The Politics of Transformation

The Politics of Transformation

The LTTE and the 2002-2006 peace process in Sri Lanka

This publication was prepared in cooperation with CJPD (Centre for Just Peace and Democracy)

Berghof Series

Resistance/Liberation Movements and

Suthaharan Nadarajah, Luxshi Vimalarajah:

The Politics of Transformation: The LTTE and the 2002-2006 peace process in Sri Lanka.

Berghof Transitions Series No. 4

© Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management 2008

Copies can be ordered from:

Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management Altensteinstraße 48a

D–14195 Berlin, Germany Te. +49/(0)30 - 8441540 Via Internet:

http://www.berghof-center.org/

ISBN 978-3-927783-90-4

Transition to Politics

Editors

Veronique Dudouet and David Bloomfield

The Berghof Research Center is grateful to acknowledge the project funding generously provided by the International Development Research Center, Ottawa, Canada, and by the Ford Foundation, New York, USA, and the support and co-operation provided by the Berghof Foundation for Peace Support (BFPS) and our institutional partner, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, South Africa.

About this Publication Series

This case-study is one of a series produced by participants in an ongoing Berghof research project on transitions from violence to peace (‘Resistance/Liberation Movements and Transition to Politics’). The project’s overall aim is to learn from the experience of those in resistance or liberation movements who have used violence in their struggle but have also engaged politically during the conflict and in any peace process. Recent experience around the world has demonstrated that reaching political settlement in protracted social conflict always eventually needs the involvement of such movements.

Our aim here is to discover how, from a non-state perspective, such political development is handled, what is the relationship between political and military strategies and tactics, and to learn more about how such movements (often sweepingly and simplistically bundled under the label of non-state armed groups) contribute to the transformation of conflict and to peacemaking. We can then use that experiential knowledge (1) to offer support to other movements who might be considering such a shift of strategy, and (2) to help other actors (states and international) to understand more clearly how to engage meaningfully with such movements to bring about political progress and peaceful settlement.

Political violence is a tool of both state and non-state actors, and replacing it by political methods of conflict management is essential to making sustainable peace. With this project we want to understand better how one side of that equation has been, or could be, achieved. Depending on the particular case, each study makes a strong argument for the necessary inclusion of the movement in any future settlement, or documents clearly how such a role was effectively executed.

We consciously asked participants to reflect on their experience from their own unique point of view. What we publish in this series is not presented as neutral commentary. All histories are biased histories, and there is no single truth in conflict or in peace. Rather, we believe these case-studies are significant because they reflect important voices which are usually excluded or devalued in the analysis of conflict. Increasing numbers of academics, for example, study “armed groups” from outside, but few actually engage directly with them to hear their own points of view, rationales, and understandings of their context. We are convinced that these opinions and perspectives urgently need to be heard in order to broaden our understanding of peacemaking. For exactly this reason, each case study has been produced with the very close co-operation of, and in some cases authored by, members of the movement concerned. As the results amply illustrate, these perspectives are sophisticated, intelligent, political and strategic.

The reader may or may not agree with the perspectives expressed. But, much more importantly, we hope that the reader will accept that these perspectives are valid in themselves and must be included in any attempt at comprehensive understanding of violent conflict and its transformation. We urgently need to understand in more depth the dynamics of organisations who make the transition between political violence and democratic politics, in order to improve our understanding of their role, and our practice, in making peace.

The views expressed are those of the authors and contributors, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or views of the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies or any of its constituent agencies.

For further information on the project, please contact:

Veronique Dudouet (Project Coordinator) Oliver Wils (Project Director, BFPS) veronique.dudouet@berghof-center.org oliver.wils@berghof-peacesupport.org

5

Introduction 7

1. The Politics of Transformation 12

2. A Question of Democracy 16

2.1 Failure of democratic mechanisms in Sri Lanka 16

2.2 Considerations on legitimacy 18

3. Sri Lanka’s Conflict 21

3.1 Antecedents 22

3.2 The LTTE 24

4. The Electoral Arena 26

4.1 “Tyranny of the majority” 26

4.2 Ideological obstacles 27

4.3 Political and constitutional obstacles 29

5. Overview of a State within a State 32

6. The LTTE and the 2002 Peace Process 36

6.1 A question of legitimacy 37

6.2 ISGA proposals 39

7. The International Role 43

Conclusion 49

Bibliography 51

Annex 1: Acronyms 56

Annex 2: Chronology 57

About the Authors 60

Introduction

The conflict in Sri Lanka is one of the world’s most protracted and multi-faceted. It has been aptly described as a conflict “where economic, political and cultural deprivation and grievances of a minority have provoked a violent rebellion against a state that has come to be seen as representative of only the majority ethnic group” (Orjuela 2003:198). Since long-simmering tensions between the island’s Tamil community and the Sinhala-dominated state erupted into open confrontation between several militant groups and the Sri Lankan armed forces in the early 1980s, the conflict has grown in intensity and complexity. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which emerged as the dominant Tamil protagonist following a number of early confrontations within the broader Tamil resistance movement, has since developed both a conventional military force and a substantial civil administrative apparatus in the parts of the island it has established control over. Since the conflict began, there have been five formal attempts to resolve it through negotiations. All, including the Norwegian-facilitated peace process which began in 2002, have proved abortive, with the fighting resuming with greater ferocity each time.

This study examines the substantial non-military activities of the LTTE since the internationally-backed Norwegian peace process began in 2002 against the wider foil of transition from war to peace. The possibilities for transforming or resolving a protracted conflict such as that in Sri Lanka cannot be discerned without understanding the evolving socio-political conditions in which armed political movements emerge, grow and function. For example, the label ‘non- state actor’ when applied to the LTTE, which controls a clear and demarcated territory and has established a substantial governance structures in these areas, obscures significant aspects of the conflict and the organisation itself. A ‘state within a state’ (Kingston 2004) would seem a more appropriate term in this context and one we look at more closely below. More generally, a nuanced understanding of the LTTE that goes well beyond the nondescript label of ‘armed group’ or ‘non-state actor,’ and of the wider dynamics of the conflict in Sri Lanka, are essential to promoting peace there. This principle underpins this study. Such understanding, we also argue, requires a systemic approach to analysis. Piecemeal approaches – for example, focusing solely on the efficacy of electoral processes in Sri Lanka – which do not consider the historic trajectories or overarching context of Sri Lanka’s politics, or the prevailing conditions, are futile. Intractable conflicts must be studied in their entirety.

Furthermore, in examining the political transformation of armed movements, we do not take a normative approach. We examine key processes and dynamics without taking a moral stance on the use of political violence (or even specific modes or acts of violence). We seek to provide insight into the decision-making process within the LTTE and its logic in pursuing particular strategies, into how LTTE actions and policies are intertwined with those of other actors within the conflict system and how these came to reinforce each other, thus producing a destructive cycle of escalating antagonism that contributed heavily to the slide into renewed violence that followed the initial optimism generated by the Norwegian initiative.

The Berghof project on ‘Resistance/liberation movements and transitions to politics’, of which this study is a part, seeks to examine political processes, including ‘transformation’, from the perspectives of the movements whose activities are being studied. This paper aims to go beyond a historical narrative and to critically examine the ontological and epistemological bases for the inquiry. To begin with, two key assumptions underlie most definitions of the concept of ‘transformation’. The first is that resistance/liberation movements begin as politico-military struggles using different degrees of violence, and then eventually transition into a purely political (i.e. non-violent) struggle. The second is that only engagement in ‘mainstream’ democratic politics and electoral processes can both constitute and facilitate such a transformation. The concept of

8

political transformation of armed non-state actors is thus embedded in the wider one of conflict transformation.

Successful peacebuilding is said to involve a ‘triple transition’: a security transition from war to peace; a political transition from authoritarianism to a more democratic form of government and a socio-economic transformation (De Zeeuw 2001:16). Although all are necessary ingredients for the creation of a self-sustaining peace, this study undertakes a critical analysis of the second proposition, that of transition from authoritarianism to democracy. We argue that the ethno- political¹ conflict in Sri Lanka emerged in the context of failed democratic politics of the state. In particular, as Sunil Bastian has pointed out “democracy is janus-faced” (Bastian and Luckham 2003:1).“It can empower citizens to overcome exclusion and it can contribute to good governance but it can also reinforce and legitimise societal inequalities, penalise national minorities and indeed prevent or constrain popular participation in the government” (ibid.).

Nonetheless, in recent times, conflict transformation and political transformation of armed non-state actors have come to take on specific, albeit not always explicitly stated, meanings revolving around values of democracy, non-violence, political pluralism, etc. These ‘liberal’ notions are, inevitably, essentially contested in meaning and practice. The Berghof research brief itself describes the stated objective of transformation as “the construction of non-violent and equitable societies.” However this laudable goal has come to be operationalised elsewhere in specific ways. To begin with, the common wisdom conceptualisation of transformation turns on explicit and implicit dichotomies of violence and peace, authoritarianism and democracy, pluralism and nationalism and so on. These not only stem from the liberal concerns manifest in contemporary international politics, they are also uncritically categorised in mutually exclusive and, we argue, overly simplistic ‘good versus bad’ dichotomies. In particular, the terms ‘political’ and ‘violent’

especially in relation to the strategies of armed non-state actors are seen as mutually exclusive and contradictory: as the brief itself notes, ‘non-state armed groups’ are often portrayed as

“initially violent organisations that eventually develop political agendas and transform themselves into non-violent, political actors.” In other words, armed non-state actors are deemed not to be political actors. However, liberation/resistance movements are, by definition, inherently political actors, pursuing discernibly political goals through violent means, even though this crucial aspect is often effectively displaced today by the increasingly dominant discourse of ‘terrorism’.

Furthermore, according to this interpretation of ‘transformation’ of armed movements, the notion of ‘political’ has come to mean something quite limited and specific: electoral politics.

This directly creates expectations of specific behaviours and institutional changes on the part of armed movements before such normatively desirable ‘transformation’ can be said to be taking place. These include the renunciation of violence and direct engagement in electoral politics.

However, in the case of armed movements fighting for independence from states they deem oppressive, such requirements can be deeply problematic, particularly when insisted on prior to the implementation of a permanent solution which resolves the structural causes of the conflict.

These difficulties are heightened, moreover, if the resistance movement is already running its own civil administration in territory ‘liberated’ from the state. The case of Sri Lanka also challenges another key assumption on which the notion of political transformation of armed non-state actors rests: that a democratic polity and electoral process with integrity already exists, or is being formed, for armed movements to transition into. In Sri Lanka it is arguable that it was precisely

1 In the context of Sri Lanka, the term ethnic conflict is the characterisation most preferred by various scholars.

However, the term ‘ethnic conflict’ is inadequate and misleading as it implies primordial motives and does not reveal the underlying political nature of the conflict. To conclude that ethnic conflict arises because there are distinct ethnic groups is tautological. Ethnic conflict refers to the form of the conflict not with regard to its core issues related to human rights, justice, political participation, economic distribution etc. As Gurr et al rightly point out, “the manifestation of these issues becomes ethnic only because that is the basis for exclusion and repression” (Gurr, Harff and Speca 1996).

the repeated failure of ‘democratic’ politics to address Tamil grievances for several decades and the concomitant lack of effective mechanisms for constitutional reform itself which, combined with heightened state violence, led to armed resistance in the first place.

This paper examines the activities and conduct of the LTTE against the foil of

‘political transformation’, focusing in particular on the period since 2002, when the heavily internationalised, Norwegian-led peace initiative in Sri Lanka began in earnest.² The LTTE’s stated goal is self governance for the island’s Tamils in their historical habitation in the Northeast.³ The LTTE thus faces both issues outlined above. As a liberation movement fighting for independence, the LTTE represents a fundamental Tamil challenge to the legitimacy of the Sinhala majoritarian state. Moreover, having captured a large swathe of territory from the state, the LTTE has set up a parallel civil administration in it. Both these aspects, as noted earlier, present specific challenges to the LTTE engaging in the linear ‘transformation’ outlined above. Nonetheless, this paper argues, throughout the conflict and especially since 2002, the LTTE has engaged in substantive and multi- faceted non-violent political activities, whose transformative potential has been insufficiently examined and engaged with as a result an overly narrow focus on the electoral politics (with the concomitant insistence on disarmament and demobilisation).

Drawing on a review of the non-military activities of the LTTE since 2002, this paper makes two central arguments. Firstly, the popular conceptualisation of ‘political transformation’ is overly restrictive and prescriptive, so much so that activities outside of and beyond an armed campaign which actually embrace and operationalise the values underpinning the normative demand for political transformation, are simply not considered. Secondly, even within the commonly accepted framework of transformation, a focus on the behaviour of the armed movement alone, divorced from the (political and socio-economical) local and international environment in which it operates, fails to recognise key (structural and other) impediments to such ‘transformation’ and, therefore, key steps being undertaken by the movement towards this. The paper also argues that as a consequence of external actors’ adopting too narrow a focus on the (lack of) specific behaviours by the armed movement, its efforts to embrace international values fail to get recognition and, more importantly, the necessary international support to sustain them. Indeed, international failure to support the LTTE’s efforts to adopt and entrench international values in its administrative apparatus helped to undermine the potential for conflict transformation in Sri Lanka and, arguably, contributed to the subsequent disintegration of the Norwegian-led peace process. In short, a combination of international policies dictated by state doctrine and international actors’⁴ scepticism of the LTTE’s willingness to ‘transform’ led to a failure to recognise and support key steps by the movement, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophesy that progressively hardened attitudes in both international actors and the LTTE. We examine this crucial point in detail below, but it serves to note here that the international community has a key role in the transformation of the LTTE. As this study later elaborates, the armed conflict in Sri Lanka is a direct consequence of not only majoritarian oppression of a numerically smaller ethnic community, but also the manifest failures of internal mechanisms for resolving ethnic tensions as they emerged. In terms of Sri

2 Low key Norwegian facilitation began in 1999. Oslo’s role was formally initiated in early 2000 but, amid continuing hostilities, did not gain momentum until the change of government in Colombo in December 2001.

3 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (July 29, 1987). The Accord, signed by India and Sri Lanka, recognised that “the Northern and Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples” (Clause 1.4). Furthermore, given this recognition, under the terms of the Accord the North and East were merged to form a single administrative entity (Clause 2.1). The Accord was unilaterally abrogated by the Sri Lankan government in 2006 when it annulled the merger. However, in keeping with political nomenclature of the Tamil struggle, we use the term ‘Northeast’

to refer to the Tamil areas of the island.

4 By international actors we mean here the bilateral and multilateral donors, Norway, the peace facilitator and the other Co-Chairs (EU, Japan and the US) who together spearheaded the post-2002 peace initiative.

10

Lanka’s transition from war to peace, therefore, the international community has a crucial role in underwriting security, especially human security⁵, and in guaranteeing the stability and durability of any negotiated agreement. The LTTE, like other actors, has its own agency, but we argue that its transformation hinges very much on the relationships between the organisation and the international community and less so on its relationship with the Sri Lankan state. The focus here is therefore on the former.

We begin by examining some of the key underpinnings of the concept of political transformation. In doing so, we promote a broader interpretation that goes beyond the simple holding of and participation in elections. In particular, we argue that the LTTE’s efforts to develop and entrench a substantial civil administration in its controlled areas also constitutes political transformation, both of the movement (from ‘guerrillas to government’⁶) and the Tamil struggle itself, from resistance to self-rule. We refer to this process as ‘state-building’ albeit with an important caveat: by state-building we refer not to the construction of a Westphalian sovereign state, but to the establishment of structures of governance and civil administration that meet the daily requirements of the inhabitants of the war zones as well as providing the foundation for implementing wider Tamil aspirations for self-rule. The crucial point here is that the structures of self-governance established by the LTTE in its controlled areas are as amenable to integration into a united state as they are to form the foundations of an independent one. To begin with, effective governance, broadly defined, has been absent in the Tamil areas of the island for decades:

systematic economic and social marginalisation of the Tamils by the majoritarian state has been followed by decades of conflict in which the violent suppression of the Tamil rebellion has taken clear precedence over governance, good or otherwise. Secondly, the restructuring and transformation of the Sri Lankan state, which is sine qua non to resolving the conflict, necessitate establishing autonomous structures of self-rule for the Tamils, just as the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord sought to lay the basis for. The LTTE-run governance structures are thus both a practical response to the necessity of administering daily life in its controlled areas and a concrete manifestation of the wider Tamil aspiration for self-rule. In short, the LTTE governance structures have the potential to constitute an essential foundation for conflict transformation in Sri Lanka.

Following an examination of the conceptual framework of conflict transformation, we briefly outline Sri Lanka’s armed conflict before considering, in some depth, the historical antecedents to the LTTE’s armed struggle. The purpose of this section, which outlines the context in which the Tamil struggle moves from peaceful agitation to armed struggle, is two-fold: to highlight the historically constituted hurdles to reversing this transition, and to outline the present-day structural impediments to transforming the Sri Lankan state and body politic so that the pursuit of Tamil political goals by electoral processes is even possible. We then examine the LTTE’s non- military activities after the Norwegian peace process began in 2001 in two ways; firstly using the narrower interpretation of transformation as a shift from ‘armed struggle to electoral politics’, and secondly as a shift from ‘armed struggle to governance’. We look at the institution-building activities of the LTTE which began in the early 1990s and have continued thereafter as a process of political transformation, i.e. from guerrillas to government. In particular we look at the structural

5 The concept of Human Security emerged in the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994. One essential characteristic is that it identifies individuals as the proper referent for security, in contrast to the ‘traditional’ notion of national security as state-centred security. The main aim was to “bridge the freedom from want and freedom from fear.” While freedom from fear means freedom from violence, freedom from want indicates freedom from poverty.

The UNDP’s Human Development Report argues for expanding global security to incorporate threats in seven areas:

economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. While this concept can be seen as a holistic understanding of the different facets of global security, it has been criticised because of its vagueness (see for instance Alkire 2003).

6 Borrowing the title of David Pool’s 2001 study of the Eritrean Liberation Front.

and strategic changes effected by the LTTE since 2002 and argue that these constitute important steps towards entrenching the normative values of ‘conflict transformation’. We then critically review international engagement with these efforts, and conclude with a summary of key findings.

A brief word on methodology: This case study draws on a range of sources, including official documentation and printed and verbal accounts of the conflict and peace process. In particular, the authors draw on their conversations and interviews with past or serving officials, including heads or senior officials of several LTTE departments, Tamil parliamentarians, international diplomats and some Sri Lankan government officials. Some of the material used was gathered specifically for this case study since March 2007, and the rest was collected in recent years as part of the authors’

doctoral research projects.

12

1. The Politics of Transformation

Building on the concepts of Systemic Conflict Transformation (Wils et al. 2006), this paper argues that social and political change processes are dynamic, non-linear and are characterised by simultaneity of developments (Max Weber’s Gleichzeitigkeit der Geschehnisse).

This systemic approach to conflict/social transformation is contrary to functionalist models of transformation, which relate to linear development models of social change directed at system maintenance and the restoring of a previous pattern of equilibrium in which stability is the most defining characteristic. Given that deep-rooted (Burton 1990) and protracted (Azar 1990) intra- state conflicts stem from structural factors⁷ and other underlying causes, ‘political transformation’

must be considered in the context of a complex and evolutionary past. The following are the salient features of the systemic thinking on which our argument is based:

Thinking in dynamic frameworks refers to the “understanding that causes and effects in 1.

social systems do not follow a simple logic, but are connected in a rather complex way and can be separated substantially by distance and time” (Ropers 2008:3).

Thinking in network structures relates to the existence of reinforcing ‘feed-back loops’

2.

and the interdependency of actors. An example would be the ‘security dilemma’: while one party takes up arms out of perceived insecurity, the other party regards this as a threat which in turn contributes to escalation and increased insecurity (Ropers 2008:3).

Power relations between parties to the conflict are ever-changing systems located in 3.

asymmetric conflict constellations. Conflict actors are mostly unevenly equipped with resources and access to power centres, as well as to the international community, which further reinforces the conflict (Wils et al. 2006:51-58).

The foundations and vehicles for change processes are to be found within the systems 4.

themselves. Solutions are sustainable only when they are generated by the parties to the conflict themselves. Moreover, parties are not monolithic or homogeneous blocks but are themselves subject to change, because of both internal dynamics and external (i.e.

systemic) factors (Wils et al. 2006: iv).

Using this systemic approach to examining political transformation in the Sri Lankan conflict immediately draws attention to key factors external to the LTTE: the nature and conduct of the Sri Lankan state, the international community and the dynamic relationships between all three. We take up the international dimensions later, but note here the powerful impact of ‘external’

logics such as the ‘global war on terror’ and ‘preventing state failure’ on complex ‘internal’

conflicts. Furthermore, we treat the actors involved not as monolithic and unchanging entities, but as complex webs of interconnectedness which respond to interactions with other actors, and which are flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances while pursuing interests. The LTTE, for example, cannot simply be positioned as inherently ‘intransigent’. Instead, its positions and actions need to be considered in the context of the prevailing dynamics of the moment and the movement’s interactions and relationships with other actors in the system. Therefore there

7 Building on the theories of Pierre Bourdieu, Johann Galtung has identified three different forms of violence commonly applied in ethno-political conflict constellations: cultural, physical and structural violence (1990:291).

can be no inevitability as to how the LTTE and the Tamil struggle will evolve, and the prevailing ground conditions dictate the options available at any given moment. Concomitantly, any lasting transformation must come from the internal convictions of the actors concerned and cannot be imposed from outside, especially by coercion.

We also argue that the LTTE cannot be considered a monolithic entity. This is not to say there are serious contradictions within the organisation, but that its decisions are made by careful and rational consideration, through internal advocacy and discussion and cost-benefit analysis of available options. Contrary to assertions by its detractors, this is not paradoxical, despite the LTTE’s reputation for iron discipline: whilst policy decisions taken are rigorously executed, space for debate re-emerges whenever strategy is being reconsidered. For example, the LTTE’s decision in 2003 to ‘temporarily suspend’ participation in the Norwegian-facilitated talks with the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) was not an arbitrary move but a considered decision taken in response to specific external developments, including the demonstrable lack of progress in implementing what the movement had repeatedly insisted were crucial agreements on humanitarian issues.

Similar strategic considerations led to the LTTE’s concomitant decision to then seek another line of negotiation around the notion of an ‘interim administration’ and, especially, to put forward concrete proposals for such negotiations, also linked to these humanitarian issues.

A key impediment to analysing conflict transformation in Sri Lanka is the abstract conception of the state and polity there as a democracy. Democracy is widely acknowledged as much more than the mere holding of regular elections. By critically reviewing contemporary democracy entitlement theories that focus on procedures, we urge a broader definition that focuses on the substantive constituting elements of democracy. The ethno-political conflict in Sri Lanka arose out of the systematic denial of Tamil identity, political power, social and cultural values and aspirations by the post-colonial Sinhala majoritarian state. Tamil resistance to this marginalisation was staged for several decades through democratic mobilisation and peaceful agitation (see Wilson 1988, Bose 1994, DeVotta 2004, Balasingham 2004). It was the failure of democratic procedures to address Tamil grievances, and the concomitant escalation of state repression, that motivated the transition to violent resistance. When examining the possible trajectories of transformation in Sri Lanka, it is of paramount importance to realise that the underlying roots of the conflict lie in the denial of the Tamils as a co-constituting nation of the post-colonial state. The Tamil quest for redress later crystallised in the form of an armed struggle for an independent state, the core issues of justice, equality, democracy, human rights and dignity. The Tamil liberation struggle, aimed at securing redress and justice, is therefore incontestably political in nature. While the nature of the struggle - from parliamentary to armed opposition - and the means - from non-violent protest to militant insurgency - changed over time, the core issue of equitable distribution of power and resources, articulated in political demands varying from federalism and confederalism to consociationalism and outright independence has remained unchanged.

Rejecting a dichotomy of violence and politics, we argue that the Tamil struggle, led today by the LTTE, is a political project pursued by both peaceful and military means with varying degrees of emphasis and intensity at any one time. Indeed both modes are pursued simultaneously, with one or the other to the fore. In considering conflict transformation, it should be borne in mind that the decision to prioritise one or other means of struggle is driven by strategic consideration and context rather than an inevitability stemming from some essential characteristic of the LTTE.

This decision-making process, moreover, can be best explained by using the rational-choice theory of utility maximisation. This holds that in pursuit of their goals, actors choose the best available option to maximise gains and minimise losses (Daase 2001). A party to a conflict will only negotiate in good faith if it believes that such negotiations will yield a result better than its

14

BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement). Otherwise, it will simply use the negotiating process to either reduce its opponents’ BATNA or increase its own BATNA. Similarly, transformation from a predominantly military to a mainly political strategy happens when the actor feels that the switch will enhance the possibility of achieving its goals, tactical or strategic. When choosing the appropriate strategy, liberation movements will consider the history of their relationship with their state opponent (i.e. the question of trust), potential losses and gains and the effectiveness of the choice in achieving their long-term goal.

A key consideration in this regard is the issue of physical security (in the context of Human Security). We reiterate that the initial transition of Tamil struggle from peaceful agitation to armed struggle also has to be considered in the context of the deepening of violent state repression which began soon after independence. Sri Lanka’s post colonial history has been

“punctuated by bouts of annihilatory violence, often called pogroms, directed against the Tamils in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983” (Krishna 1999:67) in which thousands were massacred, property was destroyed, and hundreds of thousands made refugees (Balasingham 2004:9). This “physical discrimination” by the state against the Tamils, as V. Nithiyanandam puts it, stemmed not only from the use of state (military) violence; whenever anti-Tamil rioting took place, “governments in power, by and large, condoned these” (2000:300-1). This mob violence and the repression with which the state responded to Tamil satyagraha (peaceful disobedience) campaigns in 1956 and 1961 left Tamils powerless and clearly vulnerable, in a situation where the Sinhala majority and the Sinhala-dominated state retained the monopoly on violence. Brian Blodgett, notes in his detailed historical study of Sri Lanka’s military, “in 1962, a policy of recruiting only from the Sinhalese Buddhist community was instituted. This was the beginning of an ethnically pure army”

(2004:54). Today the Sri Lankan armed forces are overwhelmingly Sinhala. In this context, John Burton’s elucidation in human needs theory on the non-negotiability of issues related to security and identity is important to understanding the different facets of the Tamil struggle; he concludes

“conflicts which are of global concern involve deep issues of ethnic and cultural identity, of recognition and of participation that are usually denied to ethnic minorities in addition to issues of security and other values that are non-negotiable” (1990:5).

Thus, apart from the impossibility of the Tamils securing justice and redress through Sri Lanka’s political system, the emergence of Tamil militancy is also rooted in an urgent need to resist state violence and (state-sanctioned) communal violence (Bose 1994). This is not to say that the LTTE has not undergone a process of transformation since its inception in 1976. Starting out as a shadowy militant group, the LTTE has today visibly transformed into a ‘state within a state’ with its own standing military and an extensive civil administrative apparatus. Moreover the extent of the LTTE’s transformation ‘from guerrillas to government’ goes beyond mere structural changes: the movement’s very ethos has transitioned from one of armed resistance to that of ‘state building’

i.e. the establishment of systems of administration and governance including law and order (police and judiciary), economic management (a ‘Central’ bank), welfare, etc. However, as Kristian Stokke (2006) has noted in his detailed study of the LTTE’s institution-building efforts, this is not to say the Sri Lankan state’s structures have been entirely replaced within LTTE areas – for example, there are two ‘parallel’ health and education systems. Thus, borrowing Amitai Etzioni’s concept of active society, the LTTE can be observed to have engaged in “intensive and perpetual self-transformation”

(1968:viii). This process has accelerated since the advent of the Norwegian peace process. However a conception of ‘transformation’ as a linear model of social change from a ‘military to a political’

struggle fails to capture (a) the dynamic nature of the conflict and its resolution process, (b) the simultaneity of pertinent socio-political realities and the actors’ decision-making logics which are demonstrably based on rational choice and real-politik considerations and (c) destructive cycles of mutually reinforcing dynamics. Having said this, social and political movements are, as Ernesto

Zirakzadeh points out, “polymorphous, with multiple personalities and lines of development. They are constantly evolving yet transforming – as they are internally dialectical – and therefore bearing multiple legacies for future generations” (2006:244).

16

2. A Question of Democracy

Democracy is commonly accepted as an effective tool for handling conflict and enabling equal and just representation. Moreover, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, democracy has become the “touchstone of legitimacy” (Bodansky 1999). The democratic ethos, rooted in pluralist culture and norms, is even deemed to preclude the resort to violence. The causal logic of this

‘democratic peace’ theory is that democracies have never waged war against each other and shun the use of violence to resolve conflicts because it is morally unacceptable to do so. The theory has inevitably come under forceful criticism, not least from the school of political neo-realism (see Waltz 2000). Its applicability in intra-state conflict is also disputed. Nevertheless, since the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1992) democracy has become a panacea for resolving disputes.

Proponents of the democratic entitlement school interpret democracy as a narrow, process-oriented concept defined by the holding of periodic elections (e.g. Schumpeter 1947, Mill 1967, Bentham 1960). However, the experience of electoral processes in Sri Lanka shows that they were largely unaccountable to their societies and politically biased in spite of the characterisation of Sri Lanka as “one of Asia’s most vibrant democracies” (Coomaraswamy 2003:145). But while elections are generally regarded as the best instrument for a population to choose a more representative leadership and the best mechanism to transfer power and legitimacy, in illiberal or majoritarian democracies elections can easily become a tool for a majority community to retain power and marginalize minorities by sheer numerical strength. Elections can thus lead to what John Stuart Mill calls the ‘tyranny of the majority’ (1859). By way of contrast, we proceed with a sequenced model in which the values and features inherent to democracy, rather than the mere operation of electoral mechanisms, are given primacy.

2.1 Failure of democratic mechanisms in Sri Lanka

The ethno-political conflict in Sri Lanka emerged in the context of a demonstrable failure of democratic mechanisms to resolve profound disputes and sustain justice. Sri Lanka may have made a smooth initial transition following independence to electoral and parliamentary democracy, but values underpinning democracy quickly gave way to majoritarianism and ethnic supremacy.

Indeed, as we detail below, democratic politics have sharpened tensions and precipitated the intractable ethno-political conflict in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan polity encompasses all the elements of majoritarian democracy, generally defined as those forms of government which concentrate power in the hands of executives elected by a majority of the popular vote. The institutional forms characterising majoritarianism include “a) strong presidential rule⁸, b) first-past-the-post electoral systems c) unicameral legislatures, d) relatively weak constitutional divisions of powers between the branches of government and e) unitary, centralised state and administrative structures”

(Bastian and Luckham 2003:43). Yet, as described earlier, countries are frequently deemed democracies when they meet the test of regular and notionally ‘free and fair’ elections, even though they might be deficient in other criteria that define formal democracy.

In the Sri Lankan context, it is arguably more appropriate to talk about ethnocracy than democracy, since political and civil rights are unevenly protected across ethnic, class and territorial units. The country has thus far had three constitutions, whose changes underline the transition to a majoritarian state. While the first (drafted by the British) reflected the Westminster

8 This is particularly the case in Sri Lanka, where political accountability is weak due to an excessively powerful presidential office and relatively weak legislature.

model, the second and third enshrined Buddhism as a specially protected religion and endorsed the unitary model of governance. The constitutions were not only mono-ethnic in design, but they were instruments in the hands of the governing party of the time to produce favourable conditions to extend their rule by appealing to Sinhala majoritarian sentiments. This dynamic of

‘ethnic outbidding’ (DeVotta 2004) has quite rightly received considerable scholarly attention.

Until the Indo-Sri Lanka accord⁹ in 1987, Sinhala was the only official language,¹⁰ sustaining the view that the island was the “special homeland”¹¹ of the Sinhala Buddhist majority. As Radhika Coomaraswamy concludes:

“Many scholars have pointed to the fact that Sinhalese nationalism recognises Sri Lanka as a Sinhala Buddhist state, united under a central monarch whose duty is to protect and foster Buddhism. The politics of Sinhalese nationalism therefore required that the imperatives of majoritarianism be entrenched. Any formula that attempted to suggest a non-majoritarian approach to democracy was treated with scorn, whether it involved power sharing at the centre or at the periphery” (2003:146).

The process of post-independence state-building in Sri Lanka thus was partisan and denied the Tamil community access to the state’s centres of power. The point here is that the transition from war to peace must inevitably involve a democratic transition in the fullest sense.

More importantly, the transition from armed struggle to electoral politics needs to be preceded by such a democratic transition.

After confrontations between Tamil militants and the Sinhala-dominated armed forces broke out in the early 1980s, Tamils have lived under starkly different modes of governance to the Sinhalese. Even for Tamils living in the government-controlled parts of the Northeast, emergency regulations and military occupation have been the order of the day. Repression characterised by indiscriminate violence, human rights abuses (and institutionalised impunity for the security forces), racial profiling and arbitrary, often punitive, exercise of laws and regulations has seriously challenged the legitimacy of the Colombo-based governments. These challenges to authority normally arise when there is a lack of congruence between community, territory and government (Birch 2001:61). Such regimes, which are classified as ‘failed states’ or ‘illiberal democracies’

(Zakaria 1997), are sometimes also endowed with democratic features, usually because they have gone through an electoral process. They can thus claim some form of legitimacy. However, there is a contradiction between the claim of the majoritarian government to be democratic (and therefore legitimate) and the perception of a sizable proportion of the population in the Northeast, who

9 The Indo-Sri Lanka accord paved the way for the amendment of the 1978 constitution, which introduced the provincial council system to meet the aspirations of the Tamils (merging of the Tamil homeland in the North and East to one unit, making Tamil an official language, etc). The provincial governments lacked power (their decisions could be overridden by the parliament), influence and support by the central government. With the 2006 court ruling on the unconstitutionality of vital provisions on the merged North East province, the Indo-Sri Lanka accord has become null and void.

10 Chapter IV of the 1978 constitution accords Sinhala the place of ‘Official Language’ (Clause 20) whilst both Sinhala and Tamil are declared ‘National Languages’ (Clause 21). The crucial difference is that while a person may be educated in either ‘National’ language, knowledge of the ‘Official’ Language can be a condition of admission to ‘Public Service, Judicial Service, Local Government Service, a public corporation or statutory institution’ (Clause 22(5)). The thirteenth amendment to the constitution (a consequence of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord) made Tamil an official language also, but this was never fully implemented.

11 This study does not intend to reflect on the self-legitimation myths and legends of the Sinhala community which underpin their claim as the “chosen” people of the island and the original inhabitants. This has been widely discussed in several scholarly works (e.g. Jayawardene 1985, Gunawardana 1995).

18

feel unrepresented and unlawfully ruled. Indeed, one of the salient features of Sri Lanka’s post- independence era is that it has had to be ruled by Emergency Powers for most of the period.¹²

After John Rawls (1971) we argue for a first-principle conception of democracy embodying compliance with the consent of the governed and the exercise of power in a manner consistent with basic political freedoms and the rule of law. This would also embrace all the other constitutive elements of democracy which find their institutional expression in numerous forms of governance.

Moreover, in this conception, the democratisation process in the transition period from war to peace can, whilst holding true to the ideals underlying democratic governance, nevertheless go through different phases and institutional forms in the interim. Following Kumar Rupesinghe’s definition, democratisation is a “process through which countries develop institutions, behaviour patterns, and a political culture that contain the exercise of power” (1998:215). However, the current literature on democratisation accords much less attention to institution-building in the transition period. To elaborate the point made above, a substantial institution-building exercise, that of the LTTE’s civil administration, has not been examined for its potential for democratisation, especially since this parallel ‘order of violence’ represents a highly institutionalised form of authority, to the degree that it controls a specific territory and the economic resources within it, and derives its legitimacy by providing security and a welfare system to the people living in that territory (see section 5 below). While rudimentary in comparison to a fully-fledged state, the LTTE’s parallel governance structures in the areas under its control have established the rule of law and elements of checks and balances as well as measures towards respecting some international norms and values. The LTTE’s civil administrative structures undoubtedly need substantial refinement and development to meet international expectations and standards. That, in turn, needs international expertise and support for capacity building. However, to begin with, this requires basic acknowledgement of the reality of their existence and their role in the daily lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

2.2 Considerations on legitimacy

Legitimacy is an essentially contested concept. We do not seek to resolve the contradictions among theorists, but adopt a basic conception from Max Weber (1978: 213-4), who identifies legitimacy with stable and effective political power, reducing it to a routine submission to authority. The essence of Weber’s concept of legitimacy is hence the individual sense of duty, obligation, or what ought to be done according to the rules, commands and so on issued by the authority. He further argues that legitimacy existed when people believed power to be just, and outlines three types of legitimate regime: traditional/aristocratic, charismatic, or legal in nature.

Traditional states were valid because they were always so, or a product of “ancient recognition”.

Charismatic states were deemed legitimate based on the rule of charismatic leaders who by a

“gift of grace” possessed authority. Legal legitimacy was based on a belief in the validity of legal statute and functional competence based on rationally created rules.

According to this typology, the LTTE’s claim to rule is based in the second and third. If legitimacy is a question of whether the political power of the leadership is stable and effective within a certain order, indicators like leadership structure, common values and principles,

12 Giorgio Agamben’s notion of states of exception (2005) is critical in this context. He argues that there is just a thin difference between dictatorship and democracy, as more and more states in times of crisis impose “exceptional laws”, which eventually become “permanent”. The indefinite suspension of laws is the defining moment of states of exception. Referring to the Third Reich, he points out that Hitler never abrogated the Weimar constitution but just suspended it for the whole period of the Third Reich. Sri Lanka has been ruled under this notion of perennial states of exception. These measures were supposed to be temporary and therefore exceptional. However, the state of exception has become the norm and democracy is not possible in the climate of exception and the tyranny of the state.

coherence and institutional structures reveal the nature and level of legitimacy.¹³ We will later examine the LTTE’s efforts to build a legitimate order based on the provision of internal (law and order) and external (protection from Sri Lankan attack) security, welfare and justice. However, we note here that a fundamental omission of the international community’s peace-building initiative in Sri Lanka has been to overlook how political institutions co-shape the transition process and the decision-making process within the organisation. International efforts towards establishing democracy in post-conflict countries routinely adopt a template approach (De Zeeuw 2005:481). It is of disputed efficacy but nevertheless a good starting point. However in the case of the territories under the control of the LTTE, this approach was never attempted in a coherent manner.¹⁴ This study argues, therefore, that the international community’s reluctance to support institution-building in the areas under LTTE control limited the scope for the consolidation of effective governance and, thus, democratic accountability in those areas.

As David Held points out: “politics is about power, that is, it is about the capacity of social agents, agencies and institution to maintain or transform their environment, social or physical. It is about the resources that underpin this capacity and about the forces that shape and influence its exercise” (2005:311). This led us to look at the power-related dimensions of the 2002 peace process. A widely held belief among the conflict resolution expert community is that a strategic equilibrium is essential for a negotiated settlement. Transformation of power relations – from domination to cooperation and mutual empowerment - is generally regarded as a precondition for sustainable peace processes. As William Zartman has observed, negotiations under conditions of asymmetry are a paradox, negotiations function best under conditions of equality and only take place when the parties have mutual veto over negative outcomes (1995:8). It is generally accepted that the peace process of 2002 was enabled by the emergence of a strategic equilibrium (characterised on the battlefield by a ‘hurting stalemate’). The LTTE entered the negotiation process with the Sri Lankan government because of a perceived commitment by the international community to support the emergence of a solution to the conflict. Without internationally-backed third party facilitation, for example, the LTTE would have not entered into the resolution process with the Sri Lankan state, which it perceived to be duplicitous, dishonest and intransigent.

However, the LTTE perceived the international engagement post-2002 to have deliberately altered this equilibrium in favour of the Sri Lankan state¹⁵, citing the role of the international community in the movement’s inexorable political marginalisation and the substantial re-arming of the Sri Lankan armed forces throughout the peace process. Indeed, former US Ambassador Jeffrey Lunstead (2007) acknowledges that the US deliberately and ‘substantially’ accelerated its military assistance to Sri Lanka from the beginning of the peace process in 2002. Interestingly, he also acknowledges that “these activities may well have contributed to a feeling by the LTTE that the international community was hemming them in and reducing their options” (Lunstead 2007:18).

13 The administrative structures in the LTTE controlled territories are not all under the sole authority of the LTTE.

The public services (health, education, power and water supply) are, to a notable extent, provided by Sri Lankan state mechanisms, but are mirrored by other LTTE-developed institutions to varying degrees. For a detailed discussion, see Stokke (2006).

14 Some limited international support was extended to the LTTE Police and Judiciary towards enhancing community policing. However, these were ad-hoc and piecemeal initiatives, rather than part of a wider strategy towards supporting transformation. The Norwegian government funded the establishment of the LTTE Peace Secretariat (as well as the Government Peace Secretariat) but this was primarily in the context of coordinating the parties’ participation in the peace talks.

15 The LTTE’s Political Strategist and Chief Negotiator, Anton Balasingham, argues: “Unfortunately the excessive involvement of international actors and their own strategic interests and power projections, began to affect the balance of power relations between the parties to the conflict. [The government’s] grand plan of an ‘international safety net’ as a containment strategy against the LTTE made the Tigers cautious and suspicious of international entrapment via the peace process” (2004:465).

20

This resulted not only from military support for the state, but also from the imposition of sanctions on the LTTE, such as its exclusion from the pre-donor aid conference in Washington (the LTTE is proscribed in the US) in April 2003¹⁶, the travel ban on its officials imposed by European countries, and the subsequent banning of the LTTE as a terrorist entity in the EU and Canada. The inability of donor countries to channel aid, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts to the Northeastern areas under LTTE control, ostensibly due to the lack of ‘legal’ mechanisms, further strengthened this perception of bias towards the state (see below in section 7).

We argue that this emerging political reality inexorably compelled the LTTE to embark on unilateral strategies to re-establish a strategic equilibrium, primarily by an accelerated military buildup. This subsequently compelled it to abandon pursuit of its stated political strategy during the peace process: the establishment of an internationally accepted interim administrative structure for the Northeast. The potential for transformation towards a fully-fledged democratic entity with accountability structures (i.e., a comprehensive civil administration in the Northeast) was superseded by the emergence of a security dilemma. By thwarting the LTTE’s efforts to establish this interim civil administration in the Northeast, the international community missed a unique opportunity to co-shape the transformation of Sri Lanka’s conflict and establish a pathway to a durable and equitable solution. Trapped in the discourses of terrorism and state sovereignty, the international community succumbed instead to the contradictions within its own goals.

While it is argued that fundamental human rights are universal and indivisible, the failure to also formalise and protect fundamental group rights reveals a crucial paradox in the liberal democratic context. In Sri Lanka, this has directly led to a refusal to recognise and thereby support processes that could ensure the transformation of the protracted ethno-political conflict and the emergence of a stable and democratic polity.

16 There was an initial agreement between the LTTE and the state that international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Northeast would be jointly solicited. The first international conference on November 25, 2002, was jointly attended by the two parties. However the second conference was scheduled in Washington, precluding the LTTE’s attendance. The LTTE also refused to attend the third, in Tokyo on June 10, 2003, for which the Washington meeting was a preliminary.

3. Sri Lanka’s Conflict

Inevitably, the origins, objectives and character of Sri Lanka’s conflict are contested, not least because it “is the result of a complex mix of factors, which have changed and mutated over time” (Goodhand 2001:26-7). The LTTE argues it is spearheading an armed struggle for self- determination and political independence for the Tamil people in their homeland as a response to institutionalised racism and escalating violence against them by a Sinhala-dominated state.¹⁷ In short, it is waging a ‘national liberation struggle’ (Balasingham 1983). On the other hand, describing itself as a beleaguered democracy, the Sri Lankan state denounces the LTTE’s violence as a terrorist challenge to its authority, unity and territorial integrity. The state therefore asserts it is ‘fighting terrorism’ (an assertion, some scholars note, at least partly rooted in an ethno-religious ideology¹⁸). This two-protagonist view of the conflict is, despite the presence of other armed non- state actors (on both sides) and the multiplicity of positions on conflict-related issues (such as independence or secession, federalism, etc.) justifiable on the basis that the state and the LTTE are the two primary actors through which strategically organised violence in Sri Lanka is manifest.¹⁹

The war between the LTTE (which, after a series of internecine clashes, established its hegemony over the other Tamil militant groups by the mid-80s²⁰) and the Sri Lankan armed forces has occurred in three phases (commonly referred to as the Eelam Wars) of increasing intensity and territorial scale: 1983-88 (Eelam War 1), 1990-94 (Eelam War 2) and 1995-2002 (Eelam War 3). In the battles of 2000 and 2001, the LTTE used a conventional military structure and captured large tracts of territory from the state. Thus, the armed struggle, “having started as a guerrilla war, by 1998, had intensified into a guerrilla-cum-semi-conventional conflict with the LTTE [controlling] large areas of the North and East” (Arunatilake et al. 2001:1484), and from 1999, to a conventional war characterised by set-piece battles with both sides fielding thousands of combatants supported by heavy weapons. In the 1990s, the LTTE’s naval arm, the Sea Tigers, emerged to challenge the Sri Lanka Navy. In 2007, the LTTE unveiled a fledgling air force consisting of armed light aircraft.

Several negotiation processes have been initiated since the armed conflict began. There were talks in 1985, 1987, 1989-90, 1994-95 and 2002-03. Whilst none of these produced progress towards a lasting solution, the most recent effort, the Norwegian-facilitated peace process which began in 2001, produced the longest cessation of hostilities ever and, initially at least, provided space for the LTTE to embark on a number of non-violent activities in pursuit of its political goals.²¹

17 Although the LTTE, whilst seeking Tamil self-rule, points out that the Tamil homeland was arbitrarily merged by Colonial Britain with the Sinhala homeland before the island was given independence, the movement posits institutionalised discrimination, rather than self-rule in the past, as the rationale for its struggle.

18 Discussing the ‘just war’ aspects of the state’s military campaign against the Tamil Tigers, Tessa Bartholomeusz notes how “the [Sri Lanka government] asks its warriors to consider their campaigns against terrorism as religious work”

(2002:36).

19 Despite assertions by anti-LTTE paramilitary groups such as the TMVP/Karuna Group of their independence within the Northeast theatre, there is now extensive evidence of collaboration and coordination between these groups and the regular Sri Lankan forces (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2007, Rock 2006).

20 Although in the late 1970’s the existence of 37 militant groups were recorded, only five were of significance in the ensuing conflict: the LTTE, PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation), EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front) and EROS (Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students). Notwithstanding their common stated goal to achieve an independent state, confrontations with the LTTE led to the collapse of the other major groups and (in the context of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of the late eighties) their switching allegiances to the state armed forces, leaving the LTTE as the dominant Tamil liberation movement.

21 Simmering violence in the form of a ‘shadow war’ between both sides’ intelligence services escalated, especially after 2004, into open war in 2006 and in 2008, the government abrogated the CFA.

22

The closure of that space, which occurred for a number of reasons outlined later, contributed greatly to the collapse of the peace process and, eventually, the ceasefire also. The primary purpose of those negotiations, according to the LTTE, was to establish an interim administration for the Northeast which could restore normality to the war-shattered region.²² The LTTE withdrew from the talks in April 2003, protesting the government’s failure to implement agreements already reached. Efforts to restart negotiations have been unsuccessful.

3.1 Antecedents

Ceylon, as it was named by Britain, the last of the three colonial powers to rule it (after Portugal and the Netherlands), became independent in 1948, and was renamed Sri Lanka in 1972²³. The mango-shaped island is 270 miles long and 150 miles wide at its broadest point. There are three ethnic communities: the Sinhalese (74%), Tamils (18.2%) and Muslims (7.4%). The Tamils are divided into two categories: the ‘Sri Lankan’ Tamils (12.6% of the population) and Indian or

‘Up-Country’ Tamils (5.6%) who are descendents of South Indian labourers brought to the island by the British from 1825 onwards. Sinhalese are predominantly Buddhists, and most Tamils are Hindu, but some of each are Christian. But “over the twentieth century, religion has gained in importance as a marker of ethnicity. … Increasingly since independence in 1948, a single, discrete Sinhalese Buddhist category has been rhetorically opposed to all the rest, who then are, by reduction, not Buddhists, not Sinhala speakers and, in some eyes, not true Sri Lankans” (Winslow and Woost 2004:5). The Tamils have predominated in the northern and eastern regions while the Sinhalese majority primarily lives in the central, western and southern parts. The Muslims are found in the urban areas of the west and southwest as well as on the east coast, while the

‘Up-Country’ Tamils live on the central highland estates. However, since independence, several state-sponsored colonisation schemes have also located Sinhalese settlements in Tamil-speaking parts of the Northeast (Manogaran 1994).

It is arguable that whilst ethnicity is not in itself the cause of Sri Lanka’s conflict, it is nevertheless the primary identity around which political tensions were mobilised even before independence and especially thereafter. As Camilla Orjuela points out, Sri Lanka’s population

“has through the years become polarised into relatively clearly defined ethnic groups” (2003:202).

At the same time, many analysts correctly privilege the role of post-colonial state in fomenting and exacerbating ethnic divisions and tensions. Sankaran Krishna, for example, argues that “Sri Lanka’s movement from a peaceful, indeed idyllic Ceylon to a synonym for macabre ethnic violence is the story of a majority community’s attempt to fashion a nation in its own image through monopolisation of the state and of the consequent emergence of a secessionist ethnonational movement” (1999:31).

The erosion of the minority-protecting checks and balances incorporated into Ceylon’s British-drafted constitution began almost immediately with the disenfranchisement of over 900,000 ‘Up-Country’ Tamils²⁴ by the newly elected United National Party (UNP). At the same time, large-scale state-sponsored settlement of Sinhalese into Tamil areas in the Northeast, mainly

22 Arguing that the slender majority of the then Sri Lankan government precluded its delivery of political restructuring, the LTTE leadership called for talks towards “formulating an interim administration set-up for the Northeast in which the LTTE can participate.” Comments to press by LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirapaharan on April 10, 2001.

23 The Sinhala name, Sri Lanka, along with the Sinhala-Buddhist constitution passed that year, remains part of Tamil-Sinhala tensions. For convenience, Sri Lanka will largely be used here to refer to both the island and the post- independence state, irrespective of the period.

24 This was implemented through three inter-connected acts of parliament – The Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948, The India-Pakistan Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949 and The Ceylon Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act of 1949.