Historically, airmen on the ground have provided the “airmanship” neces-sary to integrate airpower with ground operations.
—Maj Robert G. Armfield Today, the Air Force is tasked with providing ISR to a growing set of missions, from the global fight against terrorist organizations to humanitarian-relief efforts around the globe, while remaining postured to support major combat operations should the need arise.27 With these responsibilities in mind, the establishment of an ITC program under formal doctrine and guidance, one that conveys the employment art of ISR and an understanding of how to leverage the entire ISR enterprise, is vital to the success of taskings to come. This section builds from the foundation of the current state of ISR and begins to incorporate a CAS/
JTAC framework as a way of proposing a baseline for the ITC program.
Much of this proposal stems from JP 3-09.3.
It is important to understand that lessons learned from the evolution of CAS can and should be applied directly to ISR. From the beginnings of CAS in World War I to the formation of the air support party (later the tactical air control party), it became clear that integrating a
CAS-trained Airman across multiple levels as part of the application of air-power was critical to success. This, then, is the first lesson learned that should be applied to ISR—Uniquely skilled and trained ISR personnel must become directly involved in the execution of ISR. Next, with the cre-ation of the ALO and JTAC positions, the community recognized the importance of qualification standards that are mandatory and not sim-ply nice to have. This is the second lesson learned—ITCs must be uniquely qualified to employ their skill set. In turn, these two lessons should form the baseline for future ITC programs; however, if ISR is to truly benefit from the wisdom that CAS can provide, then we must also analyze the C2 structure.
In the 1980s, the Air Force renewed its effort “to provide the Army with the best possible service” by utilizing the theater air control sys-tem (fig. 1).28 This system aligned tactical air control parties down to the battalion level and gave higher headquarters guidance from the air support operations center (ASOC). Ultimately, though, under this sys-tem the Air Force embedded experienced Airmen where they were needed and ensured that Army counterparts had qualified personnel to control airborne fires with the maneuver units they supported. This is the third lesson learned that needs to be applied—ISR controllers must be integrated into an appropriate C2 structure that guarantees the most effective use of ISR.
FAC(A)
Air Force Air Request Net (AFARN/JARN)
A2C2 - Army airspace command and control AAGS - Army air-ground system
ACCE - air component coordination element AOC - air and space operations center ASOC - air support operations center AWACS/CRC - Airborne Warning and Control System / control and reporting center BCD - battlefield coordination detachment EOC - expeditionary operations center FAC(A) - forward air controller (airborne)
GLO - ground liaison officer GP - group
JARN - joint air request net JFC - joint force commander
JSTARS - Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System SQN - squadron
TACP - tactical air control party TACS - theater air control system WG - wing
Figure 1. Air Force theater air control system. (Reprinted from AFDD 3-03, Coun-terland Operations, 11 September 2006 [incorporating change 1, 28 July 2011], 52, http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/lemay_center/publication/afdd3-03 /afdd3-03.pdf#ProtectedMode=1.)
The last lesson learned for application to ISR comes directly from the many joint and service-specific doctrine documents that deal with CAS. Although ample guidance exists, JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, con-sisting of 275 pages dedicated to the execution of CAS, remains the most appropriate for this discussion. As a joint doctrine document, it does not stop at the operational level but offers detailed guidance for CAS execution, communications procedures, planning, considerations for munitions employment, aircraft differences, the effects of weather,
and the like. Such detail is a testament to the CAS community and the extent of its evolution over the last 50 years. Nonetheless, this leads to the final lesson learned that we should apply to ISR—ISR must have ap-propriate joint and doctrinal guidance to facilitate the conduct of tactical-level execution.
Recommendations
With such capacity for ISR, the difficult guesswork on what hostile forces are around the corner, on the roof, or over the wall is substantially reduced for our ground forces. This capability is absolutely vital at all levels of conflict—
strategic, operational, and tactical.
—Gen Norton A. Schwartz,USAF, Retired To move forward jointly and smartly in the execution of ISR, the DOD should immediately adopt a CAS/JTAC methodology and frame-work that focus on the previously described lessons learned. The framework should be accompanied by clearly defined certification and qualification criteria similar to those of the current JTAC model. Fur-ther, it should include specific employment guidelines, training re-quirements, certification guidance, personnel-placement instructions, and C2 directions to shape and field ISR professionals as ISR hunters.
Toward that end, the Air Force, as the service lead and executive agent for the joint ISR community, should begin drafting a joint publication to guide ISR employment at a level similar to that found in JP 3-09.3.
Further, incorporating a tactical publication for joint ISR employment from the Air Land Sea Application Center would add greatly to this ef-fort. Such a joint document, one that comprehensively defines ISR tac-tical employment, will equip ISR hunters with the means to leverage the global ISR enterprise, increase the effective use of ISR sensors, en-sure mission success, and protect friendly forces, among other key ob-jectives. This guidance should also clearly define the ITC as the lowest echelon controller and mandate the strict enforcement of qualification minimums and guidelines; again, only qualified and trained
profes-sionals should perform ISR tactical control. By doing so, commanders will never question whether or not an individual has the appropriate training and qualifications prior to controlling ISR assets in combat.
ISR Tactical Controller Defined
Similar to a JTAC, an ITC should be a qualified service member who, from a forward or reachback location, directs the employment of ISR assets. ITCs should come from officer and enlisted intelligence back-grounds since having a basic knowledge of intelligence will ensure a common footing for training programs and add to an ITC’s capability.
These individuals should understand the entirety of the “find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess” and PCPAD models but should pri-marily operate in the “find, fix, track” and “collection” portions.29 Lastly, the DOD should recognize qualified ITCs as personnel autho-rized to perform ISR tactical control. They must also be able to per-form, execute, and exhibit the following mandatory requirements:
1. Know the enemy situation and location of friendly units.
2. Know the supported commander’s target priority, desired effects, and tim-ing of . . . [ISR].
3. Know the commander’s intent and applicable ROE [rules of engagement].
4. Validate [and prosecute] targets of opportunity.
5. Advise the commander on proper employment of . . . [ISR] assets.
6. Submit immediate requests for . . . [ISR].
7. Control . . . [ISR] with supported commander’s approval.
8. Deconflict . . . [and manage ISR sensors for maximum advantage over the enemy].
9. Provide initial . . . [ISR assessment after operations for follow-on targets and battle damage assessment].30
A new joint publication, JP 2-09.3, ISR Tactical Control, that integrates these nine core responsibilities for full compliance should be utilized as a baseline for topic guidance and should include areas such as orga-nization and fundamentals, C2, planning and requesting, and prepara-tion and execuprepara-tion.31
Placing the ISR Tactical Controller and Evolving the Air Support Operations Center
Based on this proposed doctrine and guidance for the ITC, these posi-tions will be optimally employed at the tactical level of warfare. Al-though qualified ITCs can also operate at higher levels of warfare, in-cluding the operational and strategic, they will provide real-time
influence and prove most effective at the tactical level. For ISR employ-ment, this article suggests a structure similar to the theater air control system, which would place ITCs (if predominantly a ground campaign) at each battalion, brigade, division, and corps level, complete with a C2 node similar to the ASOC’s and subordinate to the AOC (fig. 2).
FAC(A)
JSTARS AWACS/CRC
JFC
II X XX
XXX
AOC
BCD ACCE
ComponentLand
(WG, GP, SQN)EOC Battalion
A2C2
ITC ITC ITC ITC ISOC
Brigade A2C2
Division A2C2
TACS-AAGS Connectivity Corps
A2C2
GLO
Air Force Air Request Net (AFARN/JARN)
ISOC - ISR support operations center ITC - ISR tactical controller
Figure 2. Placement of ISR tactical controllers. (Adapted from Air Force Doctrine Document 3-03, Counterland Operations, 11 September 2006 [incorporating change 1, 28 July 2011], 52, http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/lemay_center /publication/afdd3-03/afdd3-03.pdf#ProtectedMode=1.)
Placement of ITCs in an ASOC-like structure should permit the AOC to evolve and include a separate ISR support operations center (ISOC).
Doctrinally, the ASOC is charged with coordination of preplanned and immediate CAS and normally executes tactical control of joint fires available for tasking. The ISOC would execute a similar mission but concentrate instead on the employment of ISR, doing so in close coor-dination with the ASOC and other C2 elements.32 Note that having two separate chains of command is critical and that no attempt should be made to put the ISOC under the current ASOC command structure since such an arrangement would create a conflict of interest that hin-ders ISR when multiuse assets are operating on the battlefield. Thus, establishment of an ISOC with a command structure similar to the ASOC’s would allow both C2 arms to report directly to the AOC, which could arbitrate between competing demands and ensure that the com-mander’s objectives are met. Lastly, an ISOC would facilitate a direct tie into ground (or maritime) units while maintaining flexibility and responsiveness to the C2 of ISR in carrying out any mission.33
Conclusion
Over the last decade, the conduct of warfare has changed dramati-cally with the infusion of real-time ISR. Although the concepts of ISR as we know it have been in place for centuries, the speed at which in-formation is processed and required on the battlefield today, along with the vast quantity of ISR available, resembles nothing in the past.
Commanders from all services have become reliant on ISR profession-als to find, fix, and track targets; indeed, without reliable ISR, many commanders will not execute operations. In the absence of modern ISR capabilities, we could not have conducted countless successful op-erations or removed many high-value individuals from the battlefield.
Further, our forces would have faced much greater risks. In light of these developments, the DOD has done an excellent job of acquiring ISR systems and fielding them on the battlefield. However, it has not enjoyed the same level of success in establishing guidance, training,
and standards for ISR employment at the tactical level. Despite the many key developments in ISR employment (ISRLOs, ITCs employed as part of special operations teams, operational authorities, etc.), we still lack legitimate joint guidance. One can only speculate about how many lives would have been saved and enemies removed had such guidance existed. We must remedy this deficiency, capture lessons learned, and employ ISR on an equal footing with CAS. Any future conflict will demand this evolution. Employing uniquely trained and qualified ISR tactical controllers must become the standard, not the ex-ception. Our success in the full range of military operations will de-pend upon these skilled ISR hunters who give our enemies no quarter as they find, fix, and track them day or night, at any place and at any time.
Notes
1. Marshall Curtis Erwin, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Acquisition:
Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress R41284 (Washington, DC: Congressional Re-search Service, 16 April 2013), 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41284.pdf.
2. Maj James Bilby (US Air Force), in discussion with the author, 9 April 2013.
3. This article goes beyond the pilots, exploiters, and sensor operators, examining the tactical-level controllers tasked to orchestrate a multitude of unique ISR assets assigned to collect against a particular target or support a specific mission.
4. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-0, Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations, 6 January 2012 (hereafter AFDD 2-0, Global Integrated ISR Operations), [ii], http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_cv/publication/afdd2-0 /afdd2-0.pdf.
5. Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 January 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_01.pdf.
6. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 8 July 2009, I-2, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs /jp3_09_3.pdf.
7. Lt Gen Dave Deptula and Col Mike Francisco, “Air Force ISR Operations: Hunting ver-sus Gathering,” Air and Space Power Journal 24, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 13–17, http://www .airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj10/win10/2010_4_04_deptula.pdf.
8. Sherrill Lingel et al., Methodology for Improving the Planning, Execution, and Assessment of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations, Rand Technical Report TR-459 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), iii, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs /technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR459.pdf.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Judy G. Chizek, Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, CRS Report for Congress RL31425 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Janu-ary 2003), 14, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31425.pdf.
12. AFDD 2-0, Global Integrated ISR Operations; and Headquarters US Air Force Intelli-gence Directorate, Theater ISR CONOPS (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Air Force Intel-ligence Directorate, 4 January 2008).
13. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support, III-2.
14. Ibid., III-30.
15. AFDD 2-0, Global Integrated ISR Operations, 14–20.
16. Ibid., 20.
17. Ibid.
18. Headquarters US Air Force Intelligence Directorate, Theater ISR CONOPS, 1.
19. Maj Scott A. Hasken, “A Historical Look at Close Air Support” (thesis, US Army Com-mand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003), http://www.google.com /url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCkQFjAA&
url=http%3A%2F%2Fhandle.dtic.mil%2F100.2%2FADA416360&ei=8GFyUoyDIqblsAS6s4H QBg&usg=AFQjCNHz7qFqwzXUue6vLMWL_kaNyphNZg.
20. Chizek, Military Transformation, 1–9.
21. Ibid., 13; and Lt Col Rachel A. McCaffrey, Reciprocally Embedding ISR Liaisons to Build Unity of Effort (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2010), 14, http://www.google .com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCwQFj AA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA518135
&ei=HUVxUq74M7XMsQSO8ICwDA&usg=AFQjCNFI6fHPDGVn-QpGidQlGVyF433LqA.
22. McCaffrey, Reciprocally Embedding ISR Liaisons, 14.
23. Headquarters US Air Force Intelligence Directorate, Theater ISR CONOPS, 20.
24. Air Force Instruction 10-410, Operations Planning: Presentation of Air Force Special Op-erations Forces, 7 January 2010, 12, http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3 _5/publication/afi10-410/afi10-410.pdf.
25. Maj Travis Norton, “Unmanned and Unconventional: Putting ‘Special Ops’ Back into AFSOC’s UAS Program,” report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2009), 19.
26. Ibid.
27. Lance Menthe et al., The Future of Air Force Motion Imagery Exploitation Lessons from the Commercial World, Rand Technical Report TR-1133 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), iii, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1133.pdf.
28. Maj Raymond O. Knox, The Terminal Strike Controller: The Weak Link in Close Air Sup-port (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 14 November 1988), 17, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q
=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CC4QFjAB&url=http%3A%2F
%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA208256&ei=SwlwUt7GF8nrkQf g1YAw&usg=AFQjCNHikMcG-MSpF_Rj0yZVNO6HhKV6AA.
29. “Find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess” is used here, but in practice the ITC should adopt the targeting style of his or her attached unit, which could include “find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze.” Capt Jerry Gay (US Air Force), in discussion with the author, 7 April 2013.
30. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, II-9.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., II-7.
33. I am grateful to Capt Jerry Gay, whose advice was pivotal in helping me work through the conclusions for this proposed C2 structure.
Capt Adam B. Young, USAF
Captain Young (BS, University of Southern California; MMOAS, Air University) is the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) weapons officer at Headquarters Air Force ISR Agency, Joint Base San Antonio–Lackland, Texas.
He is responsible for the Agency-Wide Weapons and Tactics program, which spans the 70th and 480th ISR Wings, National Air and Space Intelligence Cen-ter, 361st Special Operations Forces ISR Group, and all Air Force cryptologic operations. As the focal point for this program, he leads the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures and integration with national, joint, and coalition partners in ISR employment. A career intelligence officer, Captain Young has deployed numerous times in support of Operation Enduring Free-dom, Operation Iraqi FreeFree-dom, and other contingency operations in Africa, most notably serving as senior intelligence duty officer at the combined air operations center (Air Forces Central) and twice as director of intelligence (J2) at various forward-deployed special operations locations. He previously served as the senior intelligence officer, 27th Special Operations Wing, Cannon AFB, New Mexico. A graduate of the US Air Force Weapons School, Squadron Of-ficer School, and Air and Space Basic Course, Captain Young has accumulated more than 1,600 hours as an MQ-1B mission intelligence coordinator and se-nior mission intelligence coordinator.
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