This section focuses on the linkages, interdependencies, synergies and conflicts of mitigation and adaptation. We define mitigation as the abatement of greenhouse gases, thereby combating the cause of climate change. In contrast, adaptation refers to the adjustment to actual or expected climate change, thereby reducing the adverse impacts of climate change and yielding potential benefits. Both strategies are pillars of a comprehensive climate policy, which will be used as the generic term for both strategies. How adaptation and mitigation are connected with each other and what implications
are to be expected for the 11 SEMCs is the topic of this section. The more theoretical topics of the major differences, the optimal policy mix, the role of uncertainty and whether the two policies are rather seen as substitutes or complements, are tackled in section A7 in the appendix.
6.1 Synergies and conflicts
The interdependencies of climate policies at the theoretical level (discussed in section A7 in the appendix) can be broken down at a lower level with concrete illustrations. There is a strand of literature that examines synergies and conflicts between concrete adaptation and mitigation measures.
Synergies are defined as the positive impacts of one policy measure on the effectiveness of another.
Sometimes they are also referred to as co-benefits. Conflicts, on the other hand, imply negative side effects of one policy on the objectives of another. These are adaptation options that come with a high amount of CO2 emissions or mitigation measures that increase climate vulnerability.
Synergies of mitigation and adaptation can be identified in many concrete policy options, most of them strengthening the role of natural resources in environmental management. Examples taken from Paterson et al. (2008) and Moser (2012) include reforestation with native and diverse tree species, coastal wetland restoration, urban greening and soil conservation. Table 1, reproduced from Moser (2012), lists some measures that work in favour of adaptation and mitigation simultaneously.
Table 1. Examples of measures that enhance adaptation and mitigation goals simultaneously
Source: Moser (2012).
Many of the synergies are found in the agricultural sector, due to the dual role of soil and vegetation in terms of vulnerability and carbon sequestration. Rosenzweig and Tubiello (2007) review these synergies and conclude that “many positive interactions have been identified”, but still
it is important to note that synergies will not be possible under all climate and socio-economic scenarios, and across regions. Adaptation strategies will likely often take precedence over mitigation, as climate changes are already underway and farmers will adapt (as they have always done), in order to maintain production systems and thus their own incomes and livelihoods.
This lack of incentives for mitigation might also be a reason why they rather speak of potential synergies of adaptation and mitigation strategies in agriculture.
At the same time, there are also clear conflicts between mitigation and adaptation activities. They are present especially in the field of technical adaptation solutions (energy-intense cooling devices, built infrastructure and energy supply). But they also occur in the forestry sector, as presented by Geijer et al. (2011) for Sweden. The climate mitigation objective calls for a high usage of wood as an alternative to fossil fuels. On the other hand, the adaptation objective makes the case for increased forest conservation. Although the study by Geijer et al. focuses on a northern European country, in general the aspect of competing objectives (mitigation vs. adaptation) in the forestry sector may also become relevant in the SEMCs.7 Regarding energy supply, Kopytko and Perkins (2011) highlight the adaptation–mitigation dilemma inherent in the mitigation strategy of an increased usage of nuclear power. Although nuclear power plants emit less greenhouse gases, they are more vulnerable to climate change than alternative energy sources, and further objectives like safety and an interruption in security have to be considered very carefully too. In essence, the authors’ view of nuclear power as a mitigation policy is very sceptical, not just for the adaptation considerations.8
Moser (2012), reviewing synergies as well as conflicts, concludes that the latter have to be analysed very carefully as they often occur more directly and imminently than positive side benefits. Although synergies with the respective counterpart are often identified as justification for some policy implementation, the harmonies between the two strategies should not be overestimated. This contribution, according to the author, should not be misunderstood as a negation of synergies, but rather as advice for realistic expectations towards climate policies.
Finally, it should be mentioned that synergies and conflicts of climate policies not only occur within the climate debate, but also in connection with other policy fields. As one of many examples, Paterson et al. (2008) examine the impact of both types of climate policies on biodiversity. The authors present a framework for analysing the policies with regard to their impact on adaptation, mitigation and the third objective of biodiversity. They place some possible options for climate policy in a diagram that illustrates this multi-objective perspective. Optimal solutions should be “win-win-win solutions”, such as “[u]rban tree planting” or “[f]orest conservation”.
6.2 Adaptation and international mitigation agreements
The effect of adaptation on international mitigation negotiations and agreements is an issue frequently tackled in the literature. The key question here is whether and how national adaptation is able to influence the probability of global mitigation. In general, there are three theoretically possible answers: first, adaptation has no influence on mitigation agreements. Second, the introduction (or increase in levels) of national adaptation lowers the global mitigation level agreed upon in international negotiations, e.g. by higher incentives to leave a mitigation coalition. Third, national adaptation helps to achieve higher levels of global mitigation. Both the latter two possibilities (which contradict one another) are present in the current literature.
Antweiler (2011), using a dynamic optimisation model in a theoretical framework, shows that the presence of multiple countries – compared with a single country case – increases the overall attractiveness of adaptation relative to mitigation. This is just because adaptation, by reducing climate damages, decreases the attractiveness of contributing to mitigation, particularly for countries that already have low emission levels. This finding proposes a negative effect of national adaptation for international mitigation efforts.
7 Three of the eleven SEMCs have forest areas that are greater than 10% of their total land area: Turkey (14.7%), Lebanon (13.4%) and Morocco (11.5%). Data from the World Bank, “Forest area (% of land area)” for 2010 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.FRST.ZS).
8 Although nuclear power is not currently used in the 11 SEMCs, this topic is essentially relevant for the future after 2018. Except for Lebanon and the Palestinian Autonomy, all 11 SEMCs have plans for establishing a nuclear energy supply. Four of them (Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Turkey) have already made concrete plans or proposals for the construction of nuclear reactors. Data from the World Nuclear Association (2012) (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf102.html).
On the other hand, there are a number of theoretical papers that raise expectations of a favourable role of adaptation in global mitigation agreements. One way adaptation increases the probability of such agreements is the strategic employment of adaptation. If a subgroup of countries invests in adaptation ex ante, this credibly commits them to a lower mitigation level in the future. Given the lower mitigation level of some countries, the remaining countries are willing to mitigate more in order to keep their optimal climate policy mix.9 In the end, this may enhance the probability of a global agreement, even though the remaining countries are more or less forced to cooperate (Auerswald et al., 2011; Farnham and Kennedy, 2010).
Another argumentation is based on the convex cost structure of adaptation. Presuming that one country free-rides and increases its own emissions, the other countries have the possibility to increase adaptation efforts to keep their climate damage constant. In this case, the free-rider also has to increase its adaptation level to keep climate damage constant. Yet, the costs of adaptation are convex in the level of adaptation and hence the costs of each individual country, including the free-rider, increase if cooperation fails. In effect, the higher the adaptation level, the higher are the gains of cooperation and the lower the incentives to leave coalitions (Benchekroun et al., 2011).
The few literature sources presented here show that the debate on the nexus of national adaptation and global mitigation agreements is still underway and definitely deserves more thorough examination than is possible here. Most contributions model climate policy in an abstract, theoretical way and many quite important empirical inputs are still missing. This possibly leads to the conclusion that without clearer quantitative knowledge of marginal adaptation as well as mitigation costs and benefits in the different world regions, this debate will continue. A second, policy-relevant conclusion is drawn by Lecocq and Shalizi (2007), who state, “mitigation policies and adaptation policies should be negotiated jointly, and not separately as is essentially the case today”.