Abstract
In contemporary discourse about metaethics, little attention is paid to positions concerning the ontological status of values that were formulated in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, despite that the questions asked today are often similar or even equivalent.
This work aims to situate McDowell's Anti-anti-realism and Max Scheler's Non-Formal Eth- ics of Values in relation to each other.
It will be shown that their positions are not only similar in respect to the conviction that mind and world are correlative and interdependent, but also in that Scheler's concept of “intention- al feeling” can be linked to McDowells negative approach insofar as it can illuminate the role of the emotional in acts of valuation and in the process of recognition of external reas- ons.
This will be done in three parts. The (1) exposition and problematization of McDowell's ap- proach will be followed by (2) the consideration of how both authors disclose the rationality of empirical thinking in emphasising the necessary correlation of mind and world. Finally (3) the implications for ethical questions will be considered.
Key words: metaethics, meta-ethics, value, Max Scheler, John McDowell, mind and world, ethical realism/ethical projectivism, value ethics, intentional feeling.
