From balancing power to balancing threat in realist theory: the role of perception

be one of the most fundamental causes of alliance or alignment formation (Gärtner, 2001;

Walt, 2009). The concept of threat in the context of balancing, however, has mostly only been taken indirectly into consideration by many theorists, or presented in the context of

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military force¹² (Hume, 1994, Waltz, 2010). In short, whereas Waltz views threat as power, and power alone, there are those who suggest that ‘threat’ is a separate and distinct concept;

and that it is these ‘threats’, and thereby what states perceive as a threat, which are most important to alignment formation.

Walt is an excellent starting point to highlight both the importance of threat, what it is, and how perception plays into it. It is important, however, to first begin an examination of balance of threat by noting that the theory is essentially a “reformulation” (Walt, 1990, p.

viii) or “modification” (Priess, 1996, p. 148) of balance of power theory. What is meant by this is that balance of threat also contends with the quandary of how states respond to imbalances in the international system. It does not challenge the overarching balancing theory – that states act to counter imbalances in the international system – but instead seeks to expand beyond singularly focusing on the concept of power, and thereby also the role of power. Walt postulates that framing balancing in terms of ‘power’ rather than ‘threat’ is flawed as it ignores the other factors considered by political figures in identifying potential threats (Walt, 1985, p. 8). Thus, according to Walt, “it is more accurate to say that states will ally with or against the most threatening power” (emphasis in original) (Walt, 1985, p.

8-9). Therein, Walt theorises four factors which states take into account when evaluating potential threat: 1) aggregate power; 2) proximity; 3) offensive capability; and 4) offensive intentions¹³. The explanations for each are as follows: aggregate power consists of a state’s total resources, (i.e. population, industrial and military capability, technological prowess etc.); proximity concerns geographic considerations, based on the theory that the ability to project power declines with distance, thus closer states are more threatening; offensive power is (all else equal) a state’s military capabilities; and offensive intentions concerns how aggressive a state is perceived as being (Walt 1985, p. 8-12). These four factors are thereby evaluated by states, and in the event of a state essentially ‘perceiving’ a

12 Waltz posits that the more power a state has, the more that state appears as a threat to the others (1979:

112), implying the importance of threat, but still putting the primary focus on power.

13 There are two additional points of importance to note with these four factions: 1) it is not necessary that each of the four factors are measured as being the same weight or applicability for something to constitute a threat, and; 2) as intentions and perceptions are subjective and mutable states may find it safer to balance against potential threats, than hope for continued benevolence (Walt, 1985, p. 8-15).

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threat, a balancing (or bandwagoning¹⁴) response is thereby produced; with the assumption that the more threatening a state appears to be, the more a balancing reaction is likely (Walt, 1985, p. 13). While the first three factors are reflective of realist measurements of power considered by other theorists (Gulick, 1955; Harknett and Van Den Ber, 1997;

Waltz, 2010), Walt’s ‘offensive intentions’ is the primary focus of this thesis in measuring Australia’s perception of threat. Thus, the next, most important question is: what can offensive intentions be considered to include?

Walt, and others exploring threat, point to a number of considerations states take into account when evaluating the ‘offensive intentions’ (i.e. threat) of another state. These generally fall into four primary categories – realist, ideological, economic, and

environmental (Walt, 1985, Walt 1990, Brauch, 2010). Realist considerations fall into the realm of military or Westphalian concerns wherein another state is perceived as posing a threat to the territory or sovereignty¹⁵ of another state, and which can be both direct or indirect (Walt, 1985, p. 30-37). Direct instances of offensive intentions, and thereby threat, can be seen in the case of one state attacking, invading, or supporting destabilizing forced in another state directly¹⁶. Whereas indirect ones can be seen in a situation where a state is known to do similarly to other states, and is thus seen as being more aggressive, and thereby more threatening, in general¹⁷ (Walt, 1985, p. 37). Walt outlines that these may either be immediate, as seen with the example of Libya and Colonel Qaddafi or perceived having a high level of potential, as seen with his example of the 1907 memorandum on British Policy towards Germany by Eyre Crowe (1985, p. 12). In addition to these, more subjective or ideological considerations are a part of the evaluation of offensive intentions.

14 While balancing is seen when states ally against a greater power; an instance where states ally with a greater power is known as “bandwagoning”, see Walt’s “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power” for more on bandwagoning.

15 A number of studies that utilize balance of threat examine cases where armed conflict has or is taking place (see (for example): Barnett & Levy, 1991; Gause III, 2003).

16 This would be the case if (for example) China was perceived as readying itself to invade Australia

17 This could be considered to be the case in the context of China’s aggressive actions in Hong Kong, the South China Sea, Tibet, and a number of other cases.

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Ideological considerations include political, cultural or other such traits (Walt, 1985, p. 18) and states which, for example, fall opposite of another’s ideological spectrum are more likely to be perceived as having offensive intentions. That is to say; states with dissimilar traits may fear each other more as they may find it easier to imagine being attacked by them (Walt, 1985, p. 20) and the existence of the other may inherently threaten their own

autonomy or authority (Walt, 1985, p. 21). This dynamic has been portrayed in the past between, for example, America and communist states such as the Soviet Union. Finally, offensive considerations also take into account the importance of the subjective perceptions of individual actors, and overarching beliefs. This is to say that if a political figure believes that a state has offensive intentions – such as through ideological differences – they will view (and act as though) another state is a potential enemy and threat (Walt, 1985, p. 26).

This dynamic was also highlighted by Waltz, wherein he opined that a country becomes what it is treated as (Waltz, 2010, p. 130), therefore, a country is a superpower, or by extension a threat, if it is treated like a superpower, or a threat¹⁸. Economic and

environmental considerations on the other hand concern issues such as; poverty, hunger, deprivation, economic and market security, as well as water, energy, migration,

environmental degradation and other issues triggered by a perception of changes to the international political order and the global environment (Brauch, 2010, p. 104).

For the purposes of this thesis, as it is focused on and uses data from Australia’s political figures and their outward perspective, ‘offensive intentions’ is instead examined under the label of [Australia’s] ‘perception of threat’ – which allows for a more concise

understanding of what is being analysed¹⁹. As such, the Independent Variable of this thesis is [Australia’s] ‘perception of threat’ – as it specifically relates to China in the context of the types of threat covered in this section (i.e. realist, ideological, economic and

environmental). While the other aspects of threat proposed by Walt, (aggregate power;

proximity; offensive capability), are important to an analysis of threat, the quantitative

18 China is an excellent example of this, Nixon spoke of China as both a superpower and an upcoming superpower in the 70s, which is a juxtaposition that can still be seen today in the speeches and texts of contemporary political leaders.

19 The alternative would be [China’s] “offensive intentions” [from the perspective of Australian political figures].