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Systemic Risk Management in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps

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Systemic Risk Management in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps

•  Study insolvency cascades in an interbank system when banks insure their interbank loans with credit default swaps (CDS)

•  A regulator imposes a systemic surcharge (i.e. tax) on CDS contracts according to how much they contribute to increasing systemic risk

•  This effectively ‘rewires’ the interbank system and leads to a more resilient configuration (with lower systemic risk)

Matt V. Leduc*, Sebastian Poledna*

,1

, Stefan Thurner*

,1,2

* IIASA, Schlossplatz 1, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria

1

Section for Science of Complex Systems, Medical University of Vienna, Spitalgasse 23, 1090 Wien, Austria

2

Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA

Interbank Network as a Multi-Layer Network

Contribution

Credit Default Swaps (CDS’s)

Agent-Based Model of Interbank System

Results Simulated with the Agent-Based Model CDS’s ‘Rewire’ the Interbank System

Multi-Layer Network Mapped into a Single

‘Rewired’ Layer of Effective Exposures

Controlling Network Formation with a Systemic Surcharge

EL

syst

=

X

B

i=1

P

idef

V R

i

(L

ef f

, C )

Interbank Networks of Effective Exposures under Different Scenarios:

DebtRank (systemic importance) of each bank

s

ij

= s

m

+ ⌧

ij

Exogenous default probability Total value of banking system

•  This leads to the expected systemic loss:

•  Incremental effect of a CDS contract on systemic risk is easily computed:

Systemic surcharge where

•  A CDS contract is an insurance contract on a reference entity (bank)

Banks are exposed to each other via loans

CDS contracts redistribute those exposures from one bank to another

CDS contracts are ‘taxed’ according to how much they increase systemic risk. If they decrease systemic risk, they are not taxed.

R

i

< . 25 R

i

< . 5 R

i

< . 75 R

i

< 1

Color code for DebtRank (systemic importance)

ij

= ⇣ · max h

0,

(+CDSijm)

EL

syst

i

(+CDSijm)

EL

syst

= EL

syst,(+CDSijm)

EL

syst

R

i

(L

ef f

, C )

•  Sytemic importance of a bank i can be measured by DebtRank:

Effective exposures layer

Capital buffers is the fraction of the value of the banking

system that is lost following bank i ’s default

Ri(Lef f, C)

•  CDS contracts are now priced according to how much they contribute to systemic risk

Effective ‘price’ of a CDS

‘price’ of CDS

Discussion

A CDS market regulated with this tax mechanism effectively ‘rewires’ the interbank system into a more resilient configuration.

Each bank has lower systemic importance (lower DebtRank) and thus causes less damage to the interbank system following its default. An unregulated CDS market however increases systemic risk as it creates more contagion channels.

•  An interbank loan can thus be insured using a CDS contract

cascade sizes (C)

0 5 10 15 20

frequency

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

no CDS

unregulated CDS regulated CDS

total losses to banks (L)

0 500 1000 1500 2000

frequency

0 0.05 0.1 0.15

no CDS

unregulated CDS regulated CDS

i

0 5 10 15 20

R i

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

no CDS

unregulated CDS regulated CDS

Banks

Firms

Households loans

deposits

consumption deposits wages / dividends

loans

deposits

consumption deposits wages / dividends

CDS

ijm

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