THE KNIFE’S EDGE OF SYSTEM STABILITY IN A REALIST’S WORLD:AN ANALYSIS OF TWOSIMULATED MULTISTATE SYSTEMS

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FIB Papers

W issenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung

Veröffentlichungsreihe der Forschungsgruppe Internationale Beziehungen

P-90-305

THE KNIFE’S EDGE OF SYSTEM STABILITY IN A REALIST’S WORLD:

AN ANALYSIS OF TWO

SIMULATED MULTISTATE SYSTEMS

Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stoll

Publication Series o f the International Relations Research Group

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Die in dieser Arbeit vertretenen Auffassungen sind die des Verfassers und nicht notwendigerweise die der Forschungsgruppe Internationale Beziehungen.

The views expressed in this paper are those o f the author and not necessarily those o f the International Relations Research Group.

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ABSTRACT

This paper provides a detailed description and analysis o f the evolutionary paths o f two simulated multistate systems grounded in the logics o f "relaxed realism." The simulation experiments were conducted with the EARTH (Exploring Alternative Realpolitik Theses) Model developed at the Science Center Berlin.

Addressed here are two basic questions at the center o f realist thought:

(1) W hat characteristics and strategies ensure the survival and success o f the state in an anarchic environment?

(2) W hat conditions enhance the likelihood that a system o f many states will retain its pluralistic character?

The results o f the analysis demonstrate that the sanguine answers proffered by this school o f realism seem unwarranted. The stability o f such a system seems balanced on a knife’s edge and the survival chances of states in such an environment appear to be remarkably slim.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

In dem vorliegender Aufsatz werden eine ausführliche Beschreibung und Analyse der Entwicklungspfade von zwei simulierten Multi-Staatensysteme gegeben, die gemäß der Logik eines weniger rigiden Realismus Ansatzes konzipiert worden sind.

Diese Experimente wurden mit dem EARTH (Exploring Alternative Realpolitik Theses) Modell durchgeführt, das am W issenschaftszentrum Berlin entwickelt wurde. Im Mittelpunkt stehen zwei grundsätzliche Probleme des Realism-Ansatzes:

1. W elche Eigenschaften und Strategien ermöglichen das Überleben und die erfolgreiche Selbstbehauptung von Staaten in einer anarchischen Umwelt?

2. A uf Grund welcher Bedingungen erhöht sich die W ahrscheinlichkeit, daß das internationale System pluralistisch bleibt?

Die Ergebnisse der Analyse zeigen, daß die optimistischen Erklärungen, die diese Spielart des Realismus anbietet, kaum

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One o f the most prominent schools o f thought within realism, a school whose members have been described as "relaxed realists" (Claude, 1989), suggests that neither the state nor system level question is problematic. This school contends that if the inhabitants o f a multistate system adhere to a laissez-faire and selfish approach in their conduct of foreign affairs, then both the security and success o f individual states is guarantied and the preservation o f system pluralism (or system stability, as it is often referred to in realist-based game theoretic analyses, cf., Niou, Ordershook and Rose, 1989) is assured.

In our analysis o f the logical implications o f realist thought, an extensive study, conducted with a large scale computer simulation model incorporating basic realist principles within a geographically defined multistate system, has demonstrated that the relaxed realists’

promises with respect to the state and system level questions enumerated above are based, at best, on implausible assumptions or, at worst, faulty reasoning (Cusack and Stoll, 1990, Chapter 4). Guided by an encompassing experimental design, thousands o f simulation runs were conducted with the model in an effort to identify the conditions that enhance state survival and system endurance. While possible in the report to evaluate a large number o f contending and often contradictory theses about stability and survival conditions, space limitations did not make it feasible for us to offer any sort o f detailed description of the operating characteristics o f such a system.

In this paper information on two o f those experiments is presented. The purpose is to provide the reader with both a feel for both how the simulation model works and a sense o f the kinds o f dynamics that m ark the relaxed realist’s vision o f a multistate system. In the

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next two sections, detailed descriptions o f the evolution o f two systems are presented.

Although the two example runs do not differ dramatically in terms o f experimental conditions, their outcomes are dramatically different. One o f the systems degenerated into a universal empire while the other achieved a permanent equilibrium wherein a fair number of states were able to maintain their independence. The section following the two descriptions looks at some o f the factors and processes that were at work in producing these different outcomes.

COLLAPSE TO UNIVERSAL EMPIRE:

RUN 20015

In this and the following section two simulation runs o f the model are described.

D etailed characteristics o f these runs, drawn from the output files generated by the model, are contained in the appendices to this paper and the reader may wish to refer to these appendices in order to obtain a more complete picture o f how these model experiments evolved. This section describes the evolution o f experimental system 20015.

During the first 20 iterations slightly more than half the time one or another state initiated a war. The outcome o f ten o f these 11 wars was the destruction o f a state; as a consequence the system shrank in size to 88 members. In more than half o f the wars, the initiator was defeated and, indeed, amongst the surviving states, the most successful war participant (in terms o f victories) was state #62, which three times joined a target’s coalition and as a result increased its territorial holdings to two units and more than doubled its power.

By iteration 40 the death rate o f states had increased and the system was further reduced to 74 states, a further decline o f 14. During this period, 15 wars occurred and again nearly every war bought on the demise o f the one o f the system ’s members. At the same time, the rewards to aggression became more favorable, with the majority o f the wars (nine of 15) resulting in victory for the initiator. Between iteration 41 and iteration 60 the tempo of warfare slowed down, with only 12 o f the 20 iterations experiencing war. The speed at which system members were being destroyed also lessened with only seven states disappearing. The balance o f war outcomes also shifted once again to favor the defense with seven o f the 12 wars won by the target o f aggression. Even fewer wars occurred between iteration 61 and 80. O f the nine wars that did occur, six resulted in the complete elimination o f states from the system. The rewards to aggression were once again favorable with the initiating side winning two-thirds o f the time.

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The tempo o f warfare increased slightly during the next 20 iterations and the rew ard to aggression shifted markedly with the initiator winning in ten o f the 11 wars. The wars themselves also proved more destructive with ten more states being destroyed during this period. To the 100th iteration, then, nearly half o f the system members had been eliminated with only 50 o f the original 98 still in existence. As a result power had become more concentrated and the distribution o f territorial holdings quite uneven (see Table 1).

Table 1

Distribution of State Territorial Holdings Run 20015

Iteration 100 Number o f Territorial Units

H eld by State

Frequency

1 30

2 7

3 3

4 5

5 5

Twelve wars accompanied by the disappearance o f eight more states transpired in the succeeding period o f 20 iterations (101-120). Seven major powers had emerged by the end o f this period, with states #45, #64, and #68 leading the power hierarchy both in terms of power and territorial holdings. None of these three states bordered on each other, and so, in the short term, none would pose a direct threat to the others.

During the next 20 iterations war occurred 50 percent of the time and in five o f those wars the defeated states suffered the lose o f their independent status. The most significant episode during this period occurred over iterations 132 and 133. Benefiting conspicuously was the already dominant power in the system, state #45. In iteration 132 it initiated a dispute with state #43 which was unable to attract any coalition support. Easily defeating its opponent, state #45 absorbed all o f the territories o f the vanquished state. In the succeeding iteration state #45 then aligned itself with two other states in support o f state #63, which was being threatened by state #47. The outcome o f this dispute was a war where #47 was badly defeated, losing three o f its four territorial units, two o f which were acquired by state #45.

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The next 20 iterations (141-160) were similar to the previous period with wars occurring in half of the iterations and the initiators generally being successful (winning eight o f the ten wars). The geopolitical situation was marked by the major defeat o f one o f the largest powers, #68, which had launched an unsuccessful war against a less powerful coalition. Losing five o f its eight territorial units and more than half o f its power holdings,

#68 also lost dominance within its local region. Meanwhile, state #45 continued its successful ways, acquiring three more territorial units. At the same time, its local situation deteriorated as state #64 slowly but steadily overcame weaker neighbors and came to border state #45 by iteration 153. By this point, then, the two clearly dominant powers in the system were poised in the position o f being able to directly threaten each other.

The succeeding period o f 20 iterations (161-180) proved remarkably peaceful with only four wars occurring. Additionally, the pace o f state destruction markedly slowed with only two states losing their existence. For state #45, the leading power in the system, the period was not uneventful. It launched two wars in rapid succession (iterations 163 and 164) against a relatively small neighboring state, #21. State #21 succeeded both times in putting together a very large coalition o f supporters. State #45 still managed to achieve a dominant power position in both wars, and, as a consequence, was able to win and by so doing eventually eliminate #21, while simultaneously gaining significant reparations from the other members o f the defeated coalitions. The only other significant geopolitical change also occurred within the region occupied by #45, although it played no direct role. State #87 launched an unsuccessful war against a coalition o f states, #72 and #60. As a consequence o f its defeat,

#87 lost three o f its five territorial units and, more importantly, set the stage for some rather dramatic events.

The system’s relative peacefulness was shattered in the next period (iterations 181 through 200) with wars occurring in 12 of the 20 iterations. Not only was this period more war-prone than the preceding, but the scope o f geopolitical changes were exceedingly more profound. More than 40 territorial units changed hands as a result o f the wars that occurred.

M ost o f the important changes occurred in rapid succession toward the end o f the period.

Events in iteration 195 set these in motion. Here the dominant power in the system, state

#45, began a dispute with state #7, a small weak neighbor. State #7 was able to build a relatively large coalition (four states altogether), though one appreciably weaker in power than #45. Nonetheless, #45 lost the war against the coalition and as a consequence lost 13 of its 20 territorial units. In the next iteration, its bad fortune was reversed as it joined in an offensive coalition with state #72 and managed to get the lion’s share (three o f four) o f the territorial losses sustained by the defeated state, #60, one o f its successful opponents in the

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previous war. Two iterations later, #45 launched another war against the much weakened

#60. Defeating #60, #45 gained one more territorial unit. Finally, another two iterations later, it reversed its orientation toward #60, which was under attack from #64, the then dominant power in the system. Joining a large coalition that successfully waged war against

#64, #45 gained eight territorial units from the defeated initiator and wound up at the end of this period with somewhat diminished power holdings but the same large number of territorial units, 20, and reappearance at the top o f the system’s power hierarchy.

By the end of iteration 200 only 22 states continued in existence. Thus the size o f the system had been reduced again by about half over a period o f 100 iterations. The distribution o f pow er and territorial holdings had also become more concentrated relative to 100 iterations previous (see Table 2).

The next period of 20 iterations (201-220) saw a significant decrease in the num ber o f wars, but was accompanied by the disappearance o f four more states, four o f the weakest in the system (#7, #11, #12, and #60). The m ajor beneficiary o f these limited changes was the already dominant state in the system, #45, which was able to quickly eliminate the two small neighbors, #7 and #60, that had played such significant roles in its roller coaster ride during the previous period. By the end o f this period, #45 possessed nearly one-fourth o f the system ’s territorial units and held nearly twice as much power as its nearest rival-testim ony to its having participated in more than 25 wars and achieving victory in 21 o f these (its role was mainly that o f an initiator or ally o f an initiator).

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Table 2

H eld by State

Frequency

1 5

2 6

3 2

4 1

5 0

6 3

7 2

8 1

; :

11 1

;

20 1

In the next period (iterations 221 through 240) there were slightly more wars, 11, but a only a rather limited number o f eliminations o f states from the system, viz., two. However, one o f these state disappearances entailed a significant redefinition o f the geopolitical situation within the system. In iteration 221 a m ajor gain accrued to state #27, which, in joining a defensive coalition against state #10, achieved victory and acquired five o f #10’s seven territorial units. Two iterations later, #27 followed this up by attacking #10 and completely eliminating it, recendy the third most powerful state in the system. In so doing,

#27 achieved dominance within its quadrant o f the system and, in combination with the consequences o f a series o f wars that shortly followed, wound up at the end o f the period in the position being a significant contender with #45 for dominance in the entire system. State

#45 again experienced a roller coaster ride. It first achieved notable gains as a participant in a

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defensive coalition during a war in iteration 225. From that war it acquired four more territorial units o f the defeated state, #39. Attempting to build upon this success, two iterations later it launched a war against state #31. This target o f aggression was able to build a large coalition and managed to defeat #45. For #45, the outcome was disastrous. It suffered dramatic losses in power and territory — having to surrender 15 o f its 28 territorial unit holdings. But #45 was once again able to climb to the pinnacle shortly thereafter, by twice joining in defensive coalitions with #71 (during iterations 228 and 231), first in defeating #72 and acquiring six o f its territorial units and then defeating #2 and thereby gaining 12 o f its units.

The next period (iterations 241 through 260) saw fewer wars but further state destruction (entailing a diminution in system size from 16 to 12). Two major wars occurred in this period and the further expansion o f one o f the system ’s larger states, #51, took place.

These large wars occurred in very quick succession (iterations 252 and 254) and saw major breaks in the development of the two most powerful empires, states #45 and #27. State #45 first attacked a much weaker neighbor, #39, which, while able to construct a fairly large defensive coalition, still lost the war and had to surrender one o f its two territories to the victor, #45. Immediately following, in iteration 252, #45 once again launched a war against the rump o f #39 but was confronted by a slightly more powerful defensive coalition than that which #39 had constructed previously. As a result, #45 was badly defeated and suffered the loss o f 18 o f its territorial units and a correspondingly large amount o f power. Three o f the four states in the defensive coalition acquired these territories with #27 and #51 gaining the lion’s share. Two iterations later, #39 once again become the target o f aggression, this time by its erstwhile ally and the now dominant power, #27. State #39 managed to build an even larger supportive coalition (with five other states joining it in an alliance) and soundly defeated #27. Once again, #45 enjoyed a return to good fortune, and, as one o f the members o f the defensive coalition, was able to make significant territorial gains. State #51 also made significant gains from its participation in this war on the side o f the target. By the end o f this period, then, a new geopolitical situation had been created. The two dominant powers had both experienced heady victory and crushing defeat and the net outcome was to marginally reduce their dominance and at the same time to allow the emergence of a third contender,

#51.

By the beginning o f the next period (iterations 261 through 280), the stage was set for some dramatic events with three large powers controlling more than half o f the system ’s territorial units and simultaneously poised on each others’ borders. The initial iterations of this period were taken up with marginal acquisitions by two o f the three dominant states. In

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iteration 263, state #51 easily swallowed up #68, which sat on the periphery o f the system and served as a partial buffer between it and #27. Immediately following this, state #45 defeated #31 and gained part o f its territorial holdings. A few iterations later, #45 once again attempted to eliminate its small and reduced neighbor, #31. This time, however, its victim was able to construct a powerful supporting coalition and thereby inflict a disastrous defeat on this once dominant power. O f the 19 territories (approximately 20 percent o f the system’s units) lost by #45 in this war, most were shared between the other two dominant powers in the system, states #27 and #51, both of which had joined the war in support o f #39. State #45 had sustained a major loss, including power in the territories it surrendered, reparations paid, and the direct costs o f fighting the war. All o f this came to approximately eighty percent of its total power holdings. Subsequent to this, state #27, the most powerful state, quickly reduced #31, which it had previously supported against #45. Then #27 turned its aggressive attentions toward the much weakened state #45. Through the assistance o f states #51 and #2,

#45 was able to defeat the very powerful #27. Although #27 sustained m ajor territorial losses, #45 came away empty-handed as its more powerful allies, #2 and particularly #51, monopolized the territorial gains from the war. The many wars in this period had the effect o f reducing the system from 12 to nine units and completely redefining the geopolitical situation. Two powers now dominated the system, #51 and #27, with the latter having first achieved primacy and then losing it. State #51 now straddled most o f the center o f the system and controlled nearly three times the number o f territorial units in the possession of

#27, but the former was actually slightly weaker in terms o f real pow er units since many of the territories in its possession had been ravaged through a long series o f wars.

The next five iterations (281 through 285) saw continuous wars, m ajor reshufflings o f the geopolitical landscape, and the elimination o f two more states. Additionally, the ultimate outcome o f these wars was to configure the geopolitical situation in a way that fundamentally destroyed the independence o f all but one o f the states in the system. The m ajor protagonist in this brief set o f dramatic events was state #51. It launched a war in iteration 281, where it sustained significant territorial losses (21 units altogether), particularly to states #2, #45, #53, and #64. The major victor in this war, state #2, then turned against its former ally, #64, and suffered a major defeat with the accompanying loss of 16 territorial units (the major territorial gains going to state #51). In iteration 283 state #80 easily destroyed #94, and, in the following iterations it then eliminated state #64. In iteration 285, state #2 attacked #45 and was dealt a major defeat with states #51 and #27 being the m ajor beneficiaries. State #51

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now spanned the entire center o f the system and #27 dominated the upper reaches o f the system. This configuration effectively split the system into two disconnected regions and placed extraordinary restriction on the room for manoeuvre available to the rem aining states.

The next ten iterations saw the two leading empires, #27, in terms o f disposable power, and #51, in terms o f territorial holdings, easily eliminating most o f the weaker states in the system. In a series o f wars over iterations 288 and 289, #27 destroyed state #2. Four iterations later, state #51 significantly reduced #53. One iteration later, #27 eliminated the residue o f #53 and then turned in the following iteration to eliminate state #39. By the end of iteration 295 only four states were left and the distribution o f power was very malapportioned. State #27 possessed nearly as much power as the other three states combined and at the same time the geographically immense #51 spanned the system. The latter’s configuration effectively hindered the possibility o f the rem aining two system members, #45 and #80, from aiding it in any war with #27. State #27 then systematically set about eliminating its competition. In two wars over the iterations 297 and 298, #27 overwhelmed #51. Three wars later, it had completely destroyed the rem aining two states and was in complete control o f the system.

PLURALISM PRESERVED:

RUN 20021

The first period o f 20 iterations in this run was marked by an extensive amount o f war.

In 18 o f the 20 iterations a war occurred and the consequence in each instance was deadly for one o f the participants as each war involved the destruction of a state. Thus, by the end o f the period only 80 states were still in existence. No major advantage marked the fortunes of either the offensive or defensive sides with ten o f the 18 wars being won by the initiator. The second period (21st to 40th iterations) saw a slight decline in the frequency o f wars (from 18 to 16) and a correspondingly smaller number o f states being destroyed (13 were absorbed by others during this period). Again, no marked advantage for offense or defense was apparent, as the initiator won about half, i.e., seven, o f the 16 wars. In the third period (iterations 41 through 60), every iteration but one experienced war. This extensive violence entailed more destruction with a further 14 states losing their independence. By the end o f this period, then, the system had been reduced to only 52 states. The corresponding figure in the run described above, 20015, was 67. In other words, this particular system in its early phases was far and away m ore destructive. Again, this period saw no great advantage accruing to either the offense or defense.

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The next period (iterations 61-80) saw a significant reduction in the amount o f warfare within the system. In only 12 o f the 20 iterations did a war a occur. This marked diminution in violence, however, did not bring a major reduction in the pace at which states were being destroyed. Through this period another 11 states disappeared and the system shrank further to just 41 members. A dramatic improvement in the rewards to aggression was also registered with the initiator winning in ten o f the 12 wars.

Table 3

Iteration 100 Num ber o f Territorial Units

H eld by State

Frequency

1 12

2 6

3 3

4 5

5 2

• •

7 1

; ;

12 1

: ;

16 1

W arfare increased dramatically in the succeeding period o f twenty iterations (81-100) with the balance in outcomes slightly favoring the offense (here the initiator won in ten o f the 17 wars). Ten more states also were destroyed; thus by the end o f the period only 31 states were still in existence. This compares quite unfavorably with the parallel phase in experimental system 20015 described above where 50 states managed to survive to the end o f the 100th iteration. Dissimilar as well was the distribution in pow er and territorial holdings

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with both being far more concentrated in this run as, for example, partially can be seen in Table 3. No state in system 20015 had amassed more than five territorial units by this point while in system 20021 two states had gone well beyond that with one holding 12 and the other 16.

The clear dominance o f these two large powers, states #77 and #46, did not continue undisturbed in the following period o f 20 iterations (101-120). W hile relatively peaceful by the standards o f the previous 100 iterations, with only 11 wars occurring, this period was notable for the m ajor changes that took place in the geopolitical situation. These changes occurred in relatively rapid order. In iteration 111, state #66 joined a large defensive coalition against state #9. The initiator, #9, was defeated and state #66 was able to acquire three o f the four territorial units that #9 had to surrender. Two iterations later, state #77, the second most powerful in the system, launched an attack against a small neighbor, #81.

Again, state #66 allied with the target, indeed it was the only state to do so, and again fortune was on its side. State #77 was defeated and #66 took over nine o f its territorial units.

Through this 20th iteration period, state #77 fought in three wars and was twice successful, but its one failure cost it dearly, implying, in conjunction with its other war experiences, a net loss o f seven territorial units and an overall reduction in its power holdings o f more than 66 percent. State #66 was quite active in the wars o f this period, fighting in six o f the 11 that occurred. While being on the losing side twice, it also racked up four victories, making a net gain o f 13 territorial units and expanding its power holding by a factor o f nearly five. The other leading state in the system, #46, was completely inactive during this period; it participated in no wars and, indeed, involved itself in no disputes. Suffering no losses then, it increased its power by 22 percent through internal growth. This, however, was insufficient to allow it to continue holding first rank in the power hierarchy because the tremendous gains achieved by the recently very war-like #66 were more than sufficient to relegate it to the second rank.

Only slightly more war-prone (with 12 wars occurring), the succeeding period (iterations 121 through 140) saw a significant advantage going to initiators o f war (they won 75 percent o f the time) and a tremendous amount o f flux in the distribution o f power and territorial holdings within the system. Five states lost their existence during this period but a new state, #99, entered the system as a result o f the territorial redistribution process at the end o f one o f the wars. This im plied a net reduction o f four bringing system size to 21 by the end o f the period. The two most powerful states in the system, #46 and #66, were both involved in wars. State #46 fought in three and lost one o f these; as a consequence it suffered a major deterioration in its position. Starting the period with 16 territorial units and 34.05 units of

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power, it ended the period with only six territorial units and 16.84 units o f power. The ever war-like #66 fought in eight o f the period’s 12 wars, and, while it was successful in five of these, its three losses produced a m ajor decline in its situation. It had to give up two-thirds of its 18 territorial units and had to suffer a reduction in its power holdings o f m ore than 50 percent. Displacing these leading states were three others, #54, #17, and #9, which increased their territorial holdings from seven to 19, seven to 14, and four to 11, respectively. Their pow er holdings increased at almost corresponding rates.

The next period o f 20 iterations (141-through 160) saw 13 wars occur with the balance o f success in war slightly favoring the defense (the target side won in seven o f these wars).

As a consequence the system shrank in size from 21 to 19. This net loss o f two states resulted from the fact that five states were actually destroyed and a number o f new states entered the system. W hat occurred was that through the tremendous, almost chaotic reshuffling o f geopolitical arrangements that transpired, three new states entered the system by way o f splits or divisions o f defeated empires. One o f these three survived, however, only for a short period o f time. Four o f the original 98 also lost their independence. The effects of the wars in this period were fairly dramatic with 73 territorial units, (i.e., nearly three-fourths o f the system ’s territory) changing hands after the defeat o f one or another state. The major protagonist in this period o f severe disorder was state #46 which had fought in eight o f the 13 wars and was victorious in all but one o f these war episodes. As a consequence o f these wars, by one point in the period, #46 actually controlled 35 territorial units, more than one-third o f the system. This did not last very long but nonetheless by the end o f the period

#46 was still in possession o f 27 units, a more than four-fold increase from the beginning of the period. Its power holding had grown proportionately. The road taken by #46 was very injurious to the three leading states in the system. One o f these three, state #9, the third most powerful in the system, was completely engulfed by #46, thereby losing its independence.

The two others, #17 and #54, both suffered severe set-backs with the former losing ten o f its 14 territorial units and nearly two-thirds o f its power holdings and the latter shrinking from 19 to 12 units.

The following period o f 20 iterations (161-180) was as violent and disruptive to the existing order as the previous. Thirteen wars occurred with the initiator being generally successful (winning on nine occasions). Five states were also destroyed. The domination of the system by one state, #46, was also overthrown by the end o f the period and a more egalitarian distribution o f power amongst the top ranked states came into effect. State #46 was quite active in this period, fighting in nine o f the wars. However, it lost three o f these and the net result of its warring experiences was a sharp decline in territorial and power

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holdings. This period also saw a rebirth in the good fortunes o f state #17, a power that had been humbled in the period preceding. Through successful war-fighting, it returned to its previous size o f 14 territorial units and was able to take a slight lead over its nearest rival in terms o f pow er holdings.

In the succeeding period (iterations 181 through 200) major struggles occurred in both halves o f the system with some dramatic reversals in the fortunes o f those involved. These struggles had the ultimate effect o f configuring the system in a way that would almost immediately lead to an equilibrium. On the right side o f the system a struggle erupted amongst #46, #54 and #66 for dominance in their sphere. Initially state #66 made m ajor advances at the cost o f #46 which had attempted to conquer #22 sitting in the center o f the system. Reaching a high water mark, #6 6 ’s fortunes were reversed and it suffered major losses in territory and power to both #46 and #54. By the end o f the period, #66, which had achieved massive proportions, was reduced to a single remaining territorial unit on the periphery o f the system. On the other side o f the system a parallel struggle was occurring between states #17 and #77. By the end o f the period, #77 had suffered a series o f crushing defeats and was completely absorbed by #17.

By the end o f iteration 200, then, 11 states populated the system. Three major powers dominated it (see Table 4). One, #17, led the pack and seemed poised to at least overwhelm the remaining small states in its half o f the system. The other two leading powers, #46 and

#54, shared hegemony on the right side o f the system, though the former had nearly twice the power o f the latter. In one iteration, #46 would take an action that would eliminate the residue o f its former rival, #66, and unwittingly bring the system into a situation where effectively all o f the remaining states were blocked from wreaking any further destruction.

After iteration 201, frequent efforts were made by various states to annex territories of their neighbors. However, the geopolitical configuration o f the system, the attributes o f the states in terms o f their power and their power estimation abilities, as well as the decision rules that guided the states, would combine to prevent any further aggression and destruction.

Disputes were often initiated and states succeeded as well as failed in building coalitions.

But the overall configuration o f the system preserved the equilibrium to the 1000th iteration, the maximum perm itted in an experimental run.

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Table 4

H eld by State

Frequency

1 3

2 0

3 2

4 1

5 0

6 1

• :

10 1

• ;

19 1

:

23 1

;

27 1

A COMPARISON OF THE TWO RUNS

The preceding two sections described experimental runs o f the model configured to represent the automatic stabilization version o f a realist multistate system. A systematic understanding o f the influence o f various factors within such a system obviously cannot be based upon two cases. That, indeed, is the aim o f another study (Cusack and Stoll, 1990)

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which examines thousands o f experimental runs, of which the two described above represent but a small sample. Still there is some value in taking a preliminary look at the results o f this model by focusing on these two cases.

Systemic Characteristics and Differential Outcomes

Using the automatic stabilization version o f the model, more than 8,000 experiments were conducted and the results from these experiments are described elsewhere (Cusack and Stoll, 1990, Chapter 4). Variation with respect to eight experimental elements are explored and a limited analysis o f the influence o f alliances is also reported. The two runs described in this paper are drawn from a group o f 729 experiments wherein five factors were varied (with three experimental values each) and the seed value for the random number generator also varied (again, with three alternatives).

Run 20015 comes from a group o f three experiments with the following characteristics.

The standard deviation in the distribution o f power was set at .3, which is the medium o f the three experimental alternatives. The parameter for error range in power estimation was set at 20, again the medium o f the alternatives. The war cost max parameter used was .05, the lowest o f the three variants. The parameter regulating reparations was also the low o f the three alternatives, taking a value o f .10. The parameter controlling the shape o f the likelihood o f victory curve was 1.0, again, the lowest of the alternatives used. The seed used for the random number generator was 2047. Run 20021 differed from 20015 only with respect to two o f the parameter values. These were the power distribution parameter where, in the case o f 20021, the high variant o f .6 was employed and the parameter controlling the error range in power estimation, where the low variant o f 10 was used. The same values for the other three parameters were employed and the seed value was also the same. Note that in both cases the possibility o f ties or indecisive war outcomes was excluded, as was also, the possibility o f disproportional war costs and variance in growth rates.

Since 20021 retained its pluralistic character and 20015 did not, one might be tempted to conclude that the differences that prevailed in the experimental conditions played an important role. That may or may not have been the case and evidence o f a more systematic character with respect to this question is provided in the aforementioned report. With only two runs and differences along two dimensions, no conclusive statement can be made here, and, indeed, it can be pointed out that the picture is really very mixed. The two other experimental runs analogous to 20021, differing only with respect to the seed used for the random number generator, were not uniform in terms o f their outcomes. One, 20020, also

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retained its pluralistic character, while the other, 20019, collapsed to a universal empire after only 180 iterations. The picture is varied as well with respect to the triad o f runs from which 20015 is drawn. There, one o f the other two, specifically 20013, collapsed, as did 20015, but at a far earlier point, viz., iteration 192, while the other experimental run, 20014, retained its pluralistic character and ran to the pre-designated limit o f 1000 iterations without producing a universal empire.

System Size and the Balancing Process

A central mechanism in the automatic stabilization model is a constellation o f processes that falls under the rubric of balancing. Included here are situations whereby states: (a) have sufficient power to deter other states from even threatening them, (b) receive aid from other states to counter threats that have been made against them so that a potential aggressor is deterred from going to war, and (c) are assured that should war nonetheless occur, other states will come to their aid in strength sufficient to enhance the possibility o f defeating the aggressor. Since the two experimental runs ended differently did this occur because they systematically differed in terms o f the balancing process?

Run 20015 ended in a universal empire while 20021 preserved its pluralistic character.

Yet, by observing the trajectories o f system size over the first 200 iterations, one might easily have expected the opposite outcome (see Figure 1). State destruction was occurring at a far faster pace within experiment 20021 than in 20015. Power was also far more concentrated after the initial period o f consolidation in the run 20021 than in 20015 (see Figures 2 and 3).

Clearly both these sets o f trends were being driven by the amount o f warfare in the two systems. Run 20015 was far and away more peaceful than 20021 (see Figures 4 and 5). Was this difference in relative peacefulness a function o f the balancing process and if so what elem ent o f the process was central?

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FIGURE 1

THE EVOLUTION OF SYSTEM SIZE EXPERIMENTAL RUNS 20015 AND 20021

FIGURE 2

THE EVOLUTION OF POWER CONCENTRATION IN THE SYSTEM

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FIGURE 3

THE EVOLUTION OF POWER CONCENTRATION IN THE SYSTEM

FIGURE 4

RELATIVE PEACEFULNESS OF SYSTEM OVER TIME RUN 20015

100 -i

90 -

80 -

70 - Percent of

Iterations 60 -

in which

No War 50 -

Occurred

21 41 61 81 101 121 141 161 181 201 221 241 261 281

Periods of 20 Iterations

♦ - Indudes 22 iterations

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FIGURE 5

RELATIVE PEACEFULNESS OF SYSTEM OVER TIME RUN 20021

Periods of 20 iterations

Some insight on this question can be gained by tracing the general paths of action within the iterations and the degree to which these tended to lead to either war or peace.

Figures 6 and 7 provide a synopsis for the first 200 iterations in each o f the runs. At the first level it is clear that it was much easier in run 20021 for a state to find a target for aggression amongst its neighbors. The ability to do so would lead to a dispute. In run 20021 this occurred more than 86 percent o f the time, while it occurred at a not insignificantly lower rate in run 20015 (less than 72 percent o f all iterations saw a dispute occurring).

Once a dispute occurred, the target theoretically has the ability to deter the aggressor from pressing forward; it can do this by forming a coalition o f sufficient pow er to shift the likelihood o f success for the initiator into an unfavorable region. This improves the chances o f preventing war, though it does not guarantee this because the initiator has the potential of building its own superior coalition. At any rate, the chances o f failing to build a superior coalition by the target were not insignificant in either run, although in run 20021 it seems that the target was better able to do so than was the case in 20015 (failure rate for target: 26 percent versus 34 percent, respectively). While less likely to deter through positive actions on its part, the target was more fortunate in 20015 than in 20021 through the failure o f an initiator to be able to generate a counter coalition of perceived greater strength. Here, in those cases where an initiator needed to build a counter coalition, it was less likely to be successful (success rate o f about 62 percent) than in run 20021 (success rate o f initiator in

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alliance formation: nearly 78 percent). Finally, once war occurred there is the question o f the degree to which balancing manifested itself in the likelihood that the target had o f defeating the aggressor. Here the target seemed to be at greater advantage in run 20021 than in 20015 where the success rates for the target were 40 percent and 34 percent, respectively.

The difference between the two runs on the balancing question comes through clearly though when one looks at what transpired in iterations 202 through 301 (see Figure 8 and 9).

The general propensities that marked the first 200 iterations in run 20015 continued over the next 100 iterations; nearly half o f all iterations culminated in war. On the other hand, the pattern in 20021 shifted markedly. W hile disputes continued to occur at a high rate (85 percent o f the iterations saw the onset o f a dispute), the target was always successful in building a counter-coalition. The target’s chances were assured by the failure o f an initiator either to find a potential counter-coalition or to succeed in actually building one where the potential existed. This prevented initiators from ever pressing forward to war.

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FIGURE 6 ₍₂₀₁₎

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FIGURE 7

22

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FIGURE 8

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FIGURE 9

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State Survival

The survival chances of states in both systems were obviously rather limited. Realists debate the extent to which the characteristics o f states and the attributes o f the system within which states are embedded influence the success and life chances of states. This is a theme that is addressed elsewhere (Cusack and Stoll, 1990). For the present our attention will focus on the more limited question o f the extent to which the characteristics o f these states were conducive to survival or destruction.

This question will be examined by first looking at the capacity o f states to endure from the beginning o f the system through iteration 151. This criterion suggests itself as reasonable, given that it is about the halfway point in the one system that collapsed to universal empire, and was also a point where a fair amount o f state destruction had occurred in both systems (within experiment 20015 there were 30 o f the original 98 states still in existence and within 20021, there were only 17). Four characteristics that distinguish among states at the outset are employed as predictor variables with the dependent being a dichotomous variable coded as 1, if the state was still in existence as o f iteration 151, and 0, if it had been destroyed before that point. The four characteristics are: (1) the power o f the state at the outset, (2) its tendency to over- or underestimate its own capabilities, (3) its tendency to over- or underestimate the capabilities o f other states, and (4) its geographical position. The first three variables are fairly straightforward and need no description. The fourth, geographical position, is a bit more complicated. It is operationalized to capture the degree to which the state was peripheral to the center o f the system. It takes on low values when the state sits at the core o f the system and increases to the degree that the state is distant from the core.

The effects o f the four variables on the survival chances o f states have been estimated using probit analysis. The results for both systems are reported in Tables 5 and 6. In neither case is the overall predictive capacity o f the model very convincing. Using an analogue to the R2 statistic, the best fit is in the case o f experiment 20015, and the value o f the statistic is less than 21 percent. It is less than 12 percent in the case o f the other experiment. A cross-tabulation o f both the actual and predicted values is also presented and one can see that the model has a difficult time capturing the configuration o f state cases that managed to survive. The only consistently significant factor amongst the four across the two experiments is the power variable. The estimated coefficient suggests the not unreasonable conclusion that the larger the power of the state, the greater its chances o f survival. Both o f the errors in power assessment variables have parameter estimates that take on plausible signs, i.e.,

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overestimation o f ones own power would lessen ones survival chances, and overestimation o f others’ power would increase on e’s survival chances. However, neither has consistently significant parameter estimates across the two experiments. As expected, the parameter estimates for the geographical position variable suggest that the more peripheral the state, the greater the chances o f its survival. However, both estimated parameters are relatively small in comparison with their standard errors and fail to attain any appreciable level o f statistical significance.

Table 5

State Survival Analysis Run 20015

Probit Analysis of Factors Affecting State Survival to Iteration 151

State Characteristic:

Parameter Estimate (t-statistic)

Relative Power 2.131

(3.69)

Error Rate in Own Power Estimation Ability -1.127

(-1.96)

Error Rate in Ability to Estimate Others' Power 1.418

(2.12)

Geographic Position .007

(.34)

Constant -2.971

(-2.53)

Observations 98

Log-likelihood -48.38

Restr. Log-Likelihood -61.16

X2 25.56

pseudoR1 .207

Actual:

Predicted:

DESTROYED BEFORE ITERATION 151

SURVIVED TO

ITERATION 151 Total

60 7 67

SURVIVED TO ITERATION 151

18 13 32

Total 68 30 98

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Table 6

State Survival Analysis Run 20021

Probit Analysis of Factors Affecting State Survival to Iteration 151

State Characteristic:

Parameter Estimate (t-statistic)

Relative Power 1.011

(2-94)

Error Rate in Own Power Estimation Ability -.759

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Error Rate in Ability to Estimate Others' Power 1.372

(1-04)

Geographic Position .036

(1.615)

Constant -3.119

(-1.55)

Observations 98

Log-likelihood -38.78

Restr. Log-Likelihood -45.21

X2 12.86

pseudoR2 .116

Actual:

Predicted:

SURVIVED TO

ITERATION 151 Total

DESTROYED BEFORE

ITERATION 151 80 14 94

SURVIVED TO ITERATION 151

1 3 4

Total 81 17 98

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CONCLUSION

Two examples o f experiments with a basic configuration o f our simulation model o f a multistate system based on realist logics have been described in some detail in this paper.

The purpose was to help the reader gain some insight into the way in which the model works and the kinds o f outcomes the model can generate. The descriptions help illuminate the complexity o f behavior generated by the model. Briefly addressed as well were the problems o f the structural conditions that foster one or another systemic outcome, the processes by which these outcomes are generated, and the characteristics o f the inhabitants o f such a system and their capacity to survive. With only a small sample o f runs, viz., two, and little variation in the parameters used to configure the system and its members, only a very limited insight into these questions could be gained. In our book (Cusack and Stoll, 1990), where extensive sets o f experiments are reported on, systematic analyses o f these problems and a array o f others are presented in the hope of clarifying the logics that govern multistate systems based on realist principles.

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APPENDIX A

CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL CONFIGURATIONS OF MULTISTATE SYSTEMS IN

EXPERIMENTAL RUNS 20015 AND 20021

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Figure A .l

Maps for Experimental Run 20015

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E x p e r i m e n t a l S y s te m 2 0 0 1 5 : I t e r a t i o n 20

r 1 \ / 3 \ / 5 \ / 7 \ / 9 \ / 1 1 \ / 1 3 \

\ / 2 \ / / 6 \ / 8 \ / 1 0 \ / 1 2 \ / 1 4 \

/ 1 5 \ / 1 7 \ / 1 9 \ / 2 1 \ / / 2 5 \ / 2 7 \ /

\ / 1 6 \ / 1 8 \ / 2 0 \ / 2 2 \ / 2 4 \ / 2 6 \ / 2 8 \

/ 2 9 \ / 3 1 \ / 3 3 \ / 3 5 \ / 3 7 \ / 3 9 \ / 4 1 \ /

\ / 3 0 \ / 3 2 \ / 3 4 \ / 3 6 \ / 3 8 \ / 4 0 \ / 4 2 \

/ 4 3 \ / 4 5 \ / 4 7 \ / 4 9 \ / 5 1 \ / 5 3 \ \ /

\ / 4 4 \ / 4 6 \ / \ / 5 0 \ / \ / 5 4 \ / 5 6 \

/ 5 7 \ / 5 9 \ / 6 1 \ / 6 3 \ / 6 5 \ / 6 7 \ \ /

\ / \ / 6 0 \ / 6 2 \ / 6 4 \ / 6 6 \ / 6 8 \ / 7 0 \

/ 7 1 \ / 7 3 \ / \ / / 7 9 \ / 8 1 \ / 8 3 \ /

\ / 7 2 \ / 7 4 \ 7 6 \ / 7 8 \ / 8 0 \ / 8 2 \ / 8 4 \

/ 8 5 \ / 8 7 \ / 8 9 \ / 7 7 \ / 9 3 \ / \ / 9 7 \ /

\ / 8 6 \ / 8 8 \ / 9 0 \ / 9 2 \ / 9 4 \ 9 6 \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ 1 \ / \ / 5 \ / 7 \ / 9 \ / 1 1 \ / 1 3 \

\ / 2 \ / / \ / 8 \ / 1 0 \ / 1 2 \ / 1 4 \

/ 1 5 \ / 1 7 \ / 1 9 \ / 2 1 \ / / 2 5 \ / 2 7 \ /

\ / 1 6 \ / 1 8 \ / 2 0 \ / 2 2 \ / 2 4 \ / 2 6 \ \

/ 2 9 \ / 3 1 \ / 3 3 \ / 3 5 \ / \ / 3 9 \ / /

\ / 3 0 \ / 3 2 \ / \ / 36 / 3 8 \ / 4 0 \ / 4 2 \

/ 4 3 \ / 4 5 \ / 4 7 \ / 4 9 \ / 5 1 \ / 5 3 \ \ /

\ / 4 4 \ / 4 6 \ / \ / \ / \ \ / 5 6 \

/ 5 7 \ / \ / \ / 6 3 \ / 6 5 \ / 6 7 \ / \ /

\ / \ / 60 / 6 2 \ / 6 4 \ / 6 6 \ / 68 / 7 0 \

/ 7 1 \ / 7 3 \ / \ / / 7 9 \ / 8 1 \ \ /

\ / 7 2 \ / \ 7 6 \ / 7 8 \ / 8 0 \ / 8 2 \ / 8 4 \

/ / 87 / 8 9 \ / 7 7 \ / 9 3 \ / \ / 9 7 \ /

\ \ / 8 8 \ / 9 0 \ / 9 2 \ / 9 4 \ 9 6 \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ 1 \ / \ / 5 \ / 7 \ / 9 \ / 1 1 \ / \

\ / 2 \ / / \ / 8 \ / 1 0 \ / 1 2 \ / 1 4 \

/ \ / 1 7 \ / 1 9 \ / 2 1 \ / / 2 5 \ / 2 7 \ /

\ 1 6 \ / 1 8 \ / 2 0 \ / 2 2 \ / 2 4 \ / 2 6 \ \

/ 2 9 \ / 3 1 \ / 3 3 \ / 3 5 \ / \ / 3 9 \ / /

\ / 3 0 \ / 3 2 \ / \ / 36 / \ / 4 0 \ / 4 2 \

/ 4 3 \ / 4 5 \ / 4 7 \ \ / 51 / 5 3 \ \ /

\ / 4 4 \ / / 6 2 \ / \ / \ \ / 5 6 \

/ 5 7 \ / \ / 6 0 \ / 6 3 \ / 6 5 \ / 6 7 \ / \ /

\ / \ / \ / 6 4 \ / 6 6 \ / 68 \

/ 7 1 \ 73 / \ / / 7 9 \ / 8 1 \ /

\ / / / 7 6 \ / 7 8 \ / 8 0 \ / / 8 4 \

/ \ / 87 / 8 9 \ / 7 7 \ / 9 3 \ \ / 9 7 \ /

\ / 7 2 \ / 8 8 \ / 9 0 \ / 9 2 \ / 9 4 \ / 9 6 \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

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/ \ Z 1 7 \ / 5 \ / 7 \ / 9 \ / 1 1 \ / \

\ 2 \ / / \ / 8 \ / 1 0 \ / 1 2 \ / 1 4 \

/ \ / \ / 1 9 \ / 2 1 \ / / 2 5 \ / 2 7 \ /

\ 1 6 \ / 1 8 \ / 2 0 \ / 2 2 \ / 2 4 \ / 2 6 \ \

/ \ / 3 1 \ / 3 3 \ / 3 5 \ / \ / 3 9 \ / /

\ / 3 0 \ / \ / \ / 36 / 5 1 \ / 4 0 \ / 4 2 \

/ 4 3 \ / 45 / 4 7 \ \ / \ / 5 3 \ \ /

\ / 4 4 \ / / 6 2 \ / \ \ \ / 5 6 \

/ 5 7 \ / \ / 6 0 \ / 6 3 \ / 6 5 \ / 6 7 \ / \ /

\ / \ / \ / \ / 6 4 \ / 6 6 \ / 68 \

/ 7 1 \ 7 3 \ / \ / / 7 9 \ / 8 1 \ /

\ \ / / 7 6 \ / 78 \ / 8 0 \ / / 8 4 \

/ / 87 \ / \ / 9 3 \ \ / 9 7 \ /

\ / 7 2 \ / 9 0 \ / 9 2 \ / 9 4 \ / 9 6 \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ \ / 1 7 \ / 5 \ / 7 \ / 9 \ / 1 1 \ / \

\ 2 \ / / \ / 8 \ / 1 0 \ / 1 2 \ \

/ \ / \ / 1 9 \ / 2 1 \ / \ / 27 /

\ 1 6 \ / 1 8 \ / 2 0 \ / 2 2 \ / 2 4 \ / 2 6 \ \

/ \ / 3 1 \ / 3 3 \ / \ / \ / 3 9 \ / /

\ / \ / \ / \ 36 / 5 1 \ / 4 0 \ / 4 2 \

/ 4 3 \ / 45 / 4 7 \ \ / \ / 5 3 \ \ /

\ / / \ / \ \ \ / 5 6 \

/ 5 7 \ \ / 6 0 \ / 6 3 \ / 6 5 \ \ / \ /

\ / \ / \ / \ / 6 4 \ / 66 / 68 \

/ 71 / \ / \ / / 7 9 \ / 8 1 \ /

\ \ / / 7 6 \ \ / 8 0 \ / / 8 4 \

/ / 87 \ / / \ / 9 7 \ /

\ / 7 2 \ / 9 0 \ / 9 2 \ / 9 4 \ \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

E x p e r i m e n t a l S y s te m 2 0 0 1 5 : I t e r a t i o n 12 0

/ \ / \ / 5 \ / 7 \ / 9 \ / 1 1 \ / \

\ 2 / / \ / 8 \ / 1 0 \ / 1 2 \ \

/ \ / \ / \ / 2 1 \ / \ / 27 /

\ 1 6 \ / / 2 0 \ / 2 2 \ / 2 4 \ / 2 6 \ \

/ \ / 3 1 \ \ / \ / \ / 3 9 \ / /

\ / \ / / \ 36 / 5 1 \ / 4 0 \ / 4 2 \

/ 4 3 \ / 45 / 4 7 \ \ \ / 5 3 \ \ /

\ / / \ / \ / \ / / \

/ \ / 6 0 \ / 6 3 \ / 6 5 \ / \ / /

\ / \ / \ / \ / 6 4 \ \ 68 \

/ 71 / \ / \ / \ / 8 1 \ /

\ \ / / 7 6 \ / 8 0 \ / / 8 4 \

/ / 87 \ / / \ / 9 7 \ /

\ / 7 2 \ / / 9 2 \ / 9 4 \ \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

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/■ \

/ \ / \ / 7 \ / 9 \ / 1 1 \ / \

\ 2 / / \ / \ / 1 0 \ / 1 2 \ \

/ \ / \ \ 2 1 \ \ / 27 /

\ 1 6 \ / / 2 0 \ / 2 2 \ / 2 4 \ \ \

/ \ / 3 1 \ \ / \ / \ / 3 9 \ / /

\ / \ / / \ 36 / 5 1 \ / 4 0 \ / 4 2 \

/ \ / 45 / 47 / \ \ / 5 3 \ / /

\ \ / \ \ / \ \ / \

/ / 60 / 6 3 \ / 6 5 \ / \ / /

\ / \ \ / \ / 6 4 \ \ 68 \

/ 71 / / \ \ / 8 1 \ /

\ \ / / / 8 0 \ / / 8 4 \

/ / 87 \ / \ \ /

\ / 7 2 \ / / 9 2 \ / 9 4 \ \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ \ / \ / \ / 7 \ / 9 \ / 1 1 \ / \

\ 2 / / \ / \ / 1 0 \ / 1 2 \ \

/ / \ \ 2 1 \ \ / 27 /

\ / \ / \ / 2 2 \ / 2 4 \ \ \

/ / 3 1 \ / \ / \ / 3 9 \ / /

\ \ / / \ 36 / 5 1 \ / / 4 2 \

/ 45 / \ \ / 5 3 \ / /

\ \ / \ \ / \ \ / \

/ / 60 / / 6 5 \ / \ / /

\ / \ \ / 6 4 \ \ / 68 / \

/ 71 / / \ \ / 8 1 \ / /

\ \ / / / 8 0 \ / \

/ / 87 \ / \ \ /

\ / 7 2 \ / / 9 2 \ / 9 4 \ \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ \ / \ / \ / 7 \ / 9 \ / 1 1 \ / \

\ 2 / \ / \ / 1 0 \ / 1 2 \ \

/ / \ \ \ / 27 /

\ / \ / / 2 2 \ \ \

/ / 3 1 \ / \ / \ / 3 9 \ / /

\ \ / / \ 36 / 5 1 \ / / 4 2 \

/ 45 / \ \ / 5 3 \ / /

\ \ / \ \ / \ \ / \

/ / 60 / / 6 5 \ / \ / /

\ / \ \ / 6 4 \ \ / 68 / \

/ 71 / / \ \ / 8 1 \ / /

\ \ / 8 7 \ / / 8 0 \ / \

/ / \ / \ / \ \ /

\ / 72 / \ / / 9 2 \ / 9 4 \ \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

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E x p e r i m e n t a l S y s te m 2 0 0 1 5 : I t e r a t i o n 2 0 0

/ ' \ / \ / \ / 7 \ / \ / 1 1 \ / \

\ 2 / \ / 1 0 \ / 1 2 \ \

/ / \ / \ \ / 27 /

\ \ / \ / \ \ \

/ / 3 1 \ \ \ / 3 9 \ / /

\ \ / / / 5 1 \ / / 4 2 \

/ / 45 \ / / 5 3 \ / /

\ \ / \ \ \ / \

/ \ \ / / \ / /

\ / \ / \ / 6 4 \ / 6 5 \ / 68 / \

/ 71 / / / / \ / 8 1 \ / /

\ / \ \ / 8 0 \ / \

/ \ / 6 0 \ / \ \ \ /

\ / 72 \ \ \ / 9 4 \ \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ 2 / / 1 0 \ \

/ / \ \ \ 27 /

\ \ / / \ \ \

/ / 3 1 \ \ \ / 3 9 \ / /

\ \ / / / 5 1 \ / / 4 2 \

/ / 45 \ / / 5 3 \ / /

\ \ / \ \ \ / \

/ \ \ / \ / /

\ / \ / 6 4 \ / 6 5 \ / 68 / \

/ / / / / \ / \ / /

\ / \ \ / 8 0 \ \ / \

/ 7 1 \ / / \ \ / 8 1 \ /

\ / 72 \ \ \ / 9 4 \ \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ \ / \ / \ / 4 5 \ / \ / \ / \

\ 2 / / \

/ / \ / \ \ / \ 27 /

\ \ / / \ \

/ / 31 / / \ 3 9 \ /

\ / \ / / 5 1 \ / / 4 2 \

/ \ / / 5 3 \ \ /

\ / \ \ \ / \

/ \ / \ / /

\ / \ / 6 4 \ / \ / 68 / 8 1 \

/ / / / \ / \ /

\ / \ \ / 8 0 \ / \

/ 7 1 \ \ / \ \ \ /

\ / 72 / \ / / 9 4 \ \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

34

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/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ 2 / \ \

/ / \ / \ / / \ / \ 27 /

\ \ / 4 5 \ / \ \ \

/ / 31 / / \ / 39 / \ /

\ \ / / \ / 5 1 \ / / \

/ / \ / 53 / /

\ \ \ \ \ \

/ / / \ / /

\ / / / 6 4 \ / \ / 68 \

/ \ / / / \ / \ /

\ / / 8 0 \ / \

/ \ \ \ \ /

\ \ / / 9 4 \ \ / 9 8 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ 2 \ \

/ / / \ / \ / \ 27 /

\ / \ / \ \ \

/ / / 39 / /

\ \ 5 1 \ / / \

/ / / \ / /

\ \ \ / \ \

/ \ \ / /

\ / / \ / \ / 5 3 \ \

/ \ / \ / / \ / /

\ / / \ 8 0 \ \

/ \ / \ \ \ /

\ 45 / 64 / / 9 4 \ \ \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ 2 \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ / \

/ \ / \ / \ / \ 27 /

\ / / \ / \ \ \

/ \ / / 39 / /

\ / 5 1 \ / / \

/ / \ / /

\ / \ \ / / \

/ \ / \ \ \ /

\ / / \ / \ / 53 / \

/ \ / \ / \ \ /

\ / 8 0 \ \ / \

/ \ \ /

\ 45 / \ \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

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/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ \

/ / \ / \ l \ 27 /

\ / \ / \ \ \

/ / / 39 / /

\ / 5 1 \ / / \

/ / \ / /

\ / \ \ / / \

/ \ / \ \ \ /

\ / / \ / \ / 53 / \

/ \ / \ / \ \ /

\ / 8 0 \ \ / \

/ \ \ /

\ 45 / \ \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ \

/ / \ / \ 27 /

\ / \ / \ \

/ / / /

\ / 5 1 \ \

/ / /

\ / \ \ / \ / \

/ \ / \ /

\ / / \ / \ \

/ \ / \ / /

\ / 8 0 \ \

/ \ \ /

\ 45 / \ \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ \

/ 27 /

\ \

/ /

\ \

/ /

\ / \ / \ \

/ \ / \ / \ /

\ / / \ / \ / \

/ \ / \ / \ /

\ / 8 0 \ \ \

/ \ \ \ /

\ 45 / \ 5 1 \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

36

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/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ \

/ 27 /

\\ \

/ /

\ \

/ /

\ / \ \

/ \ / \ /

\ / / \ / \ \

/ \ / \ / /

\ / 8 0 \ \

/ \ \ /

\ 45 / \ \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ \

/ 27 /

\ \

/ /

\ \

/ /

\ \

/ / \ /

\ / \ / \ \

/ \ / /

\ / 8 0 \ \

/ \ \ /

\ / \ \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ \

/ 27 /

\ \

/ /

\ \

/ /

\ \

/ / \ /

\ / \ / \ \

/ \ / /

\ / 8 0 \ \

/ \ \ /

\ / \ \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

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E x p e r i m e n t a l Sy s t e m 2 0 0 1 5 : I t e r a t i o n 301

/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ \

/ 27 i

\ \

/ /

\ \

/ /

\ \

/ /

\ \

/ /

\ \

/ / \ /

\ / 80 / \

\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /

/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \

\ \

/ 27 /

\ \

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THE KNIFE’S EDGE OF SYSTEM STABILITY IN A REALIST’S WORLD:AN ANALYSIS OF TWOSIMULATED MULTISTATE SYSTEMS

THE KNIFE’S EDGE OF SYSTEM STABILITY IN A REALIST’S WORLD:

AN ANALYSIS OF TWO

SIMULATED MULTISTATE SYSTEMS

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

COLLAPSE TO UNIVERSAL EMPIRE:

RUN 20015

PLURALISM PRESERVED:

RUN 20021

A COMPARISON OF THE TWO RUNS

Systemic Characteristics and Differential Outcomes

System Size and the Balancing Process

State Survival

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A

CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL CONFIGURATIONS OF MULTISTATE SYSTEMS IN

EXPERIMENTAL RUNS 20015 AND 20021

Figure A .l

Maps for Experimental Run 20015

Figure A.2

Maps for Experimental Run 20021