Before I provide more details about the semantics and pragmatics I suggest for indefinite dieser, I want to be clear with respect to some terminology. In what follows I will define my understanding of (i) definiteness and indefiniteness, (ii) reference, (iii) direct reference and (iv) indefinites on wide-scope interpretations.
(i) Definiteness and indefiniteness
Definiteness and indefiniteness are conceptualized as semantic concepts in this work, which are morphologically marked: indefiniteness is marked by the indefinite article and definiteness by the definite article. The difference between the two concepts is reflected in semantic effects. Indefinite are licensed in existentital context, while definites are ungrammatical in such contexts. With respect to familiarity, indefinite articles are used in order to introduce completely hearer-new referents into the discourse. They fulfill the “Novelty Condition” as proposed by Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982), basically claiming that indefinite noun phrases introduce novel referents which are hearer- and discourse new and do not “have the same referential index as any NP to their left“ (Heim 1982: 151).
As a consequence, definite noun phrases are defined as having the same referential index to their left. Thus, definite noun phrases are defined as being given, accessible or familiar in the discourse. The indefinite article and the definite article, respectively, are thus assumed to code this category of familiarity.
(ii) Reference
Reference, in this work, is defined as a relation between expressions and what speakers talk about, i.e. the objects in the world. In the sentence Barack Obama is the president of the U.S.A., we use the proper name Barack Obama in order to refer to a particular individual. Although not all words refer, there are various types of expressions (for example demonstratives) which can be argued to be referring expressions. The crucial question concerning reference is: What are the
“mechanisms” of reference of referring expressions?, as these mechanisms are subject to variation. The investigation and suggestion of the underlying mechanism of reference for indefinite dieser is one of the main contributions of this work.
(iii) Direct reference
Direct reference is one of various mechanisms of reference, which is widely accepted to hold for standard demonstratives. A directly referential expression, according to Kaplan (1989a: 493), is an expression whose semantic rules provide directly that it designates one and the same object in every world. In the case of demonstratives, those rules provide directly that it designates the object which is pointed out by the actual speaker in the actual utterance situation. Thus, directly referential expressions are assumed to refer without a description, which would probably get different extensions in different worlds.. They behave differently if compared to definite descriptions. Kaplan states that directly referential expressions are expressions with special semantic rules which provide that the referent in all utterance contexts is to be the actual referent (Kaplan 1989a: 493).
So, if one uses a directly referential expression like a deictic dieser NP its referent is, in all possible worlds, that very referent to which the speaker intends to refer via a pointing gesture in the actual utterance context. As exemplified below, the referent of the deictic dieser NP in (17) is the very cook which is being pointed out in the actual utterance situation of (17), and nobody else. In that sense, directly referential expressions are context-dependent expressions (Zimmermann 1991), as always the actual utterance situation determines the respective referent.
Unlike the directly referential demonstrative, the definite article der (in (18)) is not context-dependent and not directly referential as it allows for readings of co-variation, if embedded under an intensional operator, for example. The definite NP is a description. Expressions which have the semantics of direct reference are labeled directly referential expressions. The semantic mechanism of direct reference, in contrast to other mechanisms of reference, will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
(17) Martina will DIESEN Koch loben [pointig gesture].
‘Martina wants to praise THIS cook [pointing gesture].’
Only one possible reading: direct reference of dieser to exactly one specific cook, i.e. the one who is pointed out in the utterance situation of (17) only (no co-variation possible)
(18) Martina will (immer) den Koch loben.
‘Martina (always) wants to praise the cook.’
Possible reading: non-direct reference: whoever is the cook in utterance situation of (18), Martina wants to praise him (co-variation).
A typical expression of direct reference is deictic dieser and also deictic dieser NPs. Additionally, I will argue that indefinite NPs may exhibit direct reference as well, such as directly referential indefinites (Fodor and Sag 1982).
They are expressions which show inherently and obligatorily the semantics of direct reference (Kaplan 1989a, 1989b) and which are indefinite from a discourse-based perspective as they introduce hearer-new referents into the discourse.
Indefinite dieser will be argued to be such a directly referential indefinite. They are not to be confused with indefinites on wide-scope interpretations (see next paragraph). A detailed semantic analysis of wide-scope indefinites, following the work of Fodor and Sag (1982), is given in Chapter 5.
(iv) Indefinites on wide-scope interpretations
Indefinites like the indefinite article ein, for example, may have a wide-scope reading on which they designate an object in the actual world, as in (19a), in contrast to (19b), in which the indefinite article is not on its wide-scope, but on its narrow-scope reading. Using examples with linguistic operators, such as the intensional operator in (19) makes this contrast visible.
Intensional operator:
(19) a. Maria will einen Spanier heiraten. Er heißt Pablo.
‘Maria wants to marry a Spaniard. His name is Pablo.’
Ein on wide-scope interpretation
b. Maria will einen Spanier heiraten. Sie kennt aber keinen.
‘Maria wants to marry a Spaniard. But she does not know one.’
Ein on narrow scope interpretation
Indefinites on wide-scope interpretations have been previously and misleadingly labeled “referential indefinites” (Fodor and Sag 1982)6. These two concepts should not be confused.
Even though indefinites NPs on their wide-scope reading may look fairly similar if compared to indefinite dieser NPs, I will show in this work that wide-scope indefinites are based on a different mechanism of reference. They are not inherently directly referential expressions, exclusively referring to one and the same object with respect to all worlds. I will show in this work that indefinites on their wide-scope reading can move freely, but they are not necessarily always widest-scope indefinites. That is, they are not (and unlike referential expressions, deictic or indefinite dieser) scopeless expressions.
The type of reference present in (19a) has often been explained by the notion of specificity: on its so-called specific reading in 19a) ein is often claimed to be used to refer to a specific individual which ‘the speaker has in mind’ (i.e.
Pablo) by uttering the indefinite noun phrase (von Heusinger 2011a). Nevertheless, I will try to avoid the term specificity in this work. It is subject to too many manifestations or “species”, as von Heusinger (2010: 1) calls it. The type of specificity exemplified in (19a) above is labeled “referential” or “wide-scope
6 Fodor and Sag’s (1982) concept of “referential indefinites” will become very important later in this work, as it can be appropriately applied to indefinite dieser, which will be argued NOT to be an indefinite on a wide-scope reading but a true “referential indefinite” in the original sense of Fodor and Sag (1982). Thus, Fodor and Sag (1982) came up with the correct account of
“referential indefinites”, albeit for the wrong morpheme.
specificity” by von Heusinger (2010). I, in turn, will refer to readings of indefinites as in (19a) using the term “wide-scope readings” or “wide-scope interpretations” of the indefinite article — showing in Chapters 5 and 6 in greater detail that the reference mechanisms of (i) directly referential indefinites (such as indefinite dieser) and of (ii) indefinites wide-scope readings are to be clearly distinguished and cannot be explained via one and the same mechanism of reference.