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The Use of Quality and Reputation Indicators by Consumers: The Case of Bordeaux Wine

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Munich Personal RePEc Archive

The Use of Quality and Reputation Indicators by Consumers: The Case of Bordeaux Wine

Landon, Stuart and Smith, Constance

University of Alberta, Department of Economics

March 1997

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9283/

MPRA Paper No. 9283, posted 24 Jun 2008 01:48 UTC

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