The Basis of Indian Classical Drama
(as Explained in Ancient Theory)*
By K. M. Vabma, Berhn
A number of speculations have been made about the beginnings of
Indian drama and the opinions of scholars on that question are widely
divergent. In any case, these beginnings cannot be assigned to the
Christian era, because recently discovered fragments of dramas of the
1st century A. D. show a high degree of development. Further we have a
treatise on drama, namely, the Nätyasästra of Bharata, which is generally
accepted to belong to the second or, at the latest, the third century A. D.
It is a monumental work treating all aspects of drama, and it is probably
the biggest of the treatises written on drama in the whole world at that
time. The fact that such a monumental treatise could come into existence
indicates a previous long process of development of the art. Moreover
the Nätyasästra is clearly not in any way the earhest work on drama,
although it is the first of the extant works. A sequence of treatises on
drama can be traced from the Nätyasästra itself in which it is the fourth
in succession^. All these facts are sufficient to prove that the beginnings
of Indian drama go back several centuries before the Christian era.
We have, however, no precise knowledge of the conditions of the
beginnmgs of drama, nor of its development before the Christian era.
Subsequent conditions have, of course, been studied to some extent from
the plays themselves and also from theoretical treatises, but, sofar as
the study of theorj' goes, insufficient attention has been paid to the shift
of emphasis and to the change of conceptions in the works written in
subsequent periods. Not only that, later conceptions have been read
into earlier works. Consequently the real spirit of the early theory of
drama has not been fully understood.
It would therefore be worthwhile to make an attempt to understand
the basis of Indian classical drama as explained in early theory. By
* This paper was written for and read in a conference on Asian Theater,
organized by the Centre National de la Eecherohe Scientifique with tbe col-
labaration of the Theatre des Nations and Le Cercle Culturel do Boyaumont
from 28th May to 1st Jime 1959 at L'abbaye de Boyaumont, near Paris. The
writer is grateful to Dr. A. A. Bake for his kindness in going through the MS.
' The author of this paper himself has discussed this matter at length in
his book, "Seven Words in Bharata: What Do They Signify" which is
entirely devoted to discuss some of the outstanding textual problems of the
NätyaSästra (see the former, p. 84 et Seq.).
early theorj- vve mean the theory as found in the Nätyasästra. All other
extant texts came into existence several centuries later, at a time when
many concepts had changed. One is, therefore, justified in making this
explicit division.
Drama is stated to have many purposes, the foremost of which is to
manifest rasa. Most of the subjects concerning drama are determined and
defined from this point of view. Because of this paramount importance of
rasa no attempt at understanding Indian drama can be made without some
knowledge of its nature. Hence we should see first what rasa is.
Rasa is the result of a perfect combination of bhävas, vibhävas and
anubhävas^. Among these the bhävas are mental conditions or moods. By
mental conditions is meant an aspect of consciousness called feeling, and
this is the most important item of our investigation.
This feeling is in itself the result of a cause, namely, cognition. It can
in its turn cause other effects on all the three planes, namely the mental,
the vocal and the physical (bodily). Everything which manifests itself
on these three planes is a consequent. Thus the feeling is, on the one
hand, a consequent, and on the other, a cause. If we single out a feeling
in ordinary life and look at it, we find that cognition, feeling and conse¬
quents of the feeling will always manifest themselves in the same order.
In the field of drama the feehng should be considered to reside in
three different places, namely, in the characters portrayed (dramatis per¬
sonae), in the actors and in the spectators. We have seen that in ordinary
life, that is in the characters portrayed, cognition, feeling and its conse¬
quents always follow in the same order. In the spectator, however, this
order changes. So far as cognition goes, that stiU comes first, but in this
case its cause is not personal, that is, although the spectator does not remain
indifferent to it, yet he does not take it as a personal matter. In the spec¬
tator it is, therefore, not a cause in the same way as it is in ordinary life or
the characters portrayed. It is still cognition, because it brings about a
feehng in the spectator, but it can no longer be called a "cause" in the
usual sense. This is why it was given a separate name in Indian aesthetic
terminology. It is now vibJiäva, a word derived from the root bhü prefixed
by vi, having the meaning oi vijnäna (cognition), as Bharata, the author
of the Nätyasästra declares^.
So far as the physical and oral consequences go, they do not occur in
the spectator. This hardly needs proving. Everyone of us has seen dramas
' See Nätyasästra (N. S.) (Chowkhamba edition), Ch. 6, p. 71. In order to
indicate the relevant places in the text references are given in this paper to
Chowkhamba edition only, but for the critical estimation of our conclusions
reader is requested to consult all the editions.
2 Ibid., Ch. 7, p. 80.
containing love-scenes, and at that time we have had, of com-se, erotic feehng. In spite of this we did not start ogling our neighbours.
Although the spectator has no consequents of his own, yet he must have
the knowledge of consequents. Without that knowledge there could not
be enjoyment in witnessing a drama, because the cognition or precisely
speaking vibhäva could just bring about the feeling in him. So here the
knowledge of the consequents comes to intensify the feeling and prolong
it, but the prolongation is possible only to a limited extent. The spectator
has no consequents of his own and yet he needs the sense of them. How
is this brought about ? The answer is by the actor, who, assuming the role of
somebody, shows certain consequents as if they were his own. The
knowledge of the consequents in the spectator intensifies the feeling which
is brought about by the vibhäva. This means that the consequents or rather
the awareness of the consequents precedes the feeling and does not follow it.
Thus we find a change of order of cognition feeling and consequents in the
spectator. Therefore they can no longer be called consequents. In this con¬
text we see them act almost as causes, yet they cannot be causes properly
speaking, as they do not really bring about the feeling. What they do is to in¬
tensify and prolong the feeling. Thus they are causes ofthe intensification and prolongation ofthe feeling but not ofthe feeling itself. As such they are quite
different from the vibhävas, and therefore Bharata calls them anubhävas.^
These two, the vibhäva and anubhäva, are essential for the manifestation
of feehng in the spectator, without them there cannot be any feeling. Has
this feeling any role to play or is it an end in itself ? In ordinary life a feeling
may cause another feeling and that one engender another, and so on, so that
wo find a chain of feelings. They are, however, nothing but feelings. In ordi¬
nary life every feeling has its own character and whenever it appears with
that character, even when it is caused by another feeling. In the same way
the feehng manifested in the spectator of a drama, will have its character
and it may, hke a feehng in ordinary life, cause another feeling. But that
is not the end, in this case it causes something else as well, something per-
vasive^ and most desirable for the spectator. Because of this something he
loves to see the performance even of a drama which persistently evokes
sorrow. Because of this unusual function the feeling manifested in the spec¬
tator when witnessing a theatrical performance is not a feeling as experi¬
enced in ordinary life, and so Bharata caUs it bhäva,^ which means that
which brings about something else of an unusual and pervasive nature.
^ Ibid. It is expected that this item also should be treated in the same lines
as bhäva and vibhäva. But in no edition one finds such a treatment, so one
might conclude that some lines are missing. - Ibid., Cb. 7, p. 80.
* Ibid., p. 79. For the classification of bhävas as well as the reasons for
their designation see the same ohapter, i.e., the seventh one.
These bhävas are forty-nine in number and are classified into three classes, sthäyi, sancäri and sättvika bhävas. Of these forty-nine, thirty-three
are sancärins, while the sthäyins and the sättvikas number eight each.
Sthäyin means something permanent, consequently the sthäyibhävas
are sentiments such as love, sorrow, fear, etc. The sthäyins are the predo-
minent ones, because the others are always subordinate to them. Some¬
times a sthäyin may act as a subordinate to another sthäyin in which
case it loses its status as a sthäyin.
Saücärins bear that name because they are repeatedly operative for
a comparatively short time. Consequently they are "transitories". They
are not final in themselves for they always serve to manifest a sthäyin. In a
sense not even a sthäyin is final in the field of drama, because it also
causes something else, viz., rasa. In another sense, however, namely in
comparison with the other bliävas it is final, because the rest of the
bhävas work as its subordinates.
The sättvikabhävas are: rigidity, sweat, horripilation, breaking of the
voice, trembling, change of facial colour, tears and stupefaction. Ap¬
parently these are physical, bodily manifestations and yet they are de¬
finitely regarded as mental actions or feehngs in the early theoretical
treatise. This created difficulties for later writers. On the one hand, they
could not refuse to accept them as feelings, but, on the other, they could
not explain them as such. As a result of this confusion they tried to offer
sentimental explanations. Even for modern psychologists these are
problems, even they cannot settle the question finally and satisfactorily.
In any case it is beyond doubt that in Bharata these eight phenomena
are considered as feelings. Perhaps in the ancient view they were origin¬
ally mental conditions and as such cause a given result on the physical
plane and that thus, in spite of their being mental conditions, they
could be designated by the same term as their consequents. In this
connection we may further observe the following: We have seen that
the spectator does not in general have any physical or oral consequents
(anubhävas), but we can observe him having horripilation, shedding
tears etc. This happens perhaps on account of the exceptional nature of
the special mental conditions or which we call sättvikas. This means that
the horripilation, tears etc. are not in fact physical in origin as we
popularly assume, but that they really are mental moods. Their special
nature is pervasiveness, because, born in the mind in a state of exaltation, they pervade the whole body. So we can call the sättvikas "pervasives".
They are sancärins as well in a sense that they are always subordinate
to the sthäyins. There is, however, a difference. AU the sättvikas will
appear in every rasa but not aU the sancärins proper can appear in
every rasa and some of them only in a certain rasa.
Thus we have discussed above about the meanings of diflFerent words
occur in rasa definition, so let us now recapitulate the same definition.
Rasa is the result of a perfect combination of bMvas, vibhävas and
anubhävas. This entire combination will give rise to a total experience
other than the individual feelings of definit nature, although the sthäyin
may figure supreme in this combination. This is like a fine drink. A fine
drink is a combination of different ingredients, but its taste is not that
of any of the ingredents. It is quite diflFerent and inclusive of the tastes
of all the diflFerent ingredients.
Vibhävas of a given feeling are not personal, so the feelings will not
give any scope to volition. Consequently the spectator is free from
bondage. Because there is no volition the spectator's total experience
from this combination of bhäva, vibhäva and anubhäva is pure, one and
completely restful. Such an experience is called rasa which is nothing
but bliss. For this reason the later writers describe rasa as alaukika which
means supramundanc. Although rasa is one, yet it is subdivided into
eight categories. This is done on the basis of the number of sthäyins or
sentiments which figure supreme in a given combination of bhävas,
vibhäva'^ and anubhävas. Nevertheless rasa is one and pure.
In order to obtain such a supramundanc experience, drama is written
and performed. But what is drama 1 Let us see how the ancient theorj^
answers this. In Indian terminology nälya is the word which designates
the totahty of dramatic compositions. It must be pointed out, however,
that it does not include plays based on nrtya or representational dance.
Bharata defines nätya in the following words : "This very nature of the
world mingled with joy and grief or pleasure and pain is called nä,tya
when it is conveyed by means of diflFerent abhinayas"
According to this definition the experience of the world by itself is
not nätya, it becomes nätya only when it is conveyed to a spectator by
means oi abhinayas.
It is therefore essential to know what abhinaya is. Etymologically the
word abhinaya means "sending forth", in other words an act of com¬
munication or, to specify it more clearlj', it is an act of a performer which
is meant to communicate something. It is neither imitation nor represen¬
tation. It cannot be imitation because the performer or actor does not
know the dramatis personae so as to be able to imitate them. In itself
it cannot be representation either, because it is only a means to represent
somebody else. If abhinaya means an act of sending forth or communic¬
ating something, what does this something mean and to whom is it
communicated ? Thc performer does not intend to send anything to
^ For detailed discussion on this matter seo our "Nätya, Nrtta and Nrtya:
Their Meaning and Belation" 45 ff.
someone who is not wilhng to receive. The one to whom the performer
communicates something is none but the spectator. Rasa is not the
"something" that is meant, since by its nature rasa manifests itself
within and can never be sent or communicated or poured directly into
somebody else's heart. One can communicate only the .sense of such
matters by which, if and when conditions are favourable, rasa may
manifest itself in somebody else's heart. This is to say that abhinaya is
a performer's act which is meant to communicate the .sense of such
matters to thc consciousness of the spectator, which works in him as
vibhäva and anubhäva, required for the manifestation of rasa. Abhinaya
is conditioned or detei'mined by human activity as a whole, the human
activity of everyday life. This fact gives birth to a variety of abhinaya.
From early times India has been accustomed to conceive or to classify
human activity as being operative on three planes, the mental, the vocal
and the bodily. Abhinaya consequently is classified on that same basis.
The performer's act of communication on the mental plane is called
sättvikäbhinaya, on the vocal plane väcikävhinaya and on the bodily
plane ängikäbhinaya. There are certain other things, as for example,
dress, ornaments and so on which do not fall within the sphere of innate
human activities. From the practical point of view, that is to say from
the pomt of view of communication, these are useful in dramatic art,
and so they are considered as a fourth human activity. On this basis a
fourth abhinaya is accepted, namely, ahär yabhinaya. Although ahärya
hterally means borrowed, it practically comes to mean that which is
owned, because it is considered to belong to the innate human activities,
while in fact it does not. These are the four abhinayas by means of which
the everyday experience of the world, the simultaneous experience of
joy and grief is conveyed. *
The experience of life is expressed by every variety or branch of
literature, but in drama it is conveyed by means of abhinayas. Thus
abhinaya characterises drama, in other words, it distinguishes drama
from the other branches of literature. This definition consequently gives
a characteristic of drama as a whole. In a general way everyday expe¬
rience is the basis of any kind of literature, including drama and conse¬
quently it is not in any sense the basis of drama alone. Something else
must be the basis of drama, to which we turn now.
We have seen already that nätya is a collective term. This imphes the
existence of different kinds of plays. In the ancient theory ten kinds of
plays are expounded in detail. Before deahng with these Bharata observes
"vrttayo kävyamätrkäh"^ — the vrttis are the basis of drama. Thus it
1 Ibid., pp. 3—4 and also p. 52. ^ N. S., Cb. 20, p. 220.
is obvious that the vrttis have a great role to play in the field of drama.
By an odd misiuiderstanding later theorists rated them very low.
For a proper understanding of the vrUis in the early theory of drama
a clear knowledge of prakrti (character) is indispensable. Apart from
vrtti we have to take note of another subject namely pravrtti which is
dependent on vrtti. Let us, therefore, examine prakrti, vrtti and pravrtti.
Prakrti just means "character". Practically all the later theorists
classify it into three classes, superior, ordinary and inferior. Obviously
this classification is based on ethics and as such is neither impossible nor
incorrect, but it does not explain what prakrti is. The Nätyasästra has
a chapter entirely devoted to this subject, which, however, offers nothing
but what the later theorists have to say about it. In fact this entire
chapter is a later interpolation.'^ If it is left out, however, there is no
portion of the Nätyasästra especially dealing with prakrti. Still that
does not mean that we are left completely in the dark as to its nature.
Bharata had an unambigious concept of prakrti which we can deduce
from several statements, especially those in connection with rasas.
Abhinavagupta, one ofthe master commentators ofthe Nätyasästra who
lived in the tenth and eleventh centuries, grasps its nature and explains
it while dealing with the importance of the sentiments. Many of the
later theorists may proclaim to be followers of Abhinavagupta, but,
as far as our present information goes, there is only one who really
utilises his explanation of prakrti and that is Hemacandra of the twelfth
century.
We observe persons behaving in a certain way and say that that is
their nature or character. By this we do not mean that the behaviour
itself is the character, but what we mean is that there is a reason which
causes such a person to behave in that particular way. Behaviour is
mostly external and the reason that causes a certain way of behaviour
must lie in the mind itself, otherwise a constant way of conduct would
not be possible. If such a reason lies in the mind that must belong to one
of its theree aspects, viz. cognition, feeling and volition. Among these
cognition cannot directly cause any external manifestation and volition
is a reaction in itself. Consequently the underlaying reason for a given
behaviour must be a feeling or a mood. Even then, many of the moods
themselves are too impermanent to condition a constant way of reaction,
so they must be ruled out. Consequently only those moods which are
called sentiments are left. They are the real causes of a given way of re¬
action. But they are multiple, and that is why we observe many cha¬
racters. A man has not always and at all times one and the same senti-
^ See our "Seven Words in Bharata: What do They Signify", 103 ff.
ment. Anybody can have all the different sentiments according to situ¬
ations as they arise. There would be, however, a sentiment in every one
of us which, although not always coming to the surface, is decisive in
every situation. This means that there is one predominent sentiment in
every one of us. The reason for the predominence of a given sentiment
in a certain person may be, for example, the society in which he is brought
up, some kind of serious disappointment, and so on. Therefore prakrti or
character is not mere sentiment, but it is the predominant sentiment or
according to modern terminology, the master sentiment which con¬
stantly determines one's reactions or behaviour.
Such is prakrti (character) and from this vrtti is born. Literally vrtti
means vyäpära, which is not function, but act or action. That is the
sense it has in dramatic terminology too, but with some qualifications. It
is not the kind of action which is present throughout the plot of a play.
Thc central or main action of a plot is a conscious striving towards a
given goal or result. Such a striving is called kärya, deed in Indian
terminology. This is said to have five stages of development and five
sources. Vrtti has a more general sense, and means an action which will
be present in all the deeds of an individual, but does not aim at a spe¬
cified goal. Vrtti is the characteristic mode of reaction or behaviour, in
other words the reaction or behaviour that is determined by prakrti, the
predominant sentiment which works throughout as the underlying prin¬
ciple. A man in whom anger is the predominant mood, wiU, of course,
react differently to different situations, but in all his reactions there will
be one constant note, viz. crudeness. And this again will predominently
reflect itself in each of the three innate human activities, mental, vocal
and physical. The reason for such a reflection in one of the three innate
human actions lies in the very nature of things. So we see that vrtti is
the characteristic and constant way of reaction of an individual, which,
being directly conditioned by his prakrti, predominently reflects in any
one of the three innate actions.
Vrtti can be classified according to the human activity in which it
reflects. When taken in the strictest sense this would mean only three
categories. The deciding factor here should, however, not be the number
of the spheres of activity alone but also the quality inherent in the sphere.
Thus one must take into account the grace and roughness in the sphere
of physical activity ; these qualities are not so clearly descernible in the
other two spheres. On that basis vrtti falls into four classes. When the
reaction belongs to the mental sphere it is called sättvativrtti, and when
to the vocal sphere it is called bhärativrtti. When it reflects itself in the
physical sphere and it is rough, it is called ärabhativrtti, but when it is
graceful it is caUed kaisikivrtti. Although kaisikivrtti is basically physical.
yet external things as well such as ornaments, dress, etc. should be taken
into consideration in order to explain its nature. Although these are
physical in a sense, yet they are not inborn. The reason why one should
take these external things also into consideration will become clear in our
further discussion.
The Nätyasästra states^ clearly that in the häsya and srngära rasas
the kaisiki, in the vira and adhhiita rasas the sättvati, in the raudra and
bliayaiiaka rasas the ärabhati and in the bhibliatsa and karuva rasas the
bhärati vrtti should be present.
Everything we have discussed about the vrttis and prakrti sofar is in
conformity with this statement. When a given sentiment is active in
one's consciousness, the total behaviour will be determined by that
sentiment. For example one cannot behave very gracefully or show
violent gestures when sorrow is active in one's mind. In such a case
one talks much or one cries and so on. The appropriate iMti in this case
would thus be vocal and accordingly Bharata prescribes the bhärativrtti
in karurjM. In the same way the appropriate action in respect to every
.sentiment is listed in the statement quoted above.
The same principle is rigourously followed in the division of plays,
while fixing the rules which determine the ten kinds of plays. We have
observed previously that vrtti is a mode of action determined by the
sentiment that is predominant in a certain person. In this connection one
might ask how it could be apphed, if, for instance, a play had to be
written with the theme of the love of a cruel person, because the appro¬
priate vrtti for the love-factor would be kaisiki and, according to the
character of such a hero ärabhati would be the proper vrtti. There is no
doubt that vrtti is the mode of reaction determined by the predominant
sentiment, and this is kept in view when the regulations of the diflFerent
plays are laid down. They never could give scope to a contradiction as
envisaged here, as will be clear when one analyses the rules for the
diflFerent plays. If one has to write a play with the theme of the love of
a cruel hero at all, one need not write it in such a way as to make kaisiki
the major vrtti in it. In such a case ärabJiati would be the major vrtti as
is proper in accordance with the character. Bharata says so in plain
words, when he mentions that demons are cruel by nature and even
when they enjoy love they do it barbarously.^ If a given vrtti is stated to
be proper in a certain play, that does not mean that other vrttis are
totally prohibited. It is a matter of predominance, not of exclusion. If
and when the exclusion of a certain vrtti is desirable the Nätyasästra
states it clearly.
1 N. 6., Ch. 22, p. 253. " Ibid., Ch. 6, p. 76.
22 ZDMG UO/2
The classification of plays is made entirely on the basis of vrtti. This
emerges clearly from a critical observation of the characteristics of the
plays as well as from the exphcit statement that the vrttis are the basis
of drama.
Against this great importance atributed to vrtti in ancient theory we
find an almost total neglect of it in later theory. Later authors differ from
one another on their explanations of it and it is not the place to summarise their different views, but it may be said that in the later texts vrtti often
means a kind of verbal composition or a mode of arranging words and
phrases. This process of degradation was already complete by the eighth
century A. D., as we can conclude from a remark by Änandavardhana
directed against the riti sehool of aesthetics as a whole. This does not
mean that Änandavardhana tried to preserve or restore the original
importance of the vrttis, on the contrary, it is clear that he holds the
same deprecating view on the subject of vrtti as some of others. It is dif¬
ficult to make a distinction between riti and vrtti in the later theories.
All the later theorists made a mess of the vrttis, especially of the
bhärativrtti. Later writers mention other things as the basis of the classi¬
fication of plays, at variance with the ancient theory. Even when they
do include vrttis, they do so without attaching any special significance
to them. Modern scholarship does no better, because of its dependence
on the later theories.
There is another matter, in a way dependent on vrtti and somewhat
similar to it, namely pravrtti. Pravrtti is what reveals the common
character of people residing in a given region or geographical unit, but
pravrtti is not the common character itself. The common character of a
given people is revealed in their general behaviour and in things such
as dress, taste, manners, customs ete. Pravrtti is inclusive of all those
which reveal that common character. It is, therefore, nothing but ' 'ethos" .
Like in our own days ancient theorists divided the Indian subconti¬
nent into four sections such as Eastem, Western, Northern and Southern,
and classified pravrtti after these four regions. That of the Southern
region is called däksinätyä, that of thc North päncäli, that of the West
ävanti and, lastly, that of the East odhramägadhi. Bharata asks how it is
possible to say that there are only four pravrttis, when one can detect in¬
numerable ways of life in the different parts. He himself answers the
question in the following words: "It is true that there are innumerable
ways of hfe, yet I classified them only as four on the basis of vrtti, for all
such different ways of life will, after all, reveal it and also it is highly
important in drama. One cannot deny that a certain vrtti or trrttis are
commonly predominant in the life of the people of a certain region. Take
for example the South Indians, they dance, sing and show a predelection
for decoration and delicate gestures. Thus the kaisikivrtti is clearly pre¬
dominant in them. In that same way one can find certain vrttis commonly
predominant in life of the people belongmg to the other regions."i It is
thus clear that here the general mode of life is taken into consideration, with an emphasis on behaviour.
All this again indicates the amount of attention the ancient theory
pays to the character and the behaviour caused by it. Before closing,
two more points connected with such an important subject like vrtti
or behaviour may be mentioned now in way of clarification.
Vrtti and abhinaya are classified on the basis of the innate human ac¬
tions. One can even find greater similarity between kaisikivrtti and the
ahär yabhinaya. The latter consists of external things, hke dress, orna¬
ments etc. and these play an essential part in establishing the former.
Yet there is a fundamental difierence. In the case of latter external
things are considered on the same level as the innate human actions when
in reality they are not. That, however, is not the case with the former
which is, to a great extent, actually based on innate human action,
namely, graceful bodily movement, although the external matters are
also taken as components of it. Thus the former, i. e., kaisikivrtti is
fundamentally an innate human action, while the latter, i. e., ähäry-
äbhinaya is not, but is only considered as one for practical purposes.
Generally speaking both vrtti and abhinaya are based on the three¬
fold human activitj'. In spite of this they are different from each other.
Fundamentally abhirmya belongs to the actor and remains with him for
ever. It can never be an original action of the persons portrayed, whereas
vrtti fundamentally belongs to the persons portrayed and, in their case,
it is real. We see vrtti in the actors too because they are supposed to be
the persons portrayed. Thus vrtti is not real in the actors, originally it
does not belong to them.
Because both vrttis and abhinayas are nothing but human actions a
question may be asked now, whether abhinaya is dependent on and
determined by vrtti or not. Let us put it differently ; suppose in a given
variety of drama sättvativrtti is the major vrtti. The question to be an¬
swered is now, whether in such a play the actor should predominantly use
the sättvikäbhinaya or not. Sättvikäbhinaya is an abhinaya which is con¬
cemed with the sättvikabhävas with which the sättvativrtti has no con¬
nection. As the sättvikabhävas appear in all the rasas, sättvikäbhinaya
may be necessary in a play in which sättvativrtti is the main vrtti, but
for the same reason it will be equally essential in plays in which the
other vrttis are the major ones. Sättvativrtti is a vrtti which is related to
^ Ibid., Ch. 14, p. 165. It is a free translation.
22»
brilliance, dignity and similar qualities and thus it cannot by itself
determine the necessity of sättvikäbhinaya. Again, taking a play in which
kaisiki is the major vrtti. In this case, if the actor just would depend on
ähärya, that is, if he would decorate himself appropriately, that would
not be sufficient. This shows that the individual vrttis and abhinayas do
not correspond to one another and that consequently the abhinayas can
never be determined by the vrttis. We may, however, take a play in
which ärabhati is the major vrtti and consider the problem again. In this
case it would be extremely appropriate if the actor uses the ängikäbhinaya
extensively. Nevertheless, it is clear that we cannot deduce the rule
that such and such an abhinaya should be used if such and such a vrtti
is the major one in the play.
Abhinaya, as mentioned above, is in the main the business of the
actor, but the dramatist should be aware of it while writing the play.
Vrtti, however, is a problem which mainly the dramatist is the person
to tackle. This means that, while composing the play, the dramatist
should see in which way the appropriate behaviour of the dramatis
personae can be effectively revealed.
That is all one can say about these problems and one should not take
a too meticulous view of these matters.
Some of the later theorists indulge in a debate on the question
whether the vrttis belong to drama only, or whether they are applicable
to other branches of literature as well. In fact there is no reason at all in
raising such a question. Bharata, who was expounding drama only, was
not concerned with the question whether the effect to be obtained from
every other kind of literature should be rasa or not. So we do not find any
such discussion in his work. But most of the later theorists, however,
maintain that rasa is the goal of every kind of literature and this insis-
tance is quite reasonable and acceptable. If rasa is the aim of all the
branches of literature, vrtti automatically finds its place there too, be¬
cause it is tho mode of reaction determined by the character (prakrti) of
the individual and without paying attention to character no good piece
of hterature can be produced. The real question here should be that
in which way and to what extent an author must pay attention
to vrtti. In a poem or an epic the most characteristic features are
description and narration and therefore it may not be possible to bring
vrtti to the fore as much and with such direct appeal as in drama. The
beauty of a poem is narration while the beauty of drama is directness.
Basing oneself on this fact, one has to pay attention to vrtti according
to necessity. So far as the application of vrtti is concerned, one needs
not make further distinctions among the different branches of
literature.
Beyond any doubt vrtti plays a very important role in the success of
play writing as well as of play-production. Vrtti in drama should be not
only comprehendable but it should also be intense, otherwise drama
becomes dull, if not meaningless stuflF. The manipulation of vrtti is the
best means of attaining variety and brilhance in drama. It is for that
reason that Bharata states that vrtti is the basis of drama.
Thus the ancient Indian theory takes into consideration action or act
in general and recognises its manifold aspects. Further, it utilises all the
aspects of action in various ways to produce the greatest effect. All these
actions are due to the volitional aspect ofthe mind and by the help of this
volition it aims at attaining an experience which is free of volition, namely, rasa, bliss, the peaceful.
under the Lodi Sultans of India
By Hameed-Ud-Din, Kingston up on Hull
The author is the former lecturer in History at the Punjab University,
Lahore, Pakistan, where he also did his doctoral research on Medieval Indian
History in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. He is now resident
in U. K. and is engaged in completing his work on the political and cultural
study of the later Sultanate period. He is one of the contributors to the forth¬
coming sixth volume of the HISTOBY AND CULTUBE OF THE INDIAN
PEOPLE, The Delhi Sultanate (Bombay).
The present article is based on the original Persian documents which the
author was able to consult in the libraries of U. K. and Western Europe as
well as those of India and Pakistan. His interest in their study has been all
the greater as he also worked for a few years as a lecturer in Persian language and literature after obtaining a Master's degree in the subject from the Delhi University, India.
The Afghan monarchy which Sultan Buhlül Lodi founded in India in
1451 differed fundamentally from the traditional pattern of absolutism
which characterized the Turkish rule in that country. He had frankly
recognized the significance of two factors which limited his authority;
namely, the tribal nature of his compatriots and the circumstances m
which he was placed. Although the freedom-loving Afghans were unac¬
customed to servile obedience to a king, yet those were the people whom
he had invited to share the conquered lands with him as equals while he
retained only the title of the kingi. The political situation in India
necessitated his continued reliance on thera-. The emergence, therefore,
of a feudal fraternitj' in which the nobles held large areas of the country
and were joined together by a community of interest, was the natural
outcome. It was not possible in the changed circumstances to uphold the
principles of absolute government obtaining under the Khaljis and early
1 'Abbäs Sarwäni, "Tubfa-yi-Akbar Shähi" (British Museum) M. S. fol. 3b.
2 The administration of the Sultanate at the time of Buhlül's accession,
had been completely paralysed and royal authority was set at naught by tbe
smallest fief-holders. Buhlül was also upset by the hostility of some nobles of
the previous reign who had secretly invited the Sharqi king of Jaunpur to
invade Delhi. Ni'matuUah "Tärikh-i-Khän Jahäni wa Makhzan-i-Afghäni"
(India Office Library. London) MS. fol. 81., 'Abdullah "Tärikh-i-Dä'üdi"
(Punjab University Library, Lahore, Pakistan) MS. fol. 7b., Nizäm al-Din,
Tahaqät-i-Akbart (Calcutta, 1927), I, 301.
