Russia is one of the depositary states of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and advocates a consistent and balanced implementation of the treaty. Strengthening the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation regime is one of Russia’s foreign policy priorities. The Russian policy is founded on the notion that progress on nuclear nonproliferation is impossible without progress in all three areas described as the pillars of the nonproliferation regime: nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. This article will first briefly review Russian policy in the latter two areas, and then focus on challenges in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and Russia’s interests in that regard.
Russia and Nuclear Disarmament
Nuclear arms reduction and their complete elimination is a noble goal. Russia has repeatedly declared its commitment to the idea of a “nuclear zero.” Efforts undertaken by Moscow and Washington in the 1990s and 2000s as part of the START I treaty and the 2002 SORT treaty (Moscow Treaty), as well as unilateral steps on non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) reductions, have enabled Russia to cut the nuclear arsenal stockpiled during the Soviet period by 80 percent.1 The NSNW arsenal has been reduced by more than 75 percent since 1991.2
Russia and the United States are now implementing the New START treaty, signed on April 8, 2010.3 As of April 3, 2013, Russia already completed its commitments on two out of the three main categories covered by the treaty (the number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy Anton Khlopkov is Director of the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and editor-in-chief of the Nuclear Club journal.
bombers; and the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and warheads counted as deployed on heavy bombers).
Under the terms of the treaty, the United States and Russia were given seven years, until February 5, 2018, to downsize their arsenals to the new limits.4
However, a nuclear zero cannot be achieved overnight and requires that several conditions be put in place. The issue of nuclear arms reductions cannot be divorced from the broader national security context. That is why progress on nuclear disarmament demands that it be considered in a wider format that takes into account the close interrelationship between the various aspects of military security, including the role of conventional weapons, space weapons, and the entire complex of offensive and defensive weaponry. Article VI of the NPT requires the state parties to conduct negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures in the context of universal and complete disarmament.
After the entry into force of the New START treaty, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia was open to new joint initiatives with the United States in the area of disarmament. He stressed, however, that such initiatives could be implemented only on a fair and equitable basis, taking into account all the factors that affect international security and strategic stability.5 The Russian foreign policy concept approved by presidential decree on February 12, 2013 emphasizes that “negotiations on further strategic offensive arms reductions will be possible only if the parties take into account the entire range of factors that affect global strategic stability.”6 The official Russian position is that further steps on nuclear disarmament can be considered only if the parties adopt a comprehensive approach, abide by the principle of equal and shared security for all, and put in place a number of necessary conditions within the international arena.7 These conditions include:
1. Adherence by all states possessing a nuclear potential to the process of nuclear disarmament.
2. Prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space.
3. Commitment to refrain from the unilateral development of strategic missile defense systems that threaten to erode strategic stability and the regime of checks and balances that help to maintain a global equilibrium.
4. Elimination of imbalances in conventional weapons alongside the resolution of other international problems, including the settlement of regional conflicts.
5. Entry into force of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
Russia regards the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the NPT framework as an inalienable right of every country. It is a staunch advocate of the global development of the nuclear energy industry, provided that countries abide by their commitment not to divert nuclear materials and technology to weapons programs. The Russian nuclear industry provides significant assistance to various countries in the implementation of nuclear energy projects. It is a world leader in terms of nuclear power plant (NPP) export projects. It has signed framework agreements on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation with over thirty countries. It has NPP projects at various stages of development in Belarus, Vietnam, India, Iran, China, and Turkey, while work on a similar project is shortly expected to commence in Bangladesh. The Russian portfolio of NPP export projects includes a total of nineteen reactors.
Russia offers the fledgling nuclear countries not only turnkey NPP projects, but also the full cycle of nuclear fuel services, including deliveries of fresh fuel throughout the life of the NPP and the transfer of spent fuel back to Russia. This model of bilateral cooperation appears in the intergovernmental documents regulating Russia’s nuclear projects in Bangladesh, Belarus, Iran, Turkey, and Vietnam. Such an approach fully addresses concerns over possible proliferation at the nuclear facilities built as part of the joint projects.
In order to create an additional mechanism of guaranteed supplies of uranium enrichment (which is one of the most sensitive and vulnerable parts of nuclear energy projects), Russia has initiated the establishment of the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC), which now operates on Russian territory. The center, designed as an instrument of guaranteed access to uranium enrichment services, is primarily a political initiative that aims to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. The IUEC ideology is focused on the interests of the fledgling nuclear countries whose demand for enrichment services remains fairly limited at this early stage. Under the terms of agreement of the center’s establishment, its main objective is “to provide guaranteed access to uranium enrichment…primarily to the participating organizations from countries which are not pursuing uranium enrichment on their own territory.” At the same time, the countries wishing to join the center are not under any obligation to pledge not to develop enrichment technologies on their own territory. At present, the list of participating states includes Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.8
Russia has also implemented a project to create a guaranteed reserve of nuclear fuel in the form of low enriched uranium (LEU). The idea behind the creation of this fuel bank is to have a backup mechanism, under IAEA auspices, that countries can utilize if they are unable to buy LEU on the open market for political reasons. Thus, a country can buy LEU from the established LEU reserve at market prices to ensure that its nuclear power plants can operate without interruption. The accumulation of the guaranteed reserve of 120 tonnes of LEU was completed in November 2010. The agreement between Russia and the IAEA on the creation of the guaranteed stockpile entered into force on February 4, 2011.9 Russia has agreed to bear all the costs, including maintenance, accumulation of the stockpile, and the cost of shipping the LEU if a decision is made to use uranium from the stockpile.
The market value of the stockpile is about $300 million.10 Nuclear Nonproliferation
On the whole, the NPT has long played, and continues to play, a key role in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by new countries. At the same time, the regime is facing a growing number of challenges. These include:
1. Unresolved and dangerous crises related to the fulfillment of nonproliferation commitments by NPT members.
2. Growing global instability and unpredictability, which encourage some countries to review their stance on nuclear nonproliferation.
3. The existence of the black market, which to a certain extent caters to the illicit demand for nuclear technologies, equipment, and materials.
4. A growing gap between the declarations of governments on nuclear nonproliferation and the actual steps taken; the inability of the international community and certain countries to implement their own decisions and abide by their own commitments.
Unfulfilled Nonproliferation Commitments by NPT Members
Russia is particularly concerned by the existing and potential signs of crisis of the nuclear nonproliferation regime developing in close proximity to its national borders. The two areas of particular concern are the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. In addition, the unresolved and frequently escalating nuclear crises in North Korea and Iran, including the crisis triggered by the third North Korean nuclear test on February 12, 2013, have a negative and destabilizing influence on the NPT review process and the
nuclear nonproliferation regime as a whole. These crises also have many other serious side effects.
North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, along with its nuclear tests, has encouraged South Korean and Japanese interest in a nuclear option.
Polls in South Korea indicate that about 70 percent of the people favor the idea of the country developing its own nuclear arsenal. Speaking at a conference in Washington in March 2013, Chung Mong-joon, an influential member of the South Korean parliament, said, “Facing an extraordinary threat to national security, South Korea may exercise the right to withdraw from the NPT as stipulated in Article X of the treaty. South Korea would then match North Korea’s nuclear program step by step, while committing to stop if North Korea stops.”11 Meanwhile, as part of ongoing work to amend the constitution, Japan is considering the possibility of adopting a new interpretation in regard to the role of a nuclear element in its national security strategy. These trends in both countries are clearly cause for alarm, given that in two separate periods over the past forty years South Korea has conducted undeclared applied nuclear research that can be used for military purposes, while Japan has the technological capability to acquire nuclear weapons in a matter of months if a political decision is made to do so.
Russia advocates a resolution of the nuclear nonproliferation challenges on the basis of the NPT, with an emphasis on the inviolability of the treaty’s provisions, while taking into account the security and development needs of all states. Given that North Korea has already conducted three nuclear tests, it appears that the first goal of the dialogue and contacts with Pyongyang should be to prevent the spread of nuclear technologies, materials, and know-how to third countries, especially to states in the Middle East that have cooperated with North Korea in the past on missile technologies, in some cases as far back as the 1980s.
In regard to the Iranian nuclear crisis, the demands put forward by the international community to Tehran must be realistic. In particular, it is unrealistic to attempt to restrict Iran’s right to enrich uranium. Arguably, the most effective way of resolving the crisis would be a simultaneous two-track dialogue between the P5+1 and Iran, as well as between Washington and Tehran. The first track can be made more effective by greater coordination and harmonization of efforts among the P5+1. It is also necessary for all six countries to demonstrate that every measure being applied now is aimed
only at preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, as opposed to advancing some hidden agenda, including regime change in that country.12
Furthermore, as part of the efforts to resolve the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program, the P5+1 and other relevant countries must be more selective in their choice of measures adopted. In a number of cases, some of the tools ostensibly aimed at resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis actually pose an even greater threat to the dialogue with Iran and to international security in the long term – a threat that outweighs any positive effects such measures might bring. A case in point is the campaign to stoke up fears over the safety of the Bushehr NPP in the wake of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in 2011 and the earthquake in southern Iran in 2013. The campaign has had a negligible effect among the Iranians, most of whom still strongly support the country’s pursuit of the development of nuclear technologies. However, it represents a potential challenge for effective coordination of efforts by Russia and the Western countries within the framework of the P5+1, because the Russian nuclear industry is the main contractor in the Bushehr project.
Furthermore, the attempts to damage Iran’s nuclear infrastructure (including the Bushehr NPP) through the use of malicious software have opened a Pandora’s Box of cyber warfare. Attacks on sensitive facilities with cyber weapons are unprecedented. In the longer term, the problem of cyber weapons is a far more serious challenge for developed countries than for nations such as Iran, because their critical infrastructure is far more reliant on IT than that of developing countries.
The Effect of Growing Global Instability on Nuclear Nonproliferation
The changing situation in several regions, especially in the Middle East and the Korean peninsula, has prompted certain states to review their stances on nuclear nonproliferation. Governments worry about the use of force in international affairs, and are afraid of possible foreign intervention. As a result, they begin to look for potential allies, as well as for the means to protect themselves from possible attack. Finding allies is difficult for those countries that are in a state of bitter political confrontation with the West.
Consequently, such countries are tempted to review their commitments under the NPT (although Article X of the treaty does in fact allow countries to withdraw from the NPT, under certain conditions). Some researchers in
the Middle East and South Asia have drawn conclusions that are highly disturbing for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. They believe that the Third World nations must acquire nuclear weapons in order to safeguard their national sovereignty, while those states that already have nuclear arsenals should not give them up. They argue that nuclear weapons are the only reliable guarantee of non-interference by foreign powers.13
Proponents of this school of thought point to Libya as a powerful example.
Colonel Muammar Qaddafi relinquished Libya’s WMD programs (which were in a nascent state in any case), but was then deposed by forces that had direct support from several Western nations. Pyongyang has certainly drawn very clear conclusions from that affair. Speaking at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea in March 2013, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said, “Without acquiring strong military capability, it is impossible to protect national sovereignty.” He added, “We should not forget the bitter lesson of the countries…in the Middle East, which…failed to develop a powerful defensive capability, yielded to foreign pressure…and relinquished their already existing deterrent, only to become victims of aggression.”14 Clearly, foreign meddling in Libya and Syria has also produced a negative impact on internal political dialogue in Tehran with regard to the possible ways of resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program.
The Black Market and the Demand for Nuclear Technologies The potential illicit demand for nuclear and dual use technologies can be met by the black market. This was of major concern for the international community as the black market phenomenon expanded through the 1980s and 1990s. The best known documented case of the involvement of non-state actors in the proliferation of information, materials, and technologies related to nuclear weapons was the underground network created by Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist. The full geographical extent of the network, and the range of items supplied through it, remains unclear to this day. Although Pakistan has implemented a number of safeguards to prevent a recurrence of the problem, including stronger export control measures, concerns remain about possible proliferation from that country.
These concerns are explained first and foremost by the general security situation and high terrorist activity in Pakistan, which is largely a consequence of instability in neighboring Afghanistan. Pakistan faces a major problem with
the prevention of unauthorized handling of nuclear materials, technologies, and ammunition by scientists, military officers, and other personnel who have access to such materials in their line of duty. There is growing anti-Western and Islamist sentiment in the Pakistani armed forces. In November 2010, the present author met the then-governor of the Punjab province, Salmaan Taseer, at his residence in Lahore, which was heavily protected by Mr. Taseer’s personal guard. Only five weeks later, on January 4, the governor was assassinated by one of his own bodyguards who apparently was a radical Islamist.
In addition, there is increasing concern over the situation in Pakistan owing to the growing nuclear rivalry between Islamabad and New Delhi.
Pakistan is pursuing programs with a view to enhance its nuclear weapons technology, primarily by achieving greater accuracy of nuclear delivery systems and improved synchronicity of nuclear detonations. There is a suspicion that Islamabad could try to gain access to the necessary technologies and materials via the black market for WMD-related materials and technologies.
Meanwhile, concerns over the possibility of illicit supplies of nuclear-related materials and technologies are not limited to Pakistan. According to an IAEA investigation, the A. Q. Khan network involved individuals and entities from more than 30 countries aside from Pakistan.
Another pressing concern is the need to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the hands of non-state actors, with an emphasis on terrorist organizations and their supporters. Russia consistently advocates the universalization of international legal mechanisms in the area of nuclear security, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), as well as the amendment to the latter convention.
In recent years, Russia has substantially increased its contributions to nuclear security projects in other countries. In late 2010, it announced a decision to contribute $6.5 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund for the period 2010-2015. In addition, Russia contributed $3 million to a project dedicated to the removal of irradiated HEU fuel from the Vinca research reactor in Serbia, and pledged $40 million for clean-up projects at uranium mining facilities in Central Asian states. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia was the largest recipient of international assistance for nuclear security projects. Today, Russia finds itself in a stronger economic position,
and has also acquired valuable expertise in such projects. As a result, Russia has become one of the largest donors to international projects designed to strengthen nuclear security in countries around the world.
Closing the Gap between Governments’ Words and Actions There can be no major progress in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime as long as we are encumbered by numerous incomplete projects, some of which were launched more than fifteen years ago. An additional
Closing the Gap between Governments’ Words and Actions There can be no major progress in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime as long as we are encumbered by numerous incomplete projects, some of which were launched more than fifteen years ago. An additional