By W. M. Floob, Abengourou, Ivory Coast
Whereas various aspects of the pohce in Persia in former times, have
been dealt with more or less satisfactorily, a description of the organi¬
zation of this part of the urban administration in Qäjär Persia is still
lacking. In the following I'll try to fill this gap in our knowledge and thus
I might clarify our picture of the civic administration for that period.
The organisation of the police in Qäjär Persia was essentially a con¬
tinuation of the patterns we find among the Safavid. As in that earlier
period we can observe that there existed a day and night police and that
each ofthe city quarters had its own police force'. The bazaar pohce are
a special case and will be treated seperately.
At the apex of the various police departments was the Mayor, the
begler begi or the kaläntar, who, therefore, is often designated by European
sources as chief of police or police magistrate*. The kaläntar, as I have
described elsewhere' was responsible for the public order in the city.
To this end he had a kadkhudä at his disposal in each of the city quarters
who was in charge of the police in this district and who was answerable
for any untoward occurrence. The kadkhudä could judge light offences
such as disorderly conduct and actions in defiance of public morality. He
could punish offenders with fines, the bastinado or imprisonment*.
More serious cases had to be referred to the kaläntar^. Both kadkhudä
and kaläntar held court in their own house and had their own prisons for
1 On the Seljuq period see : H. Horst : Die Staatsverwaltung der Qrossel-
guqen und HörazmSähs (1038—1231). Wiesbaden 1964, pp. 93—96. — On
the Timurid period see: H.R. Roemeb: Staatsschreiben der Timuridenzeit.
Wiesbaden 1952, pp. 150—152. — On the Safavid period see: V. Minoesky:
Tadhkirat al Mulük. London 1943, p. 125. — On the 18th century see:
Muhammad Häshim Äsif : RustamWt Tavärikh. Ed. Muhammad MushieI.
Tehrän 1348 (1969), p. 308.
2 R. M. B. Binning : A Joumal of Two Years in Persia, Ceylon. 2 vols.
London 1857, vol. 1, p. 337; H. Beugsch: Reise der Königlichen preußischen
Oesandtschaft nach Persien. 2 vols. Leipzig 1862, vol. 2, p. 196; S. G. Wilson:
Persian Life and Customs. London 1896, p. 248.
'W.M. Floob: The office of kaläntar in Qäjär Persia. In: .lESHO 14
(1971), pp. 253—263.
* J. Geeenfield : Die Verfassung des Persischen Staates. Berlin 1904,
p. 145; Binning, vol. 1, p. 286; Wilson, p. 66.
' Gbeentield, p. 145.
20»
294 W. M. Floob
tliose sentenced to imprisonment in chains*. If the criminal offender was a
woman she was kept in confinement within the kaläntar's own women's
quarters'.
The police were servants of individuals, kaläntar or kadkhudds, and
not of an institution e.g. police departments or Municipalities. They
owed loyalty to their chief and not to the city or the quarter they were
living in. Therefore if a kaläntar was dimissed, as a consequence his
retainers went with him*.
The number of servants employed by the kaläntars was not large.
In Mashad the begler begi in 1890 "was supposed to have a force of sixty
policemen under him : at least that is the establishment which I believe is
provided for"*. In Käshän in 1907 the kaläntar was in charge of 4 kad¬
khudds and 24 farräshes^". These numbers are not very impressive taking
into account that the estimated population of the two cities at that time
was 70.000 and 30.000 respectively. However, the situation was less
serious than these ciphers indicate since the number of unpaid hangers-on
and followers of their retinue undoubtly swelled the number of their
permanent staff''. Moreover to the number of the kaläntars' servants one
must add the staff of the kadkhudds and därügha-yi bäzär. Nevertheless
the total number of policemen was not sufficient to deal with rioting and
large scale protests, and when these happened the military had to be
called in.
Oazma
The district police were generally called farräsh'^^, though locally they
were designated with different names. In Qazvin and Tehrän around 1854,
the district police were known as gazma and were equipped, like their
kadkhudä, with a round shield and clubs" which were "of the tough
arjeen wood surmounted by an iron head"'*. In Isfahän the daypolice
were known as päkär around 1877'*, and in 1900 the police in Nishäpür
« Wilson, p. 66.
' A. DB Gobineau : Les religions et philosophies de l'Asie Centrale. 5me ed..
2 vols. Paris 1907, vol. 2, p. 24. s Wilson, p. 67.
' C. E. Yate: Khurasan and Seistan. London 1900, p. 330.
" Revue du monde musulman (RMM) 2 (1907), p. 461.
'1 Ibid., pp. 197,198.
'2 Ibid., p. 461; Wilson, p. 67.
" Lt. Col. Stuabt : .Journal of a Residence in Northem Persia etc. London 1854, p. 241.
'* C. J. Wills: Persia as it is. London 1883, p. 22.
'* MiBZÄ Husain Khän : Jughräfiyä-yi Isfahän, Ed M. Sitüda. Tehrän 1343
(1964), p. 125. See also A. K. S. Lambton: Islamic Society in Persia. London 1954, p. 14.
were called qarävuls under a chief "locally styled as Duzd baghir, or Catch-the-thief"".
The police in Tehrän around 1868 was divided into batches often men
each, who were under the orders of a chief known as dah häshi, who was
responsible for robberies and other crimes commited in his area". The
chief of a number of gaznia was also known as sar-gazma^^. In most cities
the district police was imder a därügha-yi mahalla, who was subordinate
to the kadkhudä of the quarter". The fact that the gazma lived among
the people of their area and wore no uniform facilitated their task.
There were therefore thoroughly intimate with the movements and habits
of everybody. If anything reprehensible occurred and its defaulter was
caught, he was brought by the sar gazma or därügha-yi mahalla before
the kadkhudä, who would decide, whether to deal with it himself or to
send the case to the kaläntar. If he did not judge the case himself he used
to report it to the governor*".
After sunset, at nine o'clock p.m., which event was announced by the
naqqära khäna, or Royal drum band, the task of the day police was taken
over by the night watchmen. From that time till dawn one could only go
about if one was in the possession of the password or ism-i shah, which
Persians could obtain from their khadkhudä and Europeans from their
consul*'. Moreover, one had to carry a lantern, (which was bigger the .
more important its owner was) to show that one had no criminal inten-
tion, for the streets were not hghted**. Rabino, writing in 1902, states ^
that in Kermänshäh ,, there are two passwords, which can be got on
application from the Ardel Bashi, one for the town and the other for the
" Yate, p. 451.
" C. DE Rochechouabt : Voyage en Perse. Paris 1854, p. 67; I'timädu's-
Saltana: Kiiäbu'l-Ma'äthir vaH-AtJiär. 1306 (1889), p. 233.
" Lambton, p. 14; de Gobineau, vol. 2, p. 15. European authors wrote
the term sar gazma in several ways. Aveey was deceived by these trans¬
literations and renders de Gobineaus' sar ghesmah as sar-qisma, which is
wrong P. AvEBY: Modern Iran. London 1965, p. 111.
" Lambton, p. 14, note 6; J. C. Hantszsche: Specialstatistik von Persien.
In: Zeitschrift d. Gesellschaft f. Erdkunde, Berlin 1869, p. 444.
2° Gbeenfield, p. 147; Binning, voll, p. 330; Jughräfiyä-yi Isfahän,
p. 125.
2' Wilson, p. 68; H. Bbugsch: Im Land der Sonne. Leipzig 1886, p. 124;
J. E. Polak: Persien: das Land und Seine Bewohner. 2 vols. Leipzig 1864,
vol. 1, p. 78.
"They vary in size according to the dignity of the person. A consul or nobleman will have several lanterns carried before him, two feet in diameter
and three feet long. The foreigner and tho well-to-do Persian are content
with one foot in diameter, while the poor have very small ones", Wilson, p. 69.
296 W. M. F1.00B
artillery square. There is also a third password for the Governor's palace
this one being reserved for the intimates of the palace"*'.
It seems that in Tehrän in 1889 an oflScial known as mir shah was
responsible for the preservation of law and order in the city which job
appears to have been hereditary**. The title of this oflScial reminds one
of the chief of the night watchmen in Isfahän during the Safavid era**.
That this ofiSce is an continuation of its Safavid counterpart is probable
but remains open to question. In some cities, the därügha-yi bäzär was
charged with the supervision of the night watchmen**.
The duty of the mir shah as chief of the night watchmen was to preserve
the peace of the city at night, with the exception of the bazaar area for
which the därügha-yi bäzär was responsible. Further to take up people
who were out of there houses after sunset and to prevent robberies. He
was accountable for any robbery and had to recover stolen property or
find the equivalent in money*'.
The mir shah was assisted in the execution of his task by a number of
subordinates, who patrolled the streets at night. They were probably his
personal servants. BmNmo, writing in 1852, states that "in each ward
is a gazma or night patrol. They have no particular uniform and are armed
with qaddara and cudgels. Suspicious characters and robbers which are
caught are taken to the saridam or guardhouse"*'. All persons which
were apprehended had to face a judge and were in principle punished in
accordance with their actions. But as we wiU see below a little money
prevented more than often events to take such an unfortunate course.
In Tehrän, Isfahän and Käshän the night watchmen were also known
as gazma^^. At the beginning ofthe 20th century they were called bäbäs or
chiräghchis in Qazvin — who were under the orders of därügha-yi mahalla
2^ Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Miscellaneous Series. No 590: Report
on the Trade and Oeneral Condition of the City and Province of Kermanshah.
By Mb. H. L. Rabino, p. 11. In Tehran there was also a separate password
for the Royal palace, I'timädu's-Saltana, MIezä Muhammad Hasan Khän :
Rüznäma-yi I'timädu's-Salpana. Ed. Ibaj Afshäe. Tehrän 1345 (1967), pp.
301,302.
2' I'timädu's-Saltana: Ma'äthir, p. 27,240; A. Bbioteux: Les comidies
de Malkolm Khan. Liege 1930, p. 63, note 97.
25 Minobsky, pp. 83,149; Ihsän Nabäqi: Tärikh-i Ijtimä'i-yi Käshän.
Tehrän 1345 (1966), p. 143.
2" Gbeenfield, p. 145.
" Bbicteux, p. 63, note 97; Lambton, pp. 14,15; Nabäqi, p. 341.
28 Binning, vol. 1, p. 338.
2» Lambton, p. 14; Nabäqi, p. 341; 'Abdulläh Mustawfi: Sharh-i Zin-
digäni-yi man. 3 vols. Tehrän 1343 (1964), vol. 3, p. 490, note 1; Polak,
vol. 2, p. 77.
—" and Icashikchis, 'asas and sardamdär in Tehran''. The chief of a num¬
ber of gazma was known as sar gazma, but in Tehrän also as sardamddr^^.
The gazma not only patrolled the streets but had also "the right to
ascend the tops of the houses in their midnight rounds", which was
strictly forbidden in the daytime".
The sardamdär checked his men and made rounds each horn after
sunset, taking an oil lamp with him, while crying "yä hidrat-i 'Abbäs, yä
khairu'-l-häfiza", to warn people that it was forbidden to be out of their houses'*.
Qarävuls
In 1852 Näsiru'd-Din Shäh, on instigation of his vizir, Mirzä Taqi
Khän, ordered the building of qarävulkhänas or guard houses in all big
cities. In each of the guard houses a number of guards, or qarävuls
recruted from the regiments garrisoned in the cities, were posted. The
guard houses were built near strategical points in the cities such as city
gates, important streets, and mosques". It was the duty of the qarävuls,
to maintain law and order in the city during the daytime as well as the
night. At nine o'clock in the evening they closed the city gates".
In Tabriz there were about twenty of these guard houses and in in
Tehrän about forty"; in Mashad around 1900 one whole bataillion was
used for guard duty. The soldiers or qarävuls, were detailed in small
guards of ten to a dozen men each". The guard houses as well as their
inmates, did not look very martial. They were "small, filthy dark rooms,
with porches in front, where the guards can stand or sleep"". The soldiers
were a sorry lot and except for the name had nothing in common with
soldiers. For they never did any military duty at all, be it drills, shooting
practice or otherwise. As a mihtary force they could do neither harm
'" Lambton, p. 14, note 6. —• The bähäs remind one of the situation in
Tabriz in 1758, where the kaläntar appointed and dismissed the kadkhvdäa
and bäbäs of the city quarters, Lisänu'l-Mulk, Sipihb: Tärikh-i Däru's-
Saltana-yi Tabriz. Tehrän 1808, p. 293.
" Mustawfi, vol. 3, p. 490, note 1; Bbicteux, p. 63, note 97.
'" DE Gobineau, vol. 2, p. 15; Lambton, p. 14; Mustawfi, vol. 3, p. 490, note 1.
" J. MoBiEB: A Journey through Persia, Armenia and Asia Minor etc.,
in the year ISO 8 and 1809. London 1812, p. 234.
Mustawfi, vol. 3, p. 430, note 1.
'5 Gbeenfield, p. 148; Polak, vol. 2, p. 77; H. Bbugsch: Im Land p. 124.
'• Gbeenfield, p. 148.
" Bbugsch : Beise, vol. 1, p. 217; Quezon : Persia and the Persian Question.
2vo\s. London 1889, vol. 1, p. 521.
'8 Yate, p. 330; Wilson, p. 68; Bbugsch: Beise, vol. 1, p. 217.
2» Wilson, p. 68.
298 W. M. Floor
nor good since they were "mostly armed with old muzzle loading muskets
which probably they have never fired in their lives, for which they have
no cartridges, and which look as if they would not go off under any
circumstance"*". Moreover they were poorly fed, hardly paid and in their
ragged clothes they looked beggars rather than soldiers. Their normal
regimental pay, which they were supposed to get, amounted to five shahis
a day in addition to a ration of bread. But even this, though in itself very
small, they rarely got*'. To provide for themselves and their families, for
they were often married they tried ' 'to eke out a living by money changing
or lending at usurious interest and by levying on the loads of wood and
brick, and provisions, which pass by"**. The soldiers were clad in thin
blue cotton suits, of which they were supposed to get two per year, which
usually were wom out and ragged. "As to great coats, even in the depth
of winter only one greatcoat is allowed to each guard house, and the
sentries have to wear it in turn"*'.
These unmartial men had to suppress riots in the cities, if they occurred,
supported by the mounted police (savära-yi nazmiyya-yi shahr)**. The
soldiers seem to have taken their task lightly, for "they lie sleeping,
idling or are busy with cooking, eating or drinking, while their rifle
and weapons have been laid aside"**.
The introduction of the qarävuls in the cities indicated the government's
wish to strengthen the influence of the central government vis ä vis the
local authority, a policy which ever since has received stress. It also
meant that the military element became an institutionalized aspect of
the cities' police force. Prior to 1852 the use ofthe military had been on
an ad-hoc basis. The qarävuls were regularly relieved by fresh troops
which gave cause to all sorts of problems. In 1893, in Tabriz for instance,
the qarävuls left the city without having been relieved on the pretext
that they had overstayed their period of service already. For a few
months Tabriz remained without qarävuls*^.
Although Greenfield was very positive about the beneficial effect
ofthe qarävuls' presence, other somces indicate that they did not improve
the safety in the cities, nor were they any better than the gazma. The
*" Yatb, p. 330; according to Yahyä Dawlatäbädi: Hayät-i Yahyä. 4
vols. Tehrän n.d., vol. 1, p. 141, note, it was "customary to give the soldiers rifles without cartridges; these are handed out in time of unrest".
" Yatb, p. 330; Wilson, p. 68.
*2 Ibid.
" Yate, p. 330.
** Greenfield, p. 266.
" Brugsch: Reise, vol. 1, p. 80.
*' Aminu'd-Dawla, MiRZÄ 'Ali KkXn : Khä{irät-i Siyäsi. Bd. H. Farmän-
FARMÄYÄN. Tehrän 1962, pp. 226,7.
qarävuls, underpaid and underfed, were not strongly motivated to make
an effort to execute their task well, and "a slight bakshish would open
the way as effectively as the ism-i shab"". It is therefore questionable
whether, as Greenfield has it, that these soldiers made the night-
watchmen superfluous*'. For before 1852 the Shah and the governors
relied on the city garrisons to maintain order in times of unrest and
they continued to do so after the establishment of the qarävul khänas*^.
The soldiers guarding the strategic points in the cities were more a
constant reminder of the Shah's might and power and of more soldiers
to come, than an effective deterrent, to those who wanted to start
trouble. As we have seen above, no change at all had taken place with
regard to the importance and extent of the duties of the gazma, save
may be for a few cities like Tabriz, a city about which Greenfield had
firsthand knowledge.
Here the qarävuls seemed to have played a more important role than
in other cities of Persia*". Their presence there even led to the abolition
of the ism-i shab, which, however, was reintroduced after the Kurdish
incursions in 1881*'. On the whole the gazma continued to perform their
task till well into the^'twentieth century. The fact that they were personal
retainers of government officials rather than servants of the government
furthered this situation.
Nazmiyya or Pulls
A modern police force modelled after European concept was founded
by Näsiru'd-Din Shäh in Tehrän after he returned from his second
journey to Europe in 1878**. The police department was known as
nazmiyya or pulis, short for idära-yi nazmiyya va pulis-i däru'l-khiläfa.
Its first chief was the Austrian Conte di Monteforte*'. The implementation
of the Shah's decision was the cause of a reorganisation of the then
existing police forces. This was the logical consequence of the polices*
task, viz. the responsibility for (all) police affairs and the guarding ofthe
Wn.soN, p. 68.
*' Greenfield, p. 256, comp. Polak, vol. 2, p. 77.
"J.Perkins: A Residence of Eight Years in Persia ete. Andover 1843,
p. 389; Aminu'd-Dawla, p. 209; comp, also the suppression of the 1849
rebellion in Isfahan, Jughräfiyä-yi Isfahän, p. 81
5° Their share in the nightwatch of Isfahän is not mentioned at aU in the
Jughräfiyä-yi Isfahän; comp. Lambton, p. 15.
" Wilson, p. 68.
52 I'timädu's-Saltana: Ma'äthir, p. 120; Greenfield, p. 257.
*' Ibid.; I'timädu's-Saltana: Ma'äthir, appendix, p. 27.
300 W. M. Floob
houses and the markets of Tehran**. AU ofiicials who were in charge of a
pohce squad, such as the därügha-yi häzär, the kadkhudds and the sar
gazma were put under the orders of the chief of police**. The purpose of
the reorganisation was to coordinate the various activities of police
forces. A similar situation existed already of old in Isfahän where a
dürügha was executive head of the police**. It is a moot question whether
because of this reorganisation the various police forces functioned more
smoothly than before.
The new police force was equipped with a special uniform and
weapons*'. According to Bbugsch their uniforms were the same as those
worn by the Viennese police force*'. Cuezon described them as wearing
"a black uniform with violet lacings"**.
There is reason to believe that the nazmiyya were but the continuation
of the qarävuls. There are several factors in favor of such an contention,
although, (I admit), these do not take away aU doubts. First, the chief
of the nazmiyya, normally referred to as raHs-i kull-i pulis, was also
known as ra'is-i mustahfazin-i amniyyat-i 'ämma-yi shahr (chief of the
public security guards)*". These 7nu.stahfazin were probably the same as
the qarävuls, for the latter were also designated as mustahfazin. Secondly,
the nazmiyya also were stationed in guard houses, which were spread out
over the city in front of which policemen could also be "seen constantly
hanging about"*', just like the qarävuls. Thirdly, the nazmiyya were
also recruited from the city garrison and like the qarävuls they patroUed
their particular area day and night**. Whether or not the qarävuls became
the imiformed police (nazmiyya) in 1879, it is a fact that on several
occasions soldiers were put to service as gazma. For instance, in 1896
after the assasination of Näsiru'd-Din Shäh, 300 Cossacks and 300
soldiers of the city garrison were put under the orders of the chief of
police to keep order in the city*'.
** "shughl-i shihnagi-yi shahr va päs-i huyütät va asväq-i däru'l-khiläfa".
Ibid., p. 120.
" Greenfield, p. 257.
*• W. M. Floob: The Market police in Qäjär Persia (In: WI 14 (1972).
*' I'timädu's-Saltana: Ma'äthir, p. 120.
" H. Bbugsch: Im Lande, p. 211.
5' CuBzoN, vol. 1, p. 332; see also Mrs. Bishops: Journeys in Persia and
Kurdistan. 2 vols. London 1891, vol. 1, p. 189.
*» Sani'u'd-Dawla: Mir'atu'l- Buldän. 4 vols. Tehrän 1294—6 (1877—80),
vol. 3, appendix, p. 5; Sani'u'd-Dawla: Muntazim-i Näsiri. 3 vols. Tehran
1298—1300 (1881—83),' vol. 2, appendix, p. 18. '
°' CuBzoN, vol. 1, p. 332; see also Brugsch: Im Lande, p. 212.
" Ibid. Wilson, p. 68.
Aminu'd-Dawla, p. 209.
The organisation of the police (nazmiyya) of Tehrän was in the be¬
ginning much simpler than later on, when the Persian bureaucracy had
fully exploited all possibilities for diversification and Parkinson's law
had taken its full effect. The result was a considerable extension of the
number of functions on the police force. Whereas in 1879 there were only
ten leading functionaries their number had grown to twenty-six only
ten years later, whilst the the total number of the nazmiyya had hardly
been increased.
In 1879 there was a police chief (ra'is-i idära-yi jalila-yi pulis), a
deputy chief (nä'ib-i kull-i idära-yi pulis), an advisor (mustashär) who
was chief of the investigation and claims office (majlis-i tahqiqät va
du'ävi), and a second advisor. Further there were four chiefs (ra'is) for
the four city quarters (Sangalaj, Darväza-yi Dawlat, 'Udlajan and Chäl-
maidän, Bäzär), a därügha-yi bäzär and a deputy for the ihtisabiyya
(cleaning department) for in that year the police chief was muhtasib of
Tehrän»'.
In 1880 the chiefs ofthe four city quarters had each a deputy (nä'ib).
Further there was a kaläntar (kaläntar-i idära), who was judge ofthe civil
court (qädi-yi utäq-i inahäkimät)'^*. A chief of the personal (ra'is-i pishk-
hidmathä), an archivist (munshi-yi rüznämajät), four officials (sähib
mansab ), a clerkcashier and two office chiefs ( ra'is-i majlis ) completed the staff in that year'*.
In 1884 the chief of personal is additionally known as instructor
( mashshäq) of aU police officers and he had gotten a deputy. Moreover a
chief of the stable ( ra'is-i istahl-i idära), one extra official and secretary
(munshi) and a commissionair (kumisar-i idära) had increased the ranks
of the police".
In 1886 the traffic police was represented by a chief for the thourough-
fares (ra'is-i gardishhä-yi shahr)'''', while in in 1889 an adjudant of the
chief of the police, who was at the same time chief of mounted police
(ra'is-i savärhä-yi idära), was added. The bazaars received a great deal
" SanI'u'-d-Dawla: Mir'at, vol. 4, appendix, p. 11.
In 1881 the kaläntar (who should not be mistaken for tho mayor of the
city) is reported to have been chief judge (näzim-i tamizi), and in 1886 chief
of the civil court (ra'is-i utäq-i mahkamät). This latter function was held
later on by other officials. See Sani'lt'd-Daw-la: Muntazim, vol. 1, appendix,
p. 28; vol. 2, appendix, p. 20; and Ibid. Mafla'u'-sh-Shams. 3 vols. Tehrän
1301—03 (1884—86), vol. 1, appendix, p. 37, vol. 3, appendix, p. 24.
" Ibid: Muntazim vol. 1, appendix, pp. 37,38; vol. 3, appendix, pp. 24,25.
" Ibid: Mafla\ vol. 1, appendix, pp. 37.38.
°' Ibid., vol. 3, appendix, pp. 24,25
302 W. M. Floor
of attention for besides a därügha-yi bäzär^^, who was in charge of the
Tehran's main bazaar, there was a chief of the bazaar (ra'is-i bäzär).
The later had an assistant-inspector for all the markets in the city
( nä'ib-i awal-i chahär süq va tamäm-i bäzärhä-yi shahr). The remainder of
the staff was made up a tramway official (ma'mür-i nazm-i räh-i ähan)
and an additional number of clerks'*.
The strength of the Tehrän police force was rather fluid. The official
figure as given by I'timädu's-Saltana (Sani'u'-d-Dawla) is 394 for
1879, 402 in 1881, 448 in 1884,377 in 1886 and again 402 in 1889'». Two
other reliable sources give the exact figure of 300 for 1890", and 250 for
1896'*. The cause of the difference could simply be a decrease in the
number of police officers. Another reason could be that the official num¬
ber reflects the nominal strength of the force, while the figures given by
CuBzoN and Kosogovski are based on the actual number of men em¬
ployed on the force.
In 1896 an ordinary police officer was paid 22 qräns monthly. Inspec¬
tors and higher officials had to get their income from other sources, since
there was no entry in the budget of the police force for them".
The advent of the police did not come uncommented and the ever
nimble-witted Persian mind produced a number of verses about the
police and its chief of which the following is an example :
"Beware ye blackguards, watch your step with the police, to use
guile against them won't help you in the fetters of the Conte di
Monteforte will die even Jupiter, the planet, if it commits a crime"'*
Both the police chief and the police itself made a good impression at
first. Wills judged di Monteforte to be "exactly the right man on the
right place. He got on with natives, in a few weeks established a character
for honesty and shrewdness, detected many offenders, recovered much
stolen property and established a regiment of policemen, well drilled,
well dressed, honest, polite, and who REFUSED BRIBES"'*.
" The därügha is variously referred to by the sources as därügha-yi däru'l- khiläfa {Mir'at, vol. 4, app., p. 11), därügha-yi bäzär {Muntazim, vol. 2, a.pp.,
p. 20) därügha-yi sliahr {Muntazim vol. 1, app., p. 18) and därügha ra'is-i
bäzär {Mafia', vol. 1, app., p. 37).
" I'timädu's-Saltana: Ma'äthir, appendix, p. 27.
'» Resp. Sani'u'd-Dawla: Mir'at, vol.4, app., p. 11; Ibid.: Muntazim,
vol. 1, app., p. 17; Ibid.: Mafia', vol. 1, app., p. 38; Ibid., vol. 3, app., p. 25;
I'timädu's-Saltana: Ma'äthir, app., p. 27.
" Curzon, vol. 1, p. 332.
'2 V. A. Kosogovski : Iz Tegeranskovo Dnevnika. Persian translation by
Abbäsquli Jali: Khäfirät-i Kulunil Käsäküfski. Tehrän 1344 (1965), p. 93.
Ibid., pp. 92,93.
'* I'timädu's-Saltana: Ma'äthir, app., p. 120.
'* C. J. Wills: In the Land of the Lion and the Sun. London 1883, p. 371.
But this favourable impression did not last long. Di Monteforte was
but an adventurer, who wanted to get rich fast. In this he was rather
successful, to the detriment of the population of Tehrän. He extorted
money from prisoners, for himself and his master Nä'ibu's-Saltana, the
governor of Tehrän. He introduced a so-called nightingale tax. Everyone
in Tehrän who had a nightingale in a cage had to pay 1 qrän. Those who
did not or could not pay were arrested and beaten. One ofthe imfortunate
birdlovers, a goat seller (büzi furüsh), died as a result of the beating
which he received because he could not pay 1 gräw'*. Another source of
income were the city prostitutes, who were thrown regularly out of town
at one gate and who re-entered the city through another gate. Their
"expulsion" was only a sham, for the prostitutes in Tehrän were under
the patronage of the chief of police, and di Monteforte did not want to
forgo their annual payment of 14.000 tomcwis'". These sources of income
being unofficial emoluments, di Monteforte also received 100.000 tomans
yearly from the Persian government".
Di Monteforte lived up to the reputation depicted in the poem men¬
tioned above. For many suffered in his prison, which not all them left
alive'*. He suffered a setback, when a member of the Qäjär tribe, who
was held on a charge of complicity in a robbery case, died as the result
of torture. His family complained to the Shah, who thought that di
Monteforte had gone too far. The Shah then ordered di Monteforte not to
arrest or hold a member of the Qäjär tribe in custody, without notifying
the Ilkhäni of the tribe, 'Adudu'l-Mulk'".
Di Monteforte was a man, whose pride was easily hmt. For when he
heard that a popular artist, Isma'il Bazzäz'', had given an imitation of
him at court, di Monteforte ordered the därügha to arrest and punish the
artist. The Shah, hearing about this, was vexed and ordered the därügha
to be punished'*. Di Monteforte suffered another setback when the Shah
took from the right to hold prisoners in his own jail". He seems to have
been reinstated in this right for in 1889 the Shah again commanded that
di Monteforte and the kadkhudds were not allowed any longer to have a
prison. All prisoners had to be kept in the state prison from then on'*.
" 1'timädu's-Sai.tana : Rüznäma, p. 313.
" Ibid., p. 159; for tho situation in other cities with regard to this subject see my : The Marketpolice in Qäjär Persia.
'8 I'xrMÄDU's-SALTANA : Rüznämo, p. 1060.
Ibid., pp. 313,657. "<>Ibid., p. 296.
" About this artist see Mustawfi, vol. 1, p. 361.
'2 I'timädu's-Saltana: Rüznäma, p. 256. *' Ibid., p. 365.
Ibid., p. 656; the kadkhudäs of Tehrän were obnoxious too. According
to I'timädu's-Saltana ,,they formerly were old experienced and civilized
men, but now they are young and europeanized", ibid., p. 657.
304 W. M. Floob
In 1890, due to the pressure of the ^ulama , di Monteforte was dismissed
for his part in the suppression of the demonstrations against the Tobacco
regie in that year. His successor was a Persian, AbO Turäb Khän, who up
till then had been deputy chief of the police. Neither he nor his successors
brought any change in the state of affairs. They used the police as an
instrument to further their own and their master's interest'*. The mudä-
khil (or unofficial emoluments, in short : graft) was promising enough for
candidates to apply eagerly for the job of chief of police. In 1890, chief of
police paid to the governor of Tehrän 1000 tomans monthly, "and that
is little", commented he".
A decree of 1896 informs us about the fact that the nazmiyya in Tehrän
had more tasks than guarding the city. They also had the supervision of
illegal activities such as whoremongering, wine drinking, gambling and
animal fights. Another important duty was to see to it that the city's
water channels were not polluted. The same decree also mentions some
"traffic rules", in the first place children were forbidden to throw objects
at streetcars or abuse the passengers; secondly muleteers were told to
drive their animals in a string through the streets in stead of herding
them. To accomodate pedestrians, shopkeepers were ordered to remove
their stalls from the side walks. Finally hawkers were forbidden to peddle
their wares in the bazaars, because they obstructed the traffic there".
Whether these rules were implemented is not known, but is doubtful.
Tabriz
I
On July 13,1879 the Crown prince Muzaffaru'd-Din Mrrzä followed
the example of his father. By proclamation he announced the formation
of a uniformed police which would patrol dming the night from 10.00
hours p. m. till dawn". This modern pohce force consisted of 340 police¬
men. Chief of police became Shu'ä'u'd-Dawla, the future governor of
Ardabil. As it did in Tehrän the formation of this new police force
brought many changes. It seems that was a part of a larger, the whole city
embracing reorganisation. The British Consul in Tabriz, reporting on the
police force, states that: "The beglerbeg and the qal'ah beg and aU other
magistrates and civic functionaries retained their posts but depended
henceforth on the Municipality. Moreover their powers have been ciu:-
tailed"".
85 MuLKÄBÄ, 'Abbäs MIbzä: Sharh-i häl. Ed. 'Abdu'l-Husain Navä'I.
Tehrän 1325 (194), p. 60; N. R. Keddie: Religion and Rebellion in Iran.
London 1966, pp. 59,60.
8" J. B. Feuvbiee: Trois ans ä la Cour de Perse. Paris 1900, p. 342.
8' See appendix. Foreign Office 60,425, letter July 13,1879.
88 Ibid., letter August 15,1879.
The organisation of the Tabriz police force no doubt followed the same
pattern as in Tehrän, which means a division into an administrative and
an executive branch. The executive branch had a strength of 340 police
officers and was split up over the various city quarters. In each of the
eleven city quarters of Tabriz, 30 policemen were detailed. The remaining
100 men were mounted patrols, who, as we have seen above had to
assist the qarävuls in case of riots. The mounted police were recruited
from the irregular cavalary. They received their normal regimental pay,
being about 6 d. per day and rations for themselves and their horse.
The police on foot were paid differently. An ordinary policemen would
receive 5 d. per day, a deputy inspector 16 sh per month, and an inspector
20 sh. per month'".
One does not hear anymore of the Municipahty in later sources, nor
of the police. In 1896 Wilson does not mention them at all. This may
have been caused by the fact that, as in Tehrän, the qarävuls became
the members of the new police force.
The formation of a modern police force remained restricted to Tehrän
only. In the other cities in Persia the older system remained in fuU
force. In Tehrän they existed side by side, for the nazmiyya did not
succeed in making its older counterparts obsolete. This failure, was due
to the fact that the Shah did not introduce the nazmiyya because he was
of the opinion that this would prove to be beneficial to his country, but
merely because he wished his capital to look modern. Other introductions
of European institutions, such as gas- and electric light etc, are also
expressions of this wish to Europanize, to be "civihzed". This striving
after modernization, however, did not stem from a real wish for a struc¬
tural reform of the Persian society and therefore the nazmiyya worked
in a kind of vacuum. In the first place, the other branches of the civic
administration were not reorganized. Secondly, though the därügha-yi
häzär, kadkhudds and gazma were formally subordinate to the chief of
police, in reality they continued to act very much on their own. This
fact was the more accentuated by their different budgets ; which brings
us to the third point : the eflfectivity of the nazmiyya was greatly ham¬
pered by the fact their legal source of income was by no means sure. The
gazma, därügha-yi bäzär etc. were paid by interested parties such as the
bäzäris^^. The nazmiyya, on the contrary, were aUotted the taxes of a cer¬
tain group, e.g. the tribes in Khüzistän. If these taxes were not collected,
because the tribes rebelled or the governor or mustawfi cheated, then the
chief of pohce had to look for other sources of income. The Treasury would
»» Ibid.
" Bbugsch, Reise, vol. 1, p. 227; see my: The Marketpolice.
306 W. M. Floob
not pay in sucli a case, even if tliere were money, which generally there
was not. Around 1895 the nazmiyya was to receive about 19000 tomans
yearly, if it was coUected. In 1895/96 (1274) the nazmiyya received no
money at aU. In 1896/97 (1275) only the first seven monthly instalments
were collected'*.
Constitutional Qäjär Persia
The period after the Persian revolution (1906) represented a new
chapter in the history of the Persian police. The modernizing influence
before 1906 had in effect been restricted to Tehrän and was of a nominal
rather than a structural nature.
Among the many reforms proposed by the Majlis was a bill regulating
the organisation and duties of the Tehrän police force. These proposals
were contained in chapter VIII of the law of 4 DhuH Qa'da 1325(1906)
articles 286 to 298 and in the Municipal law of 20 RabVuHh-Thäni 1325.
The latter specified the duties of the police, elaborating in such subjects
as: preventive measures against dearth(art. 2), mendacity(art. 5), the
control of weights and measures(art. 7), etc. However, these reforms
proved to be abortive. The state of affairs in the years after the revo¬
lution was too unsettled to enable implementation of the administrative
and other reforms. Police affairs remained under the jurisdiction of
the governors of the cities and the kaläntars outside Tehrän".
Kaseavi reports that under the first Majlis (1907—09) a law was
passed stipulating that the idära-yi nazmiyya would be under the juris¬
diction of the Ministry of Interior, as well as the idära-yi pulis va zhan-
därm**. The only explanation which I can offer for this apparent con¬
tradiction is that the idära-yi nazmiyya probably refers to the uniformed
city pohce, while the idära-yi pulis va zhandärm refers to the provincial
police, i. e. to those on duty outside the cities for the safeguarding of the
roads. I am aware that this explanation may be wrong, but it is certain
that the nazmiyya and the pulis were not'two separate police forces.
Since the formation of a uniformed police in 1879 Persian sources speak
indiscriminately about them as nazmiyya and pulis"^.
After the fall of Muhammad 'Ali Shäh (1909) the function of chief of
police was conferred upon Yefrem Khän. He and his Armenian volun¬
teers were part of the constitutionalist forces, thus in fact the police was
Kosogovski, pp. 92,93.
»» RMM 27 (1914), pp. 232,33.
•* Ahmad Kasbavi: Tärikh-i mashrü(a-yi Irän. 3 vols. Tehrän 1319—22
(1945—48), vol. 1, p. 317.
See note 53.
in the hands of the military. Unfortimately, Yefrem Khän died May
19,1912, fighting rebel forces, regretted by all, Muslim and Christian
alike»«.
Thereafter, the Bakhtiyäri tribe, the mainstay of the constitutionalist
government, took charge of the policing of the capital. In 1912 they were
unarmed by the Gendarmerie as the result of intergovernmental disputes.
After the-showdown with Bakhtiyäris the Persian government requested
the Dutch government to send a mission to organize the municipal police
force. After the Dutch had declined, the request was put to the Swedish
government, who sent a group of officers under general Westdahl in 1913.
The Swedish mission had to base its activities on the laws of 15 Thawr
1331(1912) and 17 Sha'bän 1331(1912). These two decrees concern
both the police on foot and on horse. According to their regulations the
police had to be instructed in the duty towards the government, the
country and the rehgious law. They had to know how to read and write
and to be able to render first aid".
The decree of 17 Sha'bän regulates the administrative organisation
of the police force, both the uniformed and the security police. Further¬
more it defines the organisation of the pohce in the nine quarters of
Tehrän'8.
The Swedish mission experienced a lot of trouble due to the disorgani¬
sation of the government apparatus. Conflicts of competence between
the Ministry of Interior, which was in charge of the police force, and the
Ministery of Justice did a lot of damage to the image of the nazmiyya.
Also the fact that there were not enough courts to try cases, caused
that prisons were full to the brim. Therefore the police was accused of
detaining people arbitrarily, unlawfully, and unduly long. However,
no steps were taken to straighten out these difficulties, which made the
work of the police more difficult**.
The laws and decrees relating to the organisation of the police had
only effect in Tehrän. In the provinces nothing changed and the police
remained in the charge of the governors and their staff, i. e. the kaläntars
and kadkhudäs. The bazaar still had its own pohce under the därügha-yi
bäzär. There was no co-ordination of the police activities in the country,
nor was there any supervision from Tehrän^»».
Although the general state of disorder, which reigned in Persia till 1921
was not a favourable condition to organize a police force the Swedish
»« RMM 27 (1914), p. 235.
»' Ibid., pp. 232—35.
»8 Ibid., pp. 232,33.
»» Ibid., pp. 236,37.
Ibid., p. 234.
21 ZDMG 123/2
308 W. M. Floor
mission continued to direct the pohce until 1923'"'. In the summer of
1920, Westdahl was dismissed after a dispute with the government. He was,
however, retained by the opposition, for legally his dismissal was not
flawless'**. When in February 1921 a coup d'etat took place; the Cossack
Division under Ridä Khän marched on Tehrän and overthrew the old
government, Sayyid Diyä'u'd-Din the leader of the opposition thought
that Westdahl's "prestige and decision would be useful adjuncts in main¬
taining order in the capital"'*'. However, the Cossacks were not sure
where the police stood, so "the first act ofthe troops was to send detach¬
ments to the ten principal police offices of the city and arrest the police.
At the headquarters alone was any resistance offered, and here occurred
the only bloodshed of the night. The whole thing was indeed due to
a misunderstanding""*. Soon Westdahl obtained permission from the
Shah to cooperate with the Cossacks and the next day the police, together
with the Gendarmerie and the Cossacks patrolled in the city'*'. Tribute
was paid to the police in the proclamation which Ridä Khän issued after
the coup, when he referred "to all om military brethren in the Gendar¬
merie and the Police BataUions who share in the sacrifices of the Cossack
Division"'*'.
The Situation outside Tehrän
It appears that after the Persian revolution a municipal police force
was founded too in Tabriz. According to Kasravi this event took place
in 1907. He mentions that for the very first time a municipal force was
formed there, thus, apparently no recollection of the reform effected in
1879 existed any more. The new force were clad in dark blue uniforms
with a leather belt and buttons, and with a lion-and-sun badge on their
caps'*'. Ajlälu'1-Mulk, a delegate of the provincial Anjuman, was chosen
ra'is-i shahrbäni (chief of police). That the chief of police was the same as
the därügha, which according to Aubin was in charge of the pohce in
Tabriz in 1907 seems unlikely'*'. To each squad of the police force a
sar dasta was appointed'*'.
A. C. MiLLSPAUGH : The American Task in Persia. New York 1925, p. 148.
"•2 J. M. Balfoub : Recent Happenings in Persia. London 1922, p. 202;
AvEBY, p. 224.
'<" Ibid.
'" Balfoub, p. 225.
Ibid., p. 226.
V» Avery, p. 148.
KasbavI, vol. 2, p. 339.
E. Aubin: La Perse d'aujourd'hui. Paris 1908, p. 36.
"» KasbavI, vol. 2, p. 339.
The new force were hardly an improvement and remained an ineffective
force. Apart from the fact that life in Tabriz was dominated from 1909 till
1911 by fights between Constitutionalists and Royalists, which prevented
normal functioning of the city administration, there was another reason.
The municipal force was like its forenmners, only loyal to its chief. When
a slander campaign was started against the chief of police Ajlälu'1-Mulk
by his opponents, the whole police force did away with their arms and
uniforms and demonstrated in his favour in the bazaars and streets'".
Kaseavi, however, was favourably impressed by the effectivity of the
shahrbäni, for Ajlälu'1-Mulk supported by Cossacks and Shahseven tribes¬
men did a good job in a difficult period. His opinion no doubt was biased
by his nationalist sympathies and pride in the constitutional achieve¬
ments as shown by his elated feelings when he saw the shahrbäni with
their brassband marching in the bazaar'".
In the other cities in Persia graduaUy modern police forces were
organized too, throughout the second decade of this century. In 1910 in
Kermän the chief of police of the recently reorganized police force had
100 police officers and gendarmes under his orders. The latter were used
for duties outside the city such as securing the safety of the roads"*. In 1910 the existence of a municipal police force in Büshihr is mentioned'".
A decree of 11 February 1911"* charged the pohce with:
1) the supervision of alcoholic beverages; and states:
2) that the drinking of alcoholic beverages in public will be punished severely
3) that those apprehended in the act of drinking alcohol in the
house of a Jew"* will be punished 4) that gamblers will be arrested.
In the same area, the Persian Guff littoral, there was a pohce force in
Jashk, Shamilät, Bandar 'Abbäs, and Bandar Linga"*.
Whereas in all the large cities in Persia a uniformed pohce force was
gradually created in many smaller cities the gazma stiU seem to have
existed. In 1915 the kadkhudäs, the police officers, are held responsible for
Ibid., vol. 2, p. 367.
'" Ibid., p. 339, see however, his description of the situation in Tabriz on p. 390, and vol. 3, p. 289.
'" RMM 10 (1910), p. 583.
"» Ibid., p. 585.
"* Ibid. 14 (1911), p. 158.
"' As the producing, selling, and drinking of wine was forbidden to
Muslims, the activities were pursued by the minorities in Persia, foremost
among thers being the Armenians and Jews.
RMM 10 (1910), p. 586.
21»
310 W. M. Floor
the city of Tabriz, according to a governmental decree"'. Only in 1917 is
it reported that the police will be reorganized in Isfahan"'.^
Concluding this article we wiU once more look at various police insti¬
tutions in Qäjär Persia. We have seen that with regarded to Tehrän we
can distinguish three periods, gazma, qarävul, and nazmiyya, and that
apart from some cities most Persian cities acquired their own uniformed
police without going through stage 2. Now we will view back and appraise
the significance of the police for each of the three stages. But before we
do so I'd hke to point out that one has to take into account that Persia
was a pre-industrial society. This means that values and objects of the
police were different from those of the police in modern industrial states.
Whereas in the latter the object is mainly to uphold the law and enforce
its maintainance irrespective of the status of offenders, in the former
things were different. There were of course similarities like keeping law
and order but in this case it is the differences which matter. While in
industrial democratic states the police are supposed to be a public spirited
body and have to act in accordance with the law, in Qäjär Persia the
police were the law rather than its upholders. This is most clearly demon¬
strated by the fact the police were the personal retainers of a civic magi¬
strate (who at the same time often was one of the contenders for local
power), rather than servants of the public or municipality. The police,
having political rather than civic objects, protected and promoted the
interests of their patron-employer, which were not necessarily those of
the citizens.
The oppressive nature of the Persian police was reflected in the com¬
position of its personel which was a collection of corrupt and untrust¬
worthy inviduals, which were loyal only to their chief, be it the kaläntar,
kadkhudä, or därügha. "Rogues often become policemen or servants of a
khan, in order to be unmolested in their rascality, as a noble men deems it
his prerogative to protect his retainers""'. Thus the civic magistrate not only had the disposal of a loyal establishment but also of good coimections
with criminal part (awbäsh) of the city which came him in good stead. For
those on the seamy side of life could be used for fights, for spontaneous
demonstrations to assert his powers vis ä vis competitors and they could
provide information both of the things they had stolen and of the acti¬
vities of suspected or political unreliable persons. Moreover this cooper¬
ation was financially speaking advantageous to both sides. The donkey
"' Ibid. 30 (1915), p. 88.
"8 Ibid. 34 (1717), p. 250.
"° Wilson, p. 67; on the relationship between master and his servants {bachchahä) see Polak, vol. 2, pp. 238—247.
racket organized by tbe police and the underworld in Tehrän is a clear
indication of this. Migeod calculated that these worthies collected this
way 1200 tomans per year, of which the largest share was for the kalän-
tar^^o.
However, their activities were not restricted to organizing thefts only.
Apart from receiving protection money from wineshop o^vners, prostitutes
and the like, they were not above framing s.o. when in need of money.
The victim would only be too glad to be let off for a reasonable sum out
of fear for worse. In Khoi e.g. aroimd 1854 "the head ofi&cer of police,
being in want of money, sent some of his myrmidons, who seized an
unfortunate Hajee in the street, accused him of drunkenness, and stuffed
some bottles of wine into his trowsers, which they produced before their
master in evidence of the crime. The poor pilgrim was obliged to pay
a round sum in ducats to produce his release"'*'.
Nevertheless most European sources were favomably impressed by
the eflfectivity of the police {gazma). This appreciation was founded on
the success of their "intelligence and investigation department". "The
police of Sheeraz is admirably regulated; and I hardly think it possible
for the middling classes of people to harbour any design against the
government which should not come to the immediate notice of the
Governor"'**, observed Wabinq already in 1802. Their spying task was
made easier because the gazma wore no uniform. Moreover they lived
among the people they were supposed to inform about and were
thoroughly intimate with their habits and movements. The accuracy
of their information went so far that they knew who visited whom, how
many would be present, how frequent people came together, etc. By
mingling among the crowds of the day they did not attract notice'^^.
This enabled the government to implement a strong censorship. A
liberal donation to the right people, however, would alleviate such mea¬
sures. According to Lambton the lack of success of the revolutionary
reform movement during the reign of Nä§iru'd-Din Shäh must be ascribed
to the efficiency of the spy system of the police'**. "Therefore, owing to
the little political freedom, people did not meet open for political dis¬
cussions, but rather constituted themselves in secret or semi-secret
societies"'**.
'2" H. G. Migeod : Die Dütis. Ein Ferment des staatlichen Lebens in Persien.
In: JESHO 2 (1959), p. 88,'note 2.
'" Stuabt, p. 138.
E. Scott Waeing : A tour to Sheeraz by the route of Kazroon and Feero-
zabad etc. London 1807, p. 67.
'23 De Gobineau, vol. 2, pp. 16,17.
'2< See AvEBY, p. 111.
'2* Article „mashrüHyya" El'.
312 W. M. Floob
Polak was impressed by the fact that the police would solve most
burglaries. This is rather ironical, as he himself ascribes their success to
their connections with the underworld'^". More over "it is not always
their wish to discover the thief, because important thefts are organized
by the Police themselves and it is therefore not to their advantage to
find the culprits"'".
The motto of the Persian police seems to have been "it takes a thief to
catch one". A far more important incentive for doing their job well could
have been the following custom : When ever something was stolen the
pohce had to restitute the stolen property or to give its equivalent in
money, but this seems to have only been applied in cases of thefts from
Europeans and important Persians.
This custom was abolished around 1857 when a French diplomat had
pointed out to the Persian government that such a custom was absurd.
The result was an enormous increase in money thefts from Europeans ;
the thieves were never found'*'.
Though these observations concerned the gazma, they equally hold
for the performance of the qarävuls. We will therefore now turn to the
rmzmiyya.
The formation of a uniformed police in 1879 did not change the situa¬
tion as described above. In effect, one could say that, because of the
growing polarization between reformers and conservatives, the defects
of the nazmiyya were shown blatantly. Di Monteforte, under whose
guidance the nazmiyya should have brought impartiality on the part of
the police and some measure of improvement of security in Tehrän
failed completely in doing so. Ofthe various new regulations which under
his direction had been introduced in Tehrän, only one lasted after his
departure, for the obligation to write an address on letters was graduaUy
adopted'*'. In other respects di Monteforte had failed completely to
implement reforms in the pohce force. In stead of bringing change di
Monteforte had adjusted himself to his Persian surroundings remarkebly
weU. The nazmiyya, according to Dawlatäbädi, had, become a mess a
coUection of despicable people already in 1883"'. Mulkäbä a brother of
Nä$iru'd-Din Shäh, speaks in the same vein, writing that Nä'ibu's-Sal-
tana, under whose orders the nazmiyya acted, employed only a bunch of
thieves'".
J. E. Polak: Über die Communicationsmittel, die Sicherheit des Eigen¬
thums und der Reisenden, etc. In: Mitteilungen der Kais.-Kgl. Gaographisohen Gesollschaft 1861, p. 59.
'" Ibid. '28 p. 60. '2» Dawlatäbädi, vol. 1, p. 49.
"» Ibid., p. 101.
'" Mulkäbä, p. 60.
From the government point of view, however, the pohce was a rather
effective weapon in the fight against the spread of reformist ideas and
publications. Indeed, the nazmiyya became the government's main
weapon in its fight against the growing opposition. To stem their increas¬
ing influence against government policy, the governor of Tehrän, Nä'-
ibu's-Saltana, created a special task force, viz. the security police.
Apparantly the services of the gazma were not satisfactory anymore.
This new branch of the police force had a seperate budget and was char¬
ged with finding out dissidents and enemies of the regime and with
stopping the circulation of forbidden publications. This security police
had 'ulamä's, prostitutes, and even Babis, alleged opponents of the Qäjär
regime, on its pay list. Moreover its regular officers often operated in
the convenient disguise of the all covering chädur (women's outdoor
clothes)"*. The population of Tehrän was very afraid of the police, so
that when a police officer said to an artisan on his way home at the end
of the day: "You are a Bäbi" or "You have highly spoken ofthe
Shaikh (Jamälu'd-Din Afghani)" the poor man would be scared out of
his wits and give the policeman his daily earnings only to get rid of
him"'.
These activities can hardly be qualified as confidence inspiring and
consequently the population of Tehrän, did not put their trust into the
nazmiyya. Not without cause I'timädu's Saltana states in 1884 that
during the four years that the police exists unfortunately 400.000
tomans have been spent while the situation in Tehrän has not changed
favourably"*. For the city of Tehrän was and remained a corrupt city,
which was unsafe and unruly. Almost every day a mmder was committed
and robberies were common too"'.
The measures taken by the Majhs in 1907 did not bring about any chan¬
ge in the state of affairs. This was not surprising for the constitutiona¬
lists had troubles enough of their own. Formost among them was preserv¬
ing the Constitution against the actions of Muhammad 'Ali Shäh. It is
indicative for the lack of progress made in this field that in 1910 some
"2 Dawlatäbädi, vol. 1, p. 125,6. In 1907, the prostitutes of Tehrän
were paid by the chief of police to go with unveiled faces into the bazaar
during Muharram, saying: "this is what freedom means, women must go
unveiled". The constitutionalists, however, got wind of this plan and
engineered the dismissal ofthe chief of police (ibid. p. 160.
"3 Dawlatäbädi, vol. 1, p. 126.
"* I'timädu's-Saltana: Rüznäma, p. 656.
Ibid., pp. 426,503; Wills: In the Land, p. 371; DawlatäbädI is milder
in his opinion about di Monteforte, for he allows him a certain degree of
success in keeping the turmoil of Tehrän within bounds, Dawlatäbädi,
vol. 1, p. 45.
314 W. M. Floor
Persian newspapers commented that "the reorganisation, or rather the
organisation of the pohce force is one of the first reforms to effect in a
country where many parts are still desolated by banditism""*. The
activities of the Swedish mission constituted, in effect, the first real
structural reform in Persia with regard to the police. The picture from that
moment is clear, slowly the old institutions fade away and are replaced
by a uniformed police. In 1922, modernity had already left its imprint
on the police in Tehrän, for they threatened to strike if they were not
paid their wages"'. This subsequent strike heralds the end of the special
ties existing previously between chief of police and his retainers, and it
marks the beginning of new, may be not ideal, relations. When, in 1925,
Ridä Khän crowned himself as Ridä Shäh and a new era in Persian history
began, there was a police force "in aU the larger cities, the police of Tehrän comparing favorably with police organisations in other Countries""'.
To some extent corporate groups such as guild, family, viUage commu¬
nity served as a buffer between the rapacity of the elite and the popula¬
tion, but it did not protect the invidual from oppression. Once one had
faUen into the hands of the pohce only a powerful friend was able to
interfere in one's favour"'. A group of persons which often protected the
people's interests and rights, and who fought against the injustice of the
authorities were the lütigars. These formed groups in various quarters
of the city and would care for the oppressed, take care of the good name
of their district and fight against intruders and the servants of the kad¬
khudäs and farräsh bäshi of the governor'*'.
Strong ties also existed between the people and religious leaders, who
riding the waves of popular dissatisfaction could often play an important
role in local and national pohtics. They not infrequently were the virtual
rulers of a city. In 1895 there was no police to lodge a complaint with in
Mashad, according to the Dutch vice-consul. "The priests of Imam Reza
are the only ones who have authority. Whatever the government wishes
to do fails"'".
The above may sound gloomy, and it might be true that my obser¬
vations are sometimes sweeping in their condemnations, but there is no
denying that the police such as they presented themselves to the ob-
"« RMM 10 (1910), p. 583.
MiLLSPAUGH, pp. 48,72.
Ibid., p. 148.
'"K Wilson, p. 67.
'*" See my: The Lüßs-A Social Phenomenon in Qäjär Persia. In: WI 13
(1971), pp. 103—120.
'*' Algemeen Rijks Archief, (the Hague) Legatie Perzie, bundel 8, letter
April 20, 1895; see also bundel 10, letter August 22, 1896.
servers, both Persian and European, were in general oppressive. As well
as being agent provocateurs, they were dabbling in criminal practices.
The police were feared for their strong-arm methods and did not have the
confidence ofthe people. The very existence oflütigar associations and the
need of sanctuaries are clear proof of this. On the other hand this indicates
that there were traditional limits beyond which the police could not go
without giving cause to popular resistance. This limit, according to
Gordon "was the ability to pay; as measured by the patience of the suf¬
ferers"'**. In short, the police in Qäjär Persia were not guides and guards
for the pubhc, but for the small oppressive elite only.
"2 T. E. Gordon: Persia Revisited. London 1986, p. 38.
■Vr\ ^
Statistische Methoden in der Indologie'
Von Johann Tischleb, Gießen
Im Jahre 1880 veröffenthchte W. W. Whitney einen kurzen Aufsatz*,
in dem er die Ergebnisse seiner Berechnungen der relativen Häufigkeit
der verschiedenen Laute des Sanskrit bekanntgab, zu dem er durch
ähnliche Vorarbeiten Föestemänns', die aber statistisch nicht genügend
zuverlässig waren, angeregt worden war*.
Er untersuchte Texte unterschiedlichen Alters, vom Rg-veda über
die Bhagavad-gitä zur Väsavadattä, verwendete die sich dabei ergebenden
Unterschiede aber nur am Rande. Als besonders bedeutungsvoU empfand
er vielmehr die Tatsache, daß im Sanskrit das Verhältnis von Vokalen
(43,52%) zu Konsonanten (56,58%) 1:1,3 ist, während dieser Faktor
für das englische Lautsystem 1,7 beträgt. (Da jedoch nur 10 der insgesamt
41 Phoneme des Sanskrit Vokale sind, ergibt sich ein derartiges Mi߬
verhältnis in der Effizienz der einzelnen Phoneme, daß diese Verhältnis¬
zahl nicht sonderlich geeignet erscheint, sie als ein Kriterium zm Sprach¬
klassifikation zu verwenden, wie dies A. Isaöenko in seinem bekannten
Aufsatz* tat, in dem er die slavischen Sprachen auf Grund des Verhält¬
nisses von Vokal- und Konsonantenphonemen innerhalb ihrer phonolo¬
gischen Systeme einer vokalischen und einer konsonantischen Klasse
1^ . ' Der vorliegende Aufsatz, der mehr eine Auswahl denn einen vollständigen
^l, Überblick darstellen soll, wurde durch das Erscheinen dos Buches Kautilya
and the Arthasästra. A statistical investigation of the autorship and evolution of the text. Leiden : BriU 1971. XVII und 225 S., 8° von Thomas R. Tbautmann,
dessen wesentlicher Inhalt weiter unten kurz besprochen werden soll, an¬
geregt.
2 On the Comperative Frequency of Occurrence of the Alphabetic Elements in
Sanskrit. In: JAOS 10 (1880), S. 150—152.
3 E. FÖBSTBMANN : Numcrischc lautverhaltnisse im Oriechischen, Lateinischen
und Deutschen. In: KZ 1 (1852), S. 163—179; Numerische lautbeziehungen des
griech., latein. und deutschen zum sanskrit. In: KZ 2 (1853), S. 35—44;
Numerische lautverhaltnisse in griechischen dialekten. In: KZ 2 (1853, S. 401—
414.
* Einige Jahre vorher hatte Whitney sohon eine ähnliche Untersuchung
des Englischen veröffentlicht, vgl. seine Bemerkung a. Anm. 2 a.O. S. 150.
* A. V. IsAÖBNKO : Versuch einer Typologie der slavischen Sprachen. In :
Linguistica Slovaoa 1/2 (1939/40), S.64 —76. Russische Übersetzung in:
Novoe V lingvistike 3 (Moskau 1963), S. 106—121.
