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Working Paper

ON THE FORMAL EQUIVALENCEOF SOME SIMPLE FACILITY LOCATION MODELS

G i o r g i o L e o n a r d i

F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 0 WP-80-2 1

T o be p r e s e n t e d a t t h e W o r k s h o p o n ' L o c a t i o n a n d D i s t r i b u t i o n M a n a g ~ m e n t ' a t t h e E u r o p e a n I n s t i t u t e f o r A d v a n c e d S t u d i e s i n M a n a g e m e n t , B r u s s e l s ,

M a r c h 2 0 - 2 1 , 1 9 8 0 .

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria

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NOT FOR QUOTATION WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

ON THE FORMAL EQUIVALENCE OF SOME SIMPLE FACILITY LOCATION MODELS

Giorgio Leonardi

February 1980 WP-80-2 1

To be presented at the Workshop on 'Location and Distribution Management' at the European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management, Brussels,

March 20-21, 1980.

Working Papers are interim reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily repre- sent those of the Institute or of its National Member Organizations.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria

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FOREWORD

The public provision of urban facilities and services often takes the form of a few central supply points serving a large number of spatially dispersed demand points: for example, hospitals, schools, libraries, and emergency services such as fire and police. A fundamental characteristic of such systems is the spatial separation between suppliers and consumers. No market signals exist to identify efficient and inefficient geo- graphical arrangements, thus the location problem is one that arises in both East and West, in planned and in market economies.

This problem is being studied at IIASA by the Normative Location Modeling Task, which started in 1979. The expected results of this Task are comprehensive state-of-the-art survey on current theories and applications, an established network of international contacts among scholars and institutions in

different countries, a framework for comparison, unification, and generalization of existing approaches, as well as the formulation of new problems and approaches in the field of optimal location.

This paper reports on some of the first exploratory findings in the direction of a unified framework. It presents a way of generalizing both the usual allocation rules and objective func- tions in standard location models, and proposes a set of alterna- tive mathematical programming formulations.

Andrei Rogers Chairman

Human Settlements and Services Area

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