ͺͳ
2.7 Bygones are seldom bygones: discussion
ͺʹ
organization that could ensure internal security and stability for the smooth collection of revenues.
The cadre-based structure of the bureaucracy was thus designed to provide an effective centre of governing power that could perform complex administrative tasks. In addition, the patron-client relationships with local elites proved a convenient mode of governance to consolidate colonial rule, and such relationships inevitably spawned a culture of rent-seeking. Moreover, the model of development and interventionist policies led by the public sector and pursued by the bureaucracy were dictated by the prevailing economic environment characterized by an under-developed economy and a dominance of foreign owned monopolies, both of which meant a dominant role of the state in the economy including the protection of monopolies through extensive regulation.
Once the bureaucracy acquired specific traits in line with the dictates of the environment, forces of inertia and institutionalization came into play and they contributed to their persistence over time. Accustomed to power and an authoritative style of governance, the bureaucracy strived to perpetuate its power through either forging alliances with other centres of power or through efforts to undermine the political process. Once a pattern of authority was established, it gained social acceptance and legitimacy through the institutionalization of power relations, and consequently the bureaucracy remained a dominant player with significant power over administrative functions including the design and implementation of economic policies and programs.
The bureaucratic power also gave rise to rent-seeking as powerful actors used their control over policies and resources as instruments of rent-seeking. As a social
ͺ͵
behaviour, corruption showed a tendency to become institutionalized as a shared norm and an objective and external fact, which is resistant to change. Corruption also thrived as the bureaucracy, learning from the organizational memory, continued with the patron-client relationships as a mode of governance based on its success in the colonial era. Similarly, the inclination towards a state-led model of development and interventionist economic policies persisted as a shared belief reinforced by powerful vested interests that stood to gain from such policies and programs which offered possibilities for rent-seeking.
Furthermore, imprinting can work at various levels of organization. For example, administrative procedures, rules of conduct and regulatory policies can all be determined by initial conditions and may persist over time. To this day, Pakistan’s bureaucracy follows the same practice of evaluating officials’ performance through annual confidential reports that was in vogue during the colonial period.
However, it needs to be emphasized that imprinting implies persistence and not permanence; and that imprinting of certain bureaucratic attributes does not imply that bureaucratic reforms are impossible. For bureaucratic reforms to be successful, a strong political will is needed along with the adoption of mechanisms and incentives that can unleash forces of change from within the bureaucracy. Such mechanisms may include modern training programs for officials at all levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, a competitive compensation package for bureaucrats to attract the best talent, and adoption of modern monitoring and evaluation systems.
A sustained effort to reform and modernize the bureaucracy can help in breaking away from the past and in setting up an organization that adapts to changing environments. However, such reform efforts must be informed by a complete understanding of underlying factors that give rise to imprinting in the first place.
ͺͶ
The greatest challenge to current and future reform efforts will be dismantling
‘rules of the game’ that past imprints have preserved as a colonial legacy.
To sum up, the study has broadly surveyed the historical mechanisms and processes and to identified their effects on the contemporary structures, strategies and technologies of the bureaucratic organization. The case study of bureaucracy in Pakistan, a descendent of the British colonial era civil service in India, provided a means for an in-depth examination of the processes and mechanisms underlying the persistence of specific attributes in bureaucratic organisations. The study has identified the triggers of bureaucratic rigidity with the help of the experience of Pakistani bureaucracy, which has not essentially changed since its inception. The study has also provided an account of how certain practices during the colonial era of the Indian subcontinent led to unintended consequences in the form of bureaucratic power, corruption and control over economic policies after changes in the external environment (post-independence).
The analysis in this chapter was exploratory. These macro-level insights set the ground to investigate the behaviour of bureaucrats in the following chapters of the dissertation where public choice framework of utility-maximizing individuals acting strategically within the institutional contexts is used as an analytical approach. Following these macro-level insights, we next investigate the micro-level behaviour of individuals.
In the next chapter (chapter 3) of this dissertation, we will explicitly incorporate these institutionalized factors in the policy choice of the bureaucrats. The aim is to underpin the role that these imprints play in the policy choices of the bureaucrats in traditional neo classical models.
ͺͷ
ͺ
Chapter 3
Inertia and Policy Choice: The Imprints of the Bureaucrat 10