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NOT FOR QUOTATION WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

A CONVERGENT REALLOCATION POLICY I N A CONVEX SET

P a o l o C a r a v a n i

F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 0 WP-80-20

W o r k i n g P a p e r s a r e i n t e r i m r e p o r t s o n w o r k o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r A p p l i e d S y s t e m s A n a l y s i s a n d h a v e r e c e i v e d o n l y l i m i t e d review. V i e w s o r o p i n i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e - s e n t t h o s e o f t h e I n s t i t u t e o r of i t s N a t i o n a l Member O r g a n i z a t i o n s .

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS A-2361 L a x e n b u r g , A u s t r i a

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PREFACE

In a number of economic situations a decision maker is con- fronted with the problem of modifying a given and unsatisfac- tory resource allocation in order to improve it. This requires a control strategy to be implemented sequentially over time.

Typical constraints are, loosely speaking, the control effort he is willing (or able) to exert, the information requirements on the system "state", the feasibility of intermediate alloca- tions,and the total time in which the process is to be completed.

This paper deals with some of these aspects: an "equal realloca- tion policy" is introduced and appropriate convergence proper- ties are derived. On the basis of income distribution data for the Italian Economy, an example of wealth reallocation over in- come classes is presented.

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A CONVERGENT REALLOCATION POLICY IN A CONVEX SET Paolo Caravani

INTRODUCTION

A rather primitive concept in economics is the non-negati-

.

vity of the resources shared by each agent at a given time and in a given social context, as well as the finitness of the re- sources sharedamong all agents. A formal translation of this concept leads to an apparently simple set-theoretic property, convexity, from which far-reaching implications and unsus~ected results are often derived. In the past and more recently, the somewhat disguising feature of this property has drawn the

attention of applied mathematicians and mathematical economists to several aspects of the ensuing "Convex Theory" (~ockafellar,

1 9 6 9 ; Nikaido, 1 9 6 8 ) .

It appears quite natural that a systems theory viewpoint on this matter should be primarily concerned with dynamic sys- tems defined on a convex state space. One such system is con- sidered in this paper. When the matter of concern is convex re- allocation dynamics, a fundamental question can be formulated as follows: How would a policy based on taking from the "rich" and giving to the "poor" succeed in equalizing shares over a fixed time horizon? T'his paper answers that question for the singular but important case of an equal reallocation policy.

2. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

In addition to the standard assumptions of homogeneity and divisibility of resources, the policy discussed in this paper is based on the following assumptions:

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(i) Theresourceset can be modeled as a Unit Simplex.

(ii) The policy maker operates at discrete time-points and has direct access to one component of the distribution at a time.

iii) The reallocation is evenly redistributed over the re- maining components.

A few comments are in order. Regarding (i), it has been argued that reallocation dynamics in a Unit Simplex, to the extent in

which it postulates constant-sum resources, contradicts the possi- bility of growth. It seems more accurate to say, however, that what isomitted fromthis description is the feedback link between distribution and growth. But this link can be added in an

integrated growth-distribution model, if one recognizes that no conceptual difficulty arises in separating a multidimensional- growth process into a balanced-growth of all components and a zero-growth redistribution among them.

As for (ii), we should first notice that when access to all components is possible, the reallocation problem becomes mathe- matically trivial. Convex combinations of unit-sum vectors are unit-sum vectors and such combinations may be chosen at will.

Given two vectors, start-end, a trajectory connecting them and containing a desired number of arbitrarily spaced points can easily be constructed.

On the other hand, this case presupposes on the policy maker side a very strict and efficient control on all his resources.

This, in practice, may result in costly

-

if not infeasible

-

policies. In brief, this case appears both trivial mathe- matically and of very restricted scope for application.

At the other extreme, we have the case in point. One compo- nent is controlled at each step. In order to preserve convexity, it is assumed that the amount by which one component is varied will be evenly redistributed over the remaining components. That this policy should converge to any desired distribution, while

intuitively plausible, will require s0rr.e anount of 3athematical reasoning to be rigorously established.

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Regarding (iii), some implications of this assumption can be best appreciated in the light of the policy algorithm to be pre- sented in the next paragraph. For this reason, discussion on this point will be deferred until the conclusion.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

As usual, resources are modeled as non-negative unit-sum vectors. A convenient geometric interpretation is suggested by the notion of a Unit Simplex (Nikaido, 1968) in R ~ . In two-

dimensional space, resource vectors have one end on the line seg- ment through the points (1,O) and (0,l) and this segment is a Unit Simplex in R 2

.

Let S N-l be the simplex in R~ defined by

where A's are scalars and - e's unit vectors. To avoid trivial cases, we will assume N > 2. As we are interested in motions

N- 1

within the simplex, we define a trajectory in S

.

def. 1 A T r a j e c t o r y T i s a c o Z Z e c t i o n o f v e c t o r s i n SEJ-l

i n d e x e d b y t h e i n t e g e r t, i . e .

For each t, we also introduce

def. 2 An a - N e i g h b o r h o o d o f - x f t ) is t h e s u b s e t o f ;iil

where

with unit component in position k. The vector abk can be re- garded as the control vector for the reallocation policy. For

fixed a. X(t) contains exactly N vectors. Notice that x(t) - is not contained in any of its a-Neighborhoods.

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T h u s , a F e a s i b l e T r a j e c t o r y i s c o m p l e t e l y s p e c i f i e d by ( 2 ) - ( 9 ) . W e now t u r n t o t h e main q u e s t i o n . G i v e n two d i s t i n c t p o i n t s i n .SN-' d o e s t h e r e e x i s t a F e a s i b l e T r a j e c t o r y s t a r t i n g a t o n e p o i n t a n d e n d i n g a t t h e o t h e r ?

An a n s w e r i s g i v e n , i n some s e n s e , by t h e f o l l o w i n g r e a l l o c a - t i o n p o l i c y .

PJ- 1

P o l i c y 1 Gitren

-

x ( 0 ) a n d - x # ~ ( 0 ) i n S

,

c o n s t r u c t t h e s e q u e n c e Ex*

-

( t ) 1 a c c o r d i n g t o

w i t h

bk

s p e c i f i e d i n ( 3 ) a n d a t e a c h t I k and a c h o s e n a c c o r d i n g t o t h e " R o b i n Hood E u Z e " :

if x 4

-

x .(t)

*

> O and 3#0 c h o o s e a=6 a n d k=j

,

u 3 ( 1 6 )

i f x j - x - i t ) J

*

> C and 6 = 0 c h o o s e a=-y and k = h , ( 1 7 )

f f xj

-

x 5 t ) < 0 c h o o s e a=-y and k = j ,

J ( 1 3 )

i f n o n e o f t h e a b o v e a p p l i s s s t o p t h q a l g o r i t h m . ( 1 9 )

Remark W e w i l l t r y t o comment b r i e f l y o n t h i s a l g o r i t h m .

A t e a c h s t e p , t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e - x

*

( t ) i s c o m p a r e d t o t h e

*

d e s i r e d s t a t e - x . The d i f f e r e n c e v e c t o r

-

x ( t )

-

- x i s a n a l y z e d c o m p o n e n t - w i s e t o f i n d :

-

t h e h i g h e s t a b s o l u t e v a l u e ( B ; c o m p o n e n t j ) , a n d

-

t h e h i g h e s t v a l u e ( y ; component h )

.

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Now t h e i d e a i s t o m o d i f y e i t h e r component o f t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e s o a s t o o b t a i n a new s t a t e v e c t o r " c l o s e r " t o t h e d e - s i r e d s t a t e . I f j = h , w e d e c r e a s e t h e j - t h component o f t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e . N o p r o b l e m s a r i s e w i t h c o n s t r a i n t s i n

t h i s case ( 1 0 ) . I f j f h , w e i n c r e a s e t h e j - t h component t o t h e e x t e n t p e r m i t t e d by t h e cr,

+

c o n s t r a i n t ( 1 6 ) . B u t

j

t h e r e m i g h t b e cases w h e r e no i n c r e a s e i s p e r m i t t e d , i . e., a + = 0 . I n t h i s c a s e , w e d e c r e a s e t h e h - t h component

3 ( 1 7 ) .

C o n v e r g e n c e r e s u l t s a r e summarized i n t h e f o l l o w i n g :

Theorem

T h e s e q u e n c e ( 1 2 ) i n P o l i c y I i s a F e a s i b l e ~ r a j e c t o r y . If t h i s s e q u e n c e i s f i n i t e , i t s l a s t e l e m e n t i s - x, o t h e r w i s e { x * ( t )

-

; t = 1 , 2 , .

. .

m o n o t ~ n i c a t Z y c o n v e r g e s t o x - i n t h e E u c l i d e a n N o r m .

P r o o f

( 1 3 ) - ( 1 8 ) i m p l y ( l o ) , ( 1 1 ) t h u s { x * ( t ) ;

-

t = 1 , 2 ,

... 1

i s a F e a s i b l e T r a j e c t o r y . I f ( 1 2 ) c o n t a i n s a f i n i t e number o f p o i n t s , t h e n a t some t = T <

-

s t e p ( 1 9 ) o f P o l i c y 1 h a s b e e n r e a c h e d . T h i s means 0 = x j

-

x $ ( T ) = I x j

- x ~ ( T ) I

a n d ,

To p r o v e m o n o t o n i c c o n v e r g e n c e , e q u i p . R N w i t h t h e E u c l i d e a n Norm

I / 1 1

2 . Then

w h e r e w e p u t

O b s e r v e t h a t ( 1 6 ) - ( 1 3 ) i m p l y

c ( 0 . 1 1 ; a A x k ( t ) - > 0 ; la1

5

n x k ( t )

/ ,

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- n

-

c, X a X -

Z v I

-

n

+'

-

-Ed

X I .4

- X

z w 7 II

-4

v I m -

-

n

c

-

,

if-

X I I X I - -

a C rd

- 4 X

A

n

+'

*.4

-

X a, k

.c Q)

3 m a,

U - 4

5 c

- r +

'+i

0

+'

Q ) .

m r(

ciJ

Q) C

.c - 4

+' a

m k (d '4 U

+ m

H + ' .4 Q)

k T

.c H

3M.W

:

N - -

5 n

n

+'

0

-

CU if-

-

X I

n

P

m

-

m -

-

n 7

I -. +) if- x I

- I

- n

l i

I

?

-

v l

CJ -

- n

-

c,

if-

XI

-

kl

-

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Remark 1 The Trajectory obtained with (12)- (18) satisfies a local optimality criterion in the following sense. At each step t,

/

15

-

x*(t)

- 1 l 2

is decreased proportionally to Axk(t) and by (13)-(15) any different choice of Axk(t) whould yield a lower value of Axk (t)

.

However, local optimality does not ensure global opti- mality, that is a locally non-optimal choice of k may yield faster convergence than a locally optimal one, as shown by this counter-example. Assume initial state - =

and finale state =

()- .

A globally optimal Feasible Trajectory is the finite sequence

whereas a locally optimal Feasible Trajectory would generate

Remark 2 In several applications, reallocation policies that are

"smoother" than implied by this rule may be desired.

This, however, can be obtained by restricting the a-range to a suitable sub-interval of (0,1] with no prejudice on convergence results.

4. AN EXAMPLE: INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE IATLIAN ECONOMY

As a possiSle application of the preceding results, consider the per-capita income distribution in Italy during the period of

1974-76. The dynamics of the distribution is best illustrated by normalized histograms, as in Figure 1. Per capita income has been divided into ten income classes ranging from one fifth to twice the average income. The diagrams show the percentage of the national income allocated to each income class. The area of the histograms is proportional to the gross national income and is normalized to one.

This representation permits the comparison of income dis-

tributions at different epochs, irrespective of variations in popu- lation size and gross national income. The three-year record

shows no substantial change in the distribution, thus it is reasonable to assume a balanced growth of all classes at a com- mon growth rate.

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P E R C A P I T A I N C O M E / AVERAGE I N C O M E

P E R C A P I T A I N C O M E / RVERRGE INCOME

.e

.

.6 .a 1 . 0 1 . 2 1 . 4 1.6 1 . 8 2 . 0

P E R C R P I T A INCOME / AVERAGE I N C O M E

F i g . 1 I n c o m e d i s t r i b u t i o n i n I t a l y ( S q u r c e : B u l l e t i n o f Bank o f I t a l y , y r s 1 9 6 6 - 7 8 )

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A rather controversial issue in Economic Theory is whether or not the observed distribution represents an economic optimum

-

aside from the question of whether or not such an optimum really exists. I will not enter that dispute here. But, for illustration purposes, I shall assume that some benevolent governmental goal has been set so as to reach the target distribution in Figure 2 (light line) starting from the 1976 situation. Assume that income trans- fers are controlled by some government action (fiscal policy, so- cial benefits, interest rates, etc.) on a trimester basis. Assume further that the policy employed is selective, i.e. at each tri- mester t the fraction of the national income allocated to one parti- cular income class is varied by a value not exceeding a pre-set

transfer rate g(t). If this class is chosen according to Rule (13)-(13), the reallocation process becomes a Feasible Trajectory in Income Space with

= min(b,g(tj) if (16) applies, otherwise

( 2 9 ) a = max(-y,-g(t))

.

Assuming a cons'tant 5 2 transfer rate, the hypothesized policy results i-1 the graphs shown in figure 2 (dark line).

Table 1 shows the number of steps required to get to the target distribution within a 15 norm error, in function of

the maximum transfer rate which is assumed constant at each step.

It may be of (academic?) interest to note that no improvement in the convergence ( number of steps) can be achieved by trans- fer rates higher than 5.86%.

5. CONCLUSIONS

There are cases where equal readjustment occurs as a spon- taneous property of an economic system. In the Theory of Demand, for instance (Hildebrand, 1974), there is room for the case in which a price increase in one commodity affects an agent's con-

sumption plan by a decrease in the budget share of that commodity and a common increase of the remaining ones. The equal readjust- ment process is endogenously performed by the system, i.e.,the commodity market, whose behavior is

-

so to speak

-

inherently convex.

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Table 1. Convergence up to 1% norm error as a function of maximum transfer rate.

In other economic situations a system may not possess that property, in which case, of course, it becomes the responsibility of the policy maker to enforce equal readjustment over the re- maining components. The advantage of concentrating the control

effort on a single component is lost in this case.

1.00

Despite this obvious drawback, the equal readjustment policy still appears to merit special attention over the other, possibly more flexible, policies when considered from the viewpoint of

information requirements. As information is minimal in a vector of equal components, it is plausible to expect that information costs would be minimal with a control vector containing as many

common values as possible, as is the case with

akk

type of controls.

Although it would be desirable to support this statement on the basis of a firmer formal theory, an attempt to clarify this point on heuristic grounds can be made along the line of reasoning

contained in the Appendix.

2.00 NUMEER OF STEPS

I

MAX TRANSFER RATE ( % ) 100 5.86 5.00 4.00 3.00

8 8 9 9 12 14 2 2

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REFERENCES

Hildebrand, W. (1974) Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Nikaido, H. (1968) Convex Structures and Economic Theory.

New York and London: Academic Press.

Nikaido, H. (1972) Pages 291-299, Introduction to Sets and Mappings in Modern Economics. Amsterdam: North Holland.

Rockafellar, W. (1969) Convex Analysis. Princeton, New Jersey:

Princeton University Press.

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APPENDIX

We will try to justify the minimality of the information re- quirement associated to an equal readjustment policy on the basis of the block-diagram shown in figure Al:

OLD PRESENT STATE

( UIJREVEALED)

-

STATE i (Reveal pre-

- , - - - . ECONOMIC SUBSYSTEM/COMPUTER

!

INTERFACE PRESENT

1 STATE

1

- 1 I

CONTROL I COMPARE

(policy al- (present state

gorithm) vs. desired state)

1

. DESIRED

i

STATE

Figure Al. Block Diagram of a Reallocation Policy

Each block in the diagram is representative of a finite set of elementary operations: storage and retrieval of information.

Some of these are to be performed by computer (square blocks),

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others involve interaction between the economic subsystem and the appropriate governing agency (round blocks). Assuming that major costs are concentrated on the latter, the equal re- adjustment policy involves:

-a sorting of an N-component vector (eqs. ( 13)

,

(1 4)

,

( 1 5) ) in

the OBSERJE block: no storage is necessary and

-an assignment of two values in the MODIFY block: the amount by which k-th component is to be changed and the amount by which the remaining components are to be changed. However, remaining components need not be identified. In this case, storage requirement is independent of the size N of the problem.

A more flexible policy would require instead:

-an appraisal of N different values in the OBSERVE block- these are to be stored for subsequent processing and

-an assignment of N different values and additional informa- tion on the identity of each component in the MODIFY block.

Information is dependent on the size N of the problem in this case.

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