Ch´ avez’s Movement

From 1982 on Ch´avez began to organize serious political conspiracy with two other military officers: Felipe Acosta Carles and Jes´us Urdaneta Hern´andez, both lecturers at the military academy. They created a political cell within the army and called it:

MBR-200 200 stood for the 200th anniversary of Bol´ıvar´s birth in 1783. Acosta was later killed in the Caracazo (see chapter 2) in 1989.

4.2.1. The Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200

On December 17th of 1982 Ch´avez and his two friends swore the oathBol´ıvar hat sworn in Rome in 1805. Underneath the great tree at Sam´an de G¨uere near Maracay where it is saidBol´ıvar had rested they swore:

I swear before you, and I swear before the God of my fathers, that I will not allow my arm to relax, nor my soul to rest, until I have broken the chains that oppress us and oppress the people by will of the powerful... ( Bol´ıvar

4. Hugo Ch´avez

had said ”until I break the chains that oppress us by will of Spanish power“) [Levin 2007, page 62].

The young men studied the history and problems of the country and began to think of coups and overthrowing the government. Their movement resembled a study group rather than a conspiracy in the beginning. They were well placed to recruit others in the military academy. Major Francisco Javier Arias C´ardenas joined them as one of the most prominent intellectuals. C´ardenas had many friends in the civilian left and later joined theCausa R and was elected governor of his home state, Zulia [Gott 2001, page 40].

They greatly appreciated the ideas of Ezequiel Zamora, the llanos leader, Bol´ıvar, the Liberator and Sim´on Rodriguez, Bol´ıvar’s tutor. Their whole project was left-wing slanted from the beginning. This was due to the fact that in the Venezuelan military of the 80s junior officers were sent to study social sciences in civilian universities which helped create contacts with survivors of the guerrilla movements and other left-wing personalities [Gott 2001, page 41].

As the movement grew it became impossible to keep it secret and the Direcci´on de Inteligencia Militar (DIM)was informed of the group. Ch´avez was identified as danger-ous and transferred away from Caracas and from his influential position to Elorza, close to Colombia. Ch´avez used his time there to try out some of his ideas. He encouraged experimental schemes of cooperation between soldiers and civilians and soon became very popular throughout the whole region. In 1988 he was brought back to Caracas to the presidential palace where he worked as aide to the national security council [Gott 2001, page 42].

On the 27th of February of 1989, the day of the Caracazo, Ch´avez lay in bed with a contagious illness. The doctor at the Miraflores Palace had sent him home. C´ardenas was among those sent out to repress the rebellion. He felt the army was on the wrong side in the war and made a great effort to ensure his soldiers would not fire into the crowd. He was appalled and enraged at what he saw that day. Weeks later Ch´avez returned to his duties in Miraflores. Soldiers of the presidential guard began asking him about his movement. They were not willing to open fire on their fellow citizens (again) [Gott 2001, page 45].

In 1991 he was transferred to Maracay to a parachute battalion about 80 km from Caracas. Spurred on by the horror of the Caracazo Ch´avez redoubled his efforts to prepare his Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement for action [Levin 2007, page 70].

4. Hugo Ch´avez

4.2.2. The 1992 Coup

From Maracay he planned his coup code-named ”Plan Zamora“. During the planning disagreements arose between the actors. Some wanted the coup to start with civilian actions as with a general strike. Ch´avez argued against ”civilians in the way“. There was also disagreement about the right time for the coup. After Ch´avez learned that he would be transferred near the Colombian border on February 14th 1992 a date was set [Levin 2007, page 70].

On February 4th 1992 Ch´avez marched into Caracas with five squads to take the Defense Ministry, Miraflores Palace, the airport where P´erez would arrive from his trip abroad and the Historical Museum where a base was set up with communications equip-ment [Levin 2007, page 72]. The forces who where to capture the president failed in doing so. Ch´avez and his troops came under fire while marching to the Museum and once he got inside realized that the equiment he needed was missing. The Palace was too well guarded and was not taken either. In other regions of the country the coup went as planned and military barracks and cities were taken over.

Early in the morning President P´erez announced on TV that the rebellion had been put down and at 9:00 Ch´avez surrendered. He asked to speak on TV ”to avoid bloodshed“.

14 soldiers had died and 50 were wounded as well as 80 civilians. It was then that he held his famous speech (see chapter 2) before going to jail. Among his coconspirators Ch´avez was blamed for having given up too fast and to not have gone far enough.

The Yares Prison where Ch´avez was sent was a very dirty run-down and dangerous institution where many prisoners carry guns [Levin 2007, page 75]. Ch´avez had privileges such as visitors, he gave radio and TV interviews and was treated as a military officer not as a criminal. He was still in a position to continue planning future rebellions.

During his time in prison Ch´avez spent a lot of time reading [Levin 2007, page 75-76]. He studied political theorists such as Antonio Negri who had written a lot about

”constituent power” and the importance of a constitutional assembly to give a country a revolutionary foundation to go from [Wilpert 2003].

The coup had failed. Nevertheless President P´erez was removed from office shortly after on corruption charges.

4.2.3. The Structure of the Movement

After being pardoned by President Caldera in 1994 Ch´avez was at first opposed to participating in elections since he considered the old system as too corrupt to be reformed and too closed shop against newcomers. He even opposed the campaign of his friend Francisco Arias C´ardenas as governor of Zulia in 1995 who was then not supported bei MBR-200 but by Causa R [Gott 2001, page 143]. Ch´avez and his friends began to

4. Hugo Ch´avez

travel around the country building up organizational structures and internal procedures for their movement. They laid out political and ideological positions more clearly than before, elaborating the beginning of a long-term political program they called the”Sim´on Bol´ıvar national project”[Ellner and Hellinger 2004, page 80].

The structure of the MBR-200 was composed of a low base calledBolivarian Circles, being local groups similar to cells in other organizations. Whoever wanted to join had to make a Bolivarian commitment, an oath to be ”hard working, honest, and humble, and excercise solidarity”MBR-200 1994, [Ellner and Hellinger 2004, page 80]. These circles were coordinated at the municipal level by municipal Bolivarian coordinators. By 1996 there were regional Bolivarian coordinators in all states. The next organizational level was thenational directorate which made all final decisions. In 1996 it consisted of Ch´avez, Luis Davila, Freddy Bernal and two civilians. The whole structure struggled to find a balance between its military and civilian members [Ellner and Hellinger 2004, page 80].

The circles organized local assemblies in neighborhoods to discuss politics, carry out activities to educate members in study circles or courses in national and international history. Interaction between military officers and civilians, it was hoped, would overcome prejudice against one another and strengthen democratic attitudes [Ellner and Hellinger 2004, page 80-81].

Ch´avez continued travelling and talking to ordinary people all over the country. Some made fun of this, others said it was his strength. Being of mixed race and from a poor background as most Venezuelans, he was a figure to identify with for most Venezuelans [Levin 2007, page 79].