These distances will be used to construct model patterns of the manifestation of violence at various times and places

Veröffentlichungsreihe des Internationalen Instituts für Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung/Globale Entwicklungen

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin

IIVG/dp 84-106

Some Patterns in

Domestic Violence and Government Change

by

Charles Lewis Taylor

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Associated Member of the IIVG/GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

September 1984

Prepared for the Workshop on the World Handbook III at the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung der Universität zu Köln, June 28-29, 1984

Publication Series of the International Institute for Comparative Social Research/Global Developments

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Steinplatz 2, D-1000 Berlin 12

len Instituts für Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung/

Globale Entwicklungen.

The views expressed in this paper are.those of the author and not necessarily those of the International Institute for Comparative Social Research/Global Developments.

A great deal of attention has been given to the conditions under which people choose violence over other forms of political

communication, but rather few robust findings have been discovered thus far. This paper describes an attempt to discover patterns among forms of domestic violence and to relate these patterns to specific economic and social conditions. It represents a radical departure from other violence studies in that it begins with distances between pairs of events rather than aggregations of events within time periods. These distances will be used to construct model patterns of the manifestation of violence at

various times and places. Finally, social and economic character­

istics of these countries and periods will be sought.

Z USAMMENFAS SUNG

Den Bedingungen, unter denen Menschen bereit sind, Gewalt allen anderen politischen Kommunikationsformen vorzuziehen, wurde bis­

her in der Forschung beträchtliche Aufmerksamkeit zuteil. Aber nur wenige robuste Ergebnisse wurden bis heute erzielt. In diesem Papier wird der Versuch unternommen, Regelmäßigkeiten bei der Anwendung innenpolitischer Gewalt aufzufinden und diese Muster mit den spezifischen ökonomischen und sozialen Bedingungen in

Zusammenhang zu bringen. Es bedeutet eine wesentliche Abkehr von anderen Studien über Gewalt insofern, als es bei den Ab­

ständen zwischen Ereignispaaren ansetzt und nicht bei der Aggre­

gation von Ereignishäufigkeiten über eine Zeitperiode. Mit Hilfe der Abstände sollen modellhafte Muster des Auftretens von Gewalt zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten und an verschiedenen Orten entwickelt werden. Schließlich werden die sozialen und ökonomischen Charak­

teristika dieser Länder und Zeitperioden erhoben.

Political Violence as Political Communication

Political violence has often been analyzed as a means for arti­

culating interests (Almond, 1960; Huntington, 1968; Graham and Gurr, 1969; Taylor, 1963). It has been seen as a mechanism that is used by people who are without the tools for more "normal", more "efficient”, and more"pleasant" political conflict. These people resort to physical force in order to have a say in the

decisions that govern their lives. Edmund Burke wrote in 1770 that when "popular discontents" were very prevalent in a society,

something could be "found amiss in the constitution, or the conduct of the government" (Burke, 1866). Burke’s assumption, of course, was that right government when properly administered would take care of all the legitimate interests of all the

members of a society. Protests, including violent protests, would not be required in such a society. Many cross-national

studies of violence have concentrated on attempting to distin­

guish between societies in which violence was considered ne­

cessary and those -in which it was not.

One does not have to share Burke’s confidence in the poten­

tialities of the elites to believe that individuals or groups do use violence as a means to communicate their needs and their desires. They indeed may use a breakdown in good government as reason to protest, to be civilly disobedient, and to use uncon­

ventional or unorthodox political means to attempt a change in policy or in leadership or to attempt a replacement of regime

(Coser, 1956; Deutsch, 1961; Gurr, 1968; Kaase, 1976). Political violence in this sense is violence that in one way or another makes demands; i.e. it asks something of those in power. It may be tactical violence, arising out of well articulated demands, carefully constructed plans of attack, and clear-cut notions of what the activity is supposed to accomplish, or it may be spon­

taneous violence, with only diffuse perceptions of goals, dis­

organized structures if any at all, and unclear understandings of exactly how violence can be used as a means for attainment.

It may ask for some simple change of policy or it may demand nothing less than a change in the regime itself. In whatever way it is organized and for whatever purpose, violence can be analyzed as a statement made by people to those in power.

This emphasis has been criticized as reflecting a statist or status quo tendency within the political science community. It is too much a "view from the top" (Gurr, 1974). It seems to posit the primary benignancy of government which occasionally has to be nudged to remind it of its duties and very occasionally has to be replaced by a government that will resume the normal benignancy. Violence all too often is the name given to what the masses do; elite "responses" are santions that are somehow not so violent. The latter are generally assumed to be a legi­

timate means for maintaining order within a society.

Other approaches, however, have stressed the predilection of governments themselves toward violence. Max Weber noted the monopoly of legal violence held by the state. The state, he

argued, relates some people to other people in terms of authority based upon the actual use or the treatened use of violence

(Weber, 1947). The state maintains order but with a purpose and this purpose is closely associated with a particular di­

stribution of goods for the society. This distribution may be more or it may be less just. The state's use or threatened use of violence may be justified or condemned on the basis of a variety of value systems. But what is of primary interest here is that violence is also a means by which governments communi- ate with their populations.

Weber concentrates upon physical force as the focus of violence.

Johan Galtung (1964) defines violence much more broadly. He writes of structural violence, i.e., violence in which no actor commits a violent act personally or directly, but which occurs whenever a reduction in the gap between potential and actuality is prevented.- In the normal course of governing, these happen

more or less frequently depending upon the type of political system

Galtung's assumption is that government, if not necessarily harmful to the legitimate interests of many members of society, will at least tend in this direction. Therefore, governments are primary sources of violence within societies.

This notion of violence comes very close to being one of social injustice. Justice is a concept of overwhelming importance, but this broadening of the term violence to include it may do more to obscure than to enlighten. The threatened or actual use of physical force is one means by which injustice may be perpetuated Physical force may also be used by governments to enhance social justice when it is threatened by some group within the society.

If most recent American studies of violence assume the government to be benign, Galtung would assume it to be basically evil. Per­

haps it is possible to begin with neither assumption.

Nevertheless, Galtung's analysis does point to a major problem for empirical studies of violence. Repression is not simply the sum of all observable sanctions taken by a government against its population. The most repressive government may be one which has to do very little to maintain its power in an unquestioned manner. Actual behaviors can be measured as sanctions, but non­

behavior is a great deal more difficult to analyze empirically.

Raymond Duvall and Michal Shamir (1980) have made some progress on this problem by regressing government sanctions multiplica- tively on rebellion (or internal war) and turmoil (riots and demonstrations). The residuals from this regression are inter­

preted as the repressive dispositions of the individual govern­

ments; i.e., governments are said to overreact or underreact to the threats particular to them by specified amounts. It is necessary to find, in this and other ways, more "static" measure­

ments of government sanctions or,in other words, better measure­

ments of threatened violence by governments against their popul­

ations. These unstated messages are also important parts of the communication between government and people.

Thus far, it appears that there are only two speakers .. the

government and the people .. involved in dialogue with each other. Nothing could be further from the truth. Neither govern­

ment nor population are homogeneous bodies acting with single wills. Groups within the population are constantly conveying messages to each other and sometimes these are done by violent means. Some parts of the elite are speaking to some parts of

the population. And members of the elite may very well be speaking to each other. (The classic coup d'etat is a case in point).

The Fickleness of Political Violence

Political violence then can be used for communication in many directions and for many messages. But it is only one form of political communication and a relatively infrequently used one at that. Even in the most violent of societies, other forms of communication are more actively pursued most of the time. Under what conditions do people choose violence over other forms?

A great deal of attention has been given to this question, but few robust findings have been discovered. This is at least in part because of the nature of the variables and their measure­

ment. Gross national product or the percentage of votes going to socialist parties are^rather consistent indicators over time as compared with political violence indicators. The gross national product for a country will tend to increase (or decrease) a little each year but prior values are good predictors for future years.

Electoral votes over time are somewhat less consistent, but they are also much less erratic than the incidence of riots or

assassinations or coups d'etat. Political violence has a dis­

concerting way of suddenly beginning and of suddenly ending.

Without warning .. at least of any type that we know how to read . a previously peaceful country may become a very violent one

and one filled with violence may become peaceful. Violence tapers upwards and downwards too, but few other cross-national indicators can so completely and quickly shift as the violence indicators.

One can, of course, consider an important intervening variable

that indeed must be taken into account in any comprehensive study of domestic political violence. That is perceptions. It is more the perception of the need for violence rather than some objective need that brings about communication in this mode. Actual unjust violence by the elites has sometimes pro­

voked violent popular response and sometimes it has not; and the distinguishing characteristic here has not always been the estimated likelihood of success. But this only begs the question; under what conditions do people perceive the need to choose violence over other forms of political communication?

Perhaps the causes of violence might be best sought on two levels: (1) what makes violence more likely at one time and in one place than -elsewhere? and (2) what actually turns it on and off? Proper to the first question is the analysis of economic, cultural, demographic, and social variables that have playöd a prominent role in previous analyses. But if the second set of factors, the ones that actually turn it on and off, affect the presence or absence of the dependent variable then these studies-are not likely to get very far by themselves.

The second question is more likely to be answered in the inter­

relationships of actual events of violence within and among countries. If there are patterns among types of violence or generalizable sequences of events, it may be possible to under­

stand more of what brings and what ends violent periods within a country's domestic politics.

It has been argued persuasively that violence feeds upon itself so that countries with histories of internal violence are more likely to experience further violence in the future than are countries that have had internal peace (Hibbs, 1973). The re­

lationships found when comparing one decade of data with a second were reasonably strong. Yet, even in countries with large amounts of domestic violence, events tend to be bunched in time (Taylor and Jodice, 1983). During the 30 years for which data are plotted in the World Handbook of Political and -Social Indicators, an

amazing number of countries switched from peaceful to violent,

or from violent to peaceful, or occasionally both ways. All other things being equal, perhaps a peaceful period will tend to remain peaceful and a violent period will continue violent.

It also appears that the original source of violence makes little difference to this time serial relationship. Violent governmental activity appears to further future violence both by the government itself and by popular groups. Likewise turmoil and internal war in the society calls forth more physical re­

pression from the government which in turn probably encourages greater violence among the population (Tilly, 1975; Lichbach,

1983). But all things do not remain equal. Violence does not in fact continue upward in a never ending spiral; nor are

peaceful societies forever immune from political violence. The question of what causes the turn around is still with us.

One possible answer may be available through contagion models.

Violence can be hypothesized to spread from country to country by way of imitation or diffusion similar to the spread of a contagious disease. In a tentative analysis, Hamilton and Hamilton (1983) estimate parameters for a class of stochastic

models of social contagion using data on terrorism. They have some success in identifying a reversal of contagion in some countries.

This line of analysis may pro ■ye fruitful in identifying at least some of the beginnings and endings of violent periods within countries, although its usefulness would seem to be greater for very internationally visible forms of violence such as terrorism than for other, more domestic forms. In any event, the question remains as to which countries at what times are susceptible to contagion and which and when not.

Patterns of Political Violence

Possibly the most useful way to examine the timing of domestic political violence is to look carefully at the patterns of violence that manifest- themselves at various times and places

and then to ask what characterizes these particular periods and countries. This approach is similar to that followed by Hibbs (1973). Some significant differences, however, will be given later in this paper.

Using simultaneous equations to work out the causal relationships among collective protest, internal war, negative government

sanctions, coups d'etat, and a number of economic, political, ethnic, and social variables, Hibbs analyzed aggregated versions of the World Handbook domestic political events dataset. For each country and for each event series, he calculated two scores:

one aggregate total for 1948-1957 and a second for 1958-1967.

His primary concern was to investigate the interrelationships among the four violence variables during the second decade, but he also included lagged variables of a similar nature from the first decade along with the non-event variables in the model.

Path coefficients did indeed show that most of the strongest relationships were found among the four second decade violence variables. There were strong reciprocal relationships between collective protests and negative sanctions and between internal war and negative sanctions. Governments do respond to mass vio­

lence and people respond to government sanctions. Hibbs observes that the dominant causal sequence that indirectly relates

these three is that collective protest is met by sanctions which in turn produce an escalated response of internal war. Coups d'etat are spurred on in part by internal war and they also give rise to greater negative sanctions. In fact, the three can be placed into a sequence of relationships of positive feedback.

Hibbs argues that internal war presents conditions in which praetorian takeover is more likely which gives rise to greater

sanctions to contain insurgency. In the short term at least, these sanctions provoke more violence although in the long term they may deter outbreaks of internal war. Collective protest may also begin this cycle by provoking sanctions which in turn bring internal war as noted above. Hibbs, however, found no direct causal reciprocity between collective protest and coups d 'etat.

*

Negative sanctions in the first decade are negatively related to internal war in the second. Hibbs takes this as evidence for his observation that sanctions may deter internal war in the long term. Internal war in the first decade predicts internal war in the second; so also do coups predict coups. High col­

lective protest in the first decade, however, did not increase high protest in the second. Hibbs states that this is an argument against the "culture of violence" hypothesis. Perhaps. But

decades are too rough a time division for this kind of observation.

If the analysis earlier in this paper is correct, one should not expect the beginnings and endings of violent periods to be spread exactly over two decades or even for violence to be randomly spread throughout the period.

A somewhat similar causal model has been developed more recently by Ted Gurr and Mark Lichbach (1982). This model is based upon the theory (1) that the extent of political conflict is a function of popular discontent, popular dispositions toward conflict,

and the balance between the organizational strength of the govern­

ment and the organizational strength of its challengers and (2) that the intensity of conflict is a function Of its extent, the disposition of elites to engage in conflict, and the organizational strength of the regime. Endogenous variables include extent of

protest (number of people involved times the duration), extent of rebellion, intensity of protest (number of resulting deaths), intensity of rebellion, external support of dissidents, and external support for the regime. Exogenous variables include regime democracy, regime organizational strength, dissident organizational strength both for protest and for rebellion, differences between regime strength and dissident strengths, strain (persisting structural barriers) times dispositions to conflict, and stress (short term obstacles) times dispositions to conflict. Data were aggregated over a five year period from 1961-1965. The equations for rebellion produce an excellent

fit for the data although those for protest do less well. Neither, however,was successful in predicting violence for the 1971-1975 period.

Gurr's and Lichbach's model does not deal as directly with the interactions of violence as does Hibb's model, although they do include some notion of how much people can get by with or not. Their model is still based in many ways on the idea that people riot when they are inclined to and think that they can be successful. How intense it all becomes depends upon the elites' willingness and ability to respond. Violence in this model is driven essentially by popular choice, not by the govern ment. The Hibbs model is more compatible with the notion stated above that violence within a society is an interaction among elite and popular groups and that the most immediate causes of violence are the current activities of others. All other variables become contextual.

A New Approach

The problem with both models is that the interesting relation­

ships are too close in time sequence to be found with such gross aggregations. Intricate patterns of events are covered over. Smaller aggregations with shorter time spans, on the other hand, suffer from too many empty cells. That is, on most days in most countries of the world relatively little violent activity is underway. .But then why should expected relation­

ships fit within prearranged serial categories of any kind?

It is possible and highly relevant to the discussion of this paper to analyze the distances between events. It is possible to have series that cover the entire 30 year period of the i/ew World Handbook but which give almost infinite possibilities

for dividing the time as needed.

There are some technical difficulties, of course. Events may

"overlap" each other. Those occuring on the same day get a distance from each other of zero. This procedure makes the assumption that distances of less than 24 hours are of no con­

sequence. This is unlikely to be true, but measurement error

would in no case allow distinctiongthat are finer than that.

Events of a duration of more than one day must be measured from their ending dates. Additional events may begin between the beginning and ending dates of an event. These events must also be considered simultaneous.

Distances are first measured within countries between pairs of like events; i.e., the distance from the first riot to the second, the second to the third, et cetera, are calculated.

Then distances from certain types of events to other types of events are determined.For some purposes,straight forward sub­

tractions of sequential dates are sufficient. For others, it is of more interest to examine the distances between concen­

trations of one event type and events of a different tyoe. If ,concen trations of armed attacks by insurgents are generally a prelude

to irregular government charges under some circumstances, then the distance of interest is the one from some point in the con­

centration to the governmental change event. It is also important to look at distances from concentrations of one event type to concentrations of other event types. For example, in testing the hypothesized pattern that peaceful demonstrations often give way to riots which lead to government sanctions that bring on armed attacks by insurgents countered by armed attacks by government forces culminating sometimes in coups d'etat, it is necessary to examine the relationships of clusters of events.

Underlying the whole project is the idea that it is the spacing of violence events over time and not the levels of violence

that is important for explanation. Consistent levels of violence, whether high or low, are thought not to bring other charges.

It is the movement away from the usual, the change from what­

ever state of affairs that has attained, that is expected to be significant. This does not mean that extent and intensity of

violence are irrelevant. Intensity when defined as the numer of deaths in domestic political violence can be treated as other event types insofar as the reporting of data will allow. The duration component of extent is addressed above, but participation com­the ponent will probably have to be managed qualitatively.

With the 'hew" data derived from the old, it is possible to re­

examine Hibbs' hypothesis that collective protests give rise to- sanctions which give rise to internal war. It is possible to answer directly questions of how much and when do people respond to government sanctions and how much and when do govern­

ments respond to the people's activities. It is in fact possible to do much better with the steps along the way from peaceful

protest to internal war at least for the last ten years for which the appropriate dataset is available. It is also possible to

deal with some problems which Hibbs was not able to manage.

He speculated that negative sanctions reduced internal war in the long sum but he had no explanation for deescalation of vio­

lence in general. It should be possible to study the reduction of violence as the reverse process of its increase. Hibbs also found a much greater government response to collective protest than to internal war. Governments respond to the latter not essentially by censorship and curfews but by more armed attacks on their part. This misinterpretation of the data series can be cleared up. Finally, it is possible to look at the inter­

relationships of collective protests, sanctions, and regular

government change. If protest is perceived by elites as essential­

ly non-threatening to the regime, as it certainly is in some places,then one can expect not the escalation to internal war but rather a pattern leading to government change by peaceful means.

It is also possible to reexamine the feedback loop found by

Hibbs relating internal war, coups d'etat, and. negative government sanctions. Again, the short term relationships can be identified.

A parallel feedback loop with regular government can also be sought. Success is less likely here than with collective protest since in the latter governing elites might be said to be responding to messages from the population for change within the structure of the regime, but in the former the question of who will control and shape the regime is at stake. Attention must be given in any event to the kinds of irregular government changes that take place. One can assume there will be differences in the relation­

ships for classic coups and for revolutionary changes.

Once the patternsof violence have been identified, the contextual variables come into play. Sometimes there will be sequences

of events that escalate violence from protest to coups d'etat.

Sometimes this escalation will get underway but for some reason will come to a halt or will reverse itself. In some places, collective protest reoccurs occasionally but without further violent consequences. Sometimes the cycle of internal war, coups d'etat and negative sanctions continues throughout several

changes of government. At other times it suddenly stops short.

The question in all of this then is why does violence follow one pattern in some places at some times but follows another pattern in others?

At this point the political, economic, social, and cultural context must be considered. The political is probably the most important. Some variable such as regime type (liberal democratic, communist, military junta, etc.) will be needed to get at the openness of the political decision making process within a society. A political rights index might serve as alternative.

How likely is it that the governing elite will listen to protests More specific information is needed for sub-groups, however.

Group discrimination will identify those countries which have open systems for the majority but which provide much fewer possibilities for a group against which it discriminates. The group can follow a different pattern of violence than that ex­

pected within the country as a whole. Political institutionali­

zation, i.e., the degree to which the population accepts the regime as legitimate, should work toward keeping violence within bounds, whatever the regime type. Political separatism, i.e., the degree to which some parts of the population wish to break away from the political system, will tend to promote the fre­

quency of violence, whatever the regime type. The political

variables will need to be coded for specific parts of the 30 year period. Changes in them can be quickly reflected in the patterns of political violence.

The level of economic development, like political democracy,

has not been found to be highly related to the levels of violence but the question here is a different one. Does gross national product per capita distinguish a protest oriented violence from violence oriented to internal war? Less work has been done with income distribution. It is likely that this is not highly related to levels of violence either, but i t may be helpful in distin­

guishing patterns of violence, especially when it is considered in conjunction with social mobilization and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.

The greater the degree of social mobilization the more likely the violence will fit a protest pattern if the regime type is an open one. The more likely the violence will go to internal war if social mobilization is high in a more closed system.

Ethno-linguistic fractionalization will be of relatively little importance unless political separation, group discrimination, . and income inequality are high. In that case it will contribute

to greater internal wars in the patterns of violence.

One final factor might be called the praetorian predisposition.

It seems almost like a fudge factor except that there really does seem to be greater willingness in some countries to let the military have its way than in others. This one requires a great deal of further thought both with regard to its meaning and to its measurement.

Empirical Analysis

Unfortunately, this workshop comes a little too early in the life of this project for a large number of empirical results. Some of the ideas have been tried with the dataset and the experience is encouraging. In a tentative effort to locate concentrations of peaceful protests (non-violent gathering of people to protest), riots (violent disturbance with little organization), and events of internal war (armed attacks by insurgents or government and

assassinations), distances were measured from the last date of one event to the first date of the next. The mean and standard deviation of these distances were calculated for each series

and for each country. Events were selected which followed closely enough on previous events to meet the following criterion:

o < distance < * - —

That is, distances had to be above zero, of course, but they also had to be less than one-third of a standard deviation below the mean (lower side only). This was a rough attempt to identify clusters of events and it did not work in every case.

In some countries even one-third of a standard deviation was still greater than the difference between zero and the mean.

These were excluded from the analysis for the moment.

Next irregular government transfers (changes in the governing executive by means other than those regularly constituted at. the time of the change) or unsuccessful attempts at such transfers were identified which took place within 28 days of any of the clustered events. The purpose was to find out the extent to which event clusters could predict irregular change. This is, of course, only a small part of the interests stated previously in this paper, but it serves to illustrate how the empirical work can get underway.

Of 151 countries in the dataset, 64 had neither successful nor unsuccessful attempts at irregular government change. They are excluded from the analysis for the moment. For another 22

countries, one third of the standard deviation was larger than the mean for internal war. This left 65 countries for analysis of the time serial relationship between internal war and irre­

gular government change. Clusters of internal war in these

countries predicted irregular changes in government in 42 of the countries for a total of 30 per cent of their changes. Peaceful protests predicted irregular changes in 38 countries (of a

possible 85 for which data could be calculated and in which irregular changes occured). These predictions accounted for

21 per cent of the changes in these countries. Riots, on the other hand, predicted irregular changes in only 26 countries

(of a possible 84) for only 14 per cent of their total. Tumultuous violence seems not to be part of the pattern toward coups d ’etat.

Perhaps they are not sufficiently organized to present a threat to the regime. -Peaceful protests do a somewhat better job at prediction. Sometimes, as Hibbs suggests, elites may attempt to protect themselves against popular desires or they may on occasion be responding to these desires. Not surprisingly, of course, internal war is the best of the predictors and this fact is consistent with the theory proposed above.

Also consistent with the theory is the fact that demonstrations predict irregular changes in Europe much better than in the rest of the world. See Table 1. Interestingly internal war predicts irregular changes in Latin America and Europe better than in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. This is clearly a matter for further investigation.

These empirical examples are given only to indicate the direction in which the analysis will proceed. Several technical problems of measurement have yet to be solved and the mathematical model has yet to be specified. Therefore, these results must be taken as tentative only.

PERCENTAGE OF IRREGULAR GOVERNMENT CHANGES

EXPLAINED BY INTERNAL WAR, PEACEFUL PROTESTS, AND RIOTS

Internal War Peaceful Protests Riots

Latin America 35 10 5

Europe 30 38 6

Africa 22 13 7

Middle East .14 16 2

Asia 11 18 7

Note: The percentages above are somewhat understated because the deno minator represents all irregular changes that took place in the region but the numerator represents successful predictions only from the countries which were available for analysis. If the alternative calculations are made and the percentages over­

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