter it came must evoke the immediate co-operation of this country.”32
Overtures to the Soviets came more slowly, but when they began they were pursued in earnest.33 In October 1938, the British was still wary of a pact with the Soviets, although they urged the French to maintain rela-tions and not to take “any action which appeared to give Russia the cold shoulder.”34 By January 1939, some officials in the Foreign Office, such as Vansittart, were pushing for closer ties with the Soviet Union, arguing that
“Anglo-Russian relations are in a most unsatisfactory state. It is not only regrettable but dangerous that they should be in this state, and a contin-uence of it will become a great deal more dangerous very shortly.”35 The Foreign Office recommended the immediate initiation of high-level civilian talks between Britain and the Soviet Union, with the aim of convincing the Soviets that British and Russian interests were aligned.36 After the Prague coup in March 1939, attempts to reach an alliance agreement were accel- erated, though they ultimately faltered in the summer of 1939, with well-known consequences for international politics.
What explains this sudden shift in strategy? If the British were “buying time,” there should be evidence that appeasement was abandoned for stra-tegic reasons, that buying time was either no longer rational or no longer possible. If Britain had gained a strategic advantage over Germany or, alternatively , if it was poised to lose relative power to Germany in the future, then it would have made sense to confront the fascist state in late 1938–39, rather than fight the inevitable war later on. Far from gaining a strategic advantage, however, historians argue that in the post-Munich world, Britain was worse off strategically than it had been from 1936 to 1938.37 As Steiner argues, it was “accepted that there had been little improvement in the numerical ratio of forces [between Britain and Germany]; in some respects , it had worsened.”38 The remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 had greatly diminished Britain and France’s capacity to take the offensive against Germany. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia left Britain and France without a valuable ally in Eastern Europe. With the conquest of the
What explains this sudden shift in strategy? If the British were “buying time,” there should be evidence that appeasement was abandoned for stra-tegic reasons, that buying time was either no longer rational or no longer possible. If Britain had gained a strategic advantage over Germany or, alternatively , if it was poised to lose relative power to Germany in the future, then it would have made sense to confront the fascist state in late 1938–39, rather than fight the inevitable war later on. Far from gaining a strategic advantage, however, historians argue that in the post-Munich world, Britain was worse off strategically than it had been from 1936 to 1938.37 As Steiner argues, it was “accepted that there had been little improvement in the numerical ratio of forces [between Britain and Germany]; in some respects , it had worsened.”38 The remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 had greatly diminished Britain and France’s capacity to take the offensive against Germany. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia left Britain and France without a valuable ally in Eastern Europe. With the conquest of the