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Munich Personal RePEc Archive

The separation of ownership and control and investment decisions in Mexican

manufacturing firms

Ruiz-Porras, Antonio and Lopez-Mateo, Celina

20 September 2010

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25237/

MPRA Paper No. 25237, posted 21 Sep 2010 15:12 UTC

(2)

THE SEPARATIO OF OW ERSHIP A D CO TROL A D I VESTME T DECISIO S I MEXICA MA UFACTURI G FIRMS

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Keywords: 51 ) ' : " 2 - " - .

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(3)

THE SEPARATIO OF OW ERSHIP A D CO TROL A D I VESTME T DECISIO S I MEXICA MA UFACTURI G FIRMS

1. Introduction

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2. Literature review and background

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3. Methodology

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(10)

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(11)

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Table 1: The census and the Mexican Economics Ministry classifications for the firms of an industry

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4 333

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(12)

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(13)

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Table 2: Investment and its determinants (variables)

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(14)

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(15)

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(16)

4. Empirical assessment

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# 2 3 0 - ' ' ' 83

Table 3. Correlations between the agency cost variables and between the ownership and management indexes

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3 > ?

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(17)

C

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# # 3

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# 3

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7 A - . # ( - '' %

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(18)

Table 4. Investment decisions and ownership and control structure in Mexican manufacturing firms (OLS regressions – Regressions that include all the

independent variables)

7 " - '' " # * .

. + # -

51 3BC

83 3

3 >

3 C

3 9 3

" . 3B?

B38

3B4 3?

3 >

399

3 3

5 . 2 3B8

3 4

38 3

34B 3?4

39>

3?

' 3

344

3 38

3 3

3 3

: 3

3 C

3B4 394

3 >

3 ?

39>

83 4

) ' 38

348

3 3 9

38 838

3 8 34C 3B4

83>?

3 ?

?3B

399 C3>9

348

?3 C

) C3B

B3>C

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>3 ?

B3C 3C

B38>

83>>

5 4 4 >> >

7 883 834 893 > ? 3>9

W 7 3 3 3 3

34B 34 39 34

E L A 83 C 349 3?? 38B

Wχ 3 B 3 9 3 38C

A - . C39 3 ? B3C 394

Wχ 3 > 388 3 B 3B

# # ' 3 - . 3 5 1 # G

# - . - - ' ' C # - - '%3

' C . - - # . # # %

L B 3 : - 1 # . % #3

. - - - # - . 3 "

- - 3 : # # ' .

(19)

>

# . # ' # -

# . 3 . - ' . .. # #

# - ' ' - %3 - - - #

- ' 1 # ' '% . - #

3 " E L A # A - . - # L -%

#3

Table 5. Investment decisions and ownership and control structure in Mexican manufacturing firms (OLS regressions – Regressions that include the ownership

and management determinants)

7 " - '' " # * .

. + # -

51 3C8

834

3 ? 3

3 ? 39

3 4 388

" . 3B

83>B

3CC 8398

38C 3B9

3 4 3>?

: 3

3 8

3CC 83

3 3B9

3>

838C

) ' 3

3

3 >

3?

3 394

3 C 348 3C>

B3>9

3 C 3>B

39?

93

34C

?384

) C34

C3 9

3 8

>3C?

B3 ? 388

839C 838B

5 4 4 >> >

7 >>3C8 BC39 B?3B8 >39?

W 7 3 3 3 3

34B 34 3C? 3>?

E L A 83CC 3?9 3 ? 3B>

Wχ 3 8 3 C 3 3 C

A - . >3 3> B3 > 3>

Wχ 3 C 38? 3 > 3B

# # ' 3 - . 3 5 1 # G

# - . - - ' ' C # - - '%3

(20)

' 9 . - # . # # %

L C 3 : - . -% - - % # # -

. - # - 3 : # # '' - - - # . 2

# # . - 3 : .'% ' ' ..

' % # # - 3

Table 6. Investment decisions and ownership and control structure in Mexican manufacturing firms (OLS regressions – Regressions that include the agency cost

determinants)

7 " - '' " # * .

. # -

5 . 2 3B4

3BC

3C4 38>

3??

3C

34B 3C

' 3 ?

3 >

3 C

3 >

3 3 8

3 4

3

: 3 4

3

3B>

3C>

3 C 3 4

39>

83 B

) ' 3 ?

3>9

3 C 3C

38B 83?4

3 ? 83 8 34

934

3

?3 C

399 C34>

3>>

3>8

) 43B8

438

3 43

C38?

83B?

B39C B3 8

5 4 4 >> >

7 C 394 843B C 399 ?3 C

W 7 3 3 3 3

34 34 39 34

E L A 83>B 3CB 34C 3C>

Wχ 3 3 ? 3 3 8

A - . 93 ? C3 B C3 > 3 9

Wχ 3 8 3 3 8 384

# # ' 3 - . 3 5 1 # G

# - . - - ' ' C # - - '%3

(21)

?

# . # ' # -

# . 3 5 - - ' . .. # # #

- ' ' % - % # # # - 3 .

- - ' '% . - # 3 7

E L A # A - . - # L -% #3

. # ' # 1 % 3 -

# # - # ' #X - - - ' 3 I 1 1

- 3 # ' / / 1

# # # ' . 3 - # 1 I

' 3 '' % # ' # L '%

- # ' > 3

% .. . # # ' . #

- - 3 - - -' '# 1 # # - .

#3 I 1 - . # #

- # '' 3 - # . .. ' -

1 # . - % L ' # - ' 3

0 # . % # - . # - -'

. -% - # - 2 ' # - 3 -

. 2 - 2 # - ' . 3 7

- % -' # H #

- ' 1 2 ' % ' 3 - - - # '' ' '%

. - # 3

(22)

Table 7. Specification tests for the regression models

7 " - '' " # * .

. -' # '' # # '

/ /

I # ' # '

43 9 93 > 3>8 39

W 7 3 3 9 3C88 39 >

I %

I # ' # '

3?8 34 3 38?

W 7 3 9 3 3 C4 3 889

. -' # 1 - ' # 2

/ /

I # ' # '

3BC 93 4 3 C 34>

W 7 3 3 C 388 4 3BC?B

I %

I # ' # '

3?> 3 B 3B9 3C

W 7 3 8 3 C9 3 C9 3 C

. -' # . -% - # 2

/ /

I # ' # '

3>B 438B 3 8 3

W 7 3 3 38>44 384B

I %

I # ' # '

838 3C8 3 38

W 7 3 3 3 9?4 3 4

' 1 ' - - % #

. 3 I 1 1 1 1 - 3 # ' / /

1 # # # ' . 3 - # 1 I

' 3 5 1 # G # - . - - ' ' C # - - '%3

5. Discussion

0 # - - ' 1 1 # - ' -

1 # - " 2 - - . .. .

- 3 5 # . % 1 1

# - ' # % ' - - . - - - #

# - 3 7 % ' -' - #

' - - - % ' - 3

(23)

# . # . # . . -% - # -

1 # 3 - ' '% % - 1 . '3 #

' K - > 3 #% # # . 1

1 # - ' # % . -% - ' 1

3 - # #% # 2 ' . ' - # 3

I 1 1 '# # . # ' '

# . - # 3 % ' ..

1 # . - ' # 2 # '

# # - 3 7 % .. - -

# ' . - # # L '% # # ' . 3

0 ' - - ' # ' - # ''

% -- # ' ' ' 3 - '

' L ' #% # ' # % /G K '' > 3 : #%

% .. - ' 1 G # 2 -

% ## ' # '' 3

7 ''% - ' # ' .% '' 1 # -

# - # -- # ' '% #

' '' - - ' L 3 ' - '

. .. . # # % # % ' '% - ' '3 I - 1

'# - . # ' ' # - # '

# ' .% # '% # ' #3

(24)

6. Conclusions

0 # # 1 1 # - ' - % 2 '

# - " 2 - - . 1 - # 3 0 # # 1

.. . # 2 # ' . 3 0 #

1 . # . -% - 4 # .

- . - 3 - - '% ' # 5* . - L

# ' - ' 3

# - -' . -% -

1 # - ' - 2 ' # - 3 - ' '% 1 #

- . 2 - 2 # - ' . 3

7 - % -' #

# - ' 1 2 ' % ' 3 - -

- # '' ' '% . - # 3

0 ' . # # - 3 7 2 '

2 #% % # '% # - - ' #

- ' - 3 O/- - ) 4P 1 ' ' % # #

' - 3 7 ' .. #

# - # '' . . - %

- %3

(25)

8

REFERE CES

'' 73 C 3 ) . - . . - 3 )"

& * 9B >>3

# )3 4 3 7 '% 1 - . - # # - 3

$ % A +U5 ' T ' ' XX 3- X - Y BC8

. E3 3 ) ' 3 3 K * E303 3 . -% - # 1 - 3

, - CC 4 93

A ' 3 K " &3 ?8 3 3 = 1 Z G

" - '' 3

AN [3 ) :3 K ' % 3 > 3 ) . - # '

# - 3 / 7 - - U5 ' T ' '

XX 3- X - Y4? 9

) '' - 3 3 > 3 / ' % . * ' -- + # ' - # '

# # - 3& & . + 8 43

) '' * *3 3 K " \ % E3"3 > 3 * # # ' -

- # . # - ' # # ' # -- + ' 2 -

$ # - \ - 3 / 0 . $= " C? 4 3

) A3 K A G 3 ? 3 : A ' # " ''% % ] 1

48 8 BB8^B>B3

)' 3 9 3 ) . - # # ' 3 2 3

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