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Variables De…nition Vector Source

p1; p2; p3 M onth ly b il l c alc ul ated for d i¤ eren t m onth ly usage tim e s (5, 500 , 3000 m in ute s) P arker-R öl le r [1997]

E N E RG Y A verage m onth ly cost p e r squ are foo t ($ p er ki lowa tt h ou r) C D

P R IM E (l agged ) O n e p erio d lagge d pri m e l en d in g rate

RE N T A verage m onth ly ren t p er squ are fo ot of o¢ c e sp ac e WAG E A verage we ek ly sa lary p er em p l oye e for th e c el lu l ar in d ustry

O P E R AT E A verage m onth ly gen e ra l overh ea d a nd op e rati n g ex p en ses p e r squ are foot

P O P M arket P op ul ation i n m il li on s D D

BU S IN E S S N u mb e r of hi gh p oten ti al bu si ne ss estab li sh m e nts (di vi de d by 100)

T T im e tre nd i n m onth s

E N TRY D u m my = 1 after th e se con d carri er en ters in to the m arket M S V

CR O S S O W N D u m my = 1 w h en th e two c om p etitors i n one m arket are pa rtn er i n any othe r m arket M ULT IM K T Tota l n um b er o f m a rke ts wh e re the tw o c om p etitors face ea ch oth e r

LE A D Le n gth of th e mo nop o ly p erio d in m on th s

BE L LB E LL D u m my = 1 i f b oth wi rel in e an d n onw ire li ne co m p etitors are R B O C s P air_ j BE L LI N D D u m my = 1 i f the w irel in e is a B E L L an d the n on -wi rel in e i s an in d ep e n de nt c arri er

IN D B E LL D u m my = 1 i f wi rel in e is an i nd ep e n de nt c arri er an d the n on -wi rel in e i s a B E LL IN D I ND D u m my = 1 i f b oth wi rel in e an d n onw ire li ne co m p etitors are a n i n de p en d en t … rm

F irm D u m m ie s U s West C el lu l ar, B el l S ou th M ob i li ty, A m e ri tech M ob il e, N yn ex M ob il e, F irm s_ i S outh We st Bel l Mo bi le ,G te M ob il en et, Co ntel C ell u lar, M ccaw , Ce ntu ry C el lu lar, R est

RE G D u m my = 1 i f n o regu latory ban w as im p ose d in the m arket S h ew [19 94]

D E M 84, D E M 88 D u m my = 1 i f the S ta te ’s G ove rno r was from the d em oc ratic party i n 1984 an d 1988 re sp ecti vel y P V U S S ta ti stica l ab str RE P 84, RE P 88 D u m my = 1 i f the S ta te ’s G ove rno r was from the rep u bl ic an pa rty i n 1984 an d 1988 re sp ec ti vel y

G O V S TA B D u m my = 1 i f in b oth el ec tion s in th e sam p l e p e ri od th e G overn or cam e from th e sam e p arty

E LE C T D u m my = 1 i f the regu la tor w as el ec te d R S C T h e B ook of State s

A P P O I N T D u m my = 1 i f the regu la tor w as ap p oin te d by p oli tic ian s

STA F F N u mb e r of ful l-ti m e e m pl oyee s in th e S tate P u b li c U ti li ty Com m i ssion i n 19 84 R C

¢S TA F F C han ge in th e n um b e r of fu l l-ti m e e m pl oyee s in the S tate P u b li c U til ity Com m i ssi on (86-84)

Tables

TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS

Full sample Sub-sample Sub-sample

Variables Regulation No Regulation

Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.

p1 17.223 10.600 16.908 11.927 17.543 9.061

p2 196.126 39.418 197.787 40.596 194.434 38.182

p3 1025.402 233.428 1029.426 220.473 1021.304 246.274

ENERGY 1.778 0.438 1.783 0.528 1.773 0.322

PRIME (lagged) 9.518 1.069 9.456 1.087 9.582 1.050

RENT 16.062 5.032 16.901 6.252 15.206 3.153

WAGE 519.598 119.172 521.617 101.292 517.534 135.197

OPERATE 6.724 1.724 6.825 2.181 6.622 1.072

POP 0.193 0.278 0.225 0.365 0.161 0.135

BUSINESS 2253.494 406.391 2227.075 457.181 2280.407 345.901

T 21.463 11.842 21.763 11.925 21.158 11.771

ENTRY 0.727 0.446 0.783 0.413 0.670 0.471

CROSSOWN 0.341 0.475 0.239 0.427 0.446 0.498

MULTIMKT 3.571 2.805 2.960 1.809 4.195 3.437

LEAD 10.696 8.047 9.798 7.310 11.611 8.653

REG 0.505 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

DEM84 0.733 0.443 0.658 0.475 0.809 0.394

DEM88 0.583 0.494 0.636 0.482 0.528 0.500

REP84 0.267 0.443 0.342 0.475 0.191 0.394

REP88 0.417 0.494 0.363 0.482 0.472 0.500

GOVSTAB 0.579 0.494 0.721 0.450 0.434 0.497

ELECT 0.200 0.401 0.154 0.362 0.247 0.432

APPOINT 0.800 0.401 0.846 0.362 0.753 0.432

STAFF 271.308 227.115 322.320 268.281 219.341 160.085

¢STAFF -27.410 161.857 -73.092 212.731 19.127 50.729

Obs. 539 272 267

TABLE 2. REGULATORY STATUS BY STATE (Table 4.2. from Shew [1994])

Regulatory Status States

Regulatory Ban AL, CO, DE, FL, GA, IA, IL, KS, MI, MN,

MO, MT, NE, NJ, OR, PA,TN, TX,WA, WI Tari¤ Regulation AZ, CA, CT, HI, IN, KY, LA, MA, MS,

NV, NM, NY, OH, OK, RI, SC, VA

Not in the Sample AK, ID, ME, ND, SD, VT, WV, WY

FIGURE 1. THE METROPOITAN AREAS

TABLE 3. FIML ESTIMATES: PRICE EQUATION REGUALTED MARKETS

Dep. Variable Low Usage Tari¤ Middle Usage Tari¤ High Usage Tari¤

(lnp1) (lnp2) (lnp3)

Coe¤. S.E. Coe¤. S.E. Coe¤. S.E.

CONSTANT 2.700 ¤¤¤ 1.017 5.192 ¤¤¤ 0.435 6.665 ¤¤¤ .418

OPERATE 0.64E-01 0.41E-01 0.17E-01 0.23E-01 0.16E-01 0.23E-01

ENERGY -0.110 0.198 -0.65E-01 0.51E-01 -0.80E-01 0.56E-01

WAGE 0.18E-03 0.97E-03 -0.57E-03 ¤¤ 0.25E-03 -0.22E-03 0.27E-03

RENT -0.75E-03 0.14E-01 0.86E-02 0.58E-02 0.13E-01 ¤¤ 0.59E-02

PRIME (lagged) -0.76E-01 0.58E-01 0.58E-02 0.21E-01 0.17E-01 0.22E-01

POP 0.278 0.201 0.139 ¤ 0.82E-01 0.72E-01 0.90E-01

BUSINESS 0.99E-04 0.13E-03 0.10E-03 ¤¤¤ 0.37E-04 0.36E-04 0.34E-04

T -0.951E-04 0.53E-02 -0.55E-02 ¤¤¤ 0.18E-02 -0.46E-02 ¤¤ 0.21E-02

CROSSOWN -0.464 ¤¤ 0.205 -0.43E-01 0.73E-01 0.40E-01 0.85E-01

MULTIMKT 0.74E-01 ¤ 0.43E-01 -0.18E-01 0.20E-01 -0.21E-01 0.21E-01

LEAD 0.78E-02 0.81E-02 0.55E-02 ¤ 0.28E-02 0.41E-02 0.28E-02

ENTRY -0.476 ¤¤¤ 0.167 0.28E-01 0.65E-01 0.35E-01 0.69E-01

BELLBELL -0.685 0.648 0.136 0.174 0.187 0.162

INDBELL -1.478 ¤¤¤ 0.370 -0.24E-02 0.111 -0.163 0.137

INDIND 0.13E-01 0.558 -0.19E-01 0.153 -0.97E-01 0.138

Firms dummies ¤(3=9) (0=9) ¤(1=9)

¾1 0.620 ¤¤¤ 0.31E-01 0.142 ¤¤¤ 0.11E-01 0.220 ¤¤¤ 0.14E-01

½1 -0.949 ¤¤¤ 0.41E-01 -0.641 ¤¤¤ 0.147 -0.932 ¤¤¤ 0.50E-01

Adj. R2 0.7913 0.5551 0.5960

Obs. 272 272 272

¤¤¤;¤¤;¤ represent signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively

TABLE 4. FIML ESTIMATES: PRICE EQUATION NON-REGUALTED MARKETS

Dep. Variable Low Usage Tari¤ Middle Usage Tari¤ High Usage Tari¤

(lnp1) (lnp2) (lnp3)

Coe¤. St.Err. Coe¤. St.Err. Coe¤. St.Err.

CONSTANT 4.071 ¤¤¤ 1.256 4.831 ¤¤¤ 0.278 6.545 ¤¤¤ 0.407

OPERATE -0.89E-01 0.75E-01 -0.14E-01 0.17E-01 -0.20E-02 0.26E-01

ENERGY -0.80E-01 0.226 0.30E-01 0.53E-01 0.33E-01 0.75E-01

WAGE 0.99E-04 0.18E-03 0.10E-04 0.12E-03 -0.27E-04 0.18E-03

RENT 0.12E-01 0.23E-01 0.17E-02 0.61E-02 -0.22E-02 0.90E-02

PRIME (lagged) -0.34E-01 0.78E-01 0.52E-01 ¤¤¤ 0.18E-01 0.49E-01 ¤ 0.28E-01

POP 0.502 0.583 0.263 ¤ 0.152 0.173 0.215

BUSINESS 0.20E-03 0.23E-03 0.37E-04 0.46E-04 0.45E-04 0.76E-04

T -0.72E-02 0.78E-02 0.23E-02 0.17E-02 0.35E-02 0.26E-02

CROSSOWN 0.28E-03 0.202 -0.14E-02 0.47E-01 -0.102 0.69E-01

MULTIMKT 0.97E-01 ¤¤ 0.45E-01 0.12E-01 0.84E-02 0.20E-01 0.14E-01

LEAD -0.95E-02 0.10E-01 -0.29E-03 0.22E-02 -0.83E-03 0.36E-02

ENTRY -0.392 ¤¤ 0.178 0.11E-01 0.48E-01 0.103 0.69E-01

BELLBELL -0.793 ¤¤ 0.346 0.375 ¤¤¤ 0.83E-01 0.235 ¤¤ 0.114

INDBELL -0.73E-01 0.392 -0.128 ¤ 0.87E-01 -0.344 ¤¤ 0.136

INDIND 0.418 0.365 -0.179 ¤¤¤ 0.72E-01 -0.319 ¤¤¤ 0.113

Firms dummies ¤(3=9) ¤¤¤(6=9) ¤¤¤(7=9)

¾0 0.467 ¤¤¤ 0.30E-01 0.148 ¤¤¤ 0.11E-01 0.155 ¤¤¤ 0.17E-01

½0 0.835 ¤¤¤ 0.65E-01 0.245 0.485 0.445 0.372

Adj. R2 0.46127 0.6060 0.6172

Obs. 267 267 267

¤¤¤;¤¤;¤ represent signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively

Table 5. PREDICTED PRICES WITH and WITHOUT REGULATION:

REGUALTED MARKETS

Low Usage Tari¤ Middle Usage Tari¤ High Usage Tari¤

^

p1 16.364 196.030 1020.101

(11.647) (33.346) (179.141)

^

p1;0 19.022 217.621 1188.160

(10.658) (69.706) (407.524)

^

p1;0¡p^1 2.659 21.5909 168.059

(17.691) (66.651) (404.421)

Standard errors in parenthesis

Table 6. PREDICTED PRICES WITH and WITHOUT REGULATION:

NON-REGUALTED MARKETS

Low Usage Tari¤ Middle Usage Tari¤ High Usage Tari¤

^

p0 21.269 200.979 1086.774

(10.439) (34.747) (205.602)

^

p0;1 19.456 194.976 997.696

(8.761) (34.202) (185.043)

^

p0;1¡p^0 -1.813 -6.002¤ -89.078¤

(4.862) (4.276) (55.988)

Standard errors in parenthesis

¤represents signi…cance at the 10% level

TABLE7.MLESTIMATESOFTHESTRUCTURALPROBIT:THEPROBABILITYOFREGULATION

VariablesCo.S.E.Co.S.E.Co.S.E.Co.S.E.Co.S.E

CONSTANT-0.356 ¤¤¤0.1641.227 ¤¤¤0.289-0.400 ¤¤¤0.2801.989 ¤¤¤0.5315.152 ¤¤¤1.9log p10tsp11ts -0.350¤¤¤0.74E-01-0.250¤¤¤0.80E-01-0.846¤¤¤0.158-10.417¤¤¤1.997-31.501¤¤¤6.1log p20tsp21ts 3.310 ¤¤¤0.9683.337 ¤¤¤1.0142.874 ¤¤¤1.485157.515 ¤¤¤30.805652.4819 ¤¤¤111.1log p30tsp31ts -2.939 ¤¤¤0.764-4.472 ¤¤¤0.859-4.546 ¤¤¤1.139-113.807 ¤¤¤22.865-447.452 ¤¤¤75.9 DEM84-0.290¤¤¤0.130-0.821¤¤¤0.154-0.489¤¤¤0.150-0.3050.298-8.418¤¤¤1.4 GOVSTAB0.492 ¤¤¤0.1460.461 ¤¤¤0.1640.894 ¤¤¤0.196-1.491 ¤¤¤0.451-0.9451.1 ELECT0.81E-010.179-0.1980.2000.656 ¤¤¤0.223-1.237 ¤0.686-0.3221.0STAFF840.15E-02¤¤¤0.32E-030.42E-030.35E-030.23E-02¤¤¤0.44E-03-0.86E-030.62E-030.64E-02¤¤0.28E

¢STAFF-0.20E-020.13E-02-0.76E-02 ¤¤¤0.15E-02-0.36E-02 ¤¤¤0.16E-020.76E-030.35E-02-0.34E-01 ¤¤¤0.12E RegionalE¤ectsYES¤¤¤YES¤¤¤ FirmFixedE¤ectsYES ¤¤¤YES ¤¤¤ InteractionTermsYES ¤¤¤YES ¤¤¤

Loglikelihood-320.2546-286.6652-257.6257-183.3153-52.4511

Chisquared102.5729169.7516227.8306376.4513638.1797

Obs.537537537537537

CorrectPredictions68.16%70.20%72.81%80.63%97.21%

ThedependentvariableisRts(dummy=1ifnoregualtorybanwasimposedinthemarket).Coe¢cientsestimatesrepresentthemarginalectwithrespecttotheov meansofthedataset. ¤¤¤, ¤¤,and ¤representsigni…canceatthe1%,5%,and10%levelrespectively

FIGURE2.SAMPLEDISTRIBUTIONOFTHEDIFFERENCEBETWEENNON-REGULATEDANDREGUALTEDPRICES

LowUsageTarMiddleUsageTarHighUsageTar

Bücher des Forschungsschwerpunkts Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung Books of the Research Area Market Processes and Corporate Development

(nur im Buchhandel erhältlich/available through bookstores)

Tobias Miarka

Financial Intermediation and Deregulation:

A Critical Analysis of Japanese Bank-Firm-Relationships

2000, Physica-Verlag

Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (Eds.) The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Europe and the Member States

2000, edition sigma

Jianping Yang

Bankbeziehungen deutscher Unternehmen:

Investitionsverhalten und Risikoanalyse 2000, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag

Horst Albach, Ulrike Görtzen, Rita Zobel Eds.) Information Processing as a Competitive Advantage of Japanese Firms Beitrag zur Neuen Institutionenökonomik des Marktes

1999, edition sigma

Horst Albach, Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, Kristina Vaillant (Hg.)

Organisationslernen – institutionelle und kulturelle Dimensionen

WZB-Jahrbuch 1998 1998, edition sigma

Lars Bergman, Chris Doyle, Jordi Gual, Lars Hultkrantz, Damien Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller, Leonard Waverman

Europe’s Network Industries: Conflicting Priorities - Telecommunications

Monitoring European Deregulation 1

1998, Centre for Economic Policy Research

Manfred Fleischer The Inefficiency Trap Strategy Failure in the

German Machine Tool Industry 1997, edition sigma

Christian Göseke

Information Gathering and Dissemination The Contribution of JETRO to

Japanese Competitiveness

1997, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag

Andreas Schmidt

Flugzeughersteller zwischen globalem Wettbewerb und internationaler Kooperation Der Einfluß von Organisationsstrukturen auf die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von

Hochtechnologie-Unternehmen 1997, edition sigma

Horst Albach, Jim Y. Jin, Christoph Schenk (Eds.) Collusion through Information Sharing?

New Trends in Competition Policy 1996, edition sigma

Stefan O. Georg

Die Leistungsfähigkeit japanischer Banken Eine Strukturanalyse des Bankensystems in Japan

1996, edition sigma

Stephanie Rosenkranz

Cooperation for Product Innovation 1996, edition sigma

Horst Albach, Stephanie Rosenkranz (Eds.) Intellectual Property Rights and Global Competition - Towards a New Synthesis 1995, edition sigma.

David B. Audretsch

Innovation and Industry Evolution 1995, The MIT Press.

Julie Ann Elston

US Tax Reform and Investment: Reality and Rhetoric in the 1980s

1995, Avebury

Horst Albach

The Transformation of Firms and Markets:

A Network Approach to Economic

Transformation Processes in East Germany Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum, Vol. 34

1994, Almqvist & Wiksell International (Stockholm).

DISCUSSION PAPERS 1999

Suchan Chae Bargaining Power of a Coalition in Parallel Bargaining: FS IV 99 - 1 Paul Heidhues Advantage of Multiple Cable System Operators

Christian Wey Compatibility Investments in Duopoly with Demand FS IV 99 - 2 Side Spillovers under Different Degrees of Cooperation

Horst Albach Des paysages florissants? Une contribution FS IV 99 - 3 à la recherche sur la transformation

Jeremy Lever The Development of British Competition Law: FS IV 99 - 4 A Complete Overhaul and Harmonization

Damien J. Neven Union Power and Product Market Competition: FS IV 99 - 5 Lars-Hendrik Röller Evidence from the Airline Industry

Zhentang Zhang

Justus Haucap The Incentives of Employers’ Associations to FS IV 99 - 6 Uwe Pauly Raise Rivals’ Costs in the Presence of

Christian Wey Collective Bargaining

Jianbo Zhang Asymptotic Efficiency in Stackelberg Markets FS IV 99 - 7 Zhentang Zhang with Incomplete Information

Justus Haucap Standortwahl als Franchisingproblem FS IV 99 - 8 Christian Wey

Yasar Barut A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and FS IV 99 - 9 Dan Kovenock Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete

Charles Noussair Information

Jim Y. Jin Collusion with Private and Aggregate Information FS IV 99 - 10

Jos Jansen Strategic Information Revelation and Revenue Sharing FS IV 99 - 11 in an R&D Race with Learning Labs

Johan Lagerlöf Incomplete Information in the Samaritan's Dilemma: FS IV 99 - 12 The Dilemma (Almost) Vanishes

Catherine Matraves Market Integration and Market Structure in the FS IV 99 - 13 European Soft Drinks Industry: Always Coca-Cola?

Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg The Evolution of Price Discrimination in the FS IV 99 - 14 Frank Verboven European Car Market

Olivier Cadot A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure FS IV 99 - 15 Lars-Hendrik Röller Allocation: An Empirical Assessment

Andreas Stephan

Holger Derlien Industriestandort mit Vorbildfunktion? FS IV 99 - 16 Tobias Faupel Das ostdeutsche Chemiedreieck

Christian Nieters

Christine Zulehner Testing Dynamic Oligopolistic Interaction: FS IV 99 - 17 Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry

Johan Lagerlöf Costly Information Acquisition and FS IV 99 - 18 Delegation to a “Liberal” Central Banker

Ralph Siebert New Product Introduction by Incumbent Firms FS IV 99 - 19 Ralph Siebert Credible Vertical Preemption FS IV 99 - 20

Ralph Siebert Multiproduct Competition, Learning by Doing FS IV 99 - 21 and Price-Cost Margins over the Product Life Cycle:

Evidence from the DRAM Industry

Michael Tröge Asymmetric Information Acquisition in Credit Auction FS IV 99 - 22

Michael Tröge The Structure of the Banking Sector, Credit FS IV 99 - 23 Screening and Firm Risk

Michael Tröge Monitored Finance, Usury and Credit Rationing FS IV 99 - 24

Silke Neubauer Multimarket Contact, Collusion and the FS IV 99 - 25 International Structure of Firms

Horst Albach Dokumentation der „Bonner Stichprobe“ – Zur FS IV 99 - 26 Thomas Brandt Datenbank der Jahresabschlüsse deutscher

Holger Jakob Aktiengesellschaften, 1960-1997 M. A. Paradowska-Thimm

Jianping Yang

Tomaso Duso Endogenous Switching Costs and the Incentive FS IV 99 - 29 for High Quality Entry

Jos Jansen Regulating Complementary Input Supply: FS IV 99 - 30 Production Cost Correlation and Limited Liability

Robert Greb Internationalisierung der FuE-Tätigkeit von Unter- FS IV 99 - 34 nehmen der Chemischen Industrie in Deutschland

Suchan Chae The Effects of Downstream Distributor Chains on FS IV 99 - 35 Paul Heidhues Upstream Producer Entry: A Bargaining Perspective

Tobias Miarka The Recent Economic Role of Bank-Firm- FS IV 99 - 36 Relationships in Japan

William Novshek Demand for Customized Products, Production FS IV 99 - 37 Lynda Thoman Flexibility, and Price Competition

DISCUSSION PAPERS 2000

Justus Haucap Collective Wage Setting When Wages Are FS IV 00 - 01 Uwe Pauly Generally Binding: An Antitrust Perspective

Christian Wey

Stephanie Aubert Regionale Infrastrukturpolitik und ihre Auswirkung FS IV 00 - 02 Andreas Stephan auf die Produktivität: Ein Vergleich von

Deutschland und Frankreich

Achim Kemmerling Political Economy of Infrastructure Investment FS IV 00 - 03 Andreas Stephan Allocation: Evidence from a Panel of

Large German Cities

Andreas Blume Security Needs and the Performance FS IV 00 - 04 Asher Tishler of the Defense Industry

Tomaso Duso Who Decides to Regulate? Lobbying FS IV 00 - 05 Activity in the U.S. Cellular Industry

Paul Heidhues Hiding Information in Electoral Competition FS IV 00 - 06 Johan Lagerlöf

Andreas Moerke Grundlegende methodische Überlegungen zur FS IV 00 - 07 Ulrike Görtzen mikroökonomischen Forschung mit japanischen

Rita Zobel Unternehmensdaten

Rabah Amir Market Structure, Scale Economies, and FS IV 00 - 08 Industry Performance

Lars-Hendrik Röller Efficiency Gains from Mergers FS IV 00 - 09

Johan Stennek

Frank Verboven

Horst Albach Documentation of the Kaisha-Database – The FS IV 00 - 10 Ulrike Görtzen Annual Accounts Database of Japanese Stock

Tobias Miarka Companies 1970 – 1999

Andreas Moerke With a detailed Glossary of Japanese Thomas Westphal Accounting Terminology

Rita Zobel

Paul Heidhues Employers’ Associations, Industry-wide Unions, FS IV 00 - 11 and Competition

Roman Inderst Market Structure, Bargaining, and Technology FS IV 00 - 12 Christian Wey Choice

Michael R. Baye Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: FS IV 00 - 13 Dan Kovenock An Auction-Theoretic Approach

Casper G. de Vries

Damien J. Neven The Scope of Conflict in International FS IV 00 - 14 Lars-Hendrik Röller Merger Control

Damien J. Neven Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a FS IV 00 - 15 Lars-Hendrik Röller Political Economy Model of Merger Control

Jos Jansen Coexistence of Strategic Vertical Separation FS IV 00 - 16 and Integration

Johan Lagerlöf Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, FS IV 00 - 17 and Non-Robustness

Pierre Mohnen Complementarities in Innovation Policy FS IV 00 - 18 Lars-Hendrik Röller

Rainer Nitsche Incentives to Grow: Multimarket Firms and Predation FS IV 00 - 19

Andreas Stephan The Contribution of Transport and Human Capital FS IV 00 - 20 Infrastructure to Local Private Production:

A Partial Adjustment Approach

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